Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. DP001344
OPINION
McAdams, J.
In this juvenile dependency proceeding, the father of a dependent child appeals the juvenile court order terminating his parental rights. He challenges the court’s finding that the child is likely to be adopted and that the benefits of adoption outweigh the detriment from severing the biological parent-child relationship. We find substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s determinations. We therefore affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This appeal involves Sophia S., who was born in August 2005. Sophia’s birth parents are Katy S. (the mother) and appellant Joshua L. (the father). The mother previously petitioned this court for a writ, seeking relief from the juvenile court order terminating reunification services and setting a permanency planning hearing. We denied the mother’s petition on the merits. (H030668, nonpub. opn., filed December 1, 2006.) For purposes of this appeal, we summarize the relevant background described in our prior opinion.
Detention
Sophia was placed in protective custody as soon as she was born. Two days later, a petition was filed on her behalf by the Santa Cruz County Human Resources Agency (the Agency). The petition sought dependency jurisdiction over Sophia, under the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. The petition alleged that there was a substantial risk that Sophia would suffer serious harm as a result of her parents’ inability to provide care for her due to their mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse. (§ 300, subd. (b).) After conducting a hearing, the juvenile court ordered the child detained. (See § 315.)
Further unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Jurisdiction and Disposition
The Agency prepared a jurisdiction/disposition report, dated September 1, 2005. In it, the Agency advised the court that the mother had “been receiving mental health interventions through the County since she was nine years old” and that her “history with receiving services through Children’s Mental Health and Adult Mental Health has resulted in eight volumes of case documentation.” The Agency summarized the mother’s extensive adult “history of crisis stabilization, hospitalization and enrollment in social rehabilitation programs” in a synopsis that consumed nearly two full single-spaced pages in the report. The mother’s diagnosis is schizo-affective disorder. Since May 2004, when the mother “transitioned from residential care” to independent living, she had been “provided the highest level of intensive services available, short of [being] conserved again.” The father has an extensive criminal history, which includes violence directed at the mother, and he has been diagnosed as bipolar. In the Agency’s view, the mother and the father “each have significant mental health issues and appear to continue to struggle in maintaining an independent lifestyle. They have repeatedly engaged in violent behaviors within their relationship and continued to do so when [the mother] was pregnant with Sophia.” The Agency opined that “neither parent appears able to adequately and safely care for Sophia.”
After several continuances, the court conducted a hearing in late October 2005, which addressed jurisdiction and “partial disposition.” (See §§ 355, 358.) Both parents submitted to jurisdiction based on the allegations of the petition. Sophia was living in a licensed foster home. The court allowed the mother supervised visitation, and it ordered two “psychological/psychiatric evaluations” for each parent.
Further Disposition Hearings
At a hearing held in December 2005, the social worker advised the court that only one psychological evaluation for each parent had been completed. Further disposition hearings were scheduled for February, March, and April 2006, but each was continued because neither parent had yet submitted to a second evaluation as ordered. A contested dispositional hearing was held in May 2006. In its formal dispositional order after hearing, the juvenile court required the provision of reunification services for both parents and it again ordered a second psychological/psychiatric evaluation for each.
Agency’s Modification Petition
In August 2006, the Agency filed a petition seeking to modify the disposition order insofar as it required the provision of reunification services to the parents. (See § 388.) As changed circumstances in support of the requested modification, the Agency cited the mother’s recently completed second psychological evaluation, which concluded that no level of services would benefit the mother in being able to adequately parent Sophia. The Agency had previously asked the court to terminate reunification services, and a hearing was set for that purpose.
In September 2006, the court conducted the contested hearing on the Agency’s request for denial or termination of reunification services. After hearing evidence and argument, the court ruled from the bench, granting the Agency’s petition for modification. A formal order after hearing followed. Consistent with its ruling at the hearing, the court set a permanency planning hearing for December 8, 2006. (See § 366.26.)
The Mother’s Writ Petition
The mother brought a petition for extraordinary writ in this court. (See § 366.26, subd. (l); Cal. Rules of Court, rules 38 & 38.1, former rule 39.1B.) As noted above, we denied the petition on the merits.
