Opinion
358197
03-10-2022
In re SIMPSON, Minors.
UNPUBLISHED
Van Buren Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 16-018500-NA
Before: Riordan, P.J., and K. F. Kelly and Swartzle, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-father appeals as of right the trial court's order terminating his parental rights to his minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (j). On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court erred when it found that statutory grounds existed for termination and that termination was in the children's best interests. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The children's mother, who is not a respondent in this case, has significant substance-abuse issues. These issues resulted in three of the children she shares with respondent being born with controlled substances in their systems. Mother lived with respondent at that time their youngest child-JLS-was born even though a court had ordered her to leave respondent's home due to her substance abuse. Respondent asserted the he would help respondent with her substance abuse, but her substance abuse continued. Mother repeatedly breast-fed JLS despite warnings from doctors that doing so would harm JLS because of mother's substance-abuse issues. Respondent was told to prevent mother from breast-feeding JLS, but he failed to do so. The children also had severe behavioral issues while in respondent's care. The Department of Health and Human Services filed a petition to remove the children from respondent and mother's custody because of mother's substance abuse and respondent's failures to protect the children from mother's substance abuse and follow court orders. The trial court authorized the petition and took jurisdiction over the children. Respondent appealed the order of adjudication, which this Court affirmed in In re Simpson Minors, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued October 15, 2020 (Docket No. 353790).
After the trial court took jurisdiction over the children, respondent failed to engage fully in services offered by the Department. For example, respondent attended only one of five parenting classes before those classes were suspended due to the Covid-19 pandemic. He also frequently arrived late for parenting time or would simply not attend. Additionally, respondent refused to participate in multiple drug screenings, but the few that he did complete all tested positive for controlled substances. Respondent also failed to permit Children's Protective Services to inspect his house to ensure it was safe for the children; he similarly failed to provide any proof of employment, although he maintained that he was self-employed. Domestic violence issues became apparent as this case moved through the trial court, culminating in mother's attorney interrupting a hearing to inform the trial court about mother's complaints of domestic violence and respondent's later incarceration by the time his parental rights were terminated. Despite all of these issues, however, respondent evidently had a strong bond with his children. Nevertheless, the trial court ultimately terminated respondent's parental rights because the children had been in the Department's care for more than 15 months and respondent had failed to demonstrate progress toward reunification with them. Specifically, the trial court noted respondent's poor compliance with his service plan and how well the children were doing in their then-current placements. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
Respondent first argues that the trial court erred by finding statutory grounds to terminate his parental rights. This Court "reviews for clear error the trial court's factual findings and ultimate determinations on the statutory grounds for termination." In re White, 303 Mich.App. 701, 709-710; 846 N.W.2d 61 (2014).
As an initial matter, we note that much of respondent's argument on this issue relates to whether the Department made reasonable efforts to reunify respondent with the children. But respondent's reasonable-efforts argument was not included in his statement of questions presented. Accordingly, we decline to consider the issue. See In re Rippy, 330 Mich.App. 350, 362 n 5; 948 N.W.2d 131 (2019); MCR 7.212(C)(5).
Turning to the merits of respondent's statutory-grounds argument, respondent's parental rights were terminated under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (j). We address (c)(i) first. Subsection (c)(i) authorizes a trial court to terminate parental rights if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that:
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
The record is clear that 182 or more days elapsed between the initial disposition and the order terminating respondent's parental rights. The conditions that led to the adjudication were respondent's failure to follow court orders and his failure to protect the children from their mother's substance abuse. When the trial court terminated respondent's parental rights, respondent's main barriers to reunification with the children were substance abuse and an unwillingness to protect the children from such abuse, a failure to follow court orders, and domestic violence. Although respondent was not originally suspected of abusing drugs, the only three times he tested, he tested positive for controlled substances. Respondent and mother remained together until many months into this case even though mother's substance abuse continued and prior court orders required mother to be out of the home.
