Opinion
776 WDA 2023 J-S41032-23
01-10-2024
IN THE INTEREST OF: T.L., A MINOR APPEAL OF: L.B., MOTHER
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered May 29, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000003-2023.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. [*]
MEMORANDUM
STEVENS, P.J.E.
L.B. ("Mother") appeals from the May 29, 2023, order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, which involuntarily terminated her parental rights to her son, T.L. ("Child"), born in August of 2013. Upon review, we affirm.
The orphans' court also involuntarily terminated the parental rights of T.J.L., Sr. ("Father"); however, Father did not file an appeal.
The orphans' court set forth the following relevant facts and procedural history:
The Office of Children, Youth and Families ("CYF") first became involved with the family in 2018, due to concerns regarding Mother's mental health, substance abuse history, and the cleanliness conditions in her home. [See N.T., 5/15/23,] at 33. CYF obtained an Emergency Custody Authorization ("ECA"), and Child was initially removed from Mother's care on
October 10, 2018. Id. at 34. At that time, court-ordered goals for reunification were completing mental health treatment, addressing the deplorable conditions of Mother's house, and maintaining no contact between Child and Mother's live-in paramour, [J.D.].3 Id. Child was adjudicated dependent…on November 19, 2018. Id. The case was closed on November 2, 2020, when the goal for Child was changed to permanent legal custody ("PLC") with Child's caregiver[, L.M.].4 Id.
Mother filed a PLC modification on June 25, 2021, due to the previous caregiver having an illness and no longer being able to care for Child. Id. at 35. CYF obtained a second ECA for Child on July 6, 2021, after determining that Child could not return to Mother due to the continued concerns that existed from the first ECA in 2018. Id. Following a shelter hearing, the court placed Child with [R.T.] and [J.T.] ("foster parents") on July 6, 2021.5 Id. at 36. On September 13, 2021, the court adjudicated Child dependent…for the second time since 2018. Id.
3[J.D.] has a history of providing alcohol to minors and a sex offense for voyeurism. [Id.] at 42, 69.
4[L.M.] is a [personal] connection of Mother who was willing and able to care for [Child] for a time.
5Child has remained in the care of his foster parents since July 6, 2021.Orphans' Court Opinion ("O.C.O."), 8/8/23, at 2-3 (unpaginated) (cleaned up) (footnotes in original).
Additionally, the record reveals that Mother has a history of having multiple cats and dogs in her home, a high volume of trash and clutter throughout the house, and infestation of mice. See N.T., 5/15/23, at 40. Moreover, Mother's paramour, J.D., cohabits with her, despite the court prohibiting J.D. from having contact with Child since 2018 for the reasons stated above. See id. at 36; O.C.O. at 3 n.3 (citing N.T., 5/15/23, at 42, 69). Finally, Mother has a history of mental health illness, which she self-reported as depressive disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder. See id. at 72.
In furtherance of Child's permanency goal of reunification, Mother was required to satisfy the following goals:
reducing the amount of pets within the household, cleaning the house and ridding it of the ammonia smell, having the other adult removed from the home, mental health treatment, intimate partner violence counseling with the aspect of no-contact with the live-in paramour, coached parenting, and both individual and interactional evaluations. See generally CYF Exhibit 1-Court Orders; CYF Exhibit 2-Family Plans.O.C.O. at 12 (unpaginated).
On January 13, 2023, because Mother had not satisfied her permanency goals, CYF filed a petition for the involuntary termination of Mother's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). The court held an evidentiary hearing on May 15, 2023, during which Child, then nine years old, was represented by legal counsel who advocated against the termination of Mother's parental rights.
CYF presented the testimony of Judy Wilson, the in-home worker from Every Child, Inc., who worked with Mother to make the home habitable for Child; Marci Bolger, a CYF permanency worker; Shamara Hopkins, a CYF caseworker; and Beth Bliss, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist who performed psychological and interactional evaluations of Mother, as well as an interactional evaluation between Child and his foster parents.