Termination of Parental Rights
In December 2006, the Agency prepared a report for the permanency planning hearing. A contested hearing was held in February 2007. At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court found that Sophia was likely to be adopted, and it terminated parental rights as to both the mother and the father.
The Father’s Appeal
This timely appeal by the father ensued. He challenges the order terminating his parental rights to Sophia on two grounds. He first attacks the juvenile court’s adoptability finding, arguing that it is not supported by substantial evidence and that the court erred in failing to assess the suitability of the prospective adoptive home in light of Sophia’s claimed predisposition for mental illness. In addition, he challenges the court’s decision not to apply the parental bond exception to adoption, calling it an abuse of discretion.
The Agency defends the juvenile court’s determinations, joined by Sophia.
DISCUSSION
As a framework for our analysis, we begin with a brief overview of the principles of dependency law that inform our decision. Against that backdrop, we analyze the specific contentions raised here.
I. Statutory Framework
A. Background
The Legislature has provided for juvenile court jurisdiction over dependent children. (See § 300 et seq.) The primary goal of the dependency statutes is “to ensure the safety, protection, and well-being of children who are at risk of abuse, neglect, or exploitation, while preserving the family whenever possible.” (In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, 824; see § 300.2; In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 307.) In dependency proceedings involving the removal of children from their parents, there are generally four phases: jurisdiction, disposition, reunification (unless bypassed), and the selection and implementation of a permanent plan. (In re Matthew C. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 386, 391.) We are concerned with the fourth and final phase here.
B. Permanency Planning
At the appropriate juncture, the juvenile court is required to select and implement a permanent plan for a dependent child. (§ 366.26; In re Tabatha G. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1164.) “The selection and implementation hearing under section 366.26 takes place after the juvenile court finds that the parents are unfit and the child cannot be returned to them.” (In re Josue G. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 725, 732.) Generally speaking, the court is required to “select one of three plans for the child: adoption, guardianship or long-term foster care.” (In re Jose V. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1792, 1797.)
1. Adoption
“Where there is no probability of reunification with a parent, adoption is the preferred permanent plan.” (In re Tabatha G., supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1164.) “Adoption is the preferred placement because it offers the prospect of a secure permanent home.” (In re Jamie R. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 766, 774.)
Notwithstanding the strong preference for adoption, the juvenile court may not terminate parental rights and free the child for adoption except upon clear and convincing evidence that the child is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); § 366.22, subd. (b)(6); In re Jose V., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1797-1798.) “ ‘Clear and convincing’ evidence requires a finding of high probability. The evidence must be so clear as to leave no substantial doubt.” (In re Asia L. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 498, 510.)
2. Exceptions
“Where the trial court finds that the child is likely to be adopted, it must select adoption as the permanent plan unless it finds that termination of parental rights would be detrimental under one of [several] specified [statutory] exceptions.” (In re Jamie R., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 773; see § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A) – (E).) In this case, appellant relies on one such provision: the “beneficial relationship” or “parental bond” exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).)
Parents seeking to avoid the termination of their parental rights based on the parental bond bear the burden of proving that the statutory exception applies to them. (In re Jamie R., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 773.)
II. Appellate Review
As California Supreme Court precedent teaches, the juvenile court’s placement determination for a dependent child typically is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. (In re Stephanie M. (1994)7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.) But many courts have employed the substantial evidence review standard when the issue on appeal is the termination of parental rights, since the requisite case-by-case assessment of relevant circumstances generally compels a fact-based analysis. (See, e.g., In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 400; In re Brittany C. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 847, 854; In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) As a practical matter, the differences between the two standards of review are not significant. “In its emphasis on deference, the abuse of discretion standard is similar to the substantial evidence rule.” (In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1065.) Furthermore, “evaluating the factual basis for an exercise of discretion is similar to analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence for the ruling.” (Id. at p. 1067.)
