While neither counsel nor independent research has disclosed a case wherein this precise problem has been adjudicated, this construction of the act coincides with the interpretation made in the opinions previously rendered on the question by the attorneys general of both California and Ohio. (Vol. 23, Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 33 [No. 53-157; Jan. 14, 1954]; vol. ____, Ops. Ohio Atty. Gen. ____ [No. 3009, Aug. 31, 1953].) In re Susman, 116 Cal.App.2d 698 [ 254 P.2d 161], cited by petitioner, involved a different factual situation. There the demanding state (New York), unlike Ohio, had no similar provisions to our section 1661, Code of Civil Procedure, and the obligor from New York sought to resist extradition in this state upon the basis of our said section.
It is argued that they are not reciprocal because a father's duty to support his child extends only to the age of 16 years under Colorado law; and because the Colorado act does not contain the provisions for criminal enforcement found in sections 1660 and 1661 of our Code of Civil Procedure. (Citing In re Susman, 116 Cal.App.2d 698 [ 254 P.2d 161].) [5] With respect to the age limitation, in addition to what has already been said, jurisdiction in this state is provided for in section 1672 of our Code of Civil Procedure and it is not provided therein that the laws of an initiating state and a responding state must be identical.
So far as may be determined from the sketchy record in this case, Mr. Bellah has always made these payments. In June of 1953 the mother, on behalf of the child, petitioned the courts of New York, under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Laws of New York and California, (Code Civ. Proc., ยงยง 1650-1690; and see In re Susman, 116 Cal.App.2d 698 [ 254 P.2d 161]) for an order requiring Mr. Bellah to increase his payments for the child to $250 a month. As the law provides, the Domestic Relations Court of the city of New York heard the petition in the first instance. That court ordered that the papers and testimony be forwarded to the proper court in California, and the judge made a notation on the papers that "the sum of $250 per month for the support of the one child is recommended."
The crime with which petitioner is charged is the abandonment of his minor children, leaving them in a dependent condition. It is evident that the Legislature, in using the words "failing to provide for the support of a person * *", intended by this language to encompass all forms of criminal nonsupport with a view to facilitating the extradition of persons seeking to evade their most important obligations by flight. The section of the Uniform Enforcement and Support Act has been held to cover "non-support of a minor child", Ex parte Floyd, 43 Cal.2d 379, 273 P.2d 820, 821, and "`abandonment of children without means of support and in a destitute condition'", Ex parte Susman, 116 Cal.App.2d 698, 254 P.2d 161. It follows that F.S. Sec. 88.061, F.S.A. is valid and specifically applicable herein, and accordingly the judgment appealed from must be, and it is hereby, reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
No such proceedings were commenced. In In re Susman, 116 Cal.App.2d 698, 254 P.2d 161, 162, petitioner sought release by habeas corpus proceedings from extradition under the terms of section 1661 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In that case the return was denied for the reason that the New York statute involved made no provision in its uniform support of dependents law in respect to criminal enforcement or the relieving of extradition as provided in Section 1661 of our Code of Civil Procedure.