Mother testified on her own behalf and presented the testimony of Kendra Kirkland, the visitation coach from Children's Institute; and E.B., Mother's adult son.
By order dated May 30, 2023, the orphans' court involuntarily terminated Mother's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). On June 20, 2023, Mother timely filed a notice of appeal and concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The orphans' court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on August 8, 2023.
On appeal, Mother raises the following issues:
1. Did the [orphans'] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate Mother's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8)?
2. Did the [orphans'] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of law in concluding that CYF met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother's parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of Child pursuant to § 2511(b)?Mother's Brief at 6.
Initially, we note:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the [orphans'] court if they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the [orphans'] court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The [orphans'] court's decision, however, should not be reversed merely because the record would support a different result. We have previously emphasized our deference to [orphans'] courts that often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 71 A.3d 251, 267 (2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act ("Act"), which requires a bifurcated analysis. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. The orphans' court must initially determine whether the conduct of the parent warrants termination under Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the petitioner established grounds for termination under Section 2511(a) does it then engage in assessing the petition under Section 2511(b), which involves a child's needs and welfare. See In re T.S.M., supra, 71 A.3d at 267.
To involuntarily terminate parental rights, the petitioner must prove grounds under both Section 2511(a) and (b) by clear and convincing evidence, which is evidence that is so "clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." In re Adoption of C.M., ____ Pa.____, 255 A.3d 343, 358 (2021) (quoting Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 550 Pa. 595, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (1998)).
Instantly, we conclude the certified record supports the orphans' court's order pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8) and (b), which provides as follows:
(a) General Rule.-The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
. . .
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
. . .
(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8), (b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc) (stating that we need only agree with the orphans' court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm a termination order).
Based on this disposition, to the extent Mother argues that the orphans' court abused its discretion in terminating her parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (5), we need not review those claims.
This Court has explained that "Section 2511(a)(8) sets a 12-month time frame for a parent to remedy the conditions that led to the [child's] removal by the court." In re A.R., 837 A.2d 560, 564 (Pa.Super. 2003). Once the 12-month period has been established, the court must next determine whether the conditions that led to the child's removal continue to exist, despite reasonable good faith efforts the child welfare agency supplied over a realistic time period. Id. The "relevant inquiry in this regard is whether the conditions that led to removal have been remedied, and, thus, whether reunification of parent and child is imminent at the time of the hearing." In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa.Super. 2009). Termination under Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court to evaluate a parent's current willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that initially caused placement or the availability or efficacy of the agency's services. In Re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1276 (Pa.Super. 2003).
This Court has recognized "that the application of [Section 2511(a)(8)] may seem harsh when the parent has begun to make progress toward resolving the problems that had led to the removal of her children." In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa.Super. 2006).
However, by allowing for termination when the conditions that led to removal of a child continue to exist after a year, the statute implicitly recognizes that a child's life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child's need for permanence and stability to a parent's claims of progress and hope for the future. Indeed, we work under statutory and case law that contemplates only a short period of time, to wit [18] months, in which to complete the process of either reunification or adoption for a child who has been placed in foster care.Id.
Finally, pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8), the court must consider whether termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. Id. at 1275-76. The "needs and welfare" analysis is relevant to both Sections 2511(a)(8) and (b). In In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc), this Court stated,
while both Section 2511(a)(8) and Section 2511(b) direct us to evaluate the "needs and welfare of the child," we are required to resolve the analysis relative to Section 2511(a)(8), prior to addressing the "needs and welfare" of [the child], as proscribed by Section 2511(b); as such, they are distinct in that we must address Section 2511(a) before reaching Section 2511(b).Id. at 1009 (citations omitted).
