Opinion
No. U06-CP06-005572-A
June 22, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This is a termination of parental rights ("TPR") case.
On June 11, 2009, the mother decided to offer her written consent to the termination of her parental rights to Scott K. ("Scott"). She was canvassed, and the court found such consent to be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made by the mother with the adequate advice and the effective assistance of her counsel, and the court accepted the mother's consent. With respect to the mother, upon the motion of the assistant attorney general, the court permitted the commissioner of children and families ("DCF") to amend her petition to add the ground of consent, and the court also permitted DCF to withdraw the non-consensual TPR ground of failure to rehabilitate set forth in such petition. After such consent and amendment were accepted.
Thereafter, the assistant attorney general, the current DCF worker assigned to the family, the attorney for Scott and a separate guardian ad litem for Scott appeared before the court and participated in the TPR trial. The father of Scott, who had been defaulted on April 15, 2009 did not appear and was not present for the proceedings.
The trial proceeded with respect to the issue of whether the father's parental rights should or should not be terminated and with respect to the question of whether termination of his and the mother's parental rights was in the best interest of Scott. The mother and her counsel remained present for this portion of the proceeding.
FACTS:
Each of the following facts is found by clear and convincing evidence:
1. Scott was born in September 1999.
This fact and much of the information set forth herein is contained in the two full exhibits.
2. On March 24, 2006, DCF filed a neglect petition and an ex parte motion for temporary custody in the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters ("SCJM"). On such date, the court found that Scott was in immediate physical danger from his surroundings, that continuation in the mother's home was contrary to his welfare and the court granted to DCF an ex parte order of temporary custody ("OTC"). As of March 24, 2006, the father was not living with the mother and was not in custody of Scott.
3. On March 31, 2006, the court sustained the order of temporary custody. The court ordered specific steps for the father. Because the father was not present and his then current address was unknown, the specific steps that were approved and recommended by the court on March 31, 2006, were not served on the father.
4. On May 9, 2006, the plea date for the father, service by publication was confirmed. The father was not present. The court entered a default.
5. On July 19, 2006, upon the mother's nolo contendere plea that was accepted by the court, Scott was adjudicated neglected and he was committed to the care, custody and guardianship of DCF. The father was not present in court.
6. On March 19, 2009, DCF filed its TPR petition alleging as adjudicatory grounds against the father abandonment (Ground A) and no parent-child relationship (Ground D), and Ground B against the mother.
General Statutes § 17a-112(j) provides that a court in a TPR proceeding must find that DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunify a parent and child unless the court finds "in this proceeding" that a parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, except such finding is not required if there is a prior General Statutes 17a-111b determination or a TPR trial determination that such efforts at reunification are not required:
The Superior Court, upon notice and hearing as provided in sections 45a-716 and 45a-717, may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a-111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, except that such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to section 17a-111b, or determines at trial on the petition, that such efforts are not required . . .
7. On April 15, 2009, the SCJM (Randolph, J.) confirmed service by publication on the father.
8. The father currently is twenty-nine years old. He abandoned the mother when she was four months pregnant with Scott. His last known place of residence was in Missouri. Since it has not been able to locate him, DCF has not had any contact with him. He has never seen or met Scott. He has had no role in his life, and Scott does not know who he is and does not ask for him. Scott believes that his stepfather is his biological father. The father has not financially supported Scott, nor has he sent him any gifts or cards.
9. The father does not have any parent-child relationship with Scott, and because of his absence, the father will not be able to develop any such relationship with Scott at any time in the reasonable future.
10. Additional facts are set forth, infra. Unless otherwise specified, all facts set forth in this decision are found by clear and convincing evidence.
