Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J09-01244
BANKE, J.
I. Introduction
Following a dispositional hearing at which he waived reunification services and all visitation and contact with the child, S.E., defendant Paul E. filed this appeal from oral rulings denying his requests for a paternity test. He contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in determining “parentage” and should have granted his requests for testing. On this record, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm.
II. Factual and Procedural Background
We summarize here only the facts germane to the issue raised on appeal. On August 31, 2009, the Contra Costa County Bureau of Children & Family Services (Bureau) received a report that defendant had become frustrated with and slapped S.E., leaving visible red marks on her legs. A social worker contacted the mother, Ashley W., at a friend’s residence. While Ashley and the social worker were speaking, defendant arrived on a bike and yelled that Ashley “was stupid” for calling Child Protective Services. The social worker had the four-month-old infant removed and transported to the Concord Receiving Center. At the center, personnel observed the infant was dirty and smelled as though she had not been bathed on a regular basis.
The following day, the social worker visited defendant’s and Ashley’s trailer residence. The floors were filthy and dishes were piled in the sink. The couple admitted to methamphetamine use three weeks prior. Defendant stated he intended to start a recovery program. Ashley said she had not used during her pregnancy, but relapsed immediately after the birth. Both defendant and Ashley have been diagnosed with bipolar disorder. The social worker gave the couple referrals and notified them of the court hearing scheduled for the following day.
The next day, September 2, 2009, the Bureau filed a dependency petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. The initial detention hearing the following morning opened with the following colloquy between the court and defendant and Ashley:
“[Court]: Calling the matter of [S. E.], Juvenile Case No. J09-01244. We have “the mother, Ashley [W.], appearing. Paul [E.] also appears. We show the father “as the alleged father. Were the two of you folks married at the time of the birth “of the child?
“[Ashley W.]: No.
“[Court]: Were you living together at that time?
“[Ashley W.]: Yes.
“[Court]: Was the father at the hospital?
“[Defendant]: Yes.
“[Court]: Are you on the birth certificate, sir?
“[Defendant]: Yes.
“[Court]: Does the father hold the child out as his own?
“[Defendant]: Yes.
“[Court]: And has Dad supported the child in some fashion?
“[Ashley W.]: Yes.
“[Court]: Okay. I will raise the father’s status, change it from alleged father to “presumed father....”
The court then read the dependency petition, explained “[t]hese are allegations only, ” and advised the couple they each had a right to be represented by counsel and if they could not afford counsel, they would be referred to the Dependency Project. Ashley and defendant stated they would like to speak with a lawyer. The court referred them and continued the hearing to the afternoon calendar.
At the afternoon hearing, counsel were present and requested the appointment of guardian ad litems (GAL) for both Ashley and defendant. The court ordered the infant detained and Ashley to commence a residential treatment program in connection with which she could regain custody of her child after two weeks of treatment. During this hearing, defendant’s counsel referred to defendant as the “father” and raised no question about paternity.
The matter was next called on the September 11, 2009, calendar for hearings on the appointment of GALs for Ashley and defendant. The court ordered the appointment of GALs for both and continued the matter for the acceptance of counsel. Again, defendant’s counsel referred to defendant as the “father” and raised no question about paternity.
On September 15, 2009, all parties, counsel, and GALs appeared, Ashley was experiencing difficulties in the residential program. The court rescinded its order providing for conditional return of the infant and ordered Ashley taken into custody for a 72-hour hold under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150. Defendant’s counsel once again referred to defendant as the “father” and raised no question about paternity.
On September 29, 2009, the parties and counsel appeared for a pretrial hearing and to set a contested hearing on the dependency petition. After the court suggested and the parties agreed to a further pretrial, counsel for defendant stated: “The father also would like a paternity test.” This precipitated the following exchange:
“[Court]: Haven’t we already established that? [¶]... [¶]... The father was “initially alleged. I assume that I raised his status. Yes, I did.
“[Counsel for Defendant]: If it was done
“[Deputy County Counsel]: It was 9/10/09. That was the initial detention “hearing.
“[Court]: All right. The questions I asked were whether he was at the hospital, is “he on the birth certificate, does he hold this child out as his own? They lived “together. [¶] You know what, I am not giving him a paternity test. If he wants to “pay for it himself, he can. I have him as a presumed father.
