Opinion
356785
09-16-2021
In re SHEPHERD, Minors.
UNPUBLISHED
Saginaw Circuit Court Family Division LC Nos. 19-035968-NA; 19-035970-NA
Before: Cameron, P.J., and Jansen and Gleicher, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-mother appeals the trial court's orders terminating her parental rights to two of her children, JS and LS, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (no reasonable likelihood that conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the children's ages), MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii) (other conditions exist and the parent has not rectified the conditions after a reasonable opportunity), MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), and MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) (reasonable likelihood that the children will be harmed if returned to the parent). We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On November 7, 2019, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed petitions concerning the minor children. In relevant part, the petitions alleged that respondent was abusing substances and that her home was unfit for the children. DHHS requested that the trial court remove the children from respondent's care and custody and exercise jurisdiction. The petitions were authorized, and the children were removed from respondent's care and placed with their maternal grandparents. Respondent was granted supervised parenting time.
At a November 22, 2019 hearing, respondent admitted that her substance abuse negatively impacted her ability to parent and that she lacked the necessary skills to maintain a safe and clean home for the children. Thereafter, the trial court exercised jurisdiction and ordered that reasonable efforts toward reunification would be made. DHHS created a case service plan, which the trial court adopted. Respondent was ordered to participate in and benefit from (1) parenting classes and supportive programs, (2) individual therapy, and (3) substance abuse treatment. Respondent was also ordered to complete a psychological evaluation, submit to random drug screenings, obtain and maintain a legal source of income and suitable housing, and regularly attend visits with the children. With the exception of attending supervised visits with the children, respondent's participation in the case service plan was poor. Specifically, respondent failed to demonstrate an ability to maintain sobriety, suitable housing, and employment. In November 2020, the trial court changed the permanency planning goal from reunification to termination of respondent's parental rights. In December 2020, respondent entered inpatient substance abuse treatment.
In January 2021, petitioner filed a supplemental petition, requesting that the trial court terminate respondent's parental rights to the children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j). At the termination hearing before a referee, the caseworker testified about respondent's lack of progress for a majority of the proceeding, and respondent's therapist testified about respondent's ongoing participation in inpatient treatment. After the close of proofs, the referee found that it was appropriate to terminate respondent's parental rights under the statutory grounds cited by petitioner in the supplemental petition and that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the children's best interests even though they were in the care of maternal relatives. The trial court adopted the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
Respondent argues that the trial court erred by finding that termination of her parental rights was in the children's best interests because she was making progress in treatment and given that the children were placed with maternal relatives. We disagree.
Respondent does not challenge the trial court's conclusion that statutory grounds existed to terminate her parental rights.
"The trial court must order the parent's rights terminated if the Department has established a statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence and it finds from a preponderance of the evidence on the whole record that termination is in the children's best interests." In re White, 303 Mich.App. 701, 713; 846 N.W.2d 61 (2014). We review the trial court's best-interest determination for clear error. Id.
This Court focuses on the children-not the parents-when reviewing best interests. In re Schadler, 315 Mich.App. 406, 411; 890 N.W.2d 676 (2016). "In making its best-interest determination, the trial court may consider the whole record, including evidence introduced by any party." In re Medina, 317 Mich.App. 219, 237; 894 N.W.2d 653 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
[T]he court should consider a wide variety of factors that may include the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home. The trial court may also consider . . . the parent's compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent's visitation history with the child, the children's well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption. [In re White, 303 Mich.App. at 713-714 (quotation marks and citations omitted).]
Although the record supports that respondent was bonded with the children, the record also supports that respondent was unable to appropriately care for the children at the time of termination. Indeed, respondent failed to independently maintain her sobriety for a majority of the 16-month proceeding despite being offered services. Respondent did not begin to meaningfully participate in inpatient treatment until after the trial court authorized the filing of the supplemental petition and after the children had been in care for 13 months. While respondent was showing improvement with respect to communication skills and impulse control in treatment, she was still on the initial level of treatment because she had broken a "cardinal rule" by failing to timely report that another patient possessed "contraband." Additionally, respondent's therapist testified that respondent had not participated in "a whole lot of therapy" because respondent required "a lot of case management" given the child protective proceeding. Respondent's therapist also noted that respondent still had to contact the Social Security Administration regarding benefits, that she had yet to obtain "unemployment" benefits, and that respondent could not learn about "being responsible for people" until she reached level three in the treatment program. Importantly, there were five treatment levels in the program, and respondent's therapist estimated that it would take six months to "a couple years" to complete "the entire program." Thus, because of respondent's failure to comply with services for a majority of the proceeding, she was unable to properly care for the children at the time of termination.
Respondent argues in a cursory manner that she was unable to participate in services during the proceeding because of the COVID-19 pandemic and because the caseworker failed to assist her. However, the record establishes that respondent failed to participate in the parenting education services that were offered to her during the proceeding and failed to attend individual counseling on a consistent basis. Respondent left inpatient treatment in July 2020 after only two weeks and stopped attending outpatient treatment. Respondent also tested positive for a myriad of substances and failed to submit to multiple drug screenings even though she was aware that missed screenings would be considered positive. The record further supports that respondent failed to obtain and maintain a legal source of income and failed to clean her home. On this record, we fail to see how respondent's failure to participate in services can be attributed solely to the pandemic and to any of the caseworker's deficiencies.
Moreover, the bonds that existed between respondent and the children were not healthy. Indeed, 13-year-old JS had concerns about respondent's ability to care for him and LS, and JS expressed that he would like to be returned to respondent's care only if she maintained her sobriety. LS, who was removed from respondent's care when he was five months old and only saw respondent during supervised visits during the proceeding, looked to his grandparents for support, guidance, and comfort. Thus, although respondent and the children were bonded, the bonds were not healthy. See In re CR, 250 Mich.App. 185, 197; 646 N.W.2d 506 (2002), overruled on other grounds In re Sanders, 495 Mich. 394 (2014) (holding that the fact that there was "a serious dispute" on the record concerning whether the respondent "had a healthy bond of any sort with her children" supported that termination of her parental rights was in the children's best interests).
Importantly, the children were doing well in their relative placement, where they were being provided with the stability and care that they required. While a relative placement generally weighs against termination of parental rights, In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich.App. 426, 434; 871 N.W.2d 868 (2015), the record establishes that a guardianship would not afford the children with the necessary stability and permanency. Respondent was in treatment at the time of the termination hearing and had completed only two months of a program that could take more than six months to complete. And even if respondent was successful in completing the program within six months, respondent would still have to demonstrate that she could independently maintain her sobriety, earn a stable income, and keep her home in a condition fit to raise children. Given respondent's failure to make meaningful progress for a majority of the proceeding and given the grandparents' willingness to adopt, the caseworker and the Court Appointed Special Advocate properly concluded that termination was in the children's best interests.
Additionally, testimony supported that a juvenile guardianship would be harmful to JS, who has special needs, because he would be constantly concerned that he would have to return to living with respondent before she was capable of caring for him and LS. Testimony also supported that it would be "confusing" and "unsettling" for LS to return to respondent's care given that he had been living with his grandparents for a vast majority of his life and had only interacted with respondent during supervised visits during the proceeding. As already stated, LS looked to his grandparents as parental figures, and JS had expressed that he liked living with his grandparents. Testimony further supported that the children's grandparents would remain in contact with respondent and would permit the children to have contact with respondent if it was appropriate to do so. For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by finding that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the children's best interests.
Affirmed.