CT Page 10510
LAW APPLICABLE TO TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS CASES:
The law applicable to this case is generally set forth in such recent cases as In re Davonta V., 285 Conn. 483 (2008); in In re S.D., 115 Conn.App. (2009); in In re Justice V., 111 Conn.App. 500 (2008); in In re Devaun J., 109 Conn.App. 832 (2008); in In re Joseph L., 105 Conn.App. 515, 939 A.2d 16 (2008); and in In re Marcus S., 2008 Ct.Sup. 3329, No. H12-CP07-012714-B, Superior Court, Judicial District of Middlesex, Child Protection Session at Middletown (Bear, J., February 29, 2008).GENERAL STATUTES § 17A-112(k) FINDINGS:
The court has made findings earlier in this decision, some of which relate to the seven statutory factors applicable to the father. See pages 1-4, supra. In addition to those findings, the court makes the following findings applicable to the father:
1. The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and each child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of each child with the parent.
A. The father:
Such father has made it impossible for DCF to determine what services would be of benefit to such father and to offer such services. He abandoned the mother before Scott was born and he did not continue to have contact with her.
B. The mother:
The mother has been offered a number of services relating to reunification, administrative and case management services, visitation and her issues as set forth in the exhibits.
C. Scott has been offered and has received the following services from or facilitated by DCF, inter alia:
medical and dental services plus an MDE;
reunification services;
visitation;
transportation;
foster care services, including placement in a residential facility; and
administrative and case management services.2. Whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.
DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the mother with such children. DCF has not been able to locate the father. The father has not contacted or identified himself to DCF for reunification services. Neither parent was an appropriate candidate for reunification.
Given the father's absence from Scott's life and DCF's inability to locate him, DCF was unable to and was not required to provide services, including reunification services, to such father. The reasonable efforts made and facilitated by DCF with respect to services for the mother were timely and adequate to address the issues that led to DCF involvement with her and Scott and to address the issues that continued or arose after such DCF involvement.
As noted above General Statutes § 17a-112(j) provides in relevant part:
The Superior Court . . . may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a-111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, except that such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to section 17a-111b, or determines at trial on the petition, that such efforts are not required . . . [R]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible In re Melody L., 290 Conn. 131, 144 (2009).
3. The terms of an applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order(s).
On March 31, 2006, specific steps were ordered for the father. Such father, however, was believed to be in Missouri and he has not been known to be present in Connecticut.
Before and after March 31, 2006, the father was not a serious or likely candidate for reunification with Scott. He has been absent from Scott's life. DCF was not able to locate such father.
4. The feelings and emotional ties of each child with respect to his or her parents, any guardian of the person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.
Scott does not know his biological father and thus does not have a positive bond with such biological father.
Scott has been out of the care of the mother since March 24, 2006. The mother is unable to provide a home for him and to insure his health, welfare and safety. The mother's problems disqualifying her from parenting any of her children including Scott are set forth in detail in the exhibits.
Scott is currently in need of group home services and he has made good progress in such environment.
5. The age of each child:
Scott is nine years old.
6. The efforts each parent has made to adjust his or her circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interests of the children to return home in the foreseeable future.
As set forth throughout this memorandum of decision and in the evidence, the biological father has not been any part of Scott's life. He abandoned the mother when she was four months pregnant with Scott. She and Scott have not had any contact with him.
As set forth throughout this memorandum of decision and in the evidence, the mother has not been able to adjust or improve her circumstances, conduct or conditions to enable her to make it in the best interest of Scott to be placed in her home in the foreseeable future.
7. The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the children by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the children, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.
There was no evidence presented that the father has been prevented from maintaining a relationship with Scott for any reasons other than his choice to be absent from Scott's life. Such father did not provide specific information concerning his current or past economic circumstances.
There was no evidence presented that the mother has been prevented from maintaining a relationship with Scott for any reasons other than her personal issues and circumstances. Such mother did not provide specific information concerning her current or past economic circumstances.
WITH RESPECT TO THE FATHER OF SCOTT, DCF HAS PROVED, BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THE GROUND A AND D ALLEGATIONS OF ITS TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PETITION.