“[Deputy County Counsel]: I think he signed a POPS form. In order to rescind “that, he’ll have to go through the process.
Counsel was referring to a voluntary declaration of paternity as provided for by Family Code section 7570 et seq. (See H.S. v. Superior Court (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1505; In re J.L. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1018 (J.L.).)As we discuss, infra, section 7575 sets forth detailed procedures for “rescinding” or making a “motion” to “set aside” such a declaration. (Fam. Code, § 7575.)
“[Court]: Okay. So the request for a paternity test is denied. He is a presumed “father until proven otherwise.”
Defendant made no response, and the court proceeded to set a further pretrial and contested hearing date. On October 6, 2009, the parties and counsel appeared to confirm the contested hearing date for the dependency petition.
On October 14, 2009, all parties, counsel, and GALs appeared for the contested dependency hearing. After an amendment to the petition was made, Ashley and defendant were voir dired in open court by their counsel and then expressly submitted on the alleged facts. When the court asked defendant’s counsel if she concurred, she stated “I do” and then stated: “I just wanted to bring up one issue for the [c]ourt and that is with regard to—the father had previously requested a paternity test with regard to his child, and I would like to preserve that right, that issue. But he is willing to submit on jurisdiction today.”
The court sustained the amended petition. It then acknowledged Ashley had returned the Indian status form, indicating no knowledge of any Indian ancestry. Defendant had not done so, but counsel indicated he also had no knowledge of any Indian ancestry, and defendant completed an ICWA form in court. Defendant also completed a JV-140 form confirming his mailing address. The court then set the matter for a disposition hearing, at which point defendant’s counsel and GAL again mentioned the paternity issue:
“[GAL for Defendant]: Your Honor, there was an issue we were going to address “after we took care of the ICWA and JV140 forms and that [counsel for “defendant] had indicated she wanted to preserve the right to appeal prior to “paternity test [sic].
“[Counsel for Defendant]: I think what was indicated by Department 58 was they “were not going to order for the Department to pay for a paternity testing. “Department 58 did not say it was not acceptable, the paternity testing, they just “were saying they were not going to make an order for it. I wanted to preserve “that issue. The father is still interested in having that testing done.
“[GAL for Defendant]: The [c]ourt actually said he can do it at his own expense.
“[Court]: So you’re not asking this [c]ourt to take any action at this time, you’re “just making a statement for the record, correct?
“[Counsel for Defendant]: Well, if the [c]ourt is inclined to order it, I mean, we “would be
“[Court]: If you have a previous ruling from a judge, I don’t have any basis to
“[GAL for Defendant]: The issue
“[Court]: —change his ruling.
“[GAL for Defendant]: And actually I raised it with [counsel for defendant], “maybe I was incorrect, but I just don’t want today’s submission agreement to “operate as a waiver.
“[Court]: And I think we made clear on the record that the [c]ourt did not consider “your submission today to be a waiver of that issue.
“[Counsel for Ashley W.]: Your Honor, I would like the record to reflect I think “mother would object to the [c]ourt accepting any paternity orders. Father was at “the hospital. He signed a POPS form. He is also on the birth certificate
“[Court]: I’m not making any ruling. All I’m doing at this time is stating, based “on that request, that they have not made any waivers of their right to pursue that “issue. That’s all I’m stating. I’m not ruling in favor or denial of the testing.”
At the November 12, 2009, disposition hearing, defendant failed to appear. After considerable discussion about how to proceed and with the approval of defendant’s counsel and GAL, the court continued the matter as to defendant and proceeded as to Ashley. Ashley submitted on the allegations and Bureau report. The court adjudged the child a dependent of the court, ordered her removed from the parent’s physical custody, ordered appropriate services be provided to Ashley and set the matter for a six-month review hearing.