Applying that deferential review standard, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the order. (In re Y.R. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 99, 112; In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) We thus examine the record to decide whether “a reasonable trier of fact could find that termination of parental rights is appropriate based on clear and convincing evidence.” (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 423, internal quotation marks omitted; accord, In re Erik P., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 400.) “We give the court’s finding of adoptability the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolve any evidentiary conflicts in favor of affirming.” (In re Gregory A. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1562.) The appellant has the burden of showing that the challenged finding or order lacks evidentiary support. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.)
III. Analysis
With those principles in mind, we turn to the case at hand. As noted above, the father raises two challenges on appeal, one concerning adoptability and the other concerning the parental bond exception. In his first challenge to the order, the father contends that there is an insufficient basis for the juvenile court’s finding that Sophia is likely to be adopted. As to that point, he first asserts that the court failed to adequately assess the prospective adoptive parents’ suitability to raise a child with a family history of serious mental illness. In addition, he takes issue with the court’s general adoptability finding. Concerning his second ground for appeal, the father argues for application of the parental bond exception to adoption. We consider each of the father’s arguments in turn, bearing in mind the deferential standard that governs our review.
A. Adoptability
Dependent children may be generally adoptable, because they possess desirable attributes, or they may be specifically adoptable, because a particular prospective adoptive family is willing to adopt them. (See In re Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1061.) In general adoptability determinations, the focus is on the child; the juvenile court considers whether the child’s age, physical condition, emotional state, or other factors may make adoption difficult. (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 406; In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649.) In such cases, the existence of a prospective adoptive parent is not determinative in itself. (In re Sarah M., at p. 1649; see § 366.26, subd. (c)(1); see also, e.g., In re Josue G., supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 733.) But it is a factor in assessing adoptability, since a prospective adoptive parent’s interest is evidence that the child’s attributes are not likely to discourage others from adopting that child. (In re Sarah M., at p. 1650; In re Erik P., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 400; cf., In re Asia L., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at pp. 510-512.) “If the child is considered generally adoptable, we do not examine the suitability of the prospective adoptive home. [Citation.] However, where the child is deemed adoptable based solely on the fact that a particular family is willing to adopt him or her, the trial court must determine whether there is a legal impediment to adoption.” (In re Carl R., at p. 1061.)
In this case, the juvenile court found Sophia adoptable by clear and convincing evidence. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm that finding.
1. Threshold Issues
Before discussing the substantive issues presented by the father’s appeal, we first address two threshold issues raised by the Agency.
First, the Agency takes issue with references in the father’s opening brief to the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV) and with his assertions “about the child’s future propensity for mental illness in light of her parents’ history, citing to the DSM-IV.” The Agency thus states: “None of this was, however, before the Juvenile Court and it is mere speculation, unsupported by any professional diagnosis of this child.” The father responds that the DSM-IV “has been relied on repeatedly by the courts of this state and the United States Supreme Court.” He thus defends his reliance on the DSM-IV to support his statement that “Sophia’s family background, with a multi-generational history of schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder, suggested a stronger than normal chance Sophia would develop one of the same or similar disorders.”
We agree with the Agency that the record contains no substantial evidentiary support for the father’s statement. The only reference in the record to any increased probability of future dysfunction is testimony by the social worker, who was not qualified as an expert in psychiatric disorders, that Sophia was “not exhibiting any current symptoms of mental health concerns” but “that is always possible with a family history.” (Cf., In re Jennilee T. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 212, 224 [“a neurological examination revealed the minor was at risk for developmental problems”].) In any event, as explained below, even if there were a factual basis for the father’s claim that Sophia has a genetic predisposition to mental illness, we would reject his legal arguments.
The second threshold issue concerns forfeiture. The Agency contends that the father forfeited the issue of adoptability by failing to raise it below. The father refutes that contention, asserting that adoptability “is a question of fact” and that challenges based on insufficient evidence are not subject to forfeiture.
