v. Warner (In re Warner ), 5 B.R. 434 (Bankr.D.Utah, 1980), and Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun ), 715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir.1983), and limited the Bankruptcy Court's inquiry to the nature of the award and intent of the parties. See, also, Draper v. Draper, 790 F.2d 52 (8th Cir.1986); and Schack v. Kappitt (In re Schack ), 46 B.R. 520 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1985).         As stated in Matter of Bailey, 20 B.R. 906 (Bankr.W.D.Wis.

See Fryman, 67 B.R. at 113. Electing to rely on In re Harrell, 33 B.R. 989 (N.D.Ga. 1983), aff'd 754 F.2d 902 (11th Cir. 1985), and In re Schack, 46 B.R. 520 (BC S.D.Fla. 1985), the court rejected the debtor's argument and held that the support obligations were nondischargeable. This conclusion was reached despite the fact that the ex-wife had remarried and the two minor children had grown up and married.

Further, the court specifically rejected the "needs" test set forth in In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983) and limited the bankruptcy court's inquiry to the nature of the award and the intent of the parties. See also Draper v. Draper, 790 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1986) and In re Schack, 46 B.R. 520 (Bktcy S.D. Fla. 1985). The Marital Settlement Agreement in this case refers specifically to alimony.

"[E]ven if the debt was originally imposed on the basis of the need of the spouse or children, the debt cannot be held nondischargeable unless at the time of filing there exists a present need by the spouse or children that the debt be paid." This court declines to follow Warner and Miller. As is pointed out by In re Schack, 46 B.R. 520, 521 (Bankr.SD FL 1985): "There is no basis in the statute or its legislative history for the additional requirement imposed by Warner.

This is by no means a novel reaction to situations such as those presented in the case at bar. See, e.g., Moses v. Moses, 34 B.R. 378 (S.D.Tex. 1983) (affirming bankruptcy court decision to abstain, on the ground that the adversary action filed by the debtor was nothing more than a collateral attack on a state judgment, as not reviewable); In re Boyd, 31 B.R. 591, 596 (D.Minn. 1983); In re Schack, 46 B.R. 520 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Fla. 1985). Although it deals with a different subsection of 11 U.S.C. § 523, the treatment of a similar adversary complaint in In re McNeil, 13 B.R. 743 (Bkrtcy.S.D.N.Y. 1981) is pertinent to this proceeding.