Opinion
20A-JT-1560
02-03-2021
In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: J.E., A.E., and B.E. (Minor Children) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner. and J.E. (Father), Appellant-Respondent,
Attorney for Appellant Joel C. Wieneke Wieneke Law Office, LLC Brooklyn, Indiana Attorneys for Appellee Indiana Department of Child Services Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Robert J. Henke Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
Appeal from the Putnam Circuit Court Nos. 67C01-2002-JT-7, 67C01-2002-JT-8, 67C01-2002-JT-9 The Hon. Matthew L Headley, Judge
Attorney for Appellant Joel C. Wieneke Wieneke Law Office, LLC Brooklyn, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee Indiana Department of Child Services Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Robert J. Henke Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
BRADFORD, CHIEF JUDGE
Case Summary
[¶1] J.E. ("Father") appeals the juvenile court's termination of his parental rights to J.E. (born March 17, 2003), A.E. (born September 29, 2005), and B.E. (born April 24, 2007) (collectively, "the Children"), which he had with their biological mother ("Mother") (collectively, "Parents"). Father contends that the Indiana Department of Child Services ("DCS") failed to produce sufficient evidence to satisfy the statutory requirements for the termination of his parental rights to Children. Because we disagree, we affirm.
Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to the Children and does not participate in this appeal.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] On November 30, 2016, the juvenile court authorized DCS to file a petition alleging that the Children, who were then living with Mother and the Children's stepfather, were children in need of services ("CHINS") after thirteen-year-old J.E. reported being touched in a sexual manner by her stepfather while she was in the bathtub and that he was taking pictures of her, as well as concerns "with food and lice in the home." Ex. Vol. p. 49. On January 12, 2017, the juvenile court held a hearing at which it found that "[a]n admission of the allegations of the petition having been entered, the [Children] are now adjudicated [CHINS]." Ex. Vol. p. 75. At this point, the Children were placed with Father on a trial home visit. The juvenile court did not specifically order services for Father.
[¶3] By March 10, 2017, DCS had removed the Children from Father's home, and at a March 13, 2017, hearing, the juvenile court ordered that the Children's placement changed to a foster home. The reasons for the Children's removal from Father's care included:
• There was "a lot of chaos, disruption and dysfunction in the home[;]"
• J.E. was having inappropriate contact with a seventeen-year-old male;
• Father's girlfriend ("Girlfriend") was acting inappropriately with the Children;
• Father had missed J.E.'s therapist intake appointment;
• A naked video of nine-year-old male B.E. taken by Girlfriend had been posted on Facebook;
• J.E. and A.E. were heard talking about "doing inappropriate sexual acts to other children[;]"
• Girlfriend was "touching tongues" with another female around fifteen years old, and allowed J.E. to do the same with another female;
• Father lost his job due to calling off work to be with Girlfriend;
• J.E. had told her therapist that Father had lost his housing and he and the Children had moved into a motel with Girlfriend;
• When Father did have a home, there was no heat; and
• J.E.'s therapist did not believe Father was an appropriate caregiver.
Ex. Vol. p. 68. Father was "uninvolved and absent from the case for 8 months" following the Children's removal from his home. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 95. On November 22, 2017, the juvenile court held a permanency hearing after which it found that Father was not complying with the Children's case plan. The juvenile court changed the permanency plan to a concurrent plan including both reunification and adoption.
[¶4] On February 20, 2018, at a review hearing, the juvenile court found that Father's visitation had been suspended due to J.E. "making an admission of sexual abuse perpetrated by him." Ex. Vol. p. 98. The juvenile court also found that DCS had reported that Father had failed a voice stress test regarding the sexual allegations. On March 22, 2018, the juvenile court held a hearing regarding Father reestablishing visitation after J.E. recanted the allegations of Father sexually abusing her. Despite the recantation, the juvenile court granted DCS's motion for Father to undergo a psychosexual evaluation and for him to have therapeutic supervised visitation with the Children.
[¶5] On May 22, 2018, the juvenile court held a review hearing, after which it found that "Father is participating in services and visitation, but still faces challenges to reunification" and that "Father is not yet ready to assume full-time parenting responsibilities." Ex. Vol. pp. 109, 110. On August 23, 2018, the juvenile court held a permanency hearing and found that Father had "partially complied with the [C]hildren's case plan" and "participated in services, but still lacks a home for the children, and has not progressed enough for a trial home visit to occur." Ex. Vol. p. 105. The permanency plan remained a concurrent plan for reunification and adoption.
