Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County No. DL031749 Ronald P. Kreber, Judge.
Correen Ferrentino, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Rhonda Cartwright-Ladendorf, Collette C. Cavalier and Scott Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding, the trial court declared Spencer K. (the minor) a ward of the court and placed him on probation after it found true an allegation that he committed an act constituting aggravated assault (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)). He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jurisdictional finding, the court’s restriction of his cross-examination of a prosecution witness about the witness’s recent theft-related offense, and its imposition of a search and seizure condition as part of his probation. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
Shortly after 8 p.m. one late December evening, a fight erupted in the street outside the Brant residence after Chris Brant confronted a group of young people over the fact their horseplay resulted in damage to his wife’s car. Chris Brant approached some individuals standing in the street, cursing at them, demanded their names and addresses, and said they would have to pay for the vehicle’s damage. The ensuing altercation resulted in Chris Brant being hit and kicked by several individuals and requiring medical treatment. As a result, Chris Brant suffered cuts and bruises requiring medical attention.
The parties presented conflicting evidence on who was the aggressor and as to the identity of the persons who struck Chris Brant. The prosecution’s witnesses testified that when Chris Brant asked for the names of the people who damaged the car, someone shoved him. Three to four individuals standing nearby began to move closer to him. Chris Brant, in turn, shoved one member of the group, backed up, and took a fighting stance. At that point, Michael M. struck Chris Brant in the face, knocking off his glasses and forcing his head backwards so that it struck the car behind him. Chris Brant then fell to the ground where several persons struck and kicked him numerous times.
Shaun Brant, Chris Brant’s teenage son, testified he and a friend were outside the house about to leave when the confrontation occurred. He yelled at the group to stop hitting his father and the attackers began to back away and leave the area. Shaun Brant testified he saw the minor walking away, yelling, “You just got your ass beat by... a 16-year-old.” During an in-field showup conducted by sheriff’s deputies later that evening, Shaun Brant identified the minor as one of the persons who struck his father. But, at trial, he testified “I can’t say that I actually saw him punching or kicking my dad....” On cross- and redirect examination, Shaun Brant claimed that, at school, the minor told him how to testify. He claimed the minor called him a name and said, “Hey, look, I have a really good future in front of me.... I was so drunk that night I don’t remember anything, but all I remember is that I did not hit your dad.”
Chris Brant identified the minor as one of the teenagers that initially confronted him the night of the incident, but he could not identify him as one of the persons who hit him. The next day, the minor appeared at the Brant residence to apologize for what happened the previous night. Chris Brant testified the minor “seemed aggravated and angry... like he didn’t want to be there” and said, “You didn’t see me hit you, did you?”
Cody Warren testified he was with Shaun Brant the night of the incident. Warren identified the minor as one of the persons who struck Chris Brant during the fight, both at an in-field showup later that evening and at trial.
The defense called several witnesses who claimed Chris Brant was the aggressor and who denied the minor struck Chris Brant during the fracas. The minor testified in his defense, denying he struck Chris Brant and claiming Warren held a grudge against him because of an incident when the two collided while surfing several years earlier.
DISCUSSION
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
The minor challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a finding he participated in the assault on Chris Brant. He claims “[t]he prosecution premised its case largely on the testimony of one witness, Cody Warren, who was the only witness to testify that [the minor] hit Brant, ” and argues Warren’s testimony is “not reliable since it is lacking in detail, riddled with inconsistencies, at odds with other eyewitness testimony, not supported by circumstantial evidence and biased....” This contention lacks merit.
“When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence─that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value─from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]... We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact reasonably could infer from the evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. [Citation.]” (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.) This standard of review applies to “juvenile proceedings involving criminal acts....” (In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 809; see also In re James B. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 862, 872.)
Warren’s credibility notwithstanding, the trial court relied on other evidence to find the petition’s allegations true. The court cited Shaun Brant’s on-scene identification of the minor as one of the persons who struck his father. It also relied on the minor’s flight from the altercation, his statement shortly after it occurred that “[a] 16-year-old has just kicked your ass, ” plus his apology to Chris Brant the next day as reflecting a consciousness of guilt on his part.
