Deference is accorded to findings of fact made by the Hearing Board, because the Board is able to observe the demeanor of witnesses, judge their credibility, and evaluate any conflicting testimony. In re Spak, 188 Ill.2d 53, 66, 241 Ill.Dec. 618, 719 N.E.2d 747 (1999). Therefore, this court will not disturb the Board's factual findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence.

To this end, Rule 1.5(c) is not a suggestion or aspirational (Camelot, Inc. v. Burke Burns & Pinelli, Ltd., 2021 IL App (2d) 200208, ¶ 47), but rather, it is mandatory with no exceptions. In re Spak, 188 Ill.2d 53, 67 (1999). The rule has the force and effect of law. Camelot, 2021 IL App (2d) 200208, ¶ 47.

See Storment, 203 Ill. 2d at 398 ("The requirement of a writing ensures that the scope and terms of each lawyer's representation are defined, thus preventing or minimizing uncertainties and disputes."); In re Spak, 188 Ill. 2d 53, 67 (1999) (absent written contingent-fee contract, "[a] client in such a situation may be left with the unenviable choice of agreeing with his attorney's recollection of the free agreement or delaying receipt of his money pending resolution of a fee dispute.) Written disclosure is thus mandatory "even if *** the purposes of the rule were sufficiently served by the client's knowledge of the fee terms."

The Illinois Supreme Court has explained that the writing requirement of Rule 1.5(c) is mandatory and contains no exception. In re Spak, 188 Ill. 2d 53, 67, 719 N.E.2d 747, 754 (1999). Thus, the court made clear that an attorney may not "wait to reduce a contingent fee to writing until after the work is done and the attorney is in possession of the proceeds of litigation."

In addition, a holding in Needle's favor would also flout Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(c) ("Rule 1.5(c)"), which requires that lawyers set out contingency fees in writing. Underlying that rule is the concern that, absent a written agreement ex ante, attorneys could wait to reduce their fees to writing "until after the work is done" and they are "in possession of the proceeds of the litigation" (In re Spak, 188 Ill. 2d 53, 67, 719 N.E.2d 747, 754 (1999)). At that point a client "may be left with the unenviable choice of agreeing with his attorney's recollection of the fee agreement, or delaying receipt of his money pending resolution of a fee dispute" (id. at 67, 719 N.E.2d at 754-55).

The Hearing Board is afforded great deference because it is in the best position to observe the witnesses' demeanor and judge their credibility, resolve conflicting testimony, and render other fact-finding judgments. In re Spak, 188 Ill. 2d 53, 66 (1999); In re Hopper, 85 Ill. 2d 318, 323 (1981). Although the Hearing Board's findings of fact are entitled to deference, this court is responsible for correcting errors in the application of those facts to the law.

Deference is to be accorded to the factual findings of the Hearing Board because the Hearing Board is in a position to observe the witnesses' demeanor, judge their credibility, and resolve conflicting testimony. In re Spak, 188 Ill. 2d 53, 66 (1999). Accordingly, this court will generally not disturb the Board's factual findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The purpose of attorney discipline is not punishment. Rather, attorney discipline is undertaken to protect the public, to maintain the integrity of the profession, and to protect the administration of justice from reproach. In re Spak, 188 Ill. 2d 53, 67-68 (1999), quoting In re Fox, 122 Ill. 2d 402, 410 (1988). In determining the appropriate sanction to impose, we must consider the nature of respondent's misconduct and any aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

The rule is "mandatory" and "contains no exception." In re Spak, 188 Ill.2d 53, 67 (1999).

Moreover, contingent fee agreements are required to be in writing and there are no exceptions. Id. at 1.5(c); In re Spak, 719 N.E.2d 747, 754 (Ill. 1999). Here, the scope of representation and Ms. Herman's fee were never expressed in writing.