In re Seas

Full title: IN RE MANUEL ANTONIO SEAS, M.D.; INPATIENT CONSULTANTS OF TEXAS, P.L.L.C.…

Court: COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

Date published: Feb 6, 2018

NUMBER 13-17-00685-CV (Tex. App. Feb. 6, 2018)

Opinion

NUMBER 13-17-00685-CV

02-06-2018

IN RE MANUEL ANTONIO SEAS, M.D.; INPATIENT CONSULTANTS OF TEXAS, P.L.L.C.; AND IPC THE HOSPITALIST COMPANY, INC.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Rodriguez, Longoria, and Hinojosa
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria ¹

1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) ("When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case," but when "denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not required to do so."); TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).

Relators Manuel Antonio Seas, M.D.; Inpatient Consultants of Texas, P.L.L.C.; and IPC the Hospitalist Company, Inc., filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the above cause on December 15, 2017. Through this original proceeding, relators seek to compel the trial court to withdraw its orders of March 22, 2017 and July 31, 2017 denying relators' motion to designate a responsible third party and to grant their motion to designate Rio Grande Regional Hospital as a responsible third party. This Court requested and received a response to the petition from the real parties in interest, Miguel David Garza and Beatrice Garza, and also received a reply to the response from relators. We deny relief.

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. In re H.E.B. Grocery Co., 492 S.W.3d 300, 302 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). To obtain mandamus relief, a relator must show that the underlying order is void or that the order represents a clear abuse of discretion and that no adequate appellate remedy exists. See In re Nationwide Ins. Co., 494 S.W.3d 708, 712 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court's ruling is arbitrary and unreasonable or is made without regard for guiding legal principles or supporting evidence. In re Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am., 494 S.W.3d at 712; Ford Motor Co. v. Garcia, 363 S.W.3d 573, 578 (Tex. 2012). We determine the adequacy of an appellate remedy by balancing the benefits of mandamus review against the detriments. In re Essex Ins. Co., 450 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). "[O]rdinarily, a relator need only establish a trial court's abuse of discretion to demonstrate entitlement to mandamus relief with regard to a trial court's denial of a timely-filed section 33.004(a) motion." In re Coppola, No. 16-0723, 2017 WL 6390965, at *3, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___ (Tex. Dec. 15, 2017) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). When a timely filed motion to designate a responsible third party is erroneously denied, no adequate remedy by appeal ordinarily exists. Id. at *2.

Here, the real parties assert that Miguel Garza developed paralysis of his lower extremities due to delays in his medical treatment by relators² and others following spinal surgery. The parties to this original proceeding dispute whether or not relators timely disclosed that Rio Grande Hospital, where Garza was treated, could be designated as a responsible third party. Relators assert, inter alia, that while the statute of limitations had expired on the real parties' causes of action, the relators did not earlier possess the information required to make a "fully informed, evidence-based decision" as to whether or not the hospital should be designated as a responsible third party; that the third-party designation could not occur without expert testimony; and that the medical records authorization initially furnished by the real parties was defective. Real parties assert, in contrast, that Dr. Seas possessed personal knowledge regarding the hospital's role in the incident because he was the physician on site at the hospital, and the expert report provided with the real parties' original petition included specific information regarding the medical treatment furnished at Rio Grande Hospital under the express direction of Dr. Seas that enabled relators to assess the potential designation of Rio Grande Hospital as a responsible party. Moreover, the expert report produced at the time suit was filed in 2014 indicated that there was a delay in obtaining treatment, and relators utilized that report in seeking to designate the hospital as a responsible third party. The real parties thus assert that relators had information reasonably available to them to allow them to respond, before limitations expired, that the hospital "may" be a responsible third party in response to requests for disclosure.³ TEX. R. CIV. P. 194.2(l).

2 According to the pleadings filed by the real parties in interest, Manuel Antonio Seas, M.D., is employed by Inpatient Consultants of Texas, P.L.L.C.; and IPC the Hospitalist Company, Inc.

3 Relators assert that limitations ran on December 10, 2014, before they were served with process; however, real parties assert that limitations ran on February 23, 2015 because of the seventy-five day tolling provision provided by section 74.051(c). See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.051 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). Real parties provided a notice letter and authorization to relators on July 24, 2014 and filed suit on November 18, 2014. Relators filed their answer to the lawsuit on January 2, 2015 and filed their responses to requests for disclosure on January 23, 2015. Relators filed their motion to designate on December 23, 2015. The trial court denied the motion on March 22, 2017. Relators moved for clarification and reconsideration on April 21, 2017. The trial court denied reconsideration on July 31, 2017. Relators filed this original proceeding on December 15, 2017. The trial of this matter, which was previously set for February 22, 2016, is currently set for February 20, 2018. The parties have not briefed the timeliness of this original proceeding, and given our disposition, we express no opinion here regarding that issue. See, e.g., In re Int'l Profit Assocs., Inc., 274 S.W.3d 672, 676 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding); Rivercenter Assocs. v. Rivera, 858 S.W.2d 366, 367 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding).

