Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. HJ09012111.
Banke, J.
Defendant A.B. (mother) appeals from an order following a contested six-month review hearing, finding she had been provided “reasonable services, ” but had made only partial progress toward alleviating the circumstances necessitating placement of the minor T.J. outside the home. We affirm.
Background
On March 16, 2009, the Alameda County Social Services/Children and Family Services Agency (Agency) filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition with subdivision (b) allegations. The subdivision (b) allegations concerned mother’s failure to attend to the minor’s diabetic condition. On June 15, 2009, the parties appeared for the jurisdictional hearing. The parties agreed mother would submit to a hair follicle test, return an allegedly malfunctioning glucometer, take daily blood sugar readings and fax results to Children’s Hospital, consent to the Agency speaking with the minor’s pediatrician, and submit to a psychological evaluation. On June 29, 2009, the parties appeared for a progress report. Mother had made some progress. The juvenile court found the allegations of the section 300 petition to be true and continued the previous order.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
On July 1, 2009, the minor was taken into protective custody and placed in a foster home in the wake of significantly elevated blood sugar readings indicating continuing failure to attend to his diabetes. On July 6, 2009, the Agency filed a section 342 petition, supplementing the section 300 petition, alleging mother continued to fail to follow medical instructions with respect to the minor’s diabetes. The subdivision (b) allegations recounted inter alia: In September 2008, the minor had been hospitalized for Diabetic Ketoacidosis, a life threatening condition due to high blood sugar levels. Mother received written instructions as to the minor’s care, but did not comply with the treatment plan. In December 2008, mother admitted she had failed to keep daily logs of the minor’s blood sugar levels and failed to provide logs to minor’s endocrinologist. In January 2009, mother was aware the minor’s glucometer was not working and continued to fail to keep blood sugar level logs. In February 2009, mother failed to take the minor for his appointment at the Endocrinology Clinic. In March 2009, mother’s log entries did not match the results of a blood sugar test by the clinic. Mother continued to claim the glucometer was not functioning properly, but failed to take it to the clinic for a replacement. In June 2009, the minor’s blood sugar level was seriously elevated. His physician requested that the minor be seen again in one week, reported mother had insulin that had expired two years earlier and had last received insulin 10 months earlier, and was of the opinion mother had poorly managed minor’s diabetes and the condition could result in kidney failure, nerve damage requiring amputation, blindness, and increased risk of heart attack and stroke. In addition, between September 17 and December 19, 2008, the minor had been absent 45 out of 62 school days. Mother had not cooperated with the school in obtaining medical treatment for the minor’s diabetes or in arranging for home schooling. In January 2009, the minor was referred to the Student Attendance Review Board. Mother agreed to cooperate with efforts to ensure the minor attended school, but failed to follow through. Minor continued to miss school.
On July 7, 2009, the Agency filed a detention report and the parties appeared for a detention hearing. The juvenile court found removal was necessary for the minor’s welfare and that reasonable efforts had been made to prevent the need for removal from the home. On July 20, 2009, the Agency filed an addendum report recommending dependency, out-of-home placement, and reunification services for mother. The minor’s health seemed to have improved. The Agency had spoken with the maternal aunt about mother’s reported posttraumatic stress disorder. The aunt revealed mother had been sexually abused as a child. The trial court continued dependency, ordered reunification services for mother and that mother participate in individual counseling.
On December 31, 2009, the Agency filed a status review report in anticipation of the six-month review hearing. Although ordered to submit to a psychological evaluation in June, mother did not participate in an assessment until mid-October. The Agency had not yet received a written evaluation. However, Mother had attended therapy at her church, and was referred to a therapist by the Agency in early November. Mother had not communicated with the Agency about the referral. Mother visited the minor, but did not monitor his diabetes. Mother stated she did not know readings had to be taken regardless of whether the minor had eaten. The Agency required mother to attend a diabetes class at Kaiser (which had taken over minor’s care). Mother had not maintained regular contact with the Agency. The Agency determined mother needed to complete the Kaiser diabetes education course, attend therapy, and attend and complete a parenting class. Minor’s doctor at Kaiser reported his overall health as good, although he struggled emotionally and was seeing a therapist once a week.