With respect to Section 2511(b), the court is required to "give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child." 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). Regarding the "emotional needs and welfare" of the child, our precedent has interpreted it to include "intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability." In re T.S.M., supra, 71 A.3d at 267 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Our Supreme Court in In re E.M., 533 Pa. 115, 620 A.2d 481 (1993), first recognized that the "emotional needs and welfare" analysis under Section 2511(b) should include, in part, the child's bond with his or her parent. In doing so, orphans' courts must examine the effect on the child of severing such a bond, and this includes "a determination of whether the bond is necessary and beneficial to the child, i.e., whether maintaining the bond serves the child's developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare." In the Interest of K.T., ____ Pa.____, 296 A.3d 1085, 1113 (2023). The High Court recently explained:
Severance of a "necessary and beneficial" bond would predictably cause more than the "adverse" impact that, unfortunately, may occur whenever a bond is present. By contrast, severance of a necessary and beneficial relationship is the kind of loss that would predictably cause "extreme emotional consequences" or significant, irreparable harm. See In re E.M., 620 A.2d at 484 ("a beneficial bonding could exist between a parent and child, such that, if the bond were broken, the child could suffer extreme emotional consequences").In the Interest of K.T., supra, 296 A.3d at 1109-1110 (some citations omitted).
As such, the Court in In the Interest of K.T. distinguished "extreme emotional consequences" from an "adverse impact" to the child when parental rights are terminated. Id. at 1111. Specifically, the Court cautioned that an orphans' court "must not truncate its analysis and preclude severance based solely on evidence of an 'adverse' or 'detrimental' impact to the child." Id. at 1114. The Court concluded that "to grant termination when a parental bond exists, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the bond is not necessary and beneficial." Id.
Moreover, in reiterating that the parental bond is only one part of the analysis, the Court in In the Interest of K.T. held that the "Section 2511(b) inquiry must also include consideration…[of] certain evidence if it is present in the record." Id. at 1113, n.28 (emphasis in original). The specific evidence at issue in In the Interest of K.T. related to the child's need for permanency and the length of time she had spent in foster care; the pre-adoptive nature of her foster home and the child's bond with foster parents; and whether the foster home met the child's developmental, physical, and emotional needs. Id. at 1112. The Court emphasized, however, that these foregoing factors were not an exhaustive list for consideration under all Section 2511(b) analyses. Id. at 1113, n.28. Rather, the Court found, as noted above, that the particular facts of each case determine the factors to be considered.
Our Supreme Court recognized that "case law indicates that bond, plus permanency, stability and all 'intangible' factors may contribute equally to the determination of a child's specific developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare, and thus are all of 'primary' importance in the Section 2511(b) analysis." In the Interest of K.T., supra, 296 A.3d at 1109. For instance, if relevant in a case, an orphans' court "can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child" in its analysis under Section 2511(b). See In re M.M., 106 A.3d 114, 118 (Pa.Super. 2014).
On appeal, with respect to Section 2511(a)(8), Mother argues the orphans' court abused its discretion by concluding that she has not remedied the conditions that led to Child's removal or placement. See Mother's Brief at 23-24. Indeed, Mother asserts that she has progressed in the permanency goals relating to in-home services, coached parenting, and mental health treatment, inter alia. Child similarly asserts in his appellee brief that Mother has progressed in these goals and will continue to work on them. See Child's Brief at 12. For the reasons that follow, Mother is not entitled to relief.
The testimony of Judy Wilson bears out that Mother has made some progress in cleaning and organizing her home. See N.T., 5/15/23, at 21. Ms. Wilson testified that her agency, Every Child, Inc., received a referral from CYF in August of 2022, to provide in-home services to assist Mother in cleaning her home and keeping it orderly; maintaining a household budget; and reducing the number of pets. Id. at 14. She has personally worked with Mother since September 2022, and she testified that Mother "has gotten rid of a lot of items and has cleared up the…living room and kitchen areas. They are much more suitable. And there's more organization." Id.
