1 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding that postpetition earnings of debtor's law practice attributable to invested capital, accounts receivable, goodwill, employment contracts with firm's staff, client relationships and fee agreements enured to the benefit of the estate); Calder v. Segal (In re Calder), 94 B.R. 200, 203 (D.Utah 1988) (finding that postpetition funds received by attorney/debtor represented "proceeds" from debtor's prepetition services), aff'd sub nom., Calder v. Rupp (In re Calder), 912 F.2d 454 (10th Cir. 1990) (per curiam); In re Bluman, 125 B.R. 359 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding that postpetition commissions received by debtor based on prepetition sales of insurance policies represented property of the estate notwithstanding debtor's remaining obligation under noncompete agreement); In re Carson, 82 B.R. 847, 851-52 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1987) (finding that portion of postpetition settlement which represented future lost wages represented property of the estate); Boyle v. Stefurak (In re Sloan), 32 B.R. 607, 611 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y. 1983) (held that debtor's entitlement to receive finder's fee under prepetition oral agreement represented property of the estate). "`[T]he decisive factor in determining whether post-petition income of the debtor will be deemed property of the estate is whether that income accrues from the post-petition services of the debtor.'"

Therefore the monthly payments are profits from property of the estate and should be included in the estate for the benefit of creditors. The court in In re Sloan, 32 B.R. 607 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y. 1983) stated: The decisive factor in determining whether post-petition income of the debtor will be deemed property of the estate is whether that income accrues from post-petition services of the debtor.

Thus, if Clark remained obliged to perform services (play football) after he filed for bankruptcy, notwithstanding the skill guarantee addendum, his post-petition earnings may not be included in the bankruptcy estate. See Matter of Hellums, 772 F.2d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Fitzsimmons, 725 F.2d 1208, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 1984); In re Leibowitt, 93 F.2d 333, 385 (3d Cir. 1937); In re Sloan, 32 B.R. 607, 611 (Bkrtcy.E.D.N.Y. 1983); Collier on Bankruptcy, § 70.22(3) (14th ed. 1978). In essence, the skill guarantee renders inoperative the provision of the NFL Player Contract wherein the Debtor is employed as a "skilled football player" and is required to maintain a satisfactory level of skill or performance or risk termination of the contract and its attendant monetary benefits.

19 at 541-93; 2 Norton Bankruptcy Law Practice, ¶ 29.12. The decisive factor in determining whether sums of money received post-petition constitute property of the estate is whether such income accrues from post-petition services. In re Sloan, 32 B.R. 607 (Bankr.E.D.NY 1983); see also In re Marshburn, 5 B.R. 711, 713 (Bankr.D.CO 1980). In reviewing the relevant case law regarding property of the estate, this Court has found no cases presenting facts involving post-petition award of a year-end bonus similar to the instant case.

[1] Jess contends that all of the Klouds-Pacey contingent fee he received is excludable from property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) because the fee constitutes earnings from services he performed after the commencement of his bankruptcy case. Relying on In re Sloan, 32 B.R. 607, 611 (Bankr. E.D.N Y 1983) he contends that earnings received post-petition are not part of the bankruptcy estate unless all of the debtor's services necessary to produce those earnings are rooted in pre-petition acts. We disagree. Payments for prepetition services are not excludable from the estate solely because post-petition services are required to receive payment.

Thus, the salary payments received post-petition may not be considered as part of the bankruptcy estate under Section 541(a)(6).See Matter of Hellums, 772 F.2d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Post-petition wages are not property of the estate of a Chapter 7 bankrupt", under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6)); In re Sloan, 32 B.R. 607, 611 (Bkrtcy.E.D.N.Y. 1983) ("Where a debtor derives post-petition commissions under a pre-petition contract, and such commissions are dependent upon the continued services of the debtor, they do not constitute property of the estate", under Section 541(a)(6)). V. The Calculation

In this case, the debtor's entitlement is clearly rooted in the pre-bankruptcy period when the policies are issued. See In re Sloan, 32 B.R. 607, 611 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y. 1983) ("decisive factor in determining whether postpetition income of the debtor will be deemed property of the estate is whether that income accrues from postpetition services of the debtor.") (emphasis added); see also In re Bluman, 125 B.R. 359, 366 (Bankr.E.D.N Y 1991); In re Froid, 109 B.R. 481, 483 (Bankr.N.D.Fla. 1989); In re Marshburn, 5 B.R. 711, 713-14 (Bankr.D.Colo. 1980); see generally, 4 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 541.

"The decisive factor in determining whether post-petition income of the debtor will be deemed property of the estate is whether that income accrues from post-petition services of the debtor." In re Sloan, 32 B.R. 607, 611 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983). Neither party asserts that the Debtor's post-petition income accrued on account of prepetition services or contracts or would otherwise be part of the bankruptcy estate.

In other words, "a debtor's commission is property of the estate 'if all the acts of the debtor necessary to earn it are rooted in the pre-bankruptcy past.'" Tully, 202 B.R. at 483 (quoting In re Sloan, 32 B.R. 607, 611 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983)) (citing Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 (1966)). In the event the debtor's services required to earn the fees were performed both before and after the bankruptcy filing, the estate is entitled to recover the portion of the payment attributed to pre-petition services, even though the payment is not made until after the bankruptcy filing.

Put another way, “a debtor's commission is property of the estate ‘if all the acts of the debtor necessary to earn it are rooted in the pre-bankruptcy past.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Sloan , 32 B.R. 607, 611 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983) ) (citing Segal v. Rochelle , 382 U.S. 375, 380, 86 S.Ct. 511, 15 L.Ed.2d 428 (1966) ). However, in the event the debtor's services required to earn the fees were performed both before and after the bankruptcy filing, the estate is entitled to recover the portion of the payment attributed to prepetition services, even though the payment is not made until after the bankruptcy filing.