Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J06-01968
Swager, J.
Appellant Teresa M. appeals the order of the juvenile court denying her reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6), and denying visitation with respect to her daughter T.H. We affirm.
All subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
T.H. was born in May 2003. Her parents were married following her birth, but separated soon afterwards. T.H. lived with her mother and her eight-year-old half-brother, R.D.
T.H.’s father is not a party to this appeal.
On October 27, 2006, R.D. died, allegedly as a result of ongoing torture and abuse inflicted on him by appellant. The abuses she purportedly committed against her son are horrific to recount, and include daily use of a high-pressure power hose to wash his feces off his body; forcing him to soak in a long, rectangular tub of his own urine, feces, and Pine-Sol in an effort to deter his urination and defecation behaviors; restraining him with a nylon cord around his wrists, arms and legs; keeping him locked in his bedroom while she watched him through a video monitor; and hitting him with a belt and her hands. At the time of his death, his body was covered with multiple scars, sores, and abrasions. T.H. was taken into protective custody by the Contra Costa County Children and Family Services Bureau (Bureau) following appellant’s arrest for allegedly causing R.D.’s death.
The Contra Costa County Sheriff’s Department, Coroner’s Division found evidence of 37 separate injuries on R.D.’s body, including multiple “train track” contusions, and ulceration of the skin on his genitals.
On November 3, 2006, the juvenile court ordered T.H. detained. The court authorized visitation for T.H.’s father. Appellant was denied visitation.
On May 3, 2007, the Bureau filed its third amended petition under section 300. The petition alleged that T.H. came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), (c), (d), and (j). Citing to the litany of abuses suffered by R.D., the petition alleged that T.H. was at substantial risk of serious physical harm from her mother. The petition also alleged that T.H. was suffering from severe emotional damage as a result of having been exposed to R.D.’s ongoing torture, and that she was presently exhibiting symptoms consistent with depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress.
On June 13, 2007, the Bureau filed its jurisdiction report. The report reveals that if asked to testify, appellant would state she had kept R.D. imprisoned in his bedroom. The windows were locked and the room was equipped with three motion detectors, designed to alert her if he attempted to get off of his bed or go near the door or window. A camera was also installed in his room, which fed video and sound to the video monitor in appellant’s bedroom. She would spray R.D. with cold water from a pressure hose, and would sometimes force him to soak in a long, rectangular tub of his own urine, feces, and Pine-Sol. She also liquefied his food in a blender and feed it to him in a cup. Appellant admitted that on the date of R.D.’s death she had sprayed him with cold water and poured Pine-Sol on his genitals.
The jurisdiction report also states T.H.’s foster parent would testify that T.H. was easily startled and frightened. She would cry silently, often for no apparent reason. She appeared to be afraid of doing anything wrong and said “I’m sorry” a lot. She would obsessively lock all the doors. She had difficulty going to bed and experienced frequent nightmares. She would not get out of bed in the morning unless someone gave her permission and she would urinate, defecate, and/or vomit in bed rather than get out of bed on her own. While in foster care, she had never mentioned her mother. She sometimes made reference to R.D., calling him “The Boy.”
At the jurisdiction hearing held on June 13, 2007, appellant submitted the matter based on the Bureau’s report, as modified by the juvenile court. The court adjudged T.H. a juvenile dependent pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm), (b) (failure to protect), (c) (serious emotional harm), and (j) (abuse of sibling).
On July 10, 2007, the Bureau submitted its disposition report to the juvenile court. The report states that on the evening of R.D.’s death, appellant shut T.H. in appellant’s bedroom while she attempted to revive R.D. before calling emergency personnel. The video monitor was on during this time, making it likely that T.H. witnessed the events. The report states that due to the severity of appellant’s criminal charges the Bureau had been prohibited from having any further communication or contact with her during this dependency proceeding. The report notes that some of T.H.’s early emotional and behavioral struggles were decreasing in frequency and severity as she was becoming more secure in her foster placement. The Bureau stated its belief that any visitation between T.H. and appellant would be “tremendously detrimental” to the child’s welfare, reporting that T.H. is “clearly traumatized at the simple mention of [appellant’s] name.”
At the disposition hearing held on August 20, 2007, appellant presented no affirmative evidence to contradict the evidence as set forth in the disposition report. The juvenile court denied reunification services to appellant under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6). This appeal followed.
Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6), provides, in pertinent part, “Reunification services need not be provided to a parent or guardian described in this subdivision when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, any of the following: [¶] . . . [¶] (6) That the child has been adjudicated a dependent pursuant to any subdivision of Section 300 as a result of . . . the infliction of severe physical harm to the child, a sibling, or a half sibling by a parent or guardian, as defined in this subdivision, and the court makes a factual finding that it would not benefit the child to pursue reunification services with the offending parent or guardian. [¶] . . . [¶] A finding of the infliction of severe physical harm, for the purposes of this subdivision, may be based on, but is not limited to, deliberate and serious injury inflicted to or on a child’s body or the body of a sibling or half sibling of the child by an act or omission of the parent or guardian, or of another individual or animal with the consent of the parent or guardian; deliberate and torturous confinement of the child, sibling, or half sibling in a closed space; or any other torturous act or omission that would be reasonably understood to cause serious emotional damage.”
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends that a failure by the juvenile court to make express findings required by section 361.5, subdivision (i), before denying reunification services constitutes reversible error. She further contends that the court’s decision to deny visitation was an abuse of discretion. Her contentions lack any merit.
I. Denial of Reunification Services
Preliminarily, we address the Bureau’s argument that appellant waived her claim of error regarding the juvenile court’s order under section 361.5. The Bureau notes that appellant submitted on the jurisdiction report and raised only two concerns at the disposition. Specifically, she pointed out that she had asked for help with R.D. for two years prior to his death and had not received it. She also objected to certain personal comments made by the social worker in the disposition report. She did not object to the denial of reunification services, which the Bureau argues constitutes a waiver of her right to appeal. We decline to find a waiver and proceed to evaluate appellant’s claim on the merits.
Ordinarily, “[f]amily reunification services play a ‘[critical] role’ in dependency proceedings.” (In re Alanna A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 555, 563.) Unless a specific statutory exception applies, the court must provide services designed to reunify the family within the statutory time period. (§ 361.5, subd. (a); see In re Alanna A., supra, at pp. 563–564.) “Limited exceptions to this general rule—termed reunification bypass provisions—are listed in section 361.5, subdivision (b). [Citations.] Once it is determined that one of these bypass provisions applies, ‘ “the general rule favoring reunification is replaced by a legislative assumption that offering [reunification] services would be an unwise use of governmental resources.” ’ [Citations.]” (Mardardo F. v. Superior Court (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 481, 485.) At the disposition hearing, before it may deny reunification services to a parent, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the subdivisions described in section 361.5, subdivision (b) apply. (Tyrone W. v. Superior Court (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 839, 845–846.)
This case is governed by section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) which provides that a court need not grant reunification services to a parent or guardian if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent or guardian, by an act or omission, inflicted deliberate and serious injury on a child’s body or that of a sibling or half-sibling or perpetrated any other torturous act or omission producing serious emotional damage, “and the court makes a factual finding that it would not benefit the child to pursue reunification services with the offending parent or guardian.” Subdivision (c) prohibits the court from ordering reunification for a parent who has inflicted severe physical harm on the child or the child’s sibling under subdivision (b)(6) “unless the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the child.” Subdivision (h) requires the court to consider “any information it deems relevant” in determining whether reunification services will benefit a child under subdivision (b)(6) and offers a non-exclusive list of six factors for the court to consider, including the specific act or omission constituting abuse, the circumstances of the abuse, the severity of emotional trauma to the victim, any history of abuse by the parent, the likelihood that a child may be returned to the parent within 12 months, and the child’s wishes regarding reunification. The dependency court has broad discretion in determining whether offering a parent reunification services would be in a child’s best interest. (In re Angelique C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 509, 523.)
We review “an order denying reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b) for substantial evidence.” (Cheryl P. v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 87, 96.) If, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the juvenile court, we uphold those findings. We do not consider the credibility of witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the evidence or evaluate the weight of the evidence. Instead, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings, view the record favorably to the juvenile court’s order, and affirm the order even if there is substantial evidence supporting a contrary finding. The parent has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the finding or order. (In re L. Y. L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.)
Initially we note that appellant does not expressly challenge the juvenile court’s earlier jurisdictional findings. One of these findings established jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (c). It found that T.H. “is suffering severe emotional damage as a result of residing in her mother’s care and custody. The child was exposed to the ongoing torture of the child’s half-sibling, [R.D.], whom [sic] ultimately died from his injuries. The child is now exhibiting symptoms consistent with depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress.” Jurisdiction was also established under section 300, subdivision (j), based on the findings that R.D. died after appellant had (1) kept him locked in his room, (2) forced him to sit in a tub of his own urine, feces and Pine-Sol, (3) restrained him with a nylon cord tied around his wrists, arms and legs, and (4) hit him with her hand and with a belt hard enough to leave welt marks on his body. The existence of these findings was a proper basis for the court to refuse to extend reunification services to appellant pursuant to the section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6). (See In re Rebekah R. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1638, 1652 (Rebekah R.).)
Appellant argues that the juvenile court failed to make findings required under section 361.5, subdivision (i), necessary to deny reunification services under subdivision (b)(6). Section 361.5, subdivision (i) provides: “The court shall read into the record the basis for a finding of . . . the infliction of severe physical harm under paragraph (6) of subdivision (b), and shall also specify the factual findings used to determine that the provision of reunification services to the offending parent or guardian would not benefit the child.” Appellant complains that the court “did not specify what facts that it relied on, or state them on the record as required, or give the reasons for its decision.” Her complaint is not well taken.
At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court denied appellant reunification services, stating the following: “I will adopt all the recommendations [of the disposition report] and make them findings and orders of court, find that there’s clear and convincing evidence that [R.D.], the sibling, suffered severe physical harm as a result of the mother, and so it would not benefit [T.H.] to pursue reunification services with the mother. So I will not grant reunification services with mother.” Appellant’s objection that the court’s language is “vague” with respect to what she had done to R.D. is not viable and ignores the record before the court. It is abundantly clear from the above statement that the court had read the report and that it adopted by reference the recommendations and findings contained therein.
Appellant also claims that the court “failed to demonstrate that it had considered and weighed the evidence itself, and failed to make its own findings known, thus frustrating any response or meaningful review.” We perceive no error. Appellant submitted to the evidence contained in the Bureau’s reports, including the many pages devoted to recounting the prolonged and severe abuse she committed against R.D., as well as the emotional trauma suffered by T.H. as a result of having witnessed this abuse. She offered no evidence, by witness testimony or otherwise, at any time during the proceeding to counter the evidence presented by the Bureau. Accordingly, the court was not required to detail the basis for its ruling on the record. The evidence before the court was overwhelming and clearly could lead to only one conclusion.
In support of her argument that the court erred by failing to express the details of its reasoning, appellant cites Rebekah R., supra. That case, however, is inapposite. In Rebekah R., the dependency court had found that reunification services would not benefit the child without first finding any facts sufficient to support section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) or even to invoke that subdivision. (Rebekah R., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th 1638, 1651–1652.) On review, the appellate court noted that “subdivision (i) of section 361.5 all but states that an on-the-record finding of severe sexual abuse or severe physical harm is required, in addition to an appropriate express finding concerning the lack of benefit to the child.” (Id. at p. 1651.) The court found error because the record did not reveal “any explicit finding by the juvenile court that [the minor] suffered severe sexual abuse or severe physical harm within the scope of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6).” (Id. at p. 1652.)
Here, the court did state it found “clear and convincing evidence that [R.D.], the sibling, suffered severe physical harm as a result of the mother” and that providing reunification services for appellant would not inure to her daughter’s benefit. Under the circumstances of this case, including the uncontested evidentiary record, these findings are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 361.5, subdivision (i).
We note the appellate court that decided Rebekah R. clarified its holding in a subsequent case in response to arguments similar to those advanced by appellant here: “We did not hold [in Rebekah R.] that absent explicit findings we could not uphold a denial under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6). Indeed, in the next portion of our opinion, we reiterated the pertinent rule of appellate review, that is, we will infer a necessary finding provided the implicit finding is supported by substantial evidence.” (In re S.G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1260.)
Finally, even if the court did err, the error was not prejudicial. As our recitation of the facts demonstrates, it is difficult to imagine a more compelling case for ordering a bypass of reunification services. The evidence supporting the court’s decision is not just substantial, it is overpowering. It is not reasonably probable that the decision would have been rendered in favor of appellant had the court detailed the factual basis for its findings.
II. The Denial of Visitation
Appellant claims that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying visitation with T.H. Her claim fails.
We review the denial of visitation under the abuse of discretion standard. (In re J.N. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 450, 458–459.) “The abuse of discretion standard warrants that we apply a very high degree of deference to the decision of the juvenile court.” (Id. at p. 459.)
In adopting the recommendation contained in the disposition report, the juvenile court found that “contact or visitation between [T.H. and appellant] would be detrimental to the child” and ordered that there be no contact or visitation. The Bureau strongly opposed visitation with appellant because of its fear that contact with her mother would aggravate T.H.’s emotional problems. Appellant contends that visitation would provide T.H. with “answers and closure.” What those “answers and closure” might be are not explained – perhaps because there is no rationale explanation. Given T.H.’s young age, we seriously doubt that contact with appellant would help her process the tragic events she has experienced. In any event, “the court may deny visitation to an incarcerated parent who has been denied reunification services, even in the absence of any showing that continued visitation would be detrimental to the child.” (In re J.N., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th 450, 460.) We find no abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The dispositional orders denying appellant reunification services and denying visitation with T.H. are affirmed.
We concur: Marchiano, P. J., Margulies, J.