However, Ms. Wilson also explained that Mother's home remained a work in progress and testified that Mother is still "working on" the back room. Id. "[Mother] actually stated that she has a storage unit[,] and she is getting some other items to put into the storage unit." Id. It is important to note that Ms. Wilson described the "back room" as "potentially [Child]'s room," and she testified that Mother "was still working on cleaning some of that extra stuff out." Id. at 15.
In addition, Ms. Wilson testified that Mother has given "away at least three to five cats, but there are still multiple cats" in her home. Id. Specifically, on the Saturday before the subject proceedings, there were "at least 15" cats still present in the dwelling, as well as two dogs. Id. at 16. Ms. Wilson testified that "there's an ammonia smell in the home." Id. at 17. The CYF caseworker, Shamara Hopkins, visited Mother's home approximately one month before the subject proceeding, and similarly testified that "[t]here was a strong urine smell from the cats. [She] noticed flies and gnats flying around the home." Id. at 41. Ms. Wilson concluded that "the ammonia smell" remains one of the biggest problems in Mother's home. Id. at 21. This testimony reflects that the cleanliness and habitability issues in Mother's home had not been fully addressed by the time of the termination hearing.
The testimony of Kendra Kirkland, the visitation coach from Children's Institute who started working with Mother in December of 2022, also presented similar shortcomings in Mother's parenting abilities. Specifically, Ms. Kirkland assisted Mother with respect to improving her parenting skills during supervised visits with Child. See id. at 100. Her testimony bears out that Mother's ability to engage Child has improved. See id. at 102-03. Ms. Kirkland further testified that, since approximately one month before the subject proceeding, Mother has "been more receptive. She picks up quickly on when I'm trying to model or prompt her to do something with" Child. Id. at 102, 107. Ms. Kirkland testified that Child "is a little bit more open" and "comfortable" with Mother than in the past. Id. at 104-05. Nevertheless, Ms. Kirkland was constrained to acknowledge on cross-examination that Mother needs more improvement in her parenting skills, such as by displaying the ability to redirect and correct Child, when necessary, during his play activities in the visits. See id. at 108.
Thus, based on Ms. Wilson's and Ms. Kirkland's testimony, Mother has shown some progress in organizing her home and engaging Child during visits. However, Mother has not completely satisfied those goals, and she has displayed no progress in satisfying her remaining goals.
It follows that we discern no abuse of discretion by the orphans' court in its factual findings related to the cleanliness of Mother's home. Specifically, the orphans' court found:
While the court understands that some amount of progress was made on these goals, the goals were largely not completed in full or even in part.
Numerous court orders mandated Mother to get into compliance regarding limiting the number of animals in her care. [Ms. Wilson] credibly testified that she viewed Mother's home on the Saturday before the hearing and saw at least 15 cats and 2 dogs inside Mother's home. N.T., 5/15/23, at 16. It is clear from the testimony provided by Mother's in-home service provider and the CYF caseworkers that the surplus of pets is directly correlated with the ammonia smell in the home. Mother has taken no steps to lessen the number of animals in the home or to get any of the animals fixed to prevent additional litters, despite knowing the animals are an obstacle toward reunification with Child. This has remained consistent through the entirety of this case. [Ms. Wilson] credibly testified that while Mother had utilized their services to make improvements in certain areas of the home as to organization, the room which could be designated as Child's bedroom continued to be deplorable and unusable. Id. at 14-15. Additionally, the ammonia smell within the home was identified as one of the "biggest problems" with the home at the time of the hearing and had been an ongoing issue for years in the case. Id. at [21-]22. Mother has been unable to fully remedy the cleanliness and habitability concerns which initially brought CYF intervention in 2018 despite the number of referrals made and services provided by CYF.O.C.O. at 12-13 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added) (cleaned up).
