Opinion
Case No. 07-47547-293, Adv. Proc. No. 08-4029-705, [Related to Docket ##1 23].
June 13, 2008
Stephanie Lee Gold, Teasdale Associates, LLC, St. Louis, MO.
William H. Ridings, Jr., Ridings Law Firm, St. Louis, MO.
MEMORANDUM OPINION ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On February 5, 2008, the Plaintiff filed the Complaint [Docket #1] against the Debtor-Defendant (the "Debtor"), seeking a judgment of denial of discharge under § 523(a)(6) of title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code") or, in the alternative, under § 523(a)(9), related to a prepetition debt owed by the Debtor to the Plaintiff. On April 1, 2008, the Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Motion") [Docket #23]. On April 21, 2008, the Plaintiff filed a Response [Docket #27] to the Motion and a Memorandum in Support of the Response (the "Memorandum") [Docket #28]. This Memorandum Opinion is entered contemporaneously with the Court's Order of Judgment granting the Motion.
All references herein to "section[s]" or "§ [§]" refer to the indicated section(s) of the Bankruptcy Code.
I. UNDISPUTED RELEVANT FACTS
Beginning in the late evening hours of March 6, 2007, the Debtor patronized four St. Louis, Missouri restaurant or bar establishments, where she consumed numerous alcoholic beverages. In the early morning of March 7, 2007, the Debtor was operating her vehicle when she struck two vehicles belonging to the Plaintiff that were parked on Macklind Avenue in St. Louis, Missouri. The collision resulted in several thousand dollars in damage to the Plaintiff's vehicles.
The Plaintiff is listed in the Debtor's main bankruptcy case as a creditor, although the amount of the debt admitted by the Debtor is less than the Plaintiff's asserted amount of approximately $6,800. The exact amount of the debt is the subject of a state court suit that was automatically stayed upon the filing of the Debtor's petition for bankruptcy relief.
II. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standard for Determining Summary Judgment.
A court may grant a motion for summary judgment "if all of the information before the court demonstrates that `there is no genuine issue as to material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Turner v. Southwestern Bell Telephone L.P., 2006 WL 1616478, at *1 (E.D. Mo. June 7, 2006) (quoting Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 467 (1962)); see T.K., a minor v. Love (In re Love), 347 B.R. 362, 364 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006) (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986), Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986), and Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 161 (1970), and setting forth the well-established law regarding the standards for summary judgment). In determining a motion for summary judgment, "the [c]ourt must review the facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and give that party the benefit of any inferences that logically can be drawn from those facts. The [c]ourt is required to resolve all conflicts of evidence in favor of the nonmoving party." Turner v. Southwestern Bell Telephone L.P., 2006 WL 1616478, at *1 (internal citations omitted).
B. Summary Judgment as to Count Asserting Nondischargeability Pursuant to § 523(a)(6).
The Debtor first seeks summary judgment on the count asserting that the Plaintiff is entitled to a determination of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6). Section 523(a)(6) provides that "[a] discharge under section 727 . . . does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt — . . . for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity[.]" 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (in relevant part). The Debtor concedes all statutory elements except "willful" and "malicious."
The adjectives "willful" and "malicious" are not synonymous and establish separate statutory elements, both of which must be established. Blocker v. Patch (In re Patch), ___ F.3d ___, 2008 WL 2205270, at *6 (8th Cir. May 29, 2008) ("The plain language of § 523(a)(6) requires courts . . . determine whether the debtor both `willful[ly] and malicious[ly]' caused th[e] `injury.'"). Although the Bankruptcy Code does not define either "willful" or "malicious," case law sheds light on the terms' definitions and distinctions: "[f]or purposes of § 523(a)(6) `willful' means that the injury, not merely the act leading to the injury, must be deliberate or intentional; and `malicious' means that the injury is targeted at the creditor, in the sense that the conduct is certain or almost certain to cause financial harm to that creditor." Jaynes v. Adams (In re Adams), 349 B.R. 199, 203 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006). The Debtor has shown that, even if all the facts asserted by the Plaintiff (including the contested allegation that the Debtor's operation of her vehicle at the time of the collision was illegal due to her level of intoxication) were true, no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the injuries were willful and malicious.
