Opinion
No. 1-697 / 01-0174.
Filed January 28, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Hardin County, DAVID DANILSON, Judge.
Dawn Heichel appeals the physical care provision of the parties' dissolution decree. AFFIRMED.
James L. Beres of Letz, Sween Beres, P.C., Eldora, for appellant.
Cathleen J. Siebrecht of Borseth, Genest, Suddreth Siebrecht Law Offices, Altoona, for appellee.
Heard by HUITINK, P.J., and VOGEL and EISENHAUER, JJ.
Dawn Heichel appeals the district court decision to award physical care of the parties' minor children to their father, Russell Heichel. We affirm.
Background Facts and Proceedings . Russell and Dawn Heichel were married in 1989. Their son Jerod was born in 1991, and their daughter Bethany was born in 1993. When the marriage deteriorated to the point of separation in 1998, Dawn and the children left the family home in Washington state and moved in with Dawn's mother in Iowa Falls. When Russell's contract with the Navy expired in April 2000, he reluctantly separated from the military in order to move to Iowa and be near his children. In May of that year, shortly after Russell arrived in Iowa, he received an e-mail message from the children's school principal, which stated Dawn had removed the children from school as the three of them were moving to Canada. Russell obtained a temporary injunction to prevent the children's removal from Iowa.
At trial Russell requested the injunction be made permanent and, if Dawn chose to move from Iowa, that he be granted physical care of the children. While Dawn urged dissolution of the injunction to allow her to move to Canada with the children, she stated if the injunction were not dissolved, she would remain in Iowa. Finding Dawn's sole reason for moving to Canada was to be with and marry her boyfriend, Doug Vance, and juxtaposing concessions Russell made for the sake of the children with Dawn's tendency to place her needs before the children's, the court awarded physical care to Russell. Dawn appeals.
Scope of Review . We conduct a de novo review of decisions regarding custody and physical care. In re Marriage of Murphy, 592 N.W.2d 681, 683 (Iowa 1999). We give deference to, but are not bound by, the district court's factual findings and credibility assessments. Id.
Therapist Testimony and Evaluation . Dawn argues the district court erred when it deemed the reports of Jill Schager, M.S.W, L.I.S.W., to be inadmissible hearsay. Russell contends this argument is moot in light of the district court's post-trial order, which found the reports admissible. However, the actual language of that order makes it unclear whether the district court ruled on admissibility, or simply attempted to preserve the issue for our review.
What is clear is the district court's opinion that, even if the reports could be properly admitted, they should be afforded little weight. We concur. Regardless of how Dawn attempts to categorize Schager's sessions with the children and the resulting evaluations, the reports and testimony were offered to bolster Dawn's claim the children's interests would be best served by moving to Canada in her physical care. Since Schager's opinions regarding which parent should receive physical care were based on brief interviews of the children, no home visits and little or no information from the parents, we defer to and approve of the district court's conclusion. See In re Marriage of Rebouche, 587 N.W.2d 795, 799 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998) (affording custody evaluation little weight where mother not given fair opportunity to provide information to evaluator); In re Marriage of Pothast, 539 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995) (affording little weight to custody evaluation conducted with mother and child only).
Physical Care . In determining which parent should be granted physical care, our overriding consideration is the children's best interests. In re Marriage of Ford, 563 N.W.2d 629, 631 (Iowa 1997). We consider a number of factors, including the children's needs and characteristics, the parents' abilities to meet the children's needs, the nature of each proposed home environment, and the effect of continuing or disrupting the children's current status. See In re Marriage of Winter, 223 N.W.2d 165, 166-67 (Iowa 1974); Iowa Code § 598.41 (1999). The district court found the totality of relevant factors weighed in favor of Russell, even though Dawn was the children's primary caregiver during the marriage. We see nothing in the record to undermine the court's factual findings or credibility assessments, and we agree with its decision.