In addition, the testimony adduced at the hearing also indicates that Child's safety would potentially be at risk if reunified with Mother due to J.D. continuing to reside with her despite a court order that prohibits him from having any contact with Child. See N.T., 5/15/23, at 36; O.C.O. at 3 n.3 (citing N.T., 5/15/23, at 42, 69). Moreover, Child's safety would be at risk if reunified because, according to Mother, J.D.'s friend, B.M., resides as a "squatter" in her home against her will. N.T., 5/15/23, at 120-21.
The orphans' court made the following factual findings based upon Mother's testimony:
Also, [B.M.] has squatted in Mother's home for approximately six months and Mother has been unable to remove him. Although Mother acknowledged she was given information [and] direction on filing legal action at the magistrate level, Mother has taken no active steps toward the removal of [B.M.]. At some point, because Mother has been unreceptive to these action steps, [B.M.] moved out but returned to living in the house and has remained there for the last six months. During her testimony at the termination hearing, Mother acknowledged that, with the presence of the animals and [B.M.], her home continues to be unsafe for Child. Id. at 129.O.C.O. at 13-14 (emphasis added) (cleaned up).
We also emphasize Dr. Bliss's testimony regarding Mother's statement during her psychological evaluation that "she had a homeless person charged with drug possession staying with her. She identified the person as her friend who needed a place to stay and said that the drug charges were nothing to [her]." N.T., 5/15/23, at 71.
Dr. Bliss testified that Mother's reference to the homeless person residing with her was during the time her visits were reduced from unsupervised to supervised. N.T., 5/15/23, at 71. Ms. Hopkins testified Mother's visits were unsupervised from the outset of the case until December 13, 2021. Id. at 47. We discern that Mother's visits were reduced, in part, due to her inconsistency with participating in unsupervised visitation. Id.
Turning to Mother's mental health goal, Dr. Bliss performed an individual psychological evaluation and an interactional evaluation in April of 2022, and again in March of 2023. See id. at 64. She diagnosed Mother with borderline personality disorder, and she recognized Mother's history of major depressive disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. at 72. Dr. Bliss's testimony bears out that Mother was participating in mental health treatment required by the orphans' court; however, "[Mother] didn't believe she needed that." Id. Further, Dr. Bliss testified that Mother disagreed with CYF's concern over J.D., her paramour, who resided in her home.
Dr. Bliss explained:
So the paramour has a prior sex offense, which Mother does not believe that he is a potential risk at all. Granted, it is certainly possible he is low risk. I did not assess him for risk. [But,]…she wasn't open to considering any possibilities and was very much adamant that she believed he was no risk at all and that he…should not have been found guilty of a sexual offense. So that was the main concern with him.Id. at 69. Likewise, Dr. Bliss testified Mother knew that CYF and the orphans' court had concerns about the cleanliness and number of animals in her home, but she "did not believe there were any concerns and did not understand them." Id. at 70-71.
In her first psychological evaluation of Mother, Dr. Bliss recommended that Mother participate in "mental health with a DBT component, a psychiatric evaluation, [intimate partner violence ("IPV")] counseling, and ongoing coached visitation." Id. at 76. Dr. Bliss conducted a second evaluation approximately one year later and two months before the subject proceeding. She testified as follows:
Q. When you had your updated individual evaluation with [Mother], did you notice any substantive changes in her level of functioning?
A. No. And there were actually some concerns almost going backwards within a few areas, that there definitely was not really progress in any areas.
Q. What were the concerns about going backwards?
A. So, for instance, she was aware of the previous evaluation that CYF had concerns with her animals, that was one of the issues that she needed to remedy to have her child returned to her care. Despite that she actually acquired more animals by the time I saw her next.
Q. And she appeared to take any responsibility for the reasons that [CYF] was involved in [Child]'s care?
A. No. She really did not take any responsibility at all. She was much more erodible. She was still seemingly cooperative, but she was irritable and annoyed to be at the evaluation or to still be involved with CYF. Blamed others and really did not see any concerns with her life or her home despite, you know, referencing all of the number of animals, the messes that the animals made, a significant fight between her dogs that led to an injury for her, flea infestation. She didn't have any real concerns about that despite describing that all to me.Id. at 76-77.