“The general principle of forfeiture prohibits parties from addressing on appeal issues not raised at trial. However, the argument that a judgment is not supported by substantial evidence is an ‘obvious exception to the rule.’ ” (In re P.C. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 279, 287-288.) Here, however, the father’s claim is not based entirely on insufficiency of the evidence per se; rather, one of his contentions is that the trial court had a duty to make a special inquiry of suitability under the circumstances presented, which it failed to carry out. Ultimately, however, we need not decide the forfeiture issue. Assuming that the father’s claim on this point is preserved, we reject it on the merits.
2. Need for Suitability Assessment
The father presses for a “Carl R. type assessment … of the prospective adoptive parents’ ability to meet the child’s needs” which he contends “is required when the family history indicates a likelihood the child will develop serious mental illness or other disability, even though the disease has not yet begun to manifest itself.” (See In re Carl R., supra, 128 Cal.App.4th 1051.)
We begin our analysis of this issue with the general rule that “a section 366.26 hearing does not provide a forum for the minors’ parent to contest the ‘suitability’ of a prospective adoptive family. Rather, what is required is clear and convincing evidence of the likelihood that the children will be adopted within a reasonable time either by the prospective adoptive family or some other family.” (In re Scott M. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 839, 844.) For that reason, “questions concerning the ‘suitability’ of a prospective adoptive family are irrelevant to the issue whether the minors are likely to be adopted.” (Ibid.) Put another way: “General suitability to adopt is a subjective matter which does not constitute a legal impediment to adoption and, thus, is irrelevant to the issue of whether the minors are likely to be adopted.” (Id. at p. 841.)
The father seizes on a narrow exception to this general rule, which was explicated in the case of In re Carl R., supra, 128 Cal.App.4th 1051. That case does not assist him, however, since it arose from unique circumstances not present here. The dependent child, Carl R., suffered from “cerebral palsy, severe quadriparesis, a seizure disorder, and an uncontrolled and severe psychomotor delay. Because of his disabilities, he [would] always require total care.” (Id. at p. 1058.) Furthermore, “all parties agree[d] Carl [was] adoptable only because the M. family [was] willing to adopt him.” (Id. at p. 1061.) The court described the issue before it as “very narrow—what is the proper scope of the inquiry by the juvenile court in determining the adoptability of a child who will require intensive care for life?” (Id. at p. 1062.) As the court explained: “A child who is specifically adoptable and who will need total care for life is at high risk of becoming a legal orphan if parental rights are terminated and the prospective adoptive family is later determined to be unsuitable.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) “This could occur if the courts analyze only whether there is a legal impediment to adoption ….” (Ibid.) For that reason, the court concluded, “the assessment of the adoptability of such a child must necessarily include some consideration of whether the prospective adoptive parents can meet that child’s needs ….” (Ibid.)
We see no good reason to extend the narrow holding of Carl R. to this case.
For one thing, sound policy considerations dictate against doing so. The Carl R. court itself explicitly agreed with “the analysis in the cases cited by the Agency that, as a general rule, the suitability of the prospective adoptive family does not constitute a legal impediment to adoption and is irrelevant to the issue of whether a child is likely to be adopted.” (In re Carl R., supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 1061.) As the court observed: “If an inquiry into the suitability of prospective adoptive parents were permitted at the section 366.26 hearing, many hearings would degenerate into subjective attacks on those prospective adoptive parents—a result not envisioned by the statutory scheme. [Citation.] Those types of inquiries might also discourage people from seeking to adopt, a result that would contravene the strong public policy favoring adoption.” (Id. at pp. 1061-1062.) The same considerations apply here.
For another thing, the facts of Carl R. are wholly distinguishable. There, a total needs child was involved, a factual circumstance that drove the court’s analysis. As the court noted, at issue before it was “the nature of the inquiry required where the child in question is completely developmentally disabled.” (In re Carl R., supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 1062.) Here, no such factual predicate exists. Sophia is not disabled. Factually, the case before us bears a stronger resemblance to In re Jennilee T., supra, 3 Cal.App.4th 212. There, both of the minors’ parents had “suffered from mental illness for many years and [had] been hospitalized numerous times.” (Id. at p. 216, fn. omitted.) Despite evidence that the minor was at risk for later developmental problems, the appellate court found “nothing to refute the evidence [that she] was a likely candidate for adoption.” (Id. at p. 225.)
In sum, we conclude, the analysis in Carl R. is properly limited to the unique facts of that case. We therefore decline the father’s invitation to apply it here.
3. Evidence of General Adoptability
In its December 2006 report for the selection and implementation hearing, the Agency evaluated Sophia’s medical, developmental, mental and emotional status. According to the report, “Sophia is in good health” and “meeting the developmental milestones for a child her age.” In terms of mental and emotional status, the report states: “Sophia has no identified adverse mental or emotional needs at this time. The caregivers are aware of Sophia’s birth parents’ histories of mental health services and the potential for familial etiology. The caregivers are in contact with the Stanford High Risk Infant Clinic psychologist and continue to monitor Sophia’s mental health status.”
As noted above, the relevant factors in assessing adoptability include the child’s age, physical condition, and emotional state. (In re Sarah M., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1649.) Here, both Sophia’s young age (18 months) and her physical health (good) were factors supporting adoptability. The crucial question is whether her claimed potential for serious future mental illness presents an impediment to her likely adoption. We conclude that it does not.
We acknowledge that issues with a dependent child’s “emotional and psychological development” may “present a potential obstacle to adoption.” (In re Asia L., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 512.) Thus, for example, evidence of adoptability was lacking where the dependent child – for whom no prospective adoptive family had been identified – needed constant supervision, was often out of control, was extremely hyperactive, and had a poor attention span, inadequate impulse control, and low frustration tolerance. (Id. at pp. 510-511.)
In this case, however, as the record demonstrates, Sophia has exhibited no such developmental problems. To the contrary, the Agency described her as “an adorable one year old girl” with “no identified adverse mental or emotional needs at this time.” This is not a case in which the child “might be considered unadoptable due to age, poor physical health, physical disability, or emotional instability….” (In re Sarah M., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at 1650; see also, e.g., In re Jennilee T., supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 225.)
The juvenile court’s adoptability determination thus finds ample support in the record, even without considering the existence of an identified prospective family. The fact that Sophia was in a concurrent home provides further evidentiary support for the finding of adoptability. (See In re Asia L., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 510.) In sum, on this record, a reasonable juvenile court judge could find clear and convincing evidence that Sophia is likely to be adopted.
B. Parental Bond Exception
The “parental bond” or “beneficial relationship” exception to adoption is contained in section 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A). As developed in the case law, the exception comprises three essential elements: regular visitation and contact; a parental role; and a relationship that “promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.” (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.)
That provision reads in pertinent part as follows: “(c)(1) If the court determines … that it is likely the child will be adopted, the court shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption. … A finding … that the court has continued to remove the child from the custody of the parent or guardian and has terminated reunification services, shall constitute a sufficient basis for termination of parental rights unless the court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child due to one or more of the following circumstances: [¶] (A) The parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).)
Before addressing the existence of those elements in this case, we consider the threshold question of the father’s standing.
1. Threshold Issue
In support of his argument that the parental bond exception applies here, the father relies on evidence of the mother’s relationship with Sophia, as well as his own. The Agency argues that he lacks standing to assert the mother’s parental bond with the child. (See, e.g., In re Caitlin B. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1193-1194; In re Joshua M. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 801, 807.) The father disputes the point, contending that his interests and the mother’s are interwoven. (See, e.g., In re Particia E. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 1, 6, disapproved on another point in In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 60 [for purposes of standing, the dependent child’s welfare and the parent-child relationship are “intertwined”].)
As a general rule, “a parent is precluded from raising issues on appeal which did not affect his or her own rights.” (In re Jasmine J. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1802, 1806.) A different result is not dictated by California Rules of Court, rule 5.725, on which the father relies. (In re Joshua M., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 808, discussing the predecessor rule, Cal. Rules of Court, former rule 1463(a).) “That rule, which is analogous to a compulsory joinder provision, simply provides that a court terminating parental rights in a section 366.26 proceeding must terminate the rights of both parents in one proceeding.” (Ibid.) “The stated purpose of the requirement that both parents’ rights be terminated in a single proceeding ‘is to free the dependent child for adoption.’ ” (In re Caitlin B., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1194, quoting former rule 1463(g).) “Nothing in the rule gives appellant the right to urge on appeal that an error in terminating the father’s rights redounds to her benefit so as to make into error an errorless termination of her parental rights.” (Ibid.;accord, Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Fam. Services v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 947, 949.)
