Opinion
780 WDA 2023 J-S41031-23
01-12-2024
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.B., A MINOR APPEAL OF: D.B., MOTHER
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered June 7, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000203-2021
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. [*]
MEMORANDUM
STEVENS, PJE.
D.B. ("Mother") appeals from the order entered on June 7, 2023, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, which involuntarily terminated Mother's parental rights to her natural daughter, S.B. ("Child"), born in January of 2020. After a careful review, we affirm.
In addition, the order involuntarily terminated the parental rights of Child's father, D.B. a/k/a D.D.B., and any unknown father. Neither D.B. a/k/a D.D.B. nor any unknown father appealed the order.
We summarize the relevant facts and procedural history as follows: Since December of 2016, Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Families ("CYF") has been involved with Mother concerning her older children. See N.T., 3/17/23, at 228. Immediately upon Child's birth, she was placed in the emergency protective custody of CYF due to Mother's hospitalization at Western Psychiatric Institute and Clinic ("WPIC"). See Orphans' Court Opinion ("O.C.O."), 8/7/23, at 3 (citation to record omitted).
Mother has a total of three children, and CYF has been involved with all of them. See N.T., 3/17/23, at 241. As best we can discern, the parental rights of Mother's middle child, a son, were involuntarily terminated in the fall of 2021. See N.T., 4/17/23, at 20.
Two days later, the juvenile court placed Child in shelter care as a result of finding that Mother (1) "has unresolved mental health issues and is currently inpatient at WPIC" and (2) "has two other children who are not in her care." O.C.O. at 3 (citation to record omitted). The court adjudicated Child dependent on February 11, 2020. Id. (citation to record omitted).
Mother was hospitalized and involuntarily committed at WPIC more than one month before Child's birth. See id. (citation to record omitted). According to Dr. Patrick Buckley, who treated Mother while she was hospitalized, a petition for Mother's involuntary commitment was filed by a homeless shelter, and, upon admission, she displayed significant "symptoms of psychopathology impairment." N.T., 4/14/23, at 85-86. Specifically, Mother
was very agitated on arrival….[M]ultiple safety officers were present….She was yelling, accusing staff of stealing her belongings and being racist….[Mother] said that she didn't need any medication because she was pregnant and that she was able to remain calm.Id. at 88.
Mother was discharged from WPIC on February 6, 2020, with diagnoses of "borderline personality disorder, rule out posttraumatic stress disorder, rule out unspecified schizophrenia spectrum, and other psychotic disorder."O.C.O. at 3; N.T., 4/14/23, at 79. Upon discharge, Dr. Buckley prescribed Mother a medication to be administered by injection once per month, and he recommended that she receive outpatient care at Mercy Behavioral Health. See N.T., 4/14/23, at 81-83, 90.
With respect to Mother's diagnosis of "borderline personality disorder," Dr. Buckley explained that symptoms include "some distress or functional impairment," and he confirmed that the diagnosis requires consistent treatment, which normally involves psychotherapy. N.T., 4/14/23, at 96. With respect to the diagnosis of "rule out unspecified schizophrenia spectrum," Dr. Buckley explained that Mother "had previous admissions to [WPIC], and I reviewed her documentation, and she had been previously diagnosed with schizophrenia, but…my impression…treating her for a month or so on the unit was that she exhibits some signs more consistent with personality pathology and post-traumatic stress disorder." Id. at 81.
In furtherance of the goal of reunifying with Child, Mother was required under Child's family service plan to receive mental health treatment. See N.T., 3/17/23, at 242-46. Dr. Renata Jurczak, a psychiatrist at Pittsburgh Mercy, an outpatient mental health clinic, testified at the termination proceeding that Mother was her patient from March of 2020 until November 2021. Id. at 7, 16. During that time, she evaluated Mother twice and both times diagnosed her with an unspecified "psychotic disorder." Id. at 8, 11-12. Specifically, Dr. Jurczak observed symptoms in Mother of "disorganized thought process and some delusional thoughts." Id. at 17. She recommended that Mother participate in individual therapy, which, to the best of her knowledge, Mother attended until a date uncertain. Id. at 16. In addition, Dr. Jurczak prescribed the same injectable medication recommended by Dr. Buckley. Id. at 15.