Furthermore, contrary to the minor’s argument, the trial court concluded Warren was a credible witness. It expressly found his testimony that the minor “punched... Brant[] to be true, ” and concluded Warren had “no vendetta... to testify against [the minor] over a surfing dispute....” “A reviewing court neither reweighs evidence nor reevaluates a witness’s credibility. [Citation.]” (People v. Lindberg, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 27.) Hence, “[c]onflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment....” (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403; see also People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal.3d 284, 296 [“The uncorroborated testimony of a single witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable”].)
In his reply brief, the minor claims the duty “not [to] view [the] evidence in a vacuum[] or out of context, ” plus the need for “evidence ‘of solid value’ that reasonably supports an inference of guilt, ” requires “this court [to] examine the nature and quality of Warren’s testimony.” (Italics omitted.) A similar argument was rejected by the Supreme Court in People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983. There the defendant challenged the admissibility of the testimony of a jailhouse informant, citing the witness’s “dubious background, his obvious motive to fabricate evidence for his own benefit, and the inconsistency of his statements....” (Id. at pp. 995-996, fn. omitted.) Acknowledging the general rule that “‘[e]xcept in... rare instances of demonstrable falsity, doubts about the credibility of [an] in-court witness should be left for the jury’s resolution’” (id. at p. 996, quoting People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 609), the defendant claimed the informant’s “‘reliability is not simply a determination of credibility for the jury, ’” because an appellate “‘court must ensure the evidence is reasonable, credible, and of solid value’” (People v. Hovarter, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 996).
The Supreme Court rejected this argument. “[The d]efendant confuses two standards. At trial, ‘it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts on which that determination depends.’ [Citation.] On appeal, an appellate court deciding whether sufficient evidence supports a verdict must determine whether the record contains substantial evidence.... ‘In evaluating the sufficiency of evidence, “the relevant question on appeal is not whether we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt” [citation], but “whether ‘“any rational trier of fact”’ could have been so persuaded.”’ [Citation.] Because a rational trier of fact could have found [the jailhouse informant] credible, we reject the claim that the trial court should have excluded his testimony as inherently incredible.” (People v. Hovarter, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 996-997.)
Hovarter’s analysis applies here as well. As noted, the juvenile court expressly found Warren to be a credible witness. The mere fact the evidence was conflicting and the minor presented grounds to doubt Warren’s credibility does not mean the trial court erred in relying on it to find he assaulted Chris Brant. Thus, the evidence supports the trial court’s decision.
2. Limitation on Warren’s Impeachment
a. Background
Shortly before trial, Warren was arrested in a suburb of Phoenix, Arizona on a charge of shoplifting. The court declined the defense request to introduce evidence of the incident to impeach Warren, noting “it’s too time-consuming, confusing to the issues that we have, ” with much of the evidence only hearsay and, “[i]f it’s a misdemeanor, then we have the Wheeler (People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284) issue.... So the court is missing certain information.”
Defense counsel argued he should be allowed to question Warren about the events leading to his Arizona arrest. At counsel’s request, the court called Warren to the stand, informed Warren of his right to have the presence and advice of counsel, that he “could be in certain jeopardy” if he testified about his arrest and the “transcript [became] available to a prosecutor in Arizona.” It then asked Warren “do you want to waive your rights and agree to testify regarding this matter, or do you want to talk to a lawyer?” Warren responded, “No. I don’t want to talk about it.” The court stated “[t]hat would be [my] ruling....”
Alternatively, defense counsel argued Warren’s “invocation of his [Fifth] Amendment rights... makes him an unavailable witness... ” and requested his “entire testimony... be stricken....” The court rejected the request.
Two days after completing his trial testimony and before the juvenile court ruled on the petition’s allegations, Warren entered a guilty plea in Glendale, Arizona Municipal Court to shoplifting and received a fine as punishment. Prior to disposition, the minor moved for a new trial. He argued the prosecution committed misconduct and violated his right to due process by “fail[ing] to inform the [c]ourt of the resolution in Cody Warren’s criminal case” before the court issued its jurisdictional ruling. The court denied the new trial motion and then placed the minor on probation.
b. Analysis
The minor challenges the trial court’s decision to preclude inquiry into Warren’s Arizona offense on several grounds. We find all of them lacking in merit.
