Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4223-13T3
06-15-2015
STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN THE INTEREST OF J.P., a minor.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Rochelle Watson, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief). Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Acting Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Paul H. Heinzel, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel; Christopher Santo D'Esposito, Legal Assistant, on the brief).
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Koblitz and Currier. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Monmouth County, Docket Nos. FJ-13-663-14 and FJ-13-851-14. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Rochelle Watson, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief). Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Acting Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Paul H. Heinzel, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel; Christopher Santo D'Esposito, Legal Assistant, on the brief). PER CURIAM
J.P., fifteen years old at the time of the incident, appeals the adjudication of delinquency for an offense which, if committed by an adult, would constitute fourth-degree criminal trespass into a school, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(a). The court imposed a disposition of a six-month probationary term with the obligation to provide DNA and fingerprinting and appropriate fines and penalties. The juvenile claims that the State did not prove he was aware he was not permitted to enter the school. He also maintains that the judge failed to impose on the State the proper burden of disproving the juvenile's affirmative defense: that he thought the football coach had given him permission to enter the school. We reject these arguments and affirm.
The juvenile admitted his guilt to another delinquency complaint, FJ-13-663-14, but raises no appellate issues in connection with that adjudication.
The trial revealed the following facts. J.P. did not attend Neptune High School (NHS), but rather an alternative school outside his home school district. On October 2, 2013, the vice principal at NHS saw J.P. and another non-student shortly before 2:00 p.m. inside the school building, near the rear gym entrance to the school. They had been detained by school security. Signs were posted at all entrances to the school stating "All visitors must report to the school office upon entering the building. Trespassers will be prosecuted." J.P. told the vice principal they were there to see a friend.
Although a photograph of a sign was placed into evidence, we were not provided with a copy of that photograph. The vice principal did read the contents of the sign into the record.
J.P. testified that he was stopped by the school security personnel after he entered the back door to the school and before he had a chance to report to the main office at the front of the school. J.P. said that he did not tell the vice principal that he was in the school to meet a friend, and that, in fact, he told the security personnel when he was stopped that he was there to speak to the coach about playing football on the NHS team. J.P. said that he came that day to tell "Coach Rob" that, although he practiced once with the team, due to a head injury he had suffered in June, he would be unable to play for the rest of the season.
Students from the alternative school played sports on their home district's high school team.
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Finding the vice principal to be credible and the State to have met its burden of proof, the judge found J.P. to be delinquent.
The juvenile raises the following two issues on appeal:
POINT I: BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THAT J.P. WAS AWARE THAT HE WAS NOT PERMITTED TO ENTER THE SCHOOL, AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS WAS NOT
ESTABLISHED AND THE ADJUDICATION MUST BE REVERSED.
POINT II: INSTEAD OF IMPOSING THE BURDEN ON THE STATE TO DISPROVE THE JUVENILE'S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, THE JUDGE SHIFTED THE BURDEN OF PERSUASION ONTO THE JUVENILE, DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
J.P. argues that the adjudication was not supported by the evidence. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 376 (1970) states: "The same considerations that demand extreme caution in factfinding to protect the innocent adult apply as well to the innocent child." "[T]he constitutional safeguard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is . . . required during the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding . . . ." Id. at 368, 90 S. Ct. at 1075, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 377.
The appropriate review "standard [in a non-jury case] is whether there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the judge's determination." State ex. rel. R.V., 280 N.J. Super. 118, 120-21 (App. Div. 1995) (citing State ex rel. J.R., 165 N.J. Super. 346, 350 (App. Div. 1979)). That standard of review is "narrow." State ex rel. J.P.F., 368 N.J. Super. 24, 31 (App. Div.) (citations omitted), certif. denied, 180 N.J. 453 (2004). The appellate court "defer[s] to those findings, which are substantially influenced by the [trial] judge's feel of the case." Ibid. (citing State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999)); State ex rel. S.B., 333 N.J. Super. 236, 241 (App. Div. 2000). "Because a trial court hears the case, sees and observes the witnesses, [and] hears them testify, it has a better perspective than a reviewing court in evaluating the veracity of witnesses." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A trial court "has a 'feel of the case' that can never be realized by a review of the cold record." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 293 (2007)). "An appellate court should not overturn a trial court's findings because it 'might have reached a different conclusion were it the trial tribunal' or because 'the trial court decided all evidence or inference conflicts in favor of one side' in a close case." In re Civil Commitment of R.F., 217 N.J. 152, 175 (2014) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)).
J.P. was adjudicated delinquent for a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(a), which reads in pertinent part,
A person commits an offense if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters . . . any . . . structure . . . . An offense under this subsection is a crime of the fourth degree if it is committed in a school . . . .
The judge found the vice principal credible, saying, "I didn't get the impression from her mannerisms and her responses that she was trying to be deceptive or evasive." Noting that J.P. contradicted the vice principal, the judge made no such comment regarding J.P.'s testimony, in which J.P. raised the affirmative defense that he thought the coach would have allowed him to enter the school. See N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(d)(3) ("The actor reasonably believed that the owner of the structure, or other person empowered to license access thereto, would have licensed him to enter . . . ."). The judge also mentioned that J.P. presented no corroboration of his story, such as a form from a doctor's office, or any evidence that he ever practiced with the NHS football team. By commenting on the lack of support for J.P.'s version of what happened, the judge did not shift the burden of proof. He merely clarified that the defense did not raise in his mind a reasonable doubt as to the State's proofs.
We understand the juvenile's argument to be that he was arrested before he had the opportunity to check in with the main office. As the judge noted in his decision, however, the school had the right to stop an individual who was not a student to inquire as to why he was in the school before that individual checked in with the main office. Otherwise, non-students could roam at will in the school en route to the office from various doors. The sign did not allow unauthorized individuals to enter the school. It merely advised authorized visitors to check in at the office.
The judge found beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the credible evidence, that J.P. entered NHS knowing he was not authorized to do so. The State presented sufficient credible evidence to support the judge's determination.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION