Summary
holding $10,000 attorney fee order in child custody case, payable in monthly installments of $300 due to appellant's financial difficulties, was not an abuse of discretion because some evidence supported award
Summary of this case from Laufer v. GordonOpinion
No. 05-07-01756-CV
Opinion Filed April 8, 2009.
On Appeal from the 254th District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 07-03714-R.
Before Justices MOSELEY, FITZGERALD, and LANG-MIERS.
Opinion By Justice FITZGERALD.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Covington Cormier appeals from the order enforcing the Pennsylvania court's determination in a child custody proceeding. Appellant brings two issues on appeal asserting the trial court erred (1) in awarding appellee, Eva Laackman, attorney's fees of $10,000 and (2) in ordering appellant to pay the attorney's fees at the rate of $300 per month.
The judgment awarded attorney's fees to appellant and her trial counsel, James Volberding, as follows:
It is ordered that good cause exists to award Eva Laackman and James W. Volberding judgment in the amount of $10,000 for attorney's fees, expenses, and costs incurred by Eva Laackman, with interest at 8.25% percent per year compounded annually from the date the judgment is signed until paid. The amount of $10,000 is payable monthly in the amount of $300 per month, beginning December 1, 2007, until finally and fully paid. The judgment, for which let execution issue is awarded against Covington Cormier, Respondent. Respondent is ordered to pay the fees, expenses, costs, and interest to Mrs. Eva Laackman, c/o James W. Volberding. . . . Mrs. Laackman or Mr. Volberding may enforce this judgment for fees, expenses, and costs in Mrs. Laackman's or the attorney's own name by any means available for the enforcement of a judgment for debt.
In his first issue, appellant asserts there is no evidence to support the trial court's award of attorney's fees. The decision to award attorney's fees in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship is within the discretion of the trial court. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 106.002 (Vernon 2008); Bruni v. Bruni, 924 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex. 1996). We will not reverse a trial court's judgment on attorney's fees in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. In re A.C.J., 146 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex.App. 2004, no pet.). There is no abuse of discretion where an award of attorney's fees is supported by the evidence. Tull v. Tull, 159 S.W.3d 758, 760 (Tex.App. 2005, no pet.). Appellee's counsel testified that he had spent 57.75 hours on the case, that his rate was $250 per hour, that the time he had spent on the case was reasonable and necessary, and that his rate was reasonable. Counsel's uncontradicted testimony serves as evidence for the fees. Id. at 761. Multiplying the attorney's hours by the rate produces an attorney's fee of $14,437.50, which exceeds the $10,000 awarded by the trial court. We conclude evidence supports the trial court's award, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding appellee $10,000 for attorney's fees. We overrule appellant's first issue.
In his second issue, appellant asserts the trial court abused its discretion in requiring appellant to pay the $10,000 attorney's fees award in monthly installments of $300 each. At the hearing, the trial court explained that the attorney's fees would be made payable in installments due to appellant's financial difficulties:
With regards to attorney's fees, the Court finds that, Mr. Cormier, you will pay $10,000.00 in attorney's fees. Now, we're going to have to structure that over a time period where it is affordable. I understand that you are without employment right now.
Appellant did not object at the hearing to the attorney's fees being "structure[d] . . . over a time period." In his motion for new trial, appellant argued "that the evidence presented does not legally and/or factually support the following orders of the Court: . . . 2. An order directing Movant to pay the sum of $300.00 per month on the judgment for attorney fees."
Appellant argues on appeal that the order that the fees be paid in installments was "an illegal turnover order" and that the order circumvents the statutory procedures for enforcement of a judgment. To preserve a complaint of error in a judgment, a party must inform the trial court of its objection by a motion to amend or correct the judgment, a motion for new trial, or some other similar method. Dal-Chrome Co. v. Brenntag Sw., Inc., 183 S.W.3d 133, 144 (Tex.App. 2006). In this case, appellant's only complaint in the trial court about the installment payments was the assertion in the motion for new trial that the evidence did not legally or factually support them. Appellant did not complain that the order requiring him to pay the attorney's fees in monthly installments was an illegal turnover order or that the order circumvented the procedures for enforcement of a judgment. Accordingly, we conclude appellant has not preserved error. We overrule appellant's second issue.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.