First, the mere fact of an arrest is generally inadmissible because it is more prejudicial than probative. (People v. Anderson (1978) 20 Cal.3d 647, 651; People v. Lopez (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1508, 1523.) But the minor is correct in contending Warren’s possible theft was relevant to his credibility in this case. “Misconduct involving moral turpitude may suggest a willingness to lie [citations], and this inference is not limited to conduct which resulted in a felony conviction.” (People v. Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 295-296.) Thus, “[w]hile the trial court may weigh proffered impeachment evidence on its individual merit, there is no basis for a ruling that the court’s discretion may never be exercised to admit nonfelonious conduct.” (Id. at p. 296; see also People v. Martinez (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1071, 1080-1081 [“a prosecution witness can be impeached by the mere fact of pending charges” even if “the charges pending... constitute[] only misdemeanors”].)
The minor contends “[t]he defense should have been permitted to prove up the facts of [Warren’s] theft by calling witnesses who observed the crime.” But the admission of evidence of misconduct bearing on a witness’s veracity that amounts to only a misdemeanor is subject to a court’s authority under Evidence Code section 352. That “statute empowers courts to prevent criminal trials from degenerating into nitpicking wars of attrition over collateral credibility issues.... [¶] When exercising its discretion under Evidence Code section 352, a court must always take into account, as applicable, those factors traditionally deemed pertinent in this area. [Citations.] But additional considerations may apply when evidence other than felony convictions is offered for impeachment. In general, a misdemeanor─or any other conduct not amounting to a felony─is a less forceful indicator of immoral character or dishonesty than is a felony. Moreover, impeachment evidence other than felony convictions entails problems of proof, unfair surprise, and moral turpitude evaluation which felony convictions do not present. Hence, courts may and should consider with particular care whether the admission of such evidence might involve undue time, confusion, or prejudice which outweighs its probative value.” (People v. Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 296-297, fn. omitted.)
The minor claims “the record fails to demonstrate that the court engaged in the weighing process required by [Evidence Code] section 352....” This contention misstates the record. In excluding evidence of Warren’s alleged theft, the court cited the amount of time that would be needed to obtain relevant and admissible evidence, its potential for “confusing... the issue that we have, ” and the Supreme Court’s decision in Wheeler. “Although the record must ‘affirmatively show that the trial court weighed prejudice against probative value’ [citations], the necessary showing can be inferred from the record despite the absence of an express statement by the trial court. [Citation.]” (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1237.) The court’s statements reflect it understood its obligation to balance probative value against prejudice and the other relevant factors and did so.
Nor do we find any abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to preclude the presentation of this impeachment evidence. (People v. Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 652, 684; In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1385 [“It is well established that a trial court is vested with wide discretion in determining relevance and weighing the prejudicial effect of evidence against its probative value, ” and “[e]videntiary rulings will not be overturned on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of that discretion, upon a showing that the trial court’s decision was palpably arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd, and resulted in injury sufficiently grave as to amount to a miscarriage of justice”].)
The court recognized the problems that would result from the delay in trial necessary for the parties to obtain reports of a shoplifting incident that occurred hundreds of miles away in another state, contact and interview relevant witnesses and then seek their attendance in a California court. Furthermore, the only benefit this expenditure of time and effort could possibly achieve would be the presentation of circumstantial proof relevant to a single witness’s credibility. Given these facts, plus Wheeler’s admonition that such “conduct... is a less forceful indicator of immoral character or dishonesty than is a felony” (People v. Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 296), we conclude the trial court properly exercised its discretion in precluding the defense from introducing evidence underlying Warren’s Arizona theft.
Next, the minor contends the trial court’s exclusion of evidence relating to Warren’s alleged Arizona theft offense violated his federal constitutional rights. We disagree.
“Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a defendant has the constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him and to cross-examine his accusers. A criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show bias on the part of the witness, and thereby to expose facts from which the jury could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness. [Citations.] [¶] Nevertheless, a trial court retains broad discretion over the conduct of trial. In the context of its duty to supervise the questioning of trial witnesses, it has wide discretion to limit questions that are marginally relevant and cumulative. Although the exposure through cross-examination of a witness’s motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of confrontation, the Confrontation Clause does not prevent a trial court from imposing reasonable limits on a defense counsel’s inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness. [Citation.] ‘On the contrary, trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.’ [Citations.]” (In re Ryan N., supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 1385.) Consequently, “[a]s long as the cross-examiner has the opportunity to place the witness in his or her proper light, and to put the weight of the witness’s testimony and credibility to a reasonable test which allows the fact finder fairly to appraise it, the trial court may permissibly limit cross-examination to prevent undue harassment, expenditure of time, or confusion of the issues. [Citations.] (Id. at p. 1386.)
In re Ryan N., supra, 92 Cal.App.4th 1359 presents an analogous situation. There the appellant was found to have aided and abetted a woman named Christine in an unsuccessful effort to kill herself. At trial, Christine testified against the appellant, claiming she would not have attempted suicide but for his involvement. “[D]uring [a] lengthy defense cross-examination..., the trial court overruled numerous... prosecution objections to questions designed to probe the issues of Christine’s credibility, bias and motive.” (Id. at p. 1387.) But it “sustained several relevance objections” seeking “to ask Christine whether she had told her parents she ‘hated them’; if her parents were ‘angry’ with her about her suicide attempt; whether her parents ‘believe basically what you told them’ about it being appellant’s ‘fault as to what you did’; if her parents had ‘made it clear to you they believe it is [appellant’s] fault’; whether she was aware of any letters by her parents to the juvenile court regarding appellant’s responsibility for the attempted suicide; and if she was living at home with her parents at the time of trial.” (Id. at pp. 1386-1387.)
The Court of Appeal rejected the minor’s claim the juvenile court’s restriction of his cross-examination of Christine violated his constitutional rights. “[T]he record shows the trial court permitted defense counsel to question Christine extensively about her troubled relationship with her parents, their attitude toward the case, her discussions with them about appellant’s role in the attempted suicide, and her subsequent efforts to reconcile with them. As a result, appellant was specifically able to demonstrate, among other things, that it was only after going to the hospital and subsequently speaking with her parents that Christine began to blame appellant for her suicide attempt. Because of the extensive questions defense counsel was able to ask without objection, appellant was fully able to explore the issues of whether Christine was worried that her parents were upset with her for attempting suicide and blaming them in the suicide note, and her consequent motivation to blame appellant falsely in order to appease her parents both for her suicide attempt and for the inflammatory statements in her suicide note. In view of this record, the specific questions as to which objections were sustained were clearly cumulative, repetitive and only marginally relevant.” (In re Ryan N., supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 1387.)
The same is true here. The defense was permitted to cross-examine Warren at length about his ability to see the altercation, his inability to recall certain details, plus his prior relationship with the minor. In addition, since this case involved a juvenile proceeding, the court was aware of both Warrant’s Arizona arrest and the general nature of the underlying offense with which he was charged. No denial of confrontation or due process occurred in this case.
As noted, Warren was present at trial and the court did inquire whether he would be willing to waive his privileges against self-incrimination and testify about the theft incident. Warren declined to do so and the court rejected the minor’s request to strike his trial testimony. On appeal, the minor claims Warren never properly invoked the privilege and, if he did, the court erred by not striking his testimony.
As to the minor’s first claim, Warren had been placed under oath and testified at length on direct examination before the issue of his Arizona arrest was brought up at the beginning of cross-examination. In addition, he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege solely as to the events surrounding that incident. Given the fact the court asked Warren if he “want[ed] to waive [his] rights and agree to testify” and Warren’s response “I don’t want to talk about it, ” we conclude Warren clearly invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege. The minor’s attorney even acknowledged this fact when he thereafter argued Warren’s “invocation of his [Fifth] Amendment rights... makes him an unavailable witness” and asked that his entire testimony “be stricken.”
