Opinion
2013-10-30
In the Matter of SHAQUARY B. (Anonymous), appellant.
Catherine S. Bridge, Staten Island, N.Y., for appellant. Michael A. Cardozo, New York, N.Y. (Larry A. Sonnenshein and Deborah A. Brenner of counsel), for respondent.
Catherine S. Bridge, Staten Island, N.Y., for appellant. Michael A. Cardozo, New York, N.Y. (Larry A. Sonnenshein and Deborah A. Brenner of counsel), for respondent.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, Shaquary B. appeals from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Ambrosio, J.), dated July 5, 2012, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court (Freeman, J.), dated September 15, 2011, made after a hearing, finding that he committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted assault in the second degree, menacing in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, obstructing governmental administration in the second degree, resisting arrest, and riot in the second degree,*255and after a dispositional hearing, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent and, inter alia, placed him on probation for a period of 12 months. The appeal brings up for review the fact-finding order dated September 15, 2011.
ORDERED that the appeal from so much of the order of disposition as placed the appellant on probation for a period of 12 months is dismissed as academic, without costs or disbursements; and it is further,
ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs or disbursements.
The appeal from so much of the order of disposition as placed the appellant on probation for a period of 12 months has been rendered academic, as the period of placement has expired ( see Matter of Rasean B., 7 A.D.3d 520, 775 N.Y.S.2d 878). However, because there may be collateral consequences resulting from the adjudication of delinquency, the appeal from so much of the order of disposition as adjudicated the appellant a juvenile delinquent, and which brings up for review the fact-finding order, has not been rendered academic ( seeFamily Ct. Act § 783; Matter of Darnell G., 106 A.D.3d 906, 907, 965 N.Y.S.2d 568).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency ( see Matter of David H., 69 N.Y.2d 792, 793, 513 N.Y.S.2d 111, 505 N.E.2d 621;Matter of Racheal M., 108 A.D.3d 770, 771, 970 N.Y.S.2d 249;Matter of Ashley P., 74 A.D.3d 1075, 903 N.Y.S.2d 146;cf. People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant's identity and that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted assault in the second degree ( seePenal Law §§ 110.00; 120.05[2] ), menacing in the second degree ( seePenal Law § 120.14[1] ), criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree ( seePenal Law § 265.01[2] ), obstructing governmental administration in the second degree ( seePenal Law § 195.05), resisting arrest ( seePenal Law § 205.30), and riot in the second degree ( seePenal Law § 240.05) ( see Matter of Racheal M., 108 A.D.3d at 771, 970 N.Y.S.2d 249;Matter of Darnell G., 106 A.D.3d at 907, 965 N.Y.S.2d 568;Matter of Trayvond W., 71 A.D.3d 683, 894 N.Y.S.2d 914;Matter of Terrance B., 40 A.D.3d 1083, 1084, 837 N.Y.S.2d 231;Matter of Rasean B., 7 A.D.3d at 520, 775 N.Y.S.2d 878). Moreover, in fulfilling this Court's responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence ( see Matter of Hasan C., 59 A.D.3d 617, 617–618, 873 N.Y.S.2d 709;cf.CPL 470.15[5]; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the opportunity of the trier of fact to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor ( see Matter of Victor I., 57 A.D.3d 778, 779, 868 N.Y.S.2d 898;cf. People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053,cert. denied 542 U.S. 946, 124 S.Ct. 2929, 159 L.Ed.2d 828;People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Upon reviewing the record, we are satisfied that the Family Court's fact-finding determination was not against the weight of the evidence ( seeFamily Ct. Act § 342.2[2]; Matter of Darnell C., 66 A.D.3d 771, 772, 887 N.Y.S.2d 211;cf. People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).