With respect to Mother's injury from the dog fight, Dr. Bliss testified: [Mother] said that she has two large mixed breed dogs, and one of them is at least 80 pounds[.] [T]hey get into fights with each other, and on one occasion she had to go to the hospital for a broken wrist after she tried to separate them….Another time they got into fights when she wasn't home and apparently killed one of the cats. She saw it through video surveillance later. N.T., 5/15/23, at 80. Further, Dr. Bliss confirmed the existence of a strong ammonia smell associated with Mother's home. She testified, "[A] note that I made was that there was a pungent odor of cat urine during her interview and interactional so much to the extent - it is a really large room where the interactional is, and all the way across the room it could be detected easily and lingered for hours after she left." Id. at 81.
In sum, Dr. Bliss opined that Mother is not currently in a position to care for Child because "she isn't able to prioritize him over herself." Id. at 91. Dr. Bliss also emphasized:
[Mother] doesn't have a realistic understanding of how [Child's] behaviors in his daily life are manifesting, [or] how to respond to them. She couldn't read cues in terms of how his emotions changed within the interactional [evaluation] and then appropriately respond to those cues. She identified many of [Child's] defined behaviors as triggers for her own aggression. Id. at 90-91.
For example, Dr. Bliss described the second interactional evaluation between Mother and Child, who was then nine years old, as follows:
[I]t was very similar where it was very quiet. [Mother] sat in a chair kind of across the room from where [Child] was initially. And [Child] was trying to get her attention numerous times. He tried to engage her in conversation. She did occasionally give some minimal acknowledgment to his presence or what he was saying, responding with grunts or curt answers, but after that she really
had very minimal interaction with him. He kind of started to become withdrawn and give up on trying.Id. at 82. Indeed, Dr. Bliss opined that terminating Mother's parental rights will serve Child's needs and welfare because of Mother's "lack of progress, lack of insight, inability…to currently provide for his needs or do so in any time in the near future[.] [P]lacing him with her would be a danger to his physical and psychological well-being." Id. at 92-93.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the record evidence amply supports the termination of Mother's parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8) inasmuch as Child has been removed from her care since 2018, far in excess of the 12-month statutory minimum. The conditions which led to his removal continue to exist, i.e., the cleanliness and safety of Mother's home, Mother's mental health issues, and J.D. residing with Mother despite his prohibition from having contact with Child. Finally, the testimony presented by all of CYF's witnesses, and in particular, by Dr. Bliss, demonstrates that the termination of Mother's parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of Child.
In her second issue, Mother argues the record evidence does not support terminating her parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b) based on testimony by (1) Dr. Bliss that Mother and Child displayed affection; (2) Ms. Kirkland that Child is happy to see Mother and is "opening up more with her"; (3) and E.B., Mother's adult son, that Child is excited to see Mother before visits. Mother's Brief at 27-28 (citing N.T., 5/15/23, at 74-75, 81, 103-105, 112). Mother's argument is without merit.
Our review of the record confirms generally the testimony cited by Mother. However, the testimony does not demonstrate that Child has a "necessary and beneficial bond" with Mother. See In the Interest of K.T., supra, 296 A.3d at 1114.
We focus on Dr. Bliss's testimony wherein she confirmed that, during the first interactional evaluation, Mother and Child, who was then eight years old, "engaged in reciprocal hugs." N.T., 5/15/23, at 74. However, Dr. Bliss testified that "the bond between them I would say was limited at best." Id. at 75. She explained:
It was a somewhat odd interactional. Extremely quiet. Very little interaction actually between them at all. She attended to him. It wasn't that they were ignoring each other. They were just kind of sitting side-by-side engaged in almost parallel play as a few of the young children do where they weren't really interacting with each other at all. [Mother] was very reserved and detached….
. . .