Dr. Jurczak explained that the medication administered by injection "treats psychotic symptoms and it's a mood stabilizer…." Id. at 17. She testified that, while Mother was taking the injection, Mother was "more coherent, [had a more] logical thought process," and was "less delusional." Id.
The record reflects that Mother took this injectable pharmaceutical until September or October of 2021, at which point she refused to take the medication any longer. Id. at 15. In response, Dr. Jurczak prescribed an alternative oral medication, but she did not know if Mother complied by self-administering the new drug. Id. at 17. Specifically, Dr. Jurczak testified: "I saw her once after starting the oral medication, and she denied any symptoms, although she was more antagonistic and more accusatory and [had a] hostile attitude." Id.
Our review of the certified record indicates that Mother last saw a psychiatrist at Pittsburgh Mercy in November of 2021. Id. at 16. Mother was discharged from Pittsburgh Mercy in September of 2022. Id. As best we can discern, Mother was discharged for noncompliance and not because she no longer needed mental health treatment. See N.T., 4/17/23, at 38.
Melissa Fuchs, the CYF caseworker for this family from June of 2022, through the time of the subject proceedings, testified that Mother has not provided any documentation demonstrating that she is receiving mental health treatment. See N.T., 4/14/23, at 56. Ms. Fuchs stated that Mother "doesn't want to talk about her mental health anymore because she states that she's fine." Id. at 57.
In addition to mental health treatment, Mother was required to satisfy a parenting goal, inter alia, for purposes of reunification. See N.T., 3/17/23, at 242-43. The record reveals that Mother completed a parenting class; however, at the time of the subject proceeding, she had not progressed from having more than supervised visitation for two hours per week with Child. Id. at 170-71, 256.
CYF filed an involuntary termination of parental rights petition against Mother with respect to Child on September 30, 2021, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). The orphans' court held evidentiary hearings on March 17, 2023, and April 14 and 17, 2023, at which time Child was three years old and represented by a guardian ad litem ("GAL").
Because Child's legal interests were incapable of ascertainment due to her young age, the court did not appoint separate legal counsel for her. See In re T.S., 648 Pa. 236, 192 A.3d 1080, 1092-93 (2018) (holding "if the preferred outcome of a child is incapable of ascertainment because the child is very young and pre-verbal, there can be no conflict between the child's legal interests and his or her best interests; as such, the mandate of Section 2313(a) of the Adoption Act…is satisfied[.]").
CYF presented testimony from the following witnesses: Dr. Renata Jurczak, discussed supra, a psychiatrist at Pittsburgh Mercy who treated Mother from March of 2020 until November of 2021; Dr. Eric Bernstein, an expert in child psychology; Dr. Terry O'Hara, a forensic psychologist; Sarah Kohnfelder, a caseworker from TRAC Services for Families ("TRAC"), which is a foster care agency; Patrick Riley, the CYF caseworker for the family from the time of Child's removal from Mother's custody until January 2022; and Melissa Fuchs, the CYF caseworker from June of 2022, through the subject proceedings.
Mother did not testify but presented the testimony of Dr. Buckley, an expert in psychiatry, and Dr. Joseph Roberts, an expert in forensic psychology.
By order dated April 17, 2023, and entered on June 7, 2023, the orphans' court involuntarily terminated Mother's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5), (8), and (b). Mother timely filed a notice of appeal and concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on August 7, 2023.
On appeal, Mother presents the following two issues for review:
1. Did the [orphans'] court abuse its discretion when it granted the petition to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of
[Mother] because [CYF] did not present clear and convincing evidence that the conditions which led to the removal or placement of [Child] continue to exist, [Mother] cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to [Mother] are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or placement of [Child] within a reasonable period of time and termination of the parental rights would best serve [Child]? 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(a)(5).
2. Did the [orphans'] court abuse its discretion when it granted the petition to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of [Mother] because [CYF] did not present clear and convincing evidence that the conditions which led to [Child]'s removal or placement continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve her needs and welfare[?] 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(a)(8).Mother's Brief at 5-6.
We review Mother's issues according to an abuse of discretion standard.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court's decision, however, should not be reversed merely because the record would support a different result. We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 71 A.3d 251, 267 (2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act ("Act"), which requires a bifurcated analysis. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. The orphans' court must initially determine whether the conduct of the parent warrants termination under Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the petitioner established grounds for termination under Section 2511(a) does it then engage in assessing the petition under Section 2511(b), which involves a child's needs and welfare. See In re T.S.M., supra, 71 A.3d at 267.