One week later, on November 19, 2009, the court proceeded with defendant’s dispositional hearing. Defendant submitted a waiver of reunification services, which the court accepted after discussing the matter with defendant on the record and also discussing the matter with defendant’s counsel and GAL. The court and counsel then discussed making appropriate modifications to the dispositional order to reflect defendant’s waiver of services, at which time counsel again raised the issue of paternity testing:
“[Counsel for Defendant]: Page 7, lines 10 through 14, of this report has some “new information that the father may not actually be the biological father of this “child. So in light of the information in this report, I would, once again, request “the father be given paternity testing, that the [c]ourt order that so that he can “know once and for all whether or not he is the biological father of the child. And “that’s not really the overriding factor in his decision to waive services, it’s really “more that he wants this child in a concurrent home. But he would like to have the “testing done.
“[Deputy County Counsel]: Your Honor, concerning that the [c]ourt, Department “58, already made a finding of presumed father status, prior to any type of change, “I believe [counsel for defendant] should submit some type of authority as to “whether the [c]ourt has authority to order DNA testing considering there’s “already been a POPS dec signed by the father. Father did have his name put on “the birth certificate so he would have needed to sign a POPS dec.
“[Counsel for Defendant]: I guess my response to that is that I believe that father “was raised to presumed prior to having appointment of counsel and also prior to “having a GAL... appointed for him.
“[Counsel for S.E.]: Your honor, on behalf of the minor, I think that mother and “her attorney should be here before the [c]ourt does anything else.
“[Court]: I do, too. I think—as I mentioned earlier, because I raised these “concerns the last time we were [sic] here when mother and her attorney were “present.... [¶]... [¶] So I’m not comfortable with doing that today.
“[Counsel for Defendant]: Would the [c]ourt be open to coming back to taking a “look at that at a future time?
“[Court]: You can always make a request in the future. But I’m just saying, as “of today, given that I do not have mother and her attorney present, I am not
“prepared to address the issues that are—that you have brought to our attention on “page 7 of the report.
“[Counsel for S.E.]: Once again, this is strictly for the record, your Honor. “Department 58 made it perfectly clear that with the signing of the POPS form “presumed status was granted. And he made perfectly clear that the [c]ourt was “going to take no further action on that.
“[Court]: So are you prepared to go forward with the disposition now on the “father?
“[Counsel for Defendant]: One moment, please.
“Pause in proceedings
“[Counsel for Defendant]: I think what we’d like to do for today is just have an “order that if the father should arrange his own paternity testing and that the child “be made available for that purpose.
“[Counsel for S.E.]: I would object to that.
“[Court]: I’m not going to take any action on that issue when I do not have “counsel present for mother.
“[Counsel for Defendant]: Then I would just ask to continue it so we can have a “chance
“[Court]: I’m not going to continue the detention for that purpose. I don’t have “good cause to do so.
“[Counsel for Defendant]: Then I would just object to the child not being made “available for that purpose and—for the record, and submit to the changes made.”
The court thereupon again adjudged the child a dependent of the court and ordered her removed from the parent’s physical custody, found defendant waived reunification services and visitation, and set the matter for a six-month review hearing.
The same day, defendant filed a notice of appeal from the denial of his requests for paternity testing made on September 29 and November 19, 2009, and the denial of his request to have the child made available for private DNA testing. On January 19, 2010, defendant filed an “amended notice of appeal” from “all findings, orders and rulings prior to and including those made at the [d]ispositional hearing.” In his briefs on appeal, however, defendant challenges only the rulings denying his requests for a paternity test.
On August 6, 2010, the Bureau filed a request for judicial notice and motion to take additional evidence, which we ordered deferred pending disposition of the appeal. Because we now resolve this appeal on the basis of the record before us, we deny the Bureau’s request and motion. We likewise deny defendant’s request for judicial notice and motion to take additional evidence.
III. Discussion
Defendant complains: (a) at the initial hearing, before he was represented by counsel, the court elevated his status from “alleged” to “presumed” father; (b) the court did not strictly comply with California Rules of Court procedures; and (c) the court should have granted his requests for a paternity test. The Bureau concedes the court did not direct the court clerk to transmit a “Parentage Inquiry-Juvenile” form (Judicial Council form JV-500) to the local child support agency as required by the Rules of Court. The Bureau, however, asserts this was harmless error, and there was no abuse of discretion in elevating defendant’s status to that of a “presumed” father and denying his requests for a paternity test. As we explain, on this record, we conclude there was no abuse of discretion in treating defendant as a presumed father and denying his requests for a paternity test.
