In this case, however, both of respondent-mother's attorneys sought leave to withdraw "well in advance of the [termination] hearing specifically at the request of [respondent-mother]." For that reason, DSS asserts that "[f]undamental fairness did not require the [trial court] to inquire whether [respondent-mother] had been notified of the specific date of hearing her attorney's motion to withdraw when the motion was being made at her request," citing In re M.G. , 239 N.C. App. at 83, 767 S.E.2d at 441 ; In re D.E.G. , 228 N.C. App. at 381, 747 S.E.2d at 280 ; In re T.E.G. , 2018 WL 4201263, at *7 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018) (unpublished); and In re A.D.S. , 2019 WL 1283851, at *12–13 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019) (unpublished). Finally, DSS contends that Mr. Dawson's statements to the trial court that he had attempted to get respondent-mother to come to court for his withdrawal motion hearing are "his own" statements rather than a summary of statements describing information in the possession of others.