We also reject the minor’s claim the court erred by not ordering Warren’s testimony stricken. “At one end of the spectrum are cases when [a] party... unjustifiably refuses to answer questions necessary to complete the cross-examination, ” and “in such cases the consensus is that the direct testimony must be stricken.... [¶] At the other end of the spectrum are cases where a nonparty witness has testified on direct examination and where he or she is asked a question on cross-examination that relates only to the witnesses’ credibility and the witness refuses to answer. Here, ... the direct testimony should not be stricken, ‘or at the least the judge ought to have a measure of discretion in ruling on the matter.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Sanders (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 543, 554.) “In deciding whether to strike a... witness’s testimony based on his or her refusal to answer one or more questions, the trial court should examine ‘“the motive of the witness and the materiality of the answer.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The court should also consider if less severe remedies are available before employing the ‘drastic solution’ of striking the witness’s entire testimony. [Citation.] These include striking part of the testimony or allowing the trier of fact to consider the witness’s failure to answer in evaluating his credibility. [Citations.]” (People v. Seminoff (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 518, 525-526.) In addition, “there are instances where the cross-examiner’s questions are so peripheral to the case that the witness’s refusal to answer them does not justify the sanction of striking.” (Id. at p. 527.)
In this case, Warren was cross-examined at length and only declined to answer questions related to his recent Arizona arrest. The motive for his decision was to protect his constitutional rights. The subject matter, while relevant to his credibility, was peripheral to the issues at trial, who started the fight and who hit Chris Brant. We cannot say the juvenile court abused its discretion in declining to strike Warren’s testimony.
Finally, the minor contends the trial court erred in denying his new trial motion. He claims Warren’s guilty plea to the Arizona shoplifting charge constituted newly discovered evidence warranting relief and that the prosecution violated its obligations under Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 [83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215] in failing to disclose Warren’s conviction. These arguments lack merit.
First, we note the minor waived his right to attack the juvenile court’s ruling on the ground Warren’s Arizona plea constituted newly discovered evidence. The new trial motion cited only Penal Code section 1181, subdivision (5), which includes prosecutorial misconduct, and Brady v. Maryland, supra, 373 U.S. 83 as grounds for relief. “A motion for new trial may be granted only upon a ground raised in the motion. [Citations.] ‘[A] defendant waives his right to a new trial upon all grounds included within the provisions of [section 1181] unless he specifies the grounds upon which he relies in his application therefor.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Masotti (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 504, 508.)
In any event, the minor’s appellate arguments fail on their merits. A trial court’s ruling on a new trial motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 917, fn. 27; People v. Coffman (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 127.) Both a newly discovered evidence and a Brady error claim require a showing of reasonable probability that, if presented, the new evidence would lead to a different result. (People v. Howard (2010) 51 Cal.4th 15, __ [118 Cal.Rptr.3d 678, 703] [the new evidence “‘“‘be such as to render a different result probable on a retrial of the cause’”’”].)
As for the Brady claim: “‘There are three components...: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.’ [Citation.] Prejudice, in this context, focuses on ‘the materiality of the evidence to the issue of guilt and innocence.’ [Citations.] Materiality, in turn, requires more than a showing that the suppressed evidence would have been admissible [citation], that the absence of the suppressed evidence made conviction ‘more likely’ [citation], or that using the suppressed evidence to discredit a witness’s testimony ‘might have changed the outcome of the trial’ [citation]. A defendant instead ‘must show a “reasonable probability of a different result.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Salazar (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1031, 1043.)
The only “new evidence” or undisclosed matter was Warren’s entry of a guilty plea to the Arizona shoplifting charge and his receiving a fine for that offense. “‘“In general, impeachment evidence has been found to be material where the witness at issue ‘supplied the only evidence linking the defendant[] to the crime’ [citations], or where the likely impact on the witness’s credibility would have undermined a critical element of the prosecution’s case [citation].”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 177.) While an official record of Warren’s Arizona conviction would have been admissible (Evid. Code, § 452.5, subd. (b); People v. Cadogan (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1515, fn. 4), the minor makes no showing a reasonable probability exists that admission of Warren’s Arizona conviction would have lead to a more favorable result in this case. In denying the motion, the trial court again referred to the other evidence supporting its decision, including Shaun Brant’s in-field identification of the minor and his testimony concerning the minor’s efforts to dissuade him from repeating that identification in court, plus the minor’s actions and comments that reflected a consciousness of guilt on his part.
