Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. OJ06-003610
DONDERO, J.
Defendant T.B. appeals a condition of probation that prohibits him from entering or loitering around any Ross department store. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
We take the facts from the police report dated June 16, 2009.
On June 11, 2009, defendant was caught shoplifting a pair of shoes and pants from the Ross department store in El Cerrito. After he was arrested, he provided a false name to the arresting officer. He eventually gave the officer his true name and admitted that he took the items from the store because he had a school dance the next night.
On September 21, 2009, a wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) was filed alleging that defendant committed one count of petty theft (Pen. Code, §§ 484/488), and one count of providing false identification to a law enforcement officer (Pen. Code, § 148.9, subd. (a)).
On December 21, 2009, defendant pled no contest to the petty theft allegation. The count for providing false identification to a law enforcement officer was dismissed. The matter was transferred from Contra Costa County to Alameda County for disposition.
On January 6, 2010, the juvenile court accepted the transfer of wardship and ordered defendant removed from the home of his mother to be placed in a suitable family or group home or private institution under various conditions of probation. Among these conditions, defendant was ordered not to enter or loiter around any Ross stores. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that the probation condition prohibiting him from entering any Ross store is unreasonable. We disagree.
Under Welfare & Institutions Code section 730, subdivision (b), the juvenile court may impose any reasonable conditions it determines will promote the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward. “ ‘A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it “(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality.” ’ ” (In re R.V. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 239, 246, quoting People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486.) A probation condition is not invalid unless all three factors are present. (R.V., supra, at p. 246.) Juvenile court probation orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion. (In re Josh W. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.)
Defendant claims the probation condition barring him from all Ross stores is not reasonably related either to the offense or to future criminality. We first note the Lent factors are “conjunctive-all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379.) We also note that restrictive conditions may be imposed upon juveniles more freely than upon adults. (In re Frankie J. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1153.) “When a juvenile delinquency petition is sustained, the court assumes jurisdiction over the minor and has the power to issue orders controlling the minor’s conduct.” (In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1231–1232, citing Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 601, 602, subd. (a).) “A juvenile probationer may be therefore subject to ‘any and all reasonable conditions’ the court ‘may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.’ In deciding what probation conditions are appropriate, the court shall consider not only the circumstances of the offense but also the minor’s entire social history.” (In re Juan G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1, 6–7, fn. omitted; see also In re Todd L. (1980)113 Cal.App.3d 14, 19–20.)
At oral argument, the minor’s counsel argued our decision In re D.G. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 47 applied here. In that case, we modified a probation condition barring the minor from being within 150 feet of any school campus other than the school he was attending. The minor had a petition sustained involving first degree burglary. We determined the condition was not related to the criminal offense and was not related to potential criminality in the future. Here, the stay away involves stores operated by the victim of the underlying offense. We believe it is a reasonable condition under Lent to negate future misconduct by the minor.
Here, the crime occurred in a Ross store. Additionally, the nature of the crime itself, shoplifting, is intimately connected to the retail function served by the department store chain. Thus, it cannot be said that the condition does not reasonably relate to the offense. Moreover, the condition also forbids conduct that is reasonably related to future criminality, at least insofar as it seeks to deny defendant the opportunity to commit a similar crime in the future against the same victim. Under the circumstances of this case, we disagree with defendant’s contention that “something more” is required in order for the condition to be deemed reasonable. In sum, we cannot say that the juvenile court abused its discretion in imposing the challenged probation condition.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
We concur: Marchiano, P. J., Margulies, J.