[¶6] On November 27, 2018, the juvenile court held a combined dispositional and review hearing and effectively found that its January 12, 2017, order of no services for Father had been a mistake. The juvenile court ordered Father into services with the goal of providing the Children "with a safe, secure and nurturing environment that is free from abuse and neglect and be an effective caregiver who possesses the necessary skills, knowledge and abilities to provide the children with this type of environment on a long-term basis to provide the children with permanency." Ex. Vol. p. 117.
[¶7] Throughout the case, DCS worked with Father to address his parenting issues, including working with Father in applying for benefits from the Bureau of Developmental Disabilities Services ("BDDS") to address his cognitive issues, which would have provided him long-term assistance beyond any DCS involvement. Father, however, was not approved for BDDS. DCS offered Father, inter alia, individual therapy, homebased case management, child and family team meetings, assistance in applying for BDDS, and parenting education. Even after Father reappeared eight months after the sexual abuse allegations arose, DCS again offered Father services including to help with housing, case management, parenting education, therapy, budgeting, employment, and family therapy. DCS also helped Father obtain an apartment and with funds and provided two trial home visits, with the second trial failing in the summer of 2019. Father never requested other or different services. Due to his cognitive issues, however, Father was unable to benefit from the services offered to him.
[¶8] Meanwhile, in the juvenile court's order of March 4, 2019, it found that Father was complying with the Children's case plan, i.e., that he was "working, visiting, and participating in services." Ex. Vol. p. 120. On April 29, 2019, the juvenile court approved a transition plan for Father and the Children to "proceed through unsupervised and overnight visits." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 92. On May 8, 2019, the juvenile court approved a trial home visit with two of the three Children because J.E. "still needed intensive inpatient therapy." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 92. During the time of the trial home visit, DCS provided the family with services multiple times a week to help make it successful. Contrary to the safety plan, Father permitted Girlfriend to be around the Children, and DCS requested the Children's detention, which was later vacated to try to salvage the trial home visit.
[¶9] On August 2, 2019, the parties entered into an agreed order on trial home visit. The agreed order provided, in part, as follows:
Father is EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED from allowing any person who has alleged to have neglected, sexually abused, or otherwise perpetrated against any of the [C]hildren in this matter around his children, including but not limited to [Girlfriend]. SECOND, only Father and the [C]hildren are permitted to spend the night or reside in the home for the duration of the Trial Home visit. THIRD, Father is not to personally, nor permit others to, instruct the children to lie, hide facts or otherwise be untruthful with the FCM, the CASA, or any providers. FINALLY, Father is ordered to fully disclose his bills and financial information to DCS, service providers and the CASA.Ex. Vol. p. 130.
[¶10] By August 22, 2019, however, the juvenile court held a hearing and approved the Children's removal due to Father's "inability, refusal or neglect to provide shelter, care, and/or supervision at the present time" to the Children. Ex. Vol. p. 131. The juvenile court granted Father the right to "exercise supervised visitation with the children[.]" Ex. Vol. p. 132. The juvenile court also ordered that once the Children's therapists "find it appropriate for family therapy to begin, then the family shall begin therapy." Ex. Vol. p. 132. Father was to "begin engaging in more intensive services with DCS." Ex. Vol. p. 132.
[¶11] On October 29, 2019, the juvenile court held a permanency hearing, and changed the permanency plan to adoption only. At the same time, Father's visits were "restricted to therapeutic visits until such time that the treating therapist deems it appropriate to move towards supervised visitation." Ex. Vol. p. 135. The juvenile court also granted DCS "permission to begin preparing child summaries for the adoption process." Ex. Vol. p. 136. The juvenile court again ordered Father to "not ask, encourage, or aide the children in keeping secrets or hiding information from the FCM, therapists, placement, or any service provider. If Father is found to violate this Court Order, Father's parenting time is subject to being suspended and Father is subject to a sanction of jail time." Ex. Vol. p. 136. On January 23 and June 23, 2020, the juvenile court held separate review hearings and at each found that Father had only partially complied with the Children's case plan and had only partially enhanced his ability to parent.
