Opinion
No. 1-1063 / 01-1207.
Filed May 15, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, DAVID H. SIVRIGHT, Jr., Judge.
Respondent appeals from the custody provisions of the decree dissolving the parties' marriage. AFFIRMED.
Patricia Zamora of Zamora, Taylor, Clark, Alexander Woods, Davenport, for appellant.
Douglas Scovil of Ruud, Scovil Marsh, Rock Island, Illinois, for appellee.
Considered by HUITINK, P.J., and VOGEL and EISENHAUER, JJ.
Bryce Heathman appeals from the custody provisions of the decree dissolving the parties' marriage. He contends the district court erred in awarding physical care of the parties' minor children to Lisa Heathman. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings . Lisa and Bryce Heathman were married in 1988 and have two minor children. Lisa filed a dissolution petition in July 2000 and was awarded temporary care of the children. Following trial, the court entered its decree awarding joint legal custody and physical care of the children to Lisa. The court found both parents to be competent and caring and noted the children had been doing well in school and at home in Lisa's care. Evaluating all the evidence, the court concluded Lisa is better able to provide for the long term needs and interests of the children because she "has demonstrated she is more capable of providing well-rounded care, and the loving discipline and guidance these children will need as they enter adolescence and their teenage years."
II. Evidence of Pre-trial Negotiations . Bryce argues the district court improperly allowed evidence of pre-trial negotiations into the record in violation of Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.408. Because our review is de novo, we disregard this evidence in our consideration of the issues. See In re Marriage of Williams, 303 N.W.2d 160, 163 (Iowa 1981).
Formerly Iowa Rule of Evidence 408.
III. Physical Care . We review a custody order de novo. In re Marriage of Murphy, 592 N.W.2d 681, 683 (Iowa 1999). We examine the entire record and adjudicate anew the parties' rights on the issues properly presented. See In re Marriage of Knickerbocker, 601 N.W.2d 48, 50-51 (Iowa 1999). In doing so, we give weight to the fact findings of the trial court, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, but we are not bound by them. Id. at 51.
Bryce has not provided a statement of the standard of review for each argument. He argues that doing so would be "redundant." He has also failed to state how each issue was preserved for our review. Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.14(1)(e) (formerly Rule 14(a)(5)) clearly states:
Each division of the argument shall begin with a discussion, citing relevant authority, concerning the scope or standard of appellate review (e.g. "on error," "abuse of discretion," "de novo") and shall state how the issue was preserved for review, with references to the places in the record where the issue was raised and decided.
Failure to adhere to the rules of appellate procedure can lead to summary disposition of an appeal. Myers v. Sellers, 234 N.W.2d 152, 154 (Iowa 1975).
In any custody determination, the primary consideration is the best interests of the children. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(o). The court's objective is to place the children in the environment most likely to bring them to healthy physical, mental, and social maturity. Murphy, 592 N.W.2d at 683. We identify numerous factors to help determine which parent should serve as the primary caretaker of the children in a divorce. See Iowa Code § 598.41(3) (2001). These include the characteristics of the parents, as well as the capacity and desire of each parent to provide for the needs of the children. Id.
Formerly Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 14(f)(15).
Bryce first contends the district court erred in considering the temporary care of the children as a factor in deciding long term physical care. Which party is awarded temporary physical care of the children is not a factor the district court is to consider in determining the final custody arrangement. See Iowa Code § 598.41; In re Marriage of Denly, 590 N.W.2d 48, 52 (Iowa 1999). However, we find the court did not improperly consider the temporary care award in granting Lisa physical care of the children. Instead, the court stated it had "given some consideration to the fact that the children have been doing very well in school, and at home from the time [Lisa] was awarded temporary primary physical care in August of last year to the present." The court then stated it evaluated all of the evidence and found Lisa to be more capable than Bryce of providing well-rounded care, loving discipline, and guidance to the children. There is no indication the court awarded primary physical care of the children to Lisa merely because she was awarded temporary physical care.
Bryce also contends the district court erred in its ruling on temporary care because it relied on the case of In re Marriage of Swanson, 586 N.W.2d 527, 529 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998). While Swanson was reversed in part by In re Marriage of Denly, 590 N.W.2d 48 (Iowa 1999), we note the provisions of Swanson to which the trial court cited were never addressed in Denly and have not been reversed.
Bryce contends reversal is warranted because the trial court failed to state any facts to support the custody award. However, the controlling issue on appeal concerns the correctness of the award of custody, not the lack of stated reasons. In re Marriage of Miller, 390 N.W.2d 596, 599 (Iowa 1986). Furthermore, Bryce did not address this issue in his motion under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2). While Bryce did file such a motion, it only sought reconsideration of the court's ruling on child support. Accordingly, we need not consider the absence of particular findings of fact or conclusions of law on appeal. See Miller, 390 N.W.2d at 599-600.
Formerly Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 179(b).
Bryce next contends the weight of the evidence does not support awarding primary physical care to Lisa. Upon de novo review of the record, we find no error in awarding primary physical care of the children to Lisa. During trial, Lisa and her witnesses testified that Bryce was a controlling husband and expected perfection from his wife and children. Meanwhile, Bryce and his witnesses testified that Lisa was often away from home on work or doing social activities. They likewise disagreed over who had responsibility for household work during the marriage. As the court observed, "each party was reduced to trying to inflate minor personality flaws of the other into glaring character deficits of a type which would preclude awarding primary physical care to the other party."
Bryce speculates the district court may have had an "inate (sic) bias toward women being the custodian of children." While such bias is clearly improper, see In re Marriage of Rebouche, 587 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998), Bryce cannot cite to any evidence the district court held such beliefs. Upon our review, we likewise find none.
In reviewing a district court's award of custody, we are not bound by its findings but give them deference because the district court had an opportunity to view the demeanor of the parties and evaluate them as custodians. In re Marriage of Cupples, 531 N.W.2d 656, 657 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). The district court found Lisa was "more capable of providing well-rounded care, and the loving discipline and guidance these children will need as they enter adolescence and their teenage years." Our review of the record supports this belief. Because the evidence supports the district court's award of primary physical care of the children to Lisa, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.