Opinion
J-S39016-16 J-S39017-16 No. 2227 MDA 2015 No. 2228 MDA 2015 No. 2229 MDA 2015 No. 2237 MDA 2015 No. 2238 MDA 2015 No. 2239 MDA 2015
06-14-2016
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.S.M., A MINOR APPEAL OF: J.J.M., FATHER IN THE INTEREST OF: J.G.K.M., A MINOR APPEAL OF: J.J.M., FATHER IN THE INTEREST OF: S.M.M., A MINOR APPEAL OF: J.J.M., FATHER IN RE: ADOPTION OF: S.S.M., A MINOR APPEAL OF: J.J.M., FATHER IN RE: ADOPTION OF: J.G.K.M., A MINOR APPEAL OF: J.J.M., FATHER IN RE: ADOPTION OF: S.M.M., A MINOR APPEAL OF: J.J.M., FATHER
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered November 23, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Juvenile Division at No.: CP-67-DP-0000086-2009 Appeal from the Order Entered November 23, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Juvenile Division at No.: CP-67-DP-0000087-2009 Appeal from the Order Entered November 23, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Juvenile Division at No.: CP-67-DP-0000088-2009 Appeal from the Order Entered November 24, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No.: 2015-0103 Appeal from the Order Entered November 24, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Orphans' Court at No.: 2015-0102 Appeal from the Order Entered November 24, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Orphans' Court at No.: 2015-0104 BEFORE: STABILE, PLATT, AND STRASSBURGER*, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.:
Retired Senior Judge assigned to Superior Court.
In these consolidated and related appeals, J.J.M. (Father) appeals the orders, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of York County (trial court) on November 23, 2015, that changed the goals of his children, S.S.M., born January 2003; J.G.K.M., born February 2005; and S.M.M., born October 2006, (Children), to adoption. Father also appeals the orders of the trial court, entered November 24, 2015, that terminated his parental rights to the Children. We affirm.
On January 12, 2016, this Court consolidated the appeals at 2227, 2228, and 2229 MDA 2015, sua sponte, and also consolidated the appeals at 2237, 2238, and 2239 MDA 2015, sua sponte. See Pa.R.A.P. 513. It directed that these consolidated appeals shall be listed consecutively and stated that the parties may each file a single brief.
The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the Children's mother, C.L.L. (Mother). Mother did not file an appeal.
The trial court relates the history of this case in its findings of fact in its opinion entered on November 24, 2015. ( See Trial Court Opinion, 11/24/15, at 2-7). We refer the reader to that opinion for the history of this case.
The trial court held hearings in this matter on October 28 and 29, 2015. Testifying at the hearing on October 28, 2015, were York County Children's Advocacy Center forensic interviewer, Ashley Rehm; Justice Works family resource specialist, Tara Deane; Children's Aid Society art therapist, Yvette Hardy; and York County Children, Youth, and Families caseworker, Kerry Miller. Testifying at the hearing on October 29, 2015, were Father, from prison by telephone, and Ms. Miller.
The trial court entered its orders changing Children's goals to adoption on November 23, 2015, and its orders terminating Father's parental rights, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b), on November 24, 2015. Father filed his notices of appeal and statements of errors complained of on appeal on December 21, 2015. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). The trial court entered its statement on January 14, 2016, in which it relied on its November 24, 2015 opinion. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
Father raises the following questions on appeal:
1. Whether the trial court erred in changing the goal from reunification with a parent to adoption when Father utilized all available resources to maintain his relationship with his [C]hildren during his incarceration. And his incarceration will conclude in a time frame that would allow him to parent his [C]hildren[?](Father's Brief, at 4).
2. Whether the trial court erred in deciding to change the goal from reunification with a parent to adoption when Father was utilizing all available resources to comply with the goals set forth for him in the various Family Service Plans[?]
3. Whether the trial court failed to consider the bond between Father and the [C]hildren when deciding to terminate Father's parental rights[?]
