Opinion
J-S87004-16 No. 1296 MDA 2016
01-06-2017
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.L.E.H., A MINOR APPEAL OF: A.S.H., FATHER
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Decree July 8, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County
Orphans' Court at No: A63-126B-16 BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., SOLANO, J., and PLATT, J. MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.:
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
Appellant, A.S.H. (Father), appeals the decree of the Orphans' Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County, entered July 8, 2016, that terminated his parental rights to his son, S.L.E.H. (Child), born in February 2011. We affirm the decree on the basis of the trial court opinion.
In its opinion, entered July 8, 2016, the trial court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case. ( See Trial Court Opinion, 7/08/16, at 3-8). Therefore, we have no reason to restate them at length here.
For the convenience of the reader, we note briefly that T.L.E. (Mother) and Father lived together with Child until Child was five months old, at which point Mother obtained a Protection From Abuse (PFA) order and Father left the residence. Mother filed for, and was granted, primary custody. Father was given partial custody, with three supervised two-hour visits with Child each week. After the first supervisor refused to continue overseeing the visits, Catholic Charities Agency volunteered to supervise them. Father attended one visit supervised by Catholic Charities Agency; however, because of his behavior, they too refused to continue supervising. Father has not seen, nor made any attempt to see Child, since September 4, 2012. On March 16, 2016, Mother and W.A.S. (Stepfather), filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights to Child. The trial court held a hearing on that petition on June 27, 2016. It entered its decrees terminating Father's parental rights, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1) and (b), on July 8, 2016. Father's timely appeal followed on August 5, 2016.
Father timely filed his notice of appeal and statement of errors complained of on appeal on August 5, 2016. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). The trial court entered its opinion on August 9, 2016, in which it relied on the reasoning set forth in its July 8, 2016 opinion. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(ii).
Father raises the following questions on appeal:
1. Did the trial court err and commit an abuse of discretion when it determined that [] Father failed or refused to perform parental duties for the [] [C]hild?(Father's Brief, at 4).
2. Did the trial court err and commit an abuse of discretion when it determined that the [C]hild's best interests, needs, and welfare were best served by terminating [] [F]ather's parental rights?
Our standard of review is as follows:
In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our scope of review is comprehensive: we consider all the evidence presented as well as the trial court's factual findings and legal conclusions. However, our standard of review is narrow: we will reverse the trial court's order only if we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or lacked competent evidence to support its findings. The trial judge's decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict.In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
Further, we have stated:
Where the hearing court's findings are supported by competent evidence of record, we must affirm the hearing court even though the record could support an opposite result.
In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).We are bound by the findings of the trial court which have adequate support in the record so long as the findings do not evidence capricious disregard for competent and credible evidence. The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence. Though we are not bound by the trial court's inferences and deductions, we may reject its conclusions only if they involve errors of law or are clearly unreasonable in light of the trial court's sustainable findings.
The trial court terminated Father's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1) and (b). Requests to have a natural parent's parental rights terminated are governed by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, which provides, in pertinent part:
(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.
* * *
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a), (b).
It is well settled that a party seeking termination of a parent's rights bears the burden of proving the grounds to so do by "clear and convincing evidence," a standard which requires evidence that is "so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." In re T.F., 847 A.2d 738, 742 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). Further,
A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or convenient time to perform one's parental responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her physical and emotional needs. . . .In the Interest of K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the trial court, we conclude that there is no merit to the issues Father has raised on appeal. The trial court opinion properly disposes of the questions presented. ( See Trial Ct. Op., 7/08/16, at 8-9 (finding that (1) Father last had contact with Child in 2012, and never acted to overcome any obstacles that his own actions put in way of seeing Child, (2) Father had settled purpose of relinquishing his parental rights, and (3) termination of Father's parental rights is in best interest, needs, and welfare of Child)). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court's opinion.
Decree affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 1/6/2017
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