Nor is this a case in which the parents’ interests are interwoven. Throughout the dependency proceeding, the mother periodically expressed her feeling that “it would be best for Sophia to be adopted” in light of the parents’ mental health issues and their stormy relationship. By contrast, the father “has continually stated that he wishes to raise Sophia, along with” the mother. Consistent with those positions, the father has appealed the termination of parental rights, while the mother has not. The parents’ interests thus “do not interweave….” (In re Caitlin B., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1193.)
We therefore conclude that the father lacks standing to assert the mother’s parental bond with Sophia. In any event, we observe, evidence of the maternal bond would not affect the outcome of this case. With or without that consideration, the record lacks evidence of a parental bond sufficient to overcome the statutory preference for adoption. We turn now to a discussion of the factors that lead us to that conclusion.
2. Visitation and Contact
The first requirement for the parental bond exception, “regular visitation and contact with the child,” is explicit in the statute. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A); see, e.g., In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, 689 [mother had maintained “regular visitation and contact”]; In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1343 [mother had been consistent in her visitation, although the visits did not progress to unsupervised contact].)
In this case, according to the Agency’s December 2006 report, the mother “fairly consistently participated in weekly supervised visits with Sophia, with the exception of approximately seven no-shows in the last six months. The character of these visits was generally adequate, according to the visit supervisor.” But the father visited Sophia only “four times over the past year of reunification services. The third visit was ended early, due to [the father’s] erratic behavior (pushing around furniture and making loud exclamations).” He “had approximately seven no-shows in the last six months” and had “not been in contact with the Agency since September 2006.” He was reportedly in custody.
In our view, neither the frequency nor the quality of the father’s visitation offers a “compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child” as required by the statute. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) Thus, we believe, the juvenile court could have rested its rejection of the parental bond exception solely on this first factor. The court’s decision is further bolstered when the other two factors are considered.
3. Parental Relationship
As this court explained more than a decade ago, frequent, loving contact alone is not sufficient to establish the requisite parent-child relationship. (In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418-1419.) The statute contemplates a relationship that is parental in nature. (Id. at p. 1418.) Thus, in order to trigger the statutory exception, the parent must occupy a role that goes beyond that of friendly visitor, extended family member, or day care provider. (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 468; In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52; In re Beatrice M., at pp. 1419-1420.) As we have previously observed: “While friendships are important, a child needs at least one parent.” (In re Brittany C., supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 854.)
The parental relationship is demonstrated by “the adult’s attention to the child’s needs for physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection and stimulation. [Citation.] The relationship arises from day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences.” (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) Such “daily nurturing” is the hallmark of a parental relationship. (In re Brittany C., supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 854; see also, e.g., In re Jamie R., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 774.) By the same token, however, everyday “contact is not necessarily required, although it is typical in a parent-child relationship. A strong and beneficial parent-child relationship might exist such that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child, particularly in the case of an older child, despite a lack of day-to-day contact and interaction.” (In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 51.)
Many different variables shape the parent-child relationship. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at pp. 575-576.) “Parent-child relationships do not necessarily conform to a particular pattern.” (In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350.) Four factors are commonly cited: “The age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs are some of the variables which logically affect a parent/child bond.” (In re Autumn H. at p. 576; see also, e.g., In re Amber M., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 689; In re Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at pp. 467-468; In re Jerome D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1206.) Given the many different forms that parent-child relationships may take, application of the “exception must be examined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the many variables which affect a parent/child bond.” (In re Autumn H., at p. 576.)
Examining the particular relationship at issue here in light of the foregoing factors, we conclude that the father does not occupy a parental role in relation to Sophia.