Our standard of review is as follows:
In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our scope of review is comprehensive: we consider all the evidence presented as well as the trial court's factual findings and legal conclusions. However, our standard of review is narrow: we will reverse the trial court's order only if we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or lacked competent evidence to support its findings. The trial judge's decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict.In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
Further, we have stated:
Where the hearing court's findings are supported by competent evidence of record, we must affirm the hearing court even though the record could support an opposite result.
We are bound by the findings of the trial court which have adequate support in the record so long as the findings do not evidence capricious disregard for competent and credible evidence. The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence. Though we are not bound by the trial court's inferences and deductions, we may reject its conclusions only if they involve errors of law or are clearly unreasonable in light of the trial court's sustainable findings.In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).
The trial court terminated Father's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). In order to affirm the termination of parental rights, this Court need only agree with any one subsection of Section 2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004).
Requests to have a natural parent's parental rights terminated are governed by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, which provides, in pertinent part:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
* * *
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
* * *
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
It is well settled that a party seeking termination of a parent's rights bears the burden of proving the grounds to so do by "clear and convincing evidence," a standard which requires evidence that is "so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." In re T.F., 847 A.2d 738, 742 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted). Further,
A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or convenient time to perform one's parental responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her physical and emotional needs.In the Interest of K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted).
The Adoption Act provides that a trial court "shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child." 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). The Act does not make specific reference to an evaluation of the bond between parent and child, but our case law requires the evaluation of any such bond. See In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481, 484 (Pa. 1993). However, this Court has held that the trial court is not required by statute or precedent to order a formal bonding evaluation performed by an expert. See In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2008).
In regard to incarcerated persons in a termination case, our Supreme Court has stated:
[I]ncarceration is a factor, and indeed can be a determinative factor, in a court's conclusion that grounds for termination exist under § 2511(a)(2) where the repeated and continued incapacity of a parent due to incarceration has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence and that the causes of the incapacity cannot or will not be remedied.In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 828 (Pa. 2012). The Supreme Court explained:
[W]e now definitively hold that incarceration, while not a litmus test for termination, can be determinative of the question of whether a parent is incapable of providing essential parental care, control or subsistence and the length of the remaining confinement can be considered as highly relevant to whether the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent, sufficient to provide grounds for termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(a)(2). If a court finds grounds for termination under subsection (a)(2), a court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child, considering the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child pursuant to § 2511(b). In this regard, trial courts must carefully review the individual circumstances for every child to
determine, inter alia, how a parent's incarceration will factor into an assessment of the child's best interest.Id. at 830-31 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Our review of the record reveals that Father's actions and failures to act in relation to the Children, as detailed by the trial court in its opinion entered November 24, 2015, and not the fact of his incarceration, establish the bases for the termination of his parental rights. --------
We have thoroughly reviewed the record, briefs, and the applicable law, and determined that the evidence presented is sufficient to support the trial court's orders changing the Children's goals to adoption, and the orders terminating Father's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.
Our reading of the trial court's opinion reveals that it carefully and methodically reviewed the evidence and ably addressed Father's issues presented on appeal. ( See Trial Ct. Op., at 7-17 (concluding that (1) change of goal to adoption would be in Children's best interest; (2) Father has failed to perform any significant parental duties and termination of his parental rights will provide Children with stability and permanency; (3) Children have been in placement for one year and one month, and are happy and well-bonded to foster family; and (4) although Father has some diminishing bond with Children, termination of his parental rights will best serve developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of Children, especially considering Children's belief as to Father's sexual conduct with S.S.M.)). Accordingly, we will affirm based on the concise, thoughtful, and well-written opinion of the Honorable Todd R. Platts, entered on November 24, 2015.
Therefore, we affirm the trial court's orders, entered November 23, 2015, that changed the Children's goals to adoption, and the trial court's orders, entered November 24, 2015, terminating Father's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.
Orders affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 6/14/2016
Image materials not available for display.