[¶12] Meanwhile, on February 14, 2020, DCS had petitioned to terminate Parents' parental rights to the Children. On July 13, 2020, the juvenile court held a termination hearing, at which Mother voluntarily terminated her parental rights to the Children. Father's brother testified that Father had known of the Children's sexual abuse at Mother's home prior to their removal from Mother's home but had failed to report it because "he didn't want to rock the boat[.]" Tr. Vol. II p. 135. Specifically, J.E. testified that she had disclosed her sexual abuse in the summer of 2016 to Girlfriend during a trip to Holiday World, and that Father had learned about the abuse during the same trip. Father told J.E. that he would contact his brother, but Father's brother testified he had not learned of the abuse until the weekend of Thanksgiving 2016 and had reported it to authorities the following Monday. Father's brother testified that prior to DCS involvement Father had resided with him and his wife and that when the Children visited at their home, it was he and his wife who had been the Children's caregivers, not Father.
[¶13] Emily Johns worked with Father and the Children from the fall of 2017 until February of 2020, providing parent-education services, supervised-visitation services, and homemaking services. Johns attempted to help Father with his finances, but Father was not always honest with her about his financial situation. Johns also attempted to help Father with his personal hygiene, speaking with him about showering, washing his clothing, brushing his teeth, and cleaning himself after bowel movements. Father had a noticeable body odor, and Johns noticed bedbugs on his clothing. Johns had discovered Girlfriend in Father's residence during an unannounced visit on July 4, 2019. Johns testified that the Children had looked concerned and worried when she discovered Girlfriend, and that "the atmosphere was very tense." Tr. Vol. II p. 178.
[¶14] In August of 2019, Ursula Taylor took over for Johns, and Taylor continued to work with Father as a homemaker at the time of the termination hearing. During the Covid-19 emergency measures from March to April or May of 2020, Taylor had continued to work with Father remotely. When Taylor went back to working with Father personally, however, she discovered that his housing conditions had deteriorated. Taylor testified that Father had a continuing need for her services.
[¶15] Anthony Coleman, the therapist who began seeing Father in July of 2019, testified that Father had been "dishonest" and "evasive" with him and that he "d[id]n't know if [he] could trust [Father] to keep the [C]hidren safe outside of DCS's involvement." Tr. Vol. II pp. 125, 126. Coleman adjusted how he worked with Father based on his cognitive abilities, including reading to him, providing him videos, role-playing with him, and providing verbal explanations. While Coleman testified that he supported a continued relationship between Father and the Children, he opined that Father should not be the primary caregiver.
[¶16] DCS family case manager Krista Scobee ("FCM Scobee") was assigned to the case on November 28, 2016, and testified that there had been significant evidence of sexual abuse throughout the case. FCM Scobee testified that while Father had appeared to understand why the Children had been removed from his care in March of 2017-including issues of homelessness, letting his thirteen-year-old daughter sleep with Girlfriend's seventeen-year-old son, ongoing hygiene issues, and moving the Children to a hotel to live with Girlfriend-he continued to make poor choices.
[¶17] FCM Kristina Williams took over the case in October of 2018 and testified that Father's history included poor decisions related to the women in his life, lying to the Children and her, and allowing persons who had abused the Children to be around them. In 2019, FCM Williams learned that Father had been in contact with Mother, who was incarcerated at the time. Father admitted that his telephone calls with Mother during this time were sexual in nature and that he and Mother had discussed getting back together. Father had tried to hide this relationship from everyone, including the Children. According to FCM Williams, Father had not achieved the goals laid out in the disposition, that his continuation as the Children's parent posed a threat to them, and that he could not provide them with an environment in which they could thrive due to his poor decisions.
[¶18] FCM Williams testified that Father's inability to benefit from services prevented him from remedying the reasons for Children's removal. For these same reasons, FCM Williams testified that Father remaining in a parenting role was a threat to the Children's well-being. Father's poor decisions "led to unsafe circumstances and have twice caused the Children to be removed" from his care. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 100. Father is a danger in the parenting role because he cannot maintain a safe home even when "completely surrounded by services [.]" Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 100. FCM Williams testified that all three of the Children were thriving in their current foster placements and recommend termination of Father's parental rights with a permanency plan of adoption of B.E. and A.E. by their foster mother Emily Yaw. FCM Williams opined that due to J.E.'s age, "collaborative care or something of that nature" might be her recommended placement for her. Tr. Vol. II p. 84.