In People v. Letner and Tobin, supra, 50 Cal.4th 99, the Supreme Court rejected a Brady claim where the prosecution failed to disclose one of its witnesses had an outstanding warrant for petty theft and, in a second case, had pleaded guilty to misdemeanor theft and writing a bad check. Acknowledging Wheeler’s admonition that “[i]n general, a misdemeanor─or any other conduct not amounting to a felony─is a less forceful indicator of immoral character or dishonesty than is a felony” (People v. Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 296), Letner and Tobin concluded “defendants have failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that had the prosecutor disclosed to defendants the then-pending criminal matters facing [its witness] before the prosecution called her as a witness, the jury would have reached a result more favorable to defendants. Accordingly, defendants have not established that their constitutional rights were violated.” (People v. Letner and Tobin, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 178.) The same result applies here. We conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying the minor’s new trial motion.
3. The Search and Seizure Probation Condition
One term of the minor’s probation required that he “submit [his] person, residence and property to search and seizure by any peace officer, probation officer or school official anytime day or night, with or without a warrant, probable cause o[r] reasonable suspicion....” He now claims this condition is overbroad because it “is not a reasonable method of monitoring compliance with [the] other terms of probation and... must be stricken from the probation order.”
First, the Attorney General argues the minor waived this claim by failing to object to the condition when the court imposed it. While there are cases supporting this view (see In re Josue S. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 168, 170-173 and cases cited therein), in In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, the Supreme Court held, “In common with a challenge to an unauthorized sentence that is not subject to the rule of forfeiture, a challenge to a term of probation on the ground of unconstitutional vagueness or overbreadth that is capable of correction without reference to the particular sentencing record developed in the trial court can be said to present a pure question of law. Correction on appeal of this type of facial constitutional defect in the relevant probation condition, similar to the correction of an unauthorized sentence on appeal, may ensue from a reviewing court’s unwillingness to ignore ‘correctable legal error.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 887; see also In re Ramon M. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 665, 676-677 [if minor fails to object to probation condition when imposed, “all claims except a challenge ‘based on the ground the condition is vague or overbroad and thus facially unconstitutional’” forfeited].) That is the case here.
But again, the minor’s claim fails on the merits. Welfare and Institutions Code section 730, subdivision (b) declares, “When a ward... is placed under the supervision of the probation officer or committed to the care, custody, and control of the probation officer, the court may make any and all reasonable orders for the conduct of the ward.... The court may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.”
Cases have recognized this statute “grants courts broad discretion in establishing conditions of probation in juvenile cases.” (In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 940; see also In re Ramon M., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 676.)
In fact, “juvenile conditions may be broader than those pertaining to adult offenders... because juveniles are deemed to be more in need of guidance and supervision than adults, and because a minor’s constitutional rights are more circumscribed.” (In re Antonio R., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 941.) Consequently, “[a] juvenile probation condition is generally valid unless it ‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality.’ [Citations.]” (In re Christopher M. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 684, 692.)
A search and seizure waiver probation condition has “the dual purpose of... ‘deter[ring] further offenses by the probationer and... ascertain[ing] whether he is complying with the terms of his probation’ [citation].” (People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 610; see also People v. Kern (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 962, 965.) Thus, “because such a search condition is necessarily justified by its rehabilitative purpose, it is of no moment whether the underlying offense is reasonably related to theft, narcotics, or firearms....” (People v. Balestra (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 57, 67 [search condition valid where the defendant pleaded guilty to elder abuse].) In addition, “the purpose of the juvenile court law is to provide for the protection and safety of the public as well as of the minor. [Citation.]” (In re Binh L. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 194, 204; In re Abdirahman S. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 963, 969.)
Here, the court imposed other conditions on the minor that are not challenged, including that he “not... use, possess, or be under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs..., ” “not... use or possess any dangerous, illegal or deadly weapons..., ” and “not... initiate contact or cause to be contacted by any means... the victims or witnesses....” The search and seizure condition will assist in ensuring the minor complies with these conditions. Consequently, we find the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the search and seizure waiver condition in this case.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: FYBEL, J., IKOLA, J.