Here, relators concede that limitations had expired before they filed their motion to designate a responsible third party, but argue that their motion was still timely because they "timely disclosed" their intent to designate the responsible third party. The statute at issue provides:

A defendant may not designate a person as a responsible third party with respect to a claimant's cause of action after the applicable limitations period on the cause of action has expired with respect to the responsible third party if the defendant has failed to comply with its obligations, if any, to timely disclose that the person may be designated as a responsible third party under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.004(d) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). The timing limitations in section 33.004 are part of a "statutory balance" created by the Legislature that seeks to address "a defendant's interest in identifying nonparties who may have some culpability while recognizing that a plaintiff has time limitations on pursuing its claims against parties not already included in its suit." In re CVR Energy, Inc., 500 S.W.3d 67, 73 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, orig. proceeding) (referencing subsection (d) regarding limitations and subsection (a), which requires the motion to be filed on or before the 60th day before trial unless good cause is shown). The "timely disclosure" requirement "seeks to guarantee that the defendant essentially cannot undercut the plaintiff's case by belatedly pointing its finger at a time-barred responsible third-party against whom the plaintiff has no possibility of recovery." Withers v. Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 3d 686, 689 (E.D. Tex. 2014); see In re Bustamante, 510 S.W.3d 732, 736 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, orig. proceeding); In re CVR Energy, Inc., 500 S.W.3d at 73.

Rule 194.1 provides the mechanism for requesting the disclosure of certain information in litigation. TEX. R. CIV. P. 194.1. Rule 194.2(l) allows a party to request disclosure of "the name, address, and telephone number of any person who may be designated as a responsible third party." Id. R. 194.2(l). Responses to requests for disclosure are due within thirty days of service of the request. Id. R. 194.1. When a party responds to a written discovery request, that party must "make a complete response, based on all information reasonably available to the responding party or its attorney at the time the response is made." Id. R. 193.1. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.5 requires a party to supplement or amend its discovery responses if it learns the discovery response was "incomplete or incorrect when made." Id. R. 193.5(a). The party must supplement its discovery responses "reasonably promptly after the party discovers the necessity for such a response." Id. R. 193.5(b). While there is a presumption that a supplement made less than thirty days before trial is untimely, there is no opposite presumption that a supplement made more than thirty days before trial is timely. In re Staff Care, Inc., 422 S.W.3d 876, 881 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, orig. proceeding); Snider v. Stanley, 44 S.W.3d 713, 715 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2001, pet. denied).

As a threshold matter, relators have not met their burden to provide a sufficient record to establish that they are entitled to relief. See generally TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(k) (specifying the required contents for the appendix); id. R. 52.7(a) (specifying the required contents for the record). The record before this Court is incomplete insofar as relators included the exhibits to some of the pleadings incorporated in the appendix and did not include the exhibits to others. Relators included the exhibits for their motion to designate a responsible third party; the real parties' objection to the relators' motion to designate responsible third party; and relators' first supplemental motion to designate a responsible third party. Relators failed to include the exhibits to their brief in support of their motion for clarification and reconsideration and the exhibits to the real parties' response to the motion for clarification and reconsideration.

Consequently, the record lacks documentation regarding one of the contested issues in this original proceeding. Specifically, the parties dispute whether or not the real parties properly furnished a medical records authorization as required by the statute in July 2014, or instead, did not furnish the appropriate authorization until May 21, 2015. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.052 (West, Westlaw though 2017 1st C.S.) (providing the required authorization form for the release of medical records). The documentation pertaining to this dispute is not included in this record, and this issue affects both relators' efforts to obtain information regarding the hospital's potential role as a responsible third party and when limitations ran on the real parties' cause of action. See id. § 74.051(c) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.) (stating that appropriate notice of a lawsuit shall toll the applicable statute of limitations for a period of seventy-five days as to "all parties and potential parties"). These issues are integral to the dispute before the Court. Without a complete record, relators fail to meet their burden to obtain mandamus relief. See Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839; In re Henry, 525 S.W.3d 381, 382 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Prado, 522 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, orig. proceeding). Further, disputed facts prevent the Court from resolving issues in a mandamus proceeding. In re Woodfill, 470 S.W.3d 473, 478 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding); In re Angelini, 186 S.W.3d 558, 560 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding).

The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus, the response, and the applicable law, is of the opinion that relators have not shown themselves entitled to the relief sought. Accordingly, we DENY the petition for writ of mandamus. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(a). Relators' request for emergency temporary relief, which was previously carried with the case, is likewise DENIED.

NORA L. LONGORIA

Justice Delivered and filed the 6th day of February, 2018.