The Statutory Framework
A number of statutes and rules of court are applicable to the issue of “parentage” in dependency cases.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 316.2, subdivision (a), states “[a]t the detention hearing, or as soon thereafter as practicable, the court shall inquire of the mother and any other appropriate person as to the identity and address of all presumed or alleged fathers....” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 316.2, subd. (a).) Subdivision (a) further specifies the court’s inquiry “shall” extend to a number of matters “as the court deems appropriate, ” including, for example, whether a judgment of paternity already exists, whether any man has “formally or informally acknowledged or declared his possible paternity of the child, including by signing a voluntary declaration of paternity” (i.e., a POPS declaration), or whether any man “otherwise qualifies as a presumed father pursuant to section 7611, or any other provision, of the Family Code.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 316.2, subd. (a)(1), (5) & (7).)
California Rules of Court, rule 5.635(a), similarly states a “juvenile court has a duty to inquire about and, if not otherwise determined, to attempt to determine the parentage of each child” who is the subject of a dependency petition. (Rule 5.635(a).) Rule 5.635(b), specifies “[a]t the initial hearing” on a dependency petition “and at hearings thereafter until or unless parentage has been established, the court must inquire of the child’s parents present at the hearing and any other appropriate person present as to the identity and address of any and all presumed or alleged parents of the child.” (Rule 5.635(b).) Rule 5.635(b) also lists a number of questions the court may ask in this regard, including whether the man in question has provided support payments for the mother and child and whether the man has “formally or informally acknowledged paternity, ” including by executing and filing a voluntary declaration of paternity under Family Code section 7570 (i.e., a POPS declaration) and agreeing to have his name placed on the child’s birth certificate. (Rule 5.635(b)(5), (6).) If a POPS declaration has been executed and filed with the Department of Social Services, it “establishes the paternity of a child and has the same force and effect as a judgment of paternity by a court” and the declarant is “a presumed father” under Family Code section 7611. (Rule 5.635(c); see Fam. Code, § 7573 [voluntary declaration “that has been filed with the Department of Child Support Services shall, ” with only limited exceptions, “establish the paternity of a child and shall have the same force and effect as a judgment of paternity”].)
All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court unless otherwise indicated.
Rule 5.635(d) provides “[i]f, at any proceeding regarding the child, the issue of parentage is addressed by the court, ” the court must (1) “ask the parent or the person alleging parentage... whether any parentage finding has been made, and, if so, what court made it, or whether a [POPS] declaration has been executed and filed under the Family Code” and (2) “direct the court clerk to prepare and transmit Parentage Inquiry-Juvenile (form JV-500) to the local child support agency requesting an inquiry whether or not parentage has been established through any superior court order or judgment or through the execution and filing of a” POPS declaration. (Rule 5.635(d)(1), (2).)
Welfare and Institutions Code section 316.2, subdivision (b), specifies if “after the court inquiry, one or more men are identified as an alleged father, each alleged father shall be provided notice” alleging “he is or could be the father of the child.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 316.2, subd. (b).) “Judicial Council form Paternity-Waiver of Rights (JV-505) shall be included with the notice.” (Ibid.)
Rule 5.635(g), similarly specifies if, “after inquiry by the court or through other information obtained by the county welfare department or probation department, one or more persons are identified as alleged parents of the child” as to whom a dependency petition has been filed, the clerk must provide “to each named alleged parent” notice of the next scheduled hearing and Statement Regarding Parentage (Juvenile Dependency)(form JV-505) except in specified circumstances, for example, where the petition has been dismissed. (Rule 5.635(g).)
Rule 5.635(e) specifies “[i]f the local child support agency states, or if the court determines through statements of the parties or other evidence, that there has been no prior determination of parentage of the child, the juvenile court must take appropriate steps to make such a determination.” (Rule 5.635(e).) In this regard, the “alleged father” and his counsel must complete a Statement Regarding Paternity (Juvenile Dependency)(form JV-505). (Rule 5.635(e)(1).) The court also “may order the child and any alleged parents” to submit to genetic testing. (Rule 5.635(e)(2).) The court “may make its determination of parentage or nonparentage based on the testimony, declarations, or statements of the alleged parents.” (Rule 5.635(e)(3).) The court must also advise any “alleged parent indicating a wish to be declared the parent of the child” that upon a declaration of parentage, the parent will be responsible for financial support of the child. (Rule 5.635(e)(3).) If the court “establishes parentage of the child, ” it “must sign and then direct the clerk to transmit Parentage-Finding and Judgment (form JV-501) to the local child support agency.” (Rule 5.635(f).)