We start with the first two factors, age and time in parental custody. Here, the entirety of Sophia’s young life has been spent in this dependency proceeding, in out-of-home care. Moreover, even visitation has been sparse, particularly the father’s. Thus, as of the time of the challenged decision in February 2007, Sophia had “spent relatively few hours visiting” with her parents “versus many hours being parented by” her foster family. (In re Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at pp. 467-468.) Under these circumstances, neither the child’s age nor her time in parental care compels a finding that the father occupies a parental role in Sophia’s life.
Addressing the next factor, we consider whether the parent-child interaction has been beneficial to the child. Of the father’s four visits, one was terminated early because of his erratic behavior. Interaction of that type can hardly be characterized as beneficial to Sophia. The social worker testified to her belief that it was not in Sophia’s “best interests to have ongoing contact” with the father. The record also reflects concerns about the mother’s actions during visits, including “frequently requiring prompting to change Sophia’s diaper, needing assistance from the staff to change the diaper, requiring prompting from the visit supervisor to give Sophia a bottle when she appeared hungry, and providing Sophia with a toy that [the mother] was previously informed was not safe for Sophia to play with.” (Cf., In re Brandon C. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1535 [during visitation, parents fed and cared for the children, and helped by “changing diapers, picking up toys, and keeping them safe”].) The evidence of benefit to Sophia thus is sparse.
That brings us to the last factor – ability to meet the child’s needs. In this case, the December 2006 report expresses the Agency’s view that the mother “would not be capable of keeping the child safe or consistently meeting Sophia’s needs.” (Cf., In re Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 468 [“no evidence that Angel has any particular needs that can be met by Mother but not by the foster family”].) The report opines that the mother “has a visiting relationship with the child.” The social worker repeated that opinion in testimony at the hearing. She explained that the mother and Sophia “interact in a social manner playing games in a supervised setting,” but that the mother had to be reminded to attend to the child’s needs. As for the father, the record is devoid of evidence that he has acted as a parent toward Sophia. To the contrary, according to the Agency’s December 2006 report, the father “does not have a sustaining or parenting relationship with the child.” In sum, neither the father nor the mother has functioned as a parent in meeting the child’s needs.
The evidentiary record in this case thus provides no basis for reversing the juvenile court’s determination that the father’s relationship with Sophia was not sufficiently parental to warrant application of the statutory exception.
4. Balancing Test
In determining applicability of the parental bond exception, the juvenile court weighs the benefit to the child of continuing the parent-child relationship against the advantages of permanency through adoption. (In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 424-425.) On one side of the equation is the relationship with the biological parent, which “must be sufficiently strong that the child would suffer detriment from its termination.” (In re Beatrice M., supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1418.) On the other side of the equation is permanence for the child through adoption. The “juvenile court must engage in a balancing test, juxtaposing the quality of the relationship and the detriment involved in terminating it against the potential benefit of an adoptive family.” (In re Cliffton B., at pp. 424-425.)
In this case, the juvenile court explicitly balanced the benefits of maintaining the parent-child relationship against the benefits of security, stability, and permanence that an adoptive home would provide. As the court put it, the parental relationship “doesn’t rise to the level that the child would suffer a detriment if the relationship were terminated.” We agree. Viewed in the light most favorable to the order, the record demonstrates that Sophia gained little benefit from the relationship with her biological parents. On the other hand, her needs were being met by her prospective adoptive family, with whom she had lived since October 2005, nearly her entire life. Sophia thus stood to derive great benefit from the permanency that her adoptive placement would bring.
Having weighed the parent-child relationship against Sophia’s need for permanence and stability, the juvenile court properly afforded her the most permanent and secure placement that it could – adoption. That determination is amply supported in fact and law.
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
The record supports the juvenile court’s determination that Sophia is likely to be adopted. The record likewise supports the court’s rejection of the parental bond exception to adoption. Under these circumstances, the court did not err in terminating the father’s parental rights.
Disposition
We affirm the order of February 1, 2007, terminating appellant’s parental rights and freeing Sophia for adoption.
WE CONCUR: Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J., Duffy, J.