Opinion
No. 2-693 / 01-1880.
Filed December 11, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, GEORGE W. BERGESON, Judge.
Randy Beilke appeals the property division provisions of the decree dissolving his marriage to Mary Alice Beilke. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
David L. Brown of Hansen, McClintock Riley, Des Moines, for appellant.
Ronald Wheeler, Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by HECHT, P.J., and VAITHESWARAN and EISENHAUER, JJ.
Randy Beilke appeals from the property division provisions of his decree dissolving his marriage to Mary Alice Beilke. We affirm as modified and remand.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS. Randy and Mary Alice were married on November 8, 1985. Prior to the marriage, Mary Alice had purchased a home which was then used as the marital residence. Although Randy and Mary Alice lived together in the marital residence from the date of their marriage, Mary Alice was its sole owner until 1994. Mary Alice then conveyed to Randy a joint tenancy interest, and the parties borrowed money to build an addition to the home. During the marriage, Randy's parents gave the parties $8000 for the purpose of adding a deck which was never added to the house because the parties used the money to pay a tax. Randy's parents also loaned the parties money which they used during the marriage to retire the mortgage on the home. Randy and Mary Alice lived together until December 2000 when Randy moved out.
After trial, the district court filed findings of fact and a decree of dissolution of marriage on July 2, 2001. The court awarded the home to Mary Alice, but ordered her to reimburse Randy for the value of his interest in the home. The court determined the value of Randy's interest in the real estate was one-half of the appreciation of the home from 1994 until trial. The court found the fair market value of the home at the time of trial was $142,000. Mary Alice was ordered to pay to Randy's parents the unpaid balance of a loan used to retire the mortgage on the home.
The district court denied Randy's request that the $8000 gift from his parents be credited to him in the property division. Randy was ordered to pay Mary Alice $3466 for certain expenses she claimed to have paid after the parties' separation. The district court required Mary Alice to reimburse Randy for her share of a tax obligation that she paid from a joint account. The district court concluded it might be necessary to liquidate one or more the parties' investment accounts in order to effectuate an equitable division of the property. The court decreed that "[t]he division of these accounts shall be made by the parties' financial planner, with the assistance of the parties."
Randy filed a motion to enlarge, amend and modify the decree. This motion was denied and Randy appeals, alleging several errors: (1) the district court inequitably determined Randy's net equity in the home; (2) the court should have required Mary Alice to reimburse Randy for the gift from his parents; (3) the court should have required Mary Alice to pay off the loan from Randy's parents immediately; (4) the court should not have ordered Randy to reimburse Mary Alice for half the expenses incurred after Randy moved out of the house; and (5) the court incorrectly calculated the amount Mary Alice should have reimbursed Randy for her share of the tax obligation she paid from joint funds.
While this appeal was pending, Randy filed a motion with the supreme court alleging Mary Alice violated the decree by liquidating four jointly held mutual fund accounts. The motion alleged Mary Alice failed to consult Randy or the parties' financial planner and caused adverse financial and investment consequences by liquidating the accounts at a loss. The motion papers suggest Mary Alice placed the proceeds ($101,682.81) of the liquidated accounts in a money market mutual fund account.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW. We review the economic provisions of a dissolution decree de novo. Iowa R.App.P. 6.4. We examine the entire record and adjudicate anew the issues properly presented. In re Marriage of Steenhoek, 305 N.W.2d 448, 452 (Iowa 1981). We give the trial court's factual findings weight in considering the credibility of witnesses, although we are not bound by them. Iowa R.App.P. 6.14(6)(g); In re Marriage of Clinton, 579 N.W.2d 835, 838 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998). When distributing property in a dissolution, we must determine what is fair and equitable in each circumstance. In re Marriage of Miller, 552 N.W.2d 460, 463 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996).
III. THE VALUE OF RANDY'S INTEREST IN THE HOUSE. Randy alleges two errors by the district court in determining the value of his interest in the house: (1) the court should have measured the appreciation of the home's value from the date of the marriage in 1985 instead of from 1994 when Randy became a joint owner; and (2) the court's finding as to the home's fair market value at the time of trial was not supported by a preponderance of the credible evidence.