[¶19] J.E. testified that she was doing well at her current placement with the Kessler family, she calls her foster parents "[m]om and dad[, ]" they provide her what she needs, and she wanted to stay there. Tr. Vol. II p. 193. J.E.'s therapist Jen Green testified that she "needs a controlled environment [with] very strict and very outlined limits and boundaries." Tr. Vol. II p. 116. According to Green, J.E. had been frustrated with Father's dishonesty and had struggled to trust that Father could take care of her needs and had no concerns with J.E.'s current placement with the Kesslers. B.E.'s therapist opined that he needed consistency, nurturing, and love, which is what Yaw provided him. Child B.E. needed stability, and any further moves would traumatize him. A.E.'s therapist testified that A.E. had told her that she wished to stay with Yaw rather that return to Father's care.
[¶20] Court-appointed special advocate Suzy Freeman ("CASA Freeman") was appointed in June of 2017 and spent over 1000 hours on the case. CASA Freeman testified that she did not support Father continuing to have a parent-child relationship with the Children and that J.E. and A.E. had made it clear they wanted to be adopted. Although B.E. had at times indicated a preference to go back to Father's care, he had also indicated that he would like to be with Yaw if that were not possible. CASA Freeman opined that termination followed by adoption was in the Children's best interests.
[¶21] On August 7, 2020, the juvenile court issued its order terminating Father's parental rights to the Children, which provided, in part, as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
[...]
125. The cumulative testimony from FCMs and service providers reveals that the conditions that led to removal have not been remedied.
126. The cumulative testimony from FCMs and service providers reveals that continuing in the parent/child relationship poses a threat to each of the Children's wellbeing.
[...]
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
[...]
6. In applying the law to this case, the Court expressly finds by clear and convincing evidence that termination is appropriate and justified.
7. In applying the law to this case, the Court expressly finds by clear and convincing evidence that each Child's continuing emotional and physical development would be harmed by a return to Father.
8. In applying the law to this case, the Court expressly finds by clear and convincing evidence that there is a substantial probability of future neglect by Father.
9. In applying the law to this case, the Court expressly finds by clear and convincing evidence that the conditions that resulted in each Child's placement outside the home have not been remedied. Specifically, the Children were removed from Father for issues relating to his poor life choices with women and issues surrounding hygiene and self care. Two years later, and despite intense services, the Children were again removed from Father for issues relating to his poor life choices with women and he continues to have significant issues with hygiene and self care. Even today, almost a year after this last removal, Father continues to demonstrate significant issues with hygiene and self care.
10. In applying the law to this case, the Court expressly finds by clear and convincing evidence that despite his best intentions, Father is likely to fail the Children again.
11. In applying the law to this case, the Court expressly finds by clear and convincing evidence that reunification cannot be safely achieved at this time.
Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 90, 104-05, 106, 108-09.
Discussion and Decision
[¶22] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 145 (Ind. 2005). Moreover, we acknowledge that the parent-child relationship is "one of the most valued relationships of our culture." Id. However, although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their responsibilities as parents. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001), trans. Denied. Therefore, parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the children's interests in determining the appropriate disposition of a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. Id. The Indiana Supreme Court has made clear that the "purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish parents, but to protect the children." Egly v. Blackford Cnty. Dep't. of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1234-35 (Ind. 1992). The Egly Court also explained that "[a]lthough parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their responsibilities as parents." Id. at 1234. Termination of parental rights is proper where the children's emotional and physical development is threatened. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d at 773. The juvenile court need not wait until the children are irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.
[¶23] In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, this court will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Invol. Term. of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004). We only consider the evidence that supports the juvenile court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the juvenile court includes findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights, our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and, second, whether the findings support the legal conclusions. Id. In deference to the juvenile court's unique position to assess the evidence, we set aside the juvenile court's findings and judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.
[¶24] Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) governs what DCS must allege and establish to support the termination of parental rights, and, for purposes of our disposition, that was:
(A)that [t]he child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) months under a dispositional decree[;]
[....]
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied [or]
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.
[....]
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). Because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, DCS need only establish one of the circumstances described in the subsection, two of which are listed above. Father contends that DCS failed to establish that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal or the reasons for placement outside Father's home will not be remedied, there is a reasonable probability that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the Children, and termination is in the Children's best interests.
I. Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i)
[¶25] Father argues that DCS has failed to establish that there is a reasonable probability that the reasons for the Children's continued removal would not be remedied. In making such a determination, a juvenile court engages in a two-step inquiry. First, the juvenile court must "ascertain what conditions led to their placement and retention in foster care." K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). After identifying these initial conditions, the juvenile court must determine whether a reasonable probability exists that the conditions justifying the children's continued "placement outside the home will not be remedied." In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 266 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004) (citation omitted). The statute focuses not only on the initial reasons for removal "but also those bases resulting in continued placement outside the home." In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 806 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005), trans. denied. In making this second determination, the juvenile court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 266. DCS need not rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it must establish that there is a reasonable probability that the parent's behavior will not change. In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 18-19 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008), trans. denied.
