"Standing is jurisdictional in nature and [c]onsequently, standing is a threshold issue that must be addressed, and found to exist, before the merits of [the] case are judicially resolved." In re T.M., 182 N.C. App. 566, 570, 643 S.E.2d 471, 474 (citation and quotation marks omitted), aff'd per curiam, 361 N.C. 683, 651 S.E.2d 884 (2007). It is Respondent's burden to show standing.

Furthermore, the record demonstrates that Respondent-Father received proper notice of the petitions to terminate his parental rights, and his trial counsel was personally notified of the change in hearing date and voiced no opposition. See In re T.M. , 182 N.C. App. 566, 572, 643 S.E.2d 471, 475–76, aff'd , 361 N.C. 683, 651 S.E.2d 884 (2007) ("the knowledge of an attorney is imputed to her client" (citation omitted)).Respondent-Father was represented by counsel throughout the termination hearing proceedings.

Indeed, after a thorough and in-depth examination of the entire record and transcript it is readily apparent that there is no indication that this document was ever presented to or reviewed by the trial court at all. While this Court has stated that "absent a showing of prejudice, failure to comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1104(5) does not deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction[,]" In re T.M., 182 N.C. App. 566, 571, 643 S.E.2d 471, 475, aff'd per curiam, 361 N.C. 683, 651 S.E.2d 884 (2007), we have also consistently maintained that where "the omission of [a] custody order from [a] petition is never remedied by amendment of the petition or later production of the order, the trial court never obtain[s] subject matter jurisdiction." In re T.B., J.B., C.B., 177 N.C. App. 790, 793, 629 S.E.2d 895, 898 (2006).

“Standing is jurisdictional in nature and ‘[c]onsequently, standing is a threshold issue that must be addressed, and found to exist, before the merits of [the] case are judicially resolved.’ ” In re T.M., 182 N.C.App. 566, 570, 643 S.E.2d 471, 474 (quoting In re Miller, 162 N.C.App. 355, 357, 590 S.E.2d 864, 865 (2004) ), aff'd per curiam, 361 N.C. 683, 651 S.E.2d 884 (2007). “As the party invoking jurisdiction, [J.C. has] the burden of proving the elements of standing.”

In In re T.M., we held that a similar omission was not prejudicial, because there was no indication that the mother was unaware of the minor child's placement at any point during the case. In re T.M., 182 N.C.App. 566, 572, 643 S.E.2d 471, 475,aff'd per curiam,361 N.C. 683, 651 S.E.2d 884 (2007). The information contained in the petition adequately advised father of the location of both mother and N.A.R.

Accordingly, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that termination of respondent's parental rights was in Kevin's best interests. See In re T.M., 182 N.C.App. 566, 577, 643 S.E.2d 471, 478 (upholding best interests determination where the trial court found foster parents would be good candidates to adopt the juvenile), aff'd per curiam,361 N.C. 683, 651 S.E.2d 884 (2007). This argument is overruled.

Respondent also failed to show any prejudice in light of the trial court's finding that she has failed to have any visitation with the child since 2007. See In re C.L.C., 171 N.C. App. at 445, 615 S.E.2d at 708; In Re T.M., 182 N.C. App. 566, 574, 643 S.E.2d 471, 476, aff'd per curiam, 361 N.C. 683, 651 S.E.2d 884 (2007). Moreover, respondent benefitted from any delay, because it provided her with additional time to comply with her case plan. Respondent, however, failed to take advantage of this delay.

Requiring respondent father to proceed with both attorneys protected his rights while also recognizing the "importance this state places on resolving these cases as quickly as possible to ensure our legal system is serving the best interests of the children." In re T.M., 182 N.C. App. 566, 575, 643 S.E.2d 471, 477, aff'd per curiam, 361 N.C. 683, 651 S.E.2d 884 (2007). Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion.

DSS did not, however, file the TPR petition until 8 May 2008. In In re T.M., 182 N.C. App. 566, 574, 643 S.E.2d 471, 476 (quoting In re B.M., M.M., An.M., Al.M., 168 N.C. App. 350, 354, 607 S.E.2d 698, 701 (2005)), aff'd percuriam, 361 N.C. 683, 651 S.E.2d 884 (2007), this Court explained that "the time limitation specified by [N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-907(e)] `is directory rather than mandatory and thus, not jurisdictional.'" Thus, when an appellant has demonstrated that DSS failed to timely file a TPR petition under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-907(e), the Court must "assess whether prejudice has been shown to the parties" as a result.

" ‘ Standing is jurisdictional in nature and " [c]onsequently, standing is a threshold issue that must be addressed, and found to exist, before the merits of [the] case are judicially resolved." ’ " In re T.M., 182 N.C.App. 566, 570, 643 S.E.2d 471, 474 (quoting In re Miller, 162 N.C.App. 355, 357, 590 S.E.2d 864, 865 (2004)), aff'd, 361 N.C. 683, 651 S.E.2d 884 (2007). " As the party invoking jurisdiction, plaintiff [ ] ha[s] the burden of proving the elements of standing."