The court finds that DCF has alleged and proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that
(1) this court has jurisdiction over the matter and the parties, and DCF has made reasonable efforts to locate each parent;
(2) there is no other action pending in any other court affecting custody of Scott known to this court. Neither biological parent has claimed to be affiliated in his or her lineage with any Native American tribe;
(3) on July 19, 2006, Scott was adjudicated neglected and by way of disposition he was committed to the care, custody and guardianship of DCF, which commitment currently remains in effect;
(4) prior to filing its March 19, 2009, termination petition, DCF was willing to make reasonable efforts to reunify the father with Scott through offers of and provision of services, but such father neither maintained any contact with DCF, demonstrated interest in or chose to make himself available for the provision of reunification services, and such father is and was absent from, unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts and such efforts are not required;
General Statutes § 17a-112(j) provides that a court in a TPR proceeding must find that DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunify a parent and child unless the court ". . . determines at trial on the petition, that such efforts are not required . . ." See page 3 fn 2 and page 6 fn 3, supra.
(5) on June 11, 2009, in the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, Child Protection Session at Middletown, the mother decided to offer her written consent to the termination of her parental rights to Scott. She was canvassed, and the court found her consent to be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made by her with the adequate advice and the effective assistance of her counsel, and the court accepted such written consent;
(6) Scott has been abandoned by the father in the sense that he has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to his health, safety and welfare;
Despite DCF's allegation of multiple adjudicatory grounds in the TPR petition, in the adjudicatory phase the petitioner must prove only one of such grounds by clear and convincing evidence:
"A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition . . . In the adjudicatory phase, the trial court determines whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights [under § 17a-112(j] exists by clear and convincing evidence. If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase. In the dispositional phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interests of the child." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Trevon G., 109 Conn.App. 782, 787-88, 952 A.2d 1280 (2008).
In re Janazia, 112 Conn.App. 69, 81-82 (2009).
(7) the father has no ongoing parent-child relationship with Scott, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of Scott; and
(8) DCF has thus proved, as to the father, by clear and convincing evidence, the Ground A and D allegations of its TPR petition.
CT Page 10514
THE BEST INTEREST OF SCOTT:
The court has considered the best interest of Scott. The court has considered whether it is in the best interest of Scott to be returned to the mother or to initiate/reinitiate contact with the absent and uninvolved father, including whether the mother or the father reasonably could be expected and relied upon to provide the safe, secure, nurturing, stable and permanent environment idealized in the statutes and case law, and the court has considered Scott's ". . . interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, and continuity and stability of [his] environment . . ." In re Ryan R., 102 Conn.App. 608, 625-26 (2007). Unfortunately for Scott, who has serious issues that require intensive monitoring and treatment, the mother has been and currently is unable to provide him such safe, secure, nurturing, stable and permanent environment. Scott does not know his father. He is working on his issues and improving in the group home.The court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of Scott and that it is necessary for his well-being, growth, development, safety, security, stability, continuity, consistency and permanency, that the rights of the biological father and the biological mother be terminated.
CONCLUSION AND ORDERS:
Having considered the evidence and the statutory, Practice Book and case law requirements, the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence:
(a) the mother, with adequate advice from and effective assistance of counsel, consented to the termination of her parental rights to Scott;
(b) Scott has been abandoned by the father in the sense that he has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of Scott;
(c) the father has no ongoing parent-child relationship with Scott, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of Scott; and
(e) it is in the best interest of Scott to terminate the parental rights of the mother and the father.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the parental rights of the mother and the father to Scott are hereby terminated.
The commissioner of the department of children and families is appointed as the statutory parent of Scott. The initial status report concerning Scott shall be submitted, as required, within thirty days hereof. Quarterly reports and annual permanency plans shall be submitted as required in accordance with statutory requirements, including those set forth in General Statutes § 17a-112(o).
Judgment shall enter accordingly.