Opinion
No. 333450
01-10-2017
In re SCOTT-ASH, Minor.
UNPUBLISHED Ingham Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 15-000788-NA Before: WILDER, P.J., and BORRELLO and GLEICHER, JJ. PER CURIAM.
The circuit court terminated respondent-mother's parental rights to her young daughter, SA, when respondent failed to benefit from services to overcome heroin addiction. Respondent challenges the evidentiary support for the statutory grounds cited in support of the termination decision. We discern no error and affirm.
I. FACTS
Child Protective Services (CPS) took SA into care on an emergency basis in June 2015. Respondent presented in the emergency room with "red nodules" on her arm caused by injecting heroin subcutaneously rather than into a vein. Respondent refused substance abuse addiction treatment. Hospital staff found her in the parking lot preparing to inject heroin again. When the staff members attempted to detain respondent, she fled on foot. Police were summoned and arrested respondent on outstanding warrants. During the investigation, CPS learned that respondent and SA were homeless. Moreover, SA was born with an "immunodeficiency disease," which required intensive medical treatment, but respondent had neglected her care.
During the child protective proceedings, respondent made three attempts at recovery in inpatient substance abuse treatment centers. Respondent left the first against doctor's orders and overdosed on heroin twice. She was discharged from the second program for disruptive behavior and again overdosed. Respondent's third round of inpatient treatment appeared more successful, but she failed to follow through with substance abuse counseling after discharge and continued to test positive for substances. She then entered a group home setting, but was involuntarily discharged when she was arrested for violating the terms of her probation. Respondent remained incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing.
Given respondent's inability to overcome addiction, she was unable to focus on the other elements of her reunification plan. Respondent never secured housing or employment and attended no parenting classes. Respondent was permitted three parenting time sessions each week. However, she consistently cancelled at least one visit each week. In the meantime, SA was placed in the custody of a family friend. SA's foster mother took the child to all necessary medical appointments and enjoyed a strong bond with the child.
Ultimately, the circuit court determined that respondent had not adequately benefitted from services and terminated her parental rights to SA. Respondent appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
Respondent's sole appellate challenge is to the evidentiary support for the statutory grounds underlying the court's termination decision. Pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3), a circuit court "may terminate a parent's parental rights to a child if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence" that at least one statutory ground has been proven. The petitioner bears the burden of proving that ground. MCR 3.977(A)(3); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 350; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). We review a circuit court's factual finding that a statutory termination ground has been established for clear error. In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 90-91; 763 NW2d 587 (2009). "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court's special opportunity to observe the witnesses." In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Clear error signifies a decision that strikes us as more than just maybe or probably wrong." In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 271; 779 NW2d 286 (2009).
The circuit court terminated respondent's rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j), which provide:
The court may terminate a parent's parental rights to a child if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:
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(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds . . . :
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
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(g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
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(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child's parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.
Clear and convincing evidence supported termination under factor (c)(i). More than 182 days had elapsed since initial disposition and respondent had not overcome any ground leading to court jurisdiction. Respondent travelled between the homes of relatives and continued to lack stable housing for her child. Despite repeated attempts to overcome heroin addiction, respondent continued to periodically test positive for the substance and she failed to follow through with outpatient treatment. Respondent entered Glass House treatment center on two separate occasions but was discharged without success. Following both discharges, respondent overdosed on heroin. Respondent successfully completed a program at Holy Cross, but tested positive for controlled substances following her release. Respondent did not participate in an outpatient follow-up program at Cristo Rey or attend Narcotics Anonymous meetings. Respondent then entered a group recovery home, but was discharged for drug possession. Respondent had ample opportunity to address her substance abuse, employment, and housing issues and was offered sufficient services to assist her, but made very little progress, supporting termination.
Petitioner also presented clear and convincing evidence that respondent had failed to provide proper care for SA and would be unable to do so within a reasonable time. When CPS took SA into care, mother and child were homeless and respondent had not followed through with treatment for SA's serious medical condition. Moreover, respondent admitted that her substance abuse affected her ability to safely parent SA. By the time of the termination hearing, respondent continued to abuse substances and therefore, admittedly, was still unable to safely care for her child. Given the intensive level of substance abuse treatment services provided throughout these proceedings and respondent's inability to overcome her addiction, it is unlikely she will be ready to parent SA within a reasonable time. "A parent's failure to participate in and benefit from a service plan is evidence that the parent will not be able to provide a child proper care and custody." In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 710; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). Accordingly, termination was also supportable under this ground.
Finally, termination was supportable under factor (j). Respondent conceded that she could not safely parent SA while addicted to heroin. Despite intensive efforts, respondent continued to abuse the drug. SA was placed in danger of harm while in her mother's custody because respondent did not adequately supervise her child while under the influence and failed to follow through with necessary medical treatment for the child. As respondent continued to abuse heroin, SA faced the same risk of harm if returned to her mother's care. "[A] parent's failure to comply with the terms and conditions of his or her service plan is evidence that the child will be harmed if returned to the parent's home." In re White, 303 Mich App at 711. We therefore perceive no error in this regard.
Respondent contends that the court gave insufficient consideration to her recovery efforts and her bond with SA in evaluating these factors. This simply is untrue. The court considered respondent's recovery efforts at length, but deemed them unsatisfactory to establish that respondent would be able to care for her child within a reasonable time. And while SA was clearly bonded with respondent, this relationship alone could not render respondent a fit and safe parent.
We affirm.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher