Opinion
No. COA12–152.
2012-10-2
In the Matter of S.S.L, R.B.L., and R.D.L.
Perry, Bundy, Plyler, Long & Cox, LLP, by Natalie J. Broadway and Melanie D. Cox, for Union County Department of Social Services petitioner appellee. David A. Perez, for respondent-mother appellant.
Appeal by respondent-mother from order entered 14 November 2011 by Judge William F. Helms, III, in Union County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 July 2012. Perry, Bundy, Plyler, Long & Cox, LLP, by Natalie J. Broadway and Melanie D. Cox, for Union County Department of Social Services petitioner appellee. David A. Perez, for respondent-mother appellant.
GAL Appellate Counsel Pamela Newell, for guardian ad litem.
McCULLOUGH, Judge.
Respondent appeals from an order entered 14 November 2011, which terminated her parental rights to her minor children S.S.L., R.B.L., and R.D.L. (collectively, “the juveniles”). Respondent contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to properly consider family integrity and give proper weight to the bond between the juveniles and respondent in making its determination that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the best interests of the juveniles. SeeN.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1110(a)(4) (2011) (providing that the trial court must consider the bond between the juvenile and the parent when determining whether terminating parental rights is in the juvenile's best interests). Respondent's arguments are misplaced.
“We review the trial court's decision to terminate parental rights for abuse of discretion.” In re Anderson, 151 N.C.App. 94, 98, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002). “A trial court may be reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its actions are manifestly unsupported by reason ... [or] upon a showing that [the trial court's decision] was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985).
Here the trial court made several findings of fact regarding the best interest factors of section 7B–1110, including:
[ ] The Court has considered the bond between the parents and the children. There is a bond between them, however, that bond does not override the best interest of the children, which is to place the children in a safe, a stable home.
....
[ ] One of the primary features of this case is the continued substance abuse and lapse of treatment. Although [the father] did begin treatment, that treatment did not start until January 2011.
[ ] [Respondent] has not been compliant with treatment options and tested positive for cocaine use as recently as September 19, 2011.
....
[ ] The parents have been engaged in criminal activity. At times, due to his incarceration, [the father] remained unavailable to participate in a reunification plan while the children have been in DSS custody.
[ ] The Court has at all times during the pendency of these proceedings set goals for the parents so that they may be reunited with their children: obtain and maintain substance abuse treatment, cooperate with DSS, and establish a safe and stable residence for the children. The Court considers the failure of the Respondent Parents to make adequate progress towards achieving these goals since January 2010.
[ ] In September, Respondent Parents made a fraudulent attempt to obtain food stamp benefits, rent assistance and utility bill assistance based on a misrepresentation of their current financial and custodial situation.
[ ] The Court has calculated the parties' expenses based on their testimony. Neither [the father] nor [respondent] has made choices appropriate to their financial situation enabling them to afford or arrange to keep stable housing. [The father] testified that he and [respondent] are in danger of being evicted from their current residence. He does not plan to make their current housing a permanent option.
Respondent has not challenged any of the trial court's findings of fact, and they are thus binding on this Court on appeal. See Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991) (unchallenged findings are deemed supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal). The above findings of fact show the court considered the integrity of the family in making its best interest determination. Based on these findings, we cannot say that the trial court's conclusion that it is in the juveniles' best interests to terminate respondent's parental rights is manifestly unsupported by reason or so arbitrary that it was not the result of a reasoned decision.
In her second argument, respondent essentially asks this Court to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court in determining the proper weight of the evidence of the bond between her and the juveniles. However,
when a trial judge sits as both judge and juror, as he or she does in a non-jury proceeding, it is that judge's duty to weigh and consider all competent evidence, and pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.
In re Whisnant, 71 N.C.App. 439, 441, 322 S.E.2d 434, 435 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we do not reweigh the evidence before the trial court or second-guess the unchallenged findings of fact made by the trial court regarding the juveniles' best interests. Respondent's arguments are overruled, and we affirm the trial court's order terminating respondent's parental rights to her minor children S.S.L, R.B.L., and R.D.L.
Affirmed. Judges McGEE and GEER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).