Contrary to respondent's argument, the trial court did acknowledge and consider that he loved his children and that the "children seem to love him." But it found, and the record supports its finding, that respondent did not follow through or put that love into action in an effort to have the children returned to his care. Respondent did not allow Children's Protective Services to inspect his home, he refused drug screens, he failed to provide employment verification, and he refused to acknowledge that there was a substance abuse problem in his home that was affecting the children. Thus, the trial court did not err by finding statutory grounds to terminate respondent's parental rights under subsection (c)(i).
Termination of parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) is proper when "[t]here is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child's parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent." See also In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich.App. 426, 433-434; 871 N.W.2d 868 (2015). This statutory factor considers not only the harm that may result from the parent's conduct toward the child, but also harm that might reasonably result from the parent's conduct around the child, such as exposing a child to individuals with criminal backgrounds who might exploit the children or otherwise place them at risk. See In re White, 303 Mich.App. at 712. Finally, "a parent's failure to comply with the terms and conditions of his or her service plan is evidence that the child will be harmed if returned to the parent's home." Id. at 711.
Respondent failed to comply with his service plan even before the Covid-19 pandemic limited the services available to him. For example, respondent attended only one of five parenting classes, he never permitted Children's Protective Services to inspect his home, and he never provided Children's Protective Services with proof of employment. He was also ordered to participate in drug screenings, but he refused to comply with most of the screens, and the few drug screens respondent did complete all tested positive for controlled substances. Accordingly, respondent's substance abuse remained a concern throughout this case even though the concern was originally focused on mother's substance abuse. Additionally, domestic violence issues arose during this case; at the time of termination, respondent was incarcerated for domestic violence. Thus, the trial court did not err by also finding statutory grounds to terminate respondent's parental rights under subsection (j).
Respondent next argues that the trial court erred by finding that it was in the children's best interests to terminate his parental rights. "Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that termination is in the child's best interests before it can terminate parental rights." In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich.App. 35, 40-41; 823 N.W.2d 144 (2012). "[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence." In re Moss, 301 Mich.App. 76, 90; 836 N.W.2d 182 (2013). The trial court's ruling regarding best interests is reviewed for clear error. In re Schadler, 315 Mich.App. 406, 408; 890 N.W.2d 676 (2016).
"The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the children's best interests." In re White, 303 Mich.App. at 713. In considering the child's best interests, the trial court's focus must be on the child and not the parent. In re Moss, 301 Mich.App. at 87. "In deciding whether termination is in the child's best interests, the court may consider the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home." In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich.App. at 41-42 (citations omitted). "The trial court may also consider a parent's history of domestic violence, the parent's compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent's visitation history with the child, the children's well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption." In re White, 303 Mich.App. at 714. When the trial court makes its best-interests determination, it may rely upon evidence in the entire record, including the evidence establishing the statutory grounds for termination. In re Trejo, 462 Mich. 341, 353-354; 612 N.W.2d 407 (2000), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in In re Moss, 301 Mich.App. at 83. In cases concerned with multiple children, the trial court must determine each child's interests individually. In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich.App. at 43-44. But a trial court is not required to make redundant best-interest findings for each child when the best interests of the children do not significantly differ. In re White, 303 Mich.App. at 715-716.
As explained earlier, respondent failed to participate fully in his service plan and he had such severe domestic violence issues that he was incarcerated when his parental rights to the children were terminated. Additionally, the children had severe behavioral issues when they were removed from his care, but they all were reportedly doing much better in foster care. Although respondent appeared to have a genuine bond with the children, he often arrived late to parenting time or did not attend. Respondent's youngest child never lived with him, having been removed just after leaving the hospital. Additionally, the children's foster families were providing the children with permanency and stability throughout the pendency of this case, and the Department had identified local families who were interested in adopting the children. In short, respondent failed to demonstrate that he could care or provide for the children and, although he had a bond with them, the children were doing better in foster care than they did in his care. Thus, the trial court did not err by terminating respondent's parental rights.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the trial court's order terminating respondent's parental rights.