Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County Super.Ct.No. J209348. Douglas N. Gericke, Judge.
Richard Schwartzberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General.
OPINION
RAMIREZ, P.J.
INTRODUCTION
S.P. (minor) admitted committing second degree robbery in violation of Penal Code section 211. Minor was committed to the California Youth Authority (CYA) with a maximum confinement time of five years eight months, based on the instant offense and a prior wardship petition. On appeal, minor contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by committing him to CYA when less restrictive placements were available.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
We note that CYA was redesignated the Division of Juvenile Facilities and is part of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice. (Gov. Code, §§ 12838, subd. (a), 12838.3; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1710, subd. (a).)
FACTS
On June 9, 2006, Los Angeles County police officers stopped to question minor. Minor ran from the police. The officers followed and noticed that minor was carrying a revolver. After the chase, minor was apprehended and the gun was recovered. Minor admitted carrying an unregistered loaded firearm (§12031, subd. (a)(1)) and possessing a concealed firearm on his person (§ 12025, subd. (a)(2)). The matter was transferred to San Bernardino County for disposition because minor is a resident of San Bernardino County. Both violations were declared felonies with a maximum confinement time of three years. On July 31, 2006, minor was declared a ward of the court and placed on the “Success” probation program, which involves a high level of supervision.
On September 21, 2006, minor had been drinking vodka when he and several other individuals approached a male and female in a park, and asked them for marijuana. When the victims denied having marijuana, someone hit the female victim in the head with a bottle, threw her to the ground, and kicked her. The male victim was punched in the face, but was able to get away. Minor and his associates then drove away in the female victim’s car and crashed it into a tree. Minor was apprehended after police located him hiding behind bushes. Minor admitted committing second degree robbery. (§ 211.)
At a contested disposition hearing, minor’s probation officer testified that in determining which placement to recommend for minor, she considered (1) a regional facility; (2) Fouts Springs, a camp 600 miles from San Bernardino; and (3) CYA. Fouts Springs and the regional facility are considered less secure because Fouts Springs is an open camp with no fences and the regional facility offers weekend furlough passes. In addition, the regional facility and Fouts Springs would hold minor for approximately one year, while CYA would confine minor for approximately two years.
The juvenile court committed minor to CYA, which was in accordance with the recommendation of minor’s probation officer. The court rejected the less restrictive facilities citing a need for a secure placement and a longer rehabilitation time, which were only available at CYA. Minor’s maximum confinement time for both offenses was five years eight months.
DISCUSSION
Minor’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court abused its discretion by committing him to CYA because CYA should be a last resort after less restrictive placements have been attempted. Minor asserts that since he was doing well in school, had good behavior at juvenile hall, and has no history of escaping from custody, he should have been committed to a less restrictive facility.
“A juvenile court’s commitment order may be reversed on appeal only upon a showing the court abused its discretion. [Citation.]” (In re Robert H. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329-1330.) A CYA commitment may be based on a pattern of escape from a less secure facility, increasingly serious delinquent behavior, the recommendation of the probation department, or the need for a secure facility. (In re Jose R. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 55, 61.) The court may make a commitment to the CYA without first trying less restrictive placements. (In re Asean D. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 467, 473.) “Nonetheless, there must be evidence in the record demonstrating both a probable benefit to the minor by a CYA commitment and the inappropriateness or ineffectiveness of less restrictive alternatives. [Citations.]” (In re Angela M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1396.)
Minor’s most recent criminal offense reflected an escalating pattern of violent criminal behavior. Minor’s probation officer’s report indicated that minor admitted to being a member of a gang for the past two years. The report also noted that while in his parents’ custody, minor had run away to stay on the streets of Los Angeles; minor had been using marijuana since he was 13, and methamphetamine and alcohol since the age of 15; minor had four juvenile citations, two for truancy and two for curfew; minor had been involved in two physical altercations at school and another eight in the community; and minor had been suspended from school 10 times and expelled twice.
The clerk’s transcript states that minor ran away to Las Vegas, rather than Los Angeles.
In determining which facility would best foster minor’s rehabilitation, the juvenile court considered the facilities mentioned by the probation department: (1) CYA; (2) the regional facility; and (3) Fouts Springs. The juvenile court reasoned that since minor had already been on a high level of probation supervision when he committed another serious offense, minor would be best served by a longer rehabilitation time at a secure facility, which was available only through CYA. The juvenile court found a one-year commitment at a less secure facility would not be as effective for rehabilitating minor.
We find no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s reasoning. The record reflects that minor’s probation officer recommended he be placed in CYA; minor’s criminal behavior was escalating, despite being on a high level of probation supervision; and there was a need for a secure facility, due to minor’s increasingly violent behavior and his gang affiliation. In addition, the less secure facilities did not provide the longer rehabilitation time that was available at CYA.
Minor notes that the juvenile court could have committed him to the regional facility and ordered that he be denied weekend furlough passes unless such passes were approved by the court, thereby making the regional facility a more secure placement for minor. However, when the probation officer testified at minor’s disposition hearing, she noted that even if the weekend passes were waived, she would still recommend minor be placed at CYA. In her report, minor’s probation officer noted that “due to the seriousness of the events and [minor’s] delinquent history a more restrictive sanction is necessary.” Based upon this evidence, we find the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by deciding to not place minor in the regional facility without weekend furlough passes.
Minor analogizes his case to that of In re Michael R. (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 327. In Michael R., the minor had no prior criminal record and had done poorly in school. (Id. at pp. 331, 335.) When the minor was found to have shot a firearm at a dwelling, he was committed to CYA. But, that commitment was reversed because it violated the principle that juvenile commitments should be progressively restrictive and there was no evidence before the court that a less restrictive placement was inappropriate. (Id. at pp. 331-332, 335-341.) We find this analogy unpersuasive.
First, Michael R. was decided prior to the 1984 amendments to the juvenile law, which reflect an increased emphasis on punishment as a tool of rehabilitation, as well as concern for the safety of the public. (In re Asean D., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 473.) Second, while Michael R. was being sentenced for his first offense, minor was already on a high level of probation supervision when he committed another serious felony and was committed to CYA. Third, while Michael R. shot at a dwelling, minor was involved in a violent attack upon two victims, which resulted in injury to the victims, theft, and serious property damage. Therefore, we are not convinced that minor’s case is similar to that of Michael R.
There is substantial evidence in the record to support the juvenile court’s commitment of minor to CYA, based upon minor’s increasingly violent criminal behavior; the recommendation of his probation officer; the need for a secure facility; the probable benefit to minor’s rehabilitation goals; and the ineffectiveness of the less secure facilities for meeting minor’s rehabilitation needs. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: HOLLENHORST, J., GAUT, J.