Welfare and Institutions Code section 316.2 additionally provides, in subdivision (d), “[i]f a man appears in the dependency action and files an action under Section 7630 or 7631 of the Family Code, the court shall determine if he is the father.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 316.2, subd. (d).) Rule 5.635(a), specifies, in turn, that while a dependency petition is pending, the juvenile court with jurisdiction of the proceeding “has exclusive jurisdiction to hear an action filed under Family Code section 7630 or 7631.” (Rule 5.635(a).)
Family Code section 7630, subdivision (a), specifies in part that certain individuals, including “a man presumed to be the child’s father under subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of section 7611, ” may bring an action for the purpose of “declaring the existence of the [presumed] father and child relationship” or “declaring the nonexistence of the [presumed] father and child relationship... if the action is brought within a reasonable time after obtaining knowledge of relevant facts.” (Fam. Code, § 7630, subd. (a)(1), (2).) Subdivision (b) provides that “[a]ny interested party may bring an action at any time for the purpose of determining the existence or nonexistence of the father and child relationship presumed under subdivision (d) or (f) of Section 7611.” (Fam. Code, § 7630, subd. (b).) Section 7631 provides that a “man not a presumed father” can, in certain circumstances, bring an action “for the purpose of declaring that he is the natural father of a child having a presumed father under Section 7611.” (Fam. Code, § 7631.)
Rule 5.635(h) also provides, “[i]f a person appears at a hearing in [a] dependency matter... and requests a judgment of parentage on form JV-505, the court must determine” (1) whether “that person is the biological parent of the child” and (2) whether “that person is the presumed parent of the child, if that finding is requested.” (Rule 5.635(h).)
Finally, Welfare and Institutions Code section 317, subdivision (b), and rule 5.534(h), provide that where a child is placed in out-of-home care or the petition recommends out-of-home care, the parents are entitled to counsel and to appointed counsel if they cannot afford to retain counsel. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 317, subd. (b); rule 5.534(h).)
The Proceedings Here
We begin by observing that at the initial hearing, the court should have first read the dependency petition to Ashley and defendant on the dependency petition, then advised them of their right to counsel and then, when they requested counsel, continued the hearing for appointment of counsel and further proceedings. We understand why the court promptly elevated defendant from “alleged” to “presumed” father status once he acknowledged he is on the child’s birth certificate—to afford him a more protected status during the proceedings. (See J.L. supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 1018 [“ ‘Presumed’ fathers are accorded far greater parental rights than alleged or biological fathers.”].) This “parentage” issue, however, should have been addressed after counsel was appointed. Nevertheless, we conclude putting the cart before the horse in this case does not require reversal.
As the Bureau points out, at the initial hearing, defendant told the court he was at the hospital at the time of the birth and his name is on the child’s birth certificate. This is simple, straightforward information which he imparted without hesitation to the court. It also established his status as a presumed father under rule 5.635(c), since his name would not be on the birth certificate in the absence of a duly executed and filed POPS declaration. (See In re Raphael P. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 716, 737-738 (Raphael P).) Defendant never backpedaled from these representations, even after he was represented by counsel.