The Adams definition of "willful" is wholly consistent with the recent holding in Blocker v. Patch, in which the Eighth Circuit confirmed that "willful" under § 523(a)(6) "is controlled by the Supreme Court's decision in Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998). There, the Court resolved a circuit split over the meaning of willful, holding that `debts arising from recklessly or negligently inflicted injuries do not fall within the compass of § 523(a)(6)'." Blocker v. Patch, 2008 WL 2205270, at *5; see also Cassidy v. Minihan, 794 F.2d 340, 344, 345 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that in enacting § 523(a)(6), "Congress intended to bar the discharge of intentionally inflicted injuries.").
First, as to the "willful" element: there is no evidence-or even an allegation-that the injuries suffered to the Plaintiff's vehicles were intentionally inflicted by the Debtor. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. at 63 ("The word `willful' in (a)(6) modifies the word `injury,' indicating that nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury."). Even if the Debtor intentionally acted to become intoxicated and then intentionally acted to operate her vehicle, such facts would not establish that the Debtor intentionally acted to cause the collision and resulting injuries. Rather, just as in Cassidy, the facts here as pleaded by the Plaintiff establish "at most, reckless disregard for the risks involved." Cassidy v. Minihan, 794 F.2d at 344. While the injuries were the ultimate result of the Debtor's decision to drive while intoxicated, there is no evidence that they were the result of the Debtor acting with the intent to cause such injuries. Recklessness-no matter how reprehensible or inexcusable-is not willfulness for purposes of § 523(a)(6).
Likewise, as to the "malicious" element: there is no evidence-or (again) even an allegation-suggesting that the Debtor targeted the Plaintiff or his vehicles for the injuries. At most, the facts as pleaded by the Plaintiff establish that the Plaintiff's vehicles were in the wrong place at the wrong time when the intoxicated Debtor lost control of her car. That is, the injuries were the result of unfortunate geography intersecting with the Debtor's drunken recklessness. While such facts certainly do not bear admirably on the Debtor's judgment or actions, they also do not establish that the Debtor specifically selected or otherwise targeted the Plaintiff's vehicles to sustain injuries due to her acts.
Given this, no genuine issue of material fact as to any element remains to be decided with respect to the count in the Complaint for a determination of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6), and the Debtor is entitled to judgment in her favor as a matter of law.
C. Summary Judgment as to Count Asserting Nondischargeability Pursuant to § 523(a)(9).
The Debtor also seeks summary judgment on the count asserting that the Plaintiff is entitled to a determination of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(9). Section 523(a)(9) provides that "[a] discharge under section 727 . . . does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt — . . . for . . . personal injury caused by the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle . . . if such operation was unlawful because the debtor was intoxicated from using alcohol . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) (in relevant part). The Plaintiff spends much effort in his pleadings attempting to establish that there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether Debtor's operation of her car was unlawful. However, this focus puts the argument cart before the statutory element horse. Whether there is an issue of material fact as to the Debtor's level of intoxication is a red herring, given that the Plaintiff has failed to raise any issue of material fact related to another element-that of "personal injury."
"Personal injury" in § 523(a)(9) refers to injury to a person, not injury to property. Metro Gov't of Nashville v. Williams (In re Williams), 175 B.R. 17, 19 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1994) (providing a thorough discussion of the issue); In re Higgins, 161 B.R. 993, 995 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993). The Plaintiff has not pleaded, and there is no evidence, that the debt relates to any personal injury. The only damage suffered as a result of the collision was that done to the Plaintiff's vehicles, not to any person. Accordingly, no genuine issue of material fact as to the "personal property" element of § 523(a)(9) exists and the Debtor is entitled to judgment in her favor as a matter of law.
A separate order of judgment consistent with the findings and holdings in this Memorandum Opinion will be entered forthwith, pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9021.