On January 5, 2010, the parties appeared for a review hearing. The juvenile court found the section 342 allegations to be true, continued the dependency, and set the matter for a contested six-month hearing.
On March 3, 2010, the Agency filed an addendum report recommending that the dependency, out-of-home placement, and reunification services for mother be continued. Mother had reunified with her husband, from whom she had separated due to domestic violence. The Agency was concerned about the impact on the minor and recommended couples counseling. Mother had not promptly followed up with the November referral to a therapist and was not re-referred until February 2010. Nor had she confirmed follow up on the re-referral. Mother’s psychological assessment indicated she had made minimal effort to comply with the case plan. The examining doctor suggested mother attend individual therapy, attend couple’s counseling, consistently take her medications for mood stability, and attend the diabetes class.
On March 4, 2010, the parties appeared at the six-month review hearing. The assigned child welfare worker (CWW) testified she had been unable to confirm mother’s attendance at church counseling or at the diabetes course, or even where mother was residing. Mother testified: She had completed a parenting course, but had not supplied confirmation to the CWW. She had attended two psychological assessment sessions in September 2009. She had never cancelled a counseling session, but had not supplied any verification of attendance to the CWW. The juvenile court found the Agency had complied with the case plan by making reasonable efforts to return the minor to a safe home and to take steps necessary to finalize permanent placement of the minor. It further found reasonable services had been provided to mother and mother had made partial progress with the case plan. The court ordered CWW to identify another diabetes educational course mother could attend and order mother to do so. The court also ordered mother to ensure minor’s regular attendance at school and/or make reasonable efforts to obtain educational services to meet his needs.
On April 1, 2010, mother filed a notice of appeal from the juvenile court’s orders on January 5, 2010 and March 4, 2010, finding she had been provided reasonable services.
Although mother’s notice of appeal identifies both the orders on January 5, 2010, and March 4, 2010, her opening brief identifies only the March 4 order finding she was provided reasonable services and the arguments in her briefs pertain only to that order.
Discussion
In determining whether reasonable reunification services have been provided, we employ the traditional substantial evidence test. (In re Precious J. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1472.) Under this standard, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the respondent, and indulge in every legitimate reasonable inference to uphold the judgment. (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 53.) Substantial evidence is evidence that is “ ‘reasonable, credible, and of solid value, ’ ” and such that a reasonable trier of fact could rely on it to make dispositive findings. (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Cody W. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 221, 229-230.) If there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the juvenile court, we are without power to reweigh or reevaluate the findings. Instead, we must affirm the court’s determination as based on those findings. (Constance K. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 689, 705; In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1361-1362; In re Precious J., supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1472-1473; Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762; In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545.)
A child welfare agency is required to “identify the problems leading to the loss of custody, offer services designed to remedy these problems, and maintain reasonable contact with the parents to assist in areas where compliance proves difficult, such as transportation.” (In re Joanna Y. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 433, 438; see also Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1010-1011; In re Michael S. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1448, 1458 [“it is... well settled, and clearly a matter of common sense, that a reunification plan ‘must be appropriate for each family and be based on the unique facts relating to that family’ ”].) The reunification plan must be formulated and implemented in good faith, i.e., with the purpose of preserving and strengthening the parent-child bond. (See Hansen v. Department of Social Services (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 283, 292-293.)
However, the requirement that the agency provide reunification services to the parent of a dependent child “is not a requirement that a social worker take the parent by the hand and escort him or her to and through classes or counseling sessions.” (In re Michael S., supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1463, fn. 5; accord, Robin V. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1166-1167 [agency is not required to “take [parent] by the hand or lead him [or her] step-by-step along the way”].) “Reunification services are voluntary, and cannot be forced on an unwilling or indifferent parent.” (In re Jonathan R. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1214, 1220.) And while a proponent may argue “more services could have been provided more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect... [t]he standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 547; see also In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 48; Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.)
The record reflects the conditions of the reunification plan in this case were reasonable and fair, and were properly designed to prevent a recurrence of the circumstances that led to the minor being removed from mother’s custody in the first place. (See In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1776-1777.) The plan required mother to attend individual therapy, attend couples counseling, attend and complete parenting classes, attend and complete a diabetes education course, monitor minor’s diabetic condition during visits, and take reasonable steps to ensure minor attends school or participates in some other educational program that meets his needs. Over the course of nine months, the Agency offered assistance to mother, giving her repeated opportunities to meet her obligations under the plan in order to try to reunite with minor. Mother made only partial efforts toward meeting her obligations.
