Respondent maintains that the court's order amounted to ordering a specific placement for which the trial court lacked the statutory authority. In support of his argument, respondent relies on In re Chiara C., 279 Ill. App. 3d 761 (1996), and In re T.L.C., 285 Ill. App. 3d 922 (1966). ¶ 18 In In re Chiara C., an emergency motion to change placement was filed on behalf of Chiara, who was in the guardianship of DCFS and placed in the custody of an aunt.

"We recognize that the court can generally split the guardianship and custody of a minor." In re T.L.C., 285 Ill. App. 3d 922,926, 675 N.E.2d 228, 230 (1996); see also 705 ILCS 405/2-23(1)(c) (West 2016); In re E.L., 353 Ill. App. 3d 894, 898, 819 N.E.2d 1191, 1194 (2004); In re M.P., 408 Ill App. 3d 1070, 1074, 945 N.E.2d 1197, 1200 (2011).

Moreover, our courts have recognized that the trial court can generally split the guardianship and custody of a minor. In re T.L.C., 285 Ill. App. 3d 922, 675 N.E.2d 228 (1996). So long as custody remains with the respondent, we can perceive no error in also granting guardian-ship with DCFS. Cf. T.L.C., 285 Ill. App. 3d 922, 675 N.E.2d 228 (when guardianship and placement of child are placed with DCFS, the trial court may not dictate exactly where custody must be placed).

(Reply at 1 n.1 (citing La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2020)).) 1. Illinois Relying on Laughlin v. Evanston Hosp., 550 N.E.2d 986, 993 (Ill. 1990) and Gaebler v. N.M. Potash Corp., 675 N.E.2d 228, 230 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996), Amex argues that Plaintiffs' consumer protection claim under Illinois law must be dismissed because the claim improperly "regurgitates their alleged antitrust injury." (Mem. at 19.)

Accordingly, the parties' only disputes as to whether Plaintiffs may proceed with their consumer protection claims concern the laws of Illinois and Massachusetts. 1. Illinois Relying on Laughlin v. Evanston Hosp., 550 N.E.2d 986, 993 (Ill. 1990) and Gaebler v. N.M. Potash Corp., 675 N.E.2d 228, 230 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996), Amex argues that Plaintiffs' consumer protection claim under Illinois law must be dismissed because the claim improperly "regurgitates their alleged antitrust injury." (Mem. at 19.)

In re R.M., 288 Ill.App.3d 811 (1997) (juvenile court lacked authority to order removal and specific placement of the minor); In re M.V., 288 Ill.App.3d 300 (1997) (the court has authority only under section 1-5-(2)(6) to order a specific placement); In re T.L.C., 285 Ill.App.3d 922 (1996) (court concluded that when guardianship is placed with DCFS, there is no statutory authority permitting the court to dictate to DCFS exactly where custody must be placed).

When a minor is placed pursuant to section 2-27 of the Act, the trial court "may choose only among the dispositional alternatives provided in the statute and 'may not exceed [its] statutory authority no matter how desirable or beneficial the attempted innovation might be.'" In re P.F., 265 Ill.App.3d 1092, 1104 (1994) (quoting In re Peak, 59 Ill.App.3d 548, 551-52 (1978)). ¶ 32 We find In re T.L.C., 285 Ill.App.3d 922, 924 (1996), instructive. There, the trial court appointed the guardianship administrator of DCFS as the minor's "guardian with power to place."

During the permanency phase, the circuit court cannot order a specific placement of V.M.-L. with anyone, including respondent's brother. See In re B.S., 2021 IL App (5th) 200039, ¶ 31 (citing Inre M.V., 288 Ill.App.3d 300, 306 (1997) (section 2-28(2) precludes the juvenile court from ordering specific placements "after DCFS has been appointed guardian of the minor"); In re T.L.C., 285 Ill.App.3d 922, 926-27 (1996) (juvenile court cannot order specific placement of a minor when DCFS is granted guardianship in a dispositional order)). We will not order the circuit court to do something it has no authority to do, so we cannot grant the relief that respondent seeks.

This language means that if the court is dissatisfied with the services in a permanency plan, the court "is required to make specific findings and to remand the matter to DCFS for its further consideration." In re Chiara C, 279 Ill.App.3d 761, 766 (1996); see also In re T.L.C., 285 Ill.App.3d 922, 929 (1996) (Juvenile Court Act allows "DCFS, operating under a plan, to make placement decisions with the safeguard being that the placements are subject to disapproval and required reconsideration by the circuit court"). Section 2-28(2.5) provides essentially the same thing in the context of placement, as opposed to services.

The courts have repeatedly interpreted these provisions as applying to either dispositional orders, under section 2-23(3), or orders related to permanency hearings, under section 2-28(2). See In re Chiara C., 279 Ill. App. 3d 761, 765-66, 768 (1996) (juvenile court is disempowered from ordering specific services following a dispositional hearing under section 2-23(3), or following a permanency review hearing or its equivalent under section 2-28(2), and finding that section 2-10 governing temporary custody orders is inapplicable to permanency review hearings); In re T.L.C., 285 Ill. App. 3d 922, 926-27 (1996) (under sections 2-23(3), the juvenile court cannot order specific placement of a minor when DCFS is granted guardianship in a dispositional order); In re M.V., 288 Ill. App. 3d 300, 306 (1997) (noting sections 2-23(3) and 2-28(2) specifically preclude the juvenile court from ordering specific placements "after DCFS has been appointed guardian of the minor"); In re A.L., 294 Ill. App. 3d 441, 446-47 (1998) (in a permanency review hearing, the juvenile court can, under sections 2-23(3) and 2-28(2), order DCFS to remove a minor from a foster care placement and to select another so long as the court does not select the new placement). ¶ 32 At the adjudicatory hearing, the court determines whether the minor is abused, neglected, or dependent, as demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(1), 1-3(1) (West 2018); In re A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 19.