Although Dawn's role as primary caregiver during the marriage is a weighty point in her favor, prior division of physical care does not control the determination of which placement best serves the children's interests. In re Marriage of Walton, 577 N.W.2d 869, 871 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998). The goal of the courts is to select the environment most likely to cultivate a physically, mentally and socially healthy child. See Murphy, 592 N.W.2d at 683. Here, such an environment can best be provided by Russell.
The record indicates both Russell and Dawn are competent parents. Russell is more financially stable than Dawn and has consistently taken steps to assure Jerod and Bethany's financial security while they were in their mother's care. However, the more important question is which parent is better able to provide the children with a stable emotional environment. See In re Marriage of Williams, 589 N.W.2d 759, 762 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998) (noting emphasis is on stability of the parent-child relationship, rather than the child's physical setting).
Neither we nor the district court are blind to Russell's faults. The record indicates Russell has some anger management issues, but he has taken steps to address those concerns. While Russell's position with the military limited the amount of time and care he was able to dedicate to his children, since his move to Iowa he has been an interested and active parent and has taken two independent courses to improve his parenting skills. What is perhaps of greater significance is Russell's demonstrated willingness to make personal sacrifices for his children. When Russell's ship changed home ports from one Washington town to another, he undertook a lengthy daily commute so that Dawn and the children could continue to enjoy the convenience of their residential location. Even more telling is Russell's willingness to give up a military career in order to be near Jerod and Bethany after Dawn moved the children from their home in Washington, to Iowa.
In contrast, Dawn's actions appear to be less motivated by her children's best interests than her own. Dawn contends the move to Canada was largely to provide financial stability for the children, as she was unable to find work in Iowa and was unsure she could rely on Russell for support. She offered testimony of a standing offer from one of Vance's family members for employment at a pizza restaurant and stated she would receive additional financial support from Vance. However, her assertion she had to leave because she had no means of supporting the children rings hollow, particularly in light of Russell's reliable history of financial support payments and Dawn's own admission the promised job was contingent on her successful completion of the Canadian citizenship process.
It seems clear Dawn was principally motivated by her desire to be with Vance and was willing to pursue that goal to the detriment of her children. Prior to trial Dawn took the children out of school on multiple occasions so that they could accompany her on extended trips to visit Vance in Canada. Despite warnings from the school this was negatively impacting the children, she continued the practice. Each child missed well over twenty days of school during the 1999-2000 academic year, and this high absenteeism resulted in Bethany being dropped from a remedial reading skills program. Dawn was so motivated to move to Canada in May 2000 that she was unwilling to entertain even a brief delay to allow the children to finish the school year. Dawn's actions also show a disregard for Russell's right to have access to his children. By her behaviors she has moved beyond a failure to facilitate the father-child relationship, into the realm of obstruction.
Given all the foregoing, it appears that Russell, and not Dawn, will be better able to foster the children's emotional stability. Moreover, Dawn made it clear that, unless prohibited by court order, she would move both herself and the children to Ontario to live with Vance. As a district court should not place itself in the position of entering a permanent order restricting a parent's freedom of movement, awarding Dawn physical care virtually guaranteed the children's relocation to Canada.
Nothing in the record demonstrates such a move would in any way benefit the children. It would, however, place them in yet another new environment, away from family, friends, and the stabilizing influence of regular contact with their father. Dawn's history of disregarding Russell's right of access to the children also calls into doubt her ability to facilitate a liberal visitation schedule. See In re Marriage of Vrban, 359 N.W.2d 420, 425 (Iowa 1984) (finding attempts to isolate children from the other parent and an intention to move the children to another jurisdiction are important factors to be given great weight, if evidence shows they would adversely effect the children). Viewing the totality of the record as it impacts on the environment each parent can provide for the children, we agree with the district court's conclusion Jerod's and Bethany's best interests are served by placing their physical care with Russell.
Appellate Attorney Fees . No appellate attorney fees are awarded. Costs are assessed to the parties equally.
AFFIRMED.