Mother contends the Agency failed to provide for adequate diabetes education. She asserts the juvenile court found as much and therefore ordered that she attend a 30- to 40-hour diabetes educational program at Kaiser. The court observed mother testified she had attended a two-hour class, but further observed her performance in managing the minor’s diabetes had “been poor” and was not sufficient to permit significantly increased visitation. The court then discussed that neither mother nor the Agency had communicated with one another “as much as [the court] would have liked.” The court then stated it was “very dissatisfied” with the diabetes class as described by mother and ordered the CWW to identify a “proper diabetes education program” and mother to attend it.
When considered in context and in light of the entirety of the juvenile court’s analysis on the record, the court’s comments about diabetes education cannot be read as indictment of the Agency’s undertaking in this case. In fact, in its December 31, 2009, status review report, the Agency itself recommended mother attend a diabetes education class at Kaiser. The court also reviewed all the other efforts the Agency had made to arrange for and facilitate mother’s participation in programs meeting the case plan, and expressly weighed the Agency’s responsibility to provide reasonable services and mother’s responsibility to follow the Agency’s instructions. It was not improper for the court to assess the services in their entirety and in light of all the circumstances at the time, including mother’s own failure to communicate with the Agency. Nor did the fact the juvenile court ordered additional services ipso facto make the services provided to date unreasonable. The court emphasized to mother that in the ensuing months she had an obligation to both communicate with the Agency and fully comply with the case plan, and her compliance would be a significant factor in determining whether the minor would be returned to her custody.
Mother also contends the Agency did not timely provide her with counseling services. The Agency referred her for assessment in June 2009, but she claims no evaluation was completed until the end of November, and she was not re-referred to therapy until February 2010. However, there was evidence that after being referred for assessment, mother cancelled four appointments. Mother denied this, but the juvenile court was entitled to credit the information provided by the therapist. There also was evidence the evaluation was completed in mid-September and in early November the Agency referred mother to ACCESS for individual therapy. Mother did not act on the referral promptly, and thus lost the available opening at ACCESS. The Agency arranged a second referral in early February 2010, but as of March 3, had again not heard from mother or otherwise received confirmation she was attending therapy. Mother also claimed she had not seen the psychological evaluation which, among other things recommended medical evaluation and family counseling. Nevertheless, mother participated in a medical evaluation three weeks prior to the hearing (no changes were made to her medications). The Agency also referred her to couples counseling.
The Agency did not receive the written evaluation until early January 2010.
Mother cites Amanda H. v. Superior Court (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1340, in which the Court of Appeal reversed an order terminating services after a 12-month review hearing. In that case, the mother had not enrolled in domestic counseling because she believed individual counseling was adequately addressing the issue. The social worker had led the mother to believe she was enrolled in all court ordered programs, but then used the mother’s failure to enroll separately in domestic counseling as the basis for terminating services. The court concluded the agency had not accurately informed the mother or the court of the adequacy of the programs to meet the case plan requirements. (Id. at p. 1346-1347.) Here, the Agency did not misinform mother or the court. Rather, a significant problem here was that mother failed to communicate with the Agency. Furthermore, the Agency did not recommend that mother’s services be terminated.
Nor is In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962 apposite. In that case, the minor and the father were to attend conjoint counseling, but the agency seriously delayed arranging for such. Counseling never materialized, because of the grandmother’s claimed logistical problems. There was no evidence the agency had tried to address these issues. Observing that conjoint counseling was “critical, ” the court concluded reasonable services had not been provided to the father. (Id. at pp. 965, 972-973.) Here, there was no untimely delay in making arrangements for the services specified in mother’s case plan. Again, one of the principal problems was mother’s failure to communicate with the Agency and timely avail herself of the offered services. And, again, services have not been terminated.
Based on this record, we conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings that the Agency made reasonable efforts to provide mother with adequate reunification services and the services provided were reasonable. (See Angela S. v. Superior Court, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at pp. 762-763.)
Disposition
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
We concur: Margulies, Acting P. J., Dondero, J.