As noted above, the district court found Randy's interest in the home was equal to one-half of the increase in value from 1994 until trial date. We agree with Randy that his interest in the house should be calculated from the time of the marriage, not 1994. In re Marriage of Campbell, 451 N.W.2d 192, 195 (Iowa Ct.App. 1989). The fact that the house was not titled in Randy's name is not determinative. We find he expended effort in the improvement, maintenance and upkeep of the home during the first nine years of the marriage. See id. Randy's efforts during the entire marriage contributed to the increase in value of the home, and the appreciation in value should be measured from the date of the 1985 marriage. See id. We find the value of the home at the time of the marriage was $56,000
Although Mary Alice testified she replaced some of the windows in the house with new Pella windows before the marriage, it appears that the windows were replaced in only part of the house. Because we are unable to determine on this record either the extent of such improvements or the resulting increase, if any, in the property's fair market value, we find the purchase price paid by Mary Alice in 1983 is the most reliable evidence of the property value as of the date of the marriage.
Randy also contends the district court erred in finding the present fair market value of the home. In her financial statement, Mary Alice originally listed the value of the home at $142,000. At trial, she presented an appraisal which valued the home at $116,000. Randy offered in evidence an appraisal which valued the home at $160,000. Polk County valued the home at $131,700 for tax purposes. The district court found the property's fair market value is $142,000. We find the district court's valuation of $142,000 is within the permissible range of the evidence, and adopt it as our own.
We, therefore, find the value of Randy's interest in the house should be calculated as follows: $142,000 — $56,000 — $5,600 = $80,400 / 2 = $40,200.
IV. THE $8000 GIFT FROM RANDY'S PARENTS. Randy argues he should have been given credit for an $8000 gift from his parents during the marriage. He contends this was a gift to him and should be set aside when dividing the marital property. Gifts or inheritances received by one party during marriage are not subject to division unless failure to do so would be unjust. Iowa Code § 598.21(2) (2001); see In re Marriage of Wertz, 492 N.W.2d 711, 713 (Iowa Ct.App. 1992). When determining whether gifts given to the parties during the marriage constitute marital property and should be divided upon dissolution, two factors control: (1) the intent of the donor and (2) the circumstances surrounding the inheritance or gift. Wertz, 492 N.W.2d at 714.
The preponderance of the evidence establishes that Randy's parents gave the $8000 to both Randy and Mary Alice. The donors' intent was to pay for the construction of a deck on the marital home owned jointly by the parties. We find it significant that Randy testified the $8000 was given to "us." We find no error in the district court's determination that Randy should not receive a credit for this gift.
V. THE DEBT OWED TO RANDY'S PARENTS. Randy contends the district court should have ordered Mary Alice to pay off immediately the remaining $5600 owed to his parents. The court did order Mary Alice to assume this debt, but did not specify when the debt should be paid. The record shows Mary Alice is currently paying $425.26 per month to Randy's parents to retire the debt. We reject Randy's request to accelerate the obligation and therefore affirm the district court on this issue.
VI. MARY ALICE'S EXPENSES FROM DECEMBER 2000 UNTIL TRIAL. Randy argues he should not be required to reimburse Mary Alice for half the expenses incurred by her after the parties separated in December of 2000. He contends the handwritten list of expenses submitted by Mary Alice at trial is insufficient to support the award of expenses against him. After reviewing the record, we find the list was received in evidence without objection, and there is no claim that the underlying documentation was requested by Randy and not produced by Mary Alice. We find the district court's award was equitable and affirm on this issue.
VII. REIMBURSEMENT OF TAXES. In 2000, the Beilkes incurred an unexpected tax obligation of $9558. Randy paid $4779 from his personal account, and Mary Alice paid $4779 from a joint account. The district court ordered Mary Alice to reimburse Randy in the amount of $2389. Randy contends the district court should have ordered Mary Alice to pay him $4779 to reimburse him for her expenditure of funds from the joint account. We disagree. Because Mary Alice paid her one-half of the joint tax obligation from a joint account, the district court correctly ordered her to reimburse Randy in the amount of $2389. Having found no inequity in the district court's resolution, we affirm on this issue.
VIII. MOTION FOR LIMITED REMAND. In his motion for limited remand, Randy asks that we remand the case to the district court for fact-finding regarding Mary Alice's liquidation of jointly held investment accounts. We conclude the merits of this appeal can and should be resolved without a limited remand. Our ruling on the motion is, however, without prejudice to Randy's claim against Mary Alice for the alleged violation of the decree.
IX. CONCLUSION. We overrule Randy's motion for limited remand without prejudice to his claim against Mary Alice for alleged violation of the decree. We modify the district court's decree to the extent that the value of Randy's interest in the house is calculated from the property's appreciation between the date of marriage and the date of trial. Because we find the fair market value of the house at the time of the marriage was $56,000, we modify the decree to provide that the sum of $40,200 shall be deducted from Mary Alice's share of the jointly held accounts and paid to Randy for his share of the equity in the house. We affirm on all other issues raised.