[¶26] The initial reasons for the Children's removal from Mother's home were concerns about sexual abuse of J.E. and other inappropriate behavior by her stepfather and concerns about unsanitary conditions in the home. Unfortunately, the Children would be also be removed from Father's home within months for conditions that, if anything, were more troubling, including chaos, J.E. being allowed to have inappropriate contact with a seventeen-year-old boy, Girlfriend acting inappropriately with the Children, Girlfriend taking and posting online a naked video of B.E., Father losing his job and housing, and Father moving the Children into a motel with Girlfriend.
[¶27] As for the juvenile court's determination that the conditions that justified the continued removal of the Children were not likely to the remedied, subsection (B)(i) of the statute focuses not only on the initial reasons for removal, "but also those bases resulting in continued placement outside the home." In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013) (citation omitted); Matter of K.T., 137 N.E.3d 317, 327 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019) ("A trial court may consider conditions that emerge subsequent to initial removal and that would justify continued removal"). In making this second determination, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for her children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. Matter of G.M., 71 N.E.3d 898, 908 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017). A parent's habitual patterns of conduct must also be evaluated to determine the probability of future negative behaviors. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1234.
[¶28] To summarize the juvenile court's relevant findings, the trial court found that Father was aware of abuse while the Children were in Mother's care but did nothing, allowed abuse and inappropriate behavior to continue when the Children were in his care, was unable to benefit from services due to cognitive issues, continued to expose them to persons who had abused them or treated them inappropriately, struggled with personal hygiene, and continued to make poor decisions about his partners. Father does not challenge any of these findings, arguing that the Children's issues while in his care were a result of their mistreatment while in Mother's care and that he remedied the reasons for their continued placement outside his care. Father's first argument is premised on what can only be described as a gross mischaracterization of the record. There is ample evidence that the Children's mistreatment continued-and perhaps worsened-under Father's care, but none to suggest Mother's earlier mistreatment of them had anything to do with it. Moreover, to the extent that Father's argument that he made progress may be supported by evidence in the record, the juvenile court was under no obligation to credit such evidence, and apparently did not. Father's argument in this regard amounts to nothing more than a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879. The juvenile court did not clearly err in concluding that the reasons for the Children's removal were not likely to be remedied.
Because of our disposition of this claim, we need not address Father's claim that the juvenile court erred in concluding that there is reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the Children. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(ii).
II. Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(C)
[¶29] Father also argues that the juvenile court erred in concluding that termination of his parental rights was in the Children's best interests. We are mindful that, in determining what is in the best interests of the Children, the juvenile court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and look to the totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003). In doing so, the juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children involved. Id. Furthermore, this court has previously determined that the testimony of a GAL regarding a child's need for permanency supports a finding that termination is in the child's best interests. In the matter of Y.E.C., 534 N.E.2d 273, 276 (Ind.Ct.App. 1992). FCM Williams recommend termination of Father's parental rights as to all three of the Children. CASA Freeman testified that she did not support Father continuing to have a parent-child relationship with the Children and opined that termination followed by adoption is in the Children's best interests. While this testimony is likely sufficient to support a finding that termination is in the Children's best interests, it does not stand alone.
[¶30] As mentioned, there is ample evidence to support a conclusion that Father simply cannot provide the Children with a safe and stable home, however much he may desire to. Father's choices, while undoubtedly influenced by his cognitive issues, have consistently been poor, exposing the Children to abuse and poor living conditions. In short, we believe it is fair to say that Father has consistently chosen to put his needs and those of his romantic partners before those of the Children. Moreover, the juvenile court also heard evidence that the Children were thriving in their current placements. FCM Williams and the Children's therapists testified that the Children were thriving in their placements and having their needs met. Finally, J.E. and A.E. have made it clear that they wish to be adopted, and B.E. has indicated that would like to remain with Yaw if staying with Father were not possible. In light of the evidence of Father's failure to address his issues and the very positive nature of the Children's current placements, we conclude that the record contains more than enough evidence to support the juvenile court's conclusion that termination was in the Children's best interests.
[¶31] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and May, J., concur.