Nor did defendant take the procedural steps necessary to challenge the legal conclusions that necessarily followed from his representations to the court. Specifically, defendant did not file either of the motions provided for by Family Code section 7575—the statutory, and mandatory, procedures for overturning a POPS declaration and leaving a child legally fatherless. (See Kevin Q. v. Lauren W. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1131-1132.) He did not file a motion for genetic testing, supported by “a declaration under oath... stating the factual basis for putting the issue of paternity before the court” pursuant to section 7575, subdivision (b). Nor did he file a motion on Judicial Council form JV-505 to set aside his POPS declaration pursuant to section 7575, subdivision (c). Indeed, defendant did not even file a motion under Family Code section 7630, subdivision (b), seeking a declaration of “the... nonexistence of the [presumed] father and child relationship, ” even assuming this is an alternative procedure to challenge “parentage” in the absence of a companion motion under section 7575 to set aside a POPS declaration (a matter as to which we have serious doubt given the important public policy reasons for POPS declarations (see Fam. Code, § 7570) and comprehensive provisions applicable to rescinding or setting them aside (see Fam. Code, § 7575)). (See J.L., supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1019-1022.) Nor did defendant make a motion under Family Code section 7551, which provides that “[i]n a civil action or proceeding in which paternity is a relevant fact, ” a court “may” on its own motion or “shall upon motion of any party to the action or proceeding made at a time so as not to delay the proceedings unduly order the mother, child, and alleged father to submit to genetic tests” (Fam. Code, § 7551), again even assuming such a motion is applicable where a POPS declaration has been filed and the declarant is thereby a “presumed” father. (See In re William K. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1, 9 [suggesting results of testing under section 7551 could be a basis to set aside a POPS declaration under section 7575, subdivision (b)]; see also Raphael P., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 736 [“Neither the presumed father statutes nor those governing use of genetic tests to determine paternity were developed for use in the dependency context.”].)
Section 7575, subdivision (b)(1), provides in pertinent part: “[I]f the court finds that the conclusions of all of the experts based upon the results of the genetic tests performed pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 7550) are that the man who signed the voluntary declaration is not the father of the child, the court may set aside the voluntary declaration of paternity unless the court determines that denial of the action to set aside the voluntary declaration of paternity is in the best interest of the child, after consideration” of a list of factors.
Section 7575, subdivision (c), provides:
Defendant’s oral “requests” for a paternity test—the first made in passing during the detention hearing and the second after he submitted at the disposition hearing—were insufficient to challenge his “presumed” father status which was legally compelled by his representations to the court, and provide no basis for any claim that he was “entitled” to paternity testing. Defendant complains he was not given a copy of Judicial Council form JV-505 by which he could have made a motion challenging his “presumed” father status. However, this form must be provided by statute and rule only to “alleged” fathers. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 316.2, subd. (b); rule 5.635(g).) As we have discussed, defendant’s representations to the court necessarily made him a “presumed, ” rather than merely an “alleged, ” father. Furthermore, this form is readily available, and there is not even an attempted explanation in the record as to why defendant did not file one.
Accordingly, on this record, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s determination that defendant was a “presumed” father and no abuse of discretion in the court’s denial of his requests for a paternity test.
IV. Disposition
The challenged rulings denying defendant’s requests for a paternity test are affirmed.
We concur: MARCHIANO, P. J., DONDERO, J.
“(c)(1) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prejudice or bar the rights of either parent to file an action or motion to set aside the voluntary declaration of paternity on any of the grounds described in, and within the time limits specified in, Section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the action or motion to set aside a judgment is required to be filed within a specified time period under Section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the period within which the action or motion to set aside the voluntary declaration of paternity must be filed shall commence on the date that the court makes an initial order for custody, visitation, or child support based upon a voluntary declaration of paternity.
“(2) The parent or local child support agency seeking to set aside the voluntary declaration of paternity shall have the burden of proof.
“(3) Any order for custody, visitation, or child support shall remain in effect until the court determines that the voluntary declaration of paternity should be set aside, subject to the court’s power to modify the orders as otherwise provided by law.
“(4) Nothing in this section is intended to restrict a court from acting as a court of equity.
“(5) If the voluntary declaration of paternity is set aside pursuant to paragraph (1), the court shall order that the mother, child, and alleged father submit to genetic tests pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 7550). If the court finds that the conclusions of all the experts, as disclosed by the evidence based upon the genetic tests, are that the person who executed the voluntary declaration of paternity is not the father of the child, the question of paternity shall be resolved accordingly. If the person who executed the declaration as the father of the child is not excluded as a possible father, the question of paternity shall be resolved as otherwise provided by law. If the person who executed the declaration of paternity is ultimately determined to be the father of the child, any child support that accrued under an order based upon the voluntary declaration of paternity shall remain due and owing.
“(6) The Judicial Council shall develop the forms and procedures necessary to effectuate this subdivision.” (Fam. Code, § 7575, subd. (c).)