So that presentation would be difficult to foster a close relationship with a young child, especially one not placed in her care. I saw some positive interactions at times or, like I said, there wasn't an extreme concern of overly negative interactions. So with some guidance or knowledge to change that and to increase her attention and energy and expression with him, then it's possible that they could strengthen the bond if she were to implement those skills.Id. at 75-76.
In our Section 2511(a)(8) analysis above, we set forth the interaction between Mother and Child during the second evaluation, which occurred in April of 2023, one month before the subject proceeding. In sum, Dr. Bliss testified their interaction was like the first, and that Child ultimately became "withdrawn" and gave up trying to interact with Mother. See id. at 82. Dr. Bliss explained that Child put stuffed animals on a chair before Mother joined him in the room where the evaluation occurred. Id. When Mother arrived, "she began to throw them on the ground to sit in the chair. And [Child] was observing quietly and apologized to her for leaving the toys in that chair." Id. Dr. Bliss testified that, when Child apologized, he "appeared anxious. He fidgeted, wringed his hands together and looked at the ground." Id. at 83. Dr. Bliss stated that Mother "accepted his apology verbally, but it was with that very flat affect that I described before. No warmth or reassurance to him that obviously he would have had no way of knowing she planned to sit there, that it was fine he left the stuffed animals there." Id.
Dr. Bliss opined that Mother and Child do not share a parent-child bond. Id. at 88. She explained that Child recognizes Mother as his biological mother, but his interactions with his foster parents "indicated that he views [them] as his psychological parents." Id. at 89. Dr. Bliss described the interactional evaluation with his foster parents, as follows.
[Child] was very different in how he behaved….He explored the room freely, looked back at them for reassurance, looked to share experiences with them, smiled, laughed. The family was lively, animated and consistently engaged with each other throughout.
He repeatedly sought attention from his foster parents, which, again, he had also done, especially at the beginning, with Mother, but they increased their level of engagement each time he sought those out, which he then seemed to thrive by and was happy with and enjoyed that time together. He talked to them in an affectionate way. They all displayed small acts of physical affection that were natural….He had thrown a toy on the ground, and his foster parents did correct him, which he apologized and listened… but…[h]e moved on from it and continued to happily engage after that occurred….Id. at 86-87.
Thus, Dr. Bliss concluded Child has "a secure and positive attachment" to his foster parents. Id. at 88. She stated:
[Child] does view his foster parents as his parental figures or psychological parents, and they have a strong natural bond. They are currently able to provide a safe and nurturing environment for him and they have been. To move him around anymore than he already has been would cause him unnecessary harm, and delay his ability to access the psychological services that he needs and the foster parents have been seeking.Id. at 93.
Moreover, Dr. Bliss testified:
Q. If the court were to hear some testimony or indications today that [Child] may still want to live with his mother, would that change your expert opinion on whether termination meets his needs and welfare?
A. No.Id.
Further, we emphasize Ms. Hopkins' testimony that Child "is doing really well" with his foster parents. Id. at 54. Specifically, she testified that he is making progress with his speech delay and inappropriate behavior. For example, Child's behavior had included touching other children inappropriately and taking pictures of himself. Id. Ms. Hopkins acknowledged that, at an unspecified time, Child told her he wishes to live with Mother. Id. at 60. Nevertheless, Ms. Hopkins supported the termination of Mother's parental rights.
Based upon the foregoing testimony, we conclude that CYF established clearly and convincingly that involuntarily terminating Mother's parental rights will serve Child's developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant to Section 2511(b). See In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) ("[C]oncluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent simply because the child harbors affection for the parent is not only dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child's feelings were the dispositive factor in the bonding analysis, the analysis would be reduced to an exercise in semantics as it is the rare child who, after being subject to neglect and abuse, is able to sift through the emotional wreckage and completely disavow a parent…."). Accordingly, we affirm the orphans' court's May 29, 2023, order pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8) and (b).
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
[*] Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.