To involuntarily terminate parental rights, the petitioner must prove grounds under both Section 2511(a) and (b) by clear and convincing evidence, which is evidence that is so "clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." In re Adoption of C.M., __ Pa.__, 255 A.3d 343, 358 (2021) (quoting Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 550 Pa. 595, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (1998)).
Instantly, we conclude the certified record supports the order pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8) and (b), which provides as follows:
(a) General Rule.-The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8), (b) (bold in original). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc) (stating that we need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm).
Based on this disposition, we need not review Mother's claim pursuant to Section 2511(a)(5).
This Court has explained, "Section 2511(a)(8) sets a 12-month time frame for a parent to remedy the conditions that led to the children's removal by the court." In re A.R., 837 A.2d 560, 564 (Pa.Super. 2003).
Once the 12-month period has been established, the court must next determine whether the conditions that led to the child's removal continue to exist, despite reasonable, good faith efforts the child welfare agency supplied over a realistic time period. Id. The "relevant inquiry in this regard is whether the conditions that led to removal have been remedied and thus whether reunification of parent and child is imminent at the time of the hearing." In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa.Super. 2009). Termination under Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court to evaluate a parent's current willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that initially caused placement or the availability or efficacy of the agency's services. In Re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1276 (Pa.Super. 2003).
This Court has recognized "that the application of [Section 2511(a)(8)] may seem harsh when the parent has begun to make progress toward resolving the problems that had led to the removal of her children." In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa.Super. 2006).
However, by allowing for termination when the conditions that led to removal of a child continue to exist after a year, the statute implicitly recognizes that a child's life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child's need for permanence and stability to a parent's claims of progress and hope for the future. Indeed, we work under statutory and case law that contemplates only a short period of time, to wit [18] months, in which to complete the process of either reunification or adoption for a child who has been placed in foster care.Id.
Finally, pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8), the court must consider whether termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. Id. at 1275-76. The "needs and welfare" analysis is relevant to both Sections 2511(a)(8) and (b). In In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc), this Court stated,
while both Section 2511(a)(8) and Section 2511(b) direct us to evaluate the "needs and welfare of the child," we are required to resolve the analysis relative to Section 2511(a)(8), prior to addressing the "needs and welfare" of [the child], as proscribed
by Section 2511(b); as such, they are distinct in that we must address Section 2511(a) before reaching Section 2511(b).Id. at 1009 (citations omitted).
With respect to Section 2511(b), the court is required to "give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child." 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). Regarding the "emotional needs and welfare" of the child, our precedent has interpreted it to include "intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability." T.S.M., supra, 71 A.3d at 267 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Our Supreme Court in In re E.M., 533 Pa. 115, 620 A.2d 481 (1993), first recognized that the "emotional needs and welfare" analysis under Section 2511(b) should include, in part, the child's bond with his or her parent. In doing so, the orphans' court must examine the effect on the child of severing such a bond, and this includes "a determination of whether the bond is necessary and beneficial to the child, i.e., whether maintaining the bond serves the child's developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare." In the Interest of K.T.__, Pa.__, 296 A.3d 1085, 1113 (2023). The High Court recently explained:
Severance of a "necessary and beneficial" bond would predictably cause more than the "adverse" impact that, unfortunately, may occur whenever a bond is present. By contrast, severance of a necessary and beneficial relationship is the kind of loss that would predictably cause "extreme emotional consequences" or significant, irreparable harm. See E.M., 620 A.2d at 484 ("a beneficial bonding could exist between a parent and child, such that, if the bond were broken, the child could suffer extreme emotional consequences").K.T., 296 A.3d at 1109-10 (some citations omitted).
As such, the K.T. Court distinguished "extreme emotional consequences" from an "adverse impact" to the child when parental rights are terminated. Id. at 1111. Specifically, the Court cautioned that the orphans' court "must not truncate its analysis and preclude severance based solely on evidence of an 'adverse' or 'detrimental' impact to the child." Id. at 1114. The Court concluded that "to grant termination when a parental bond exists, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the bond is not necessary and beneficial." Id.
Moreover, in reiterating that the parental bond is only one part of the analysis, the K.T. Court held that the "Section 2511(b) inquiry must also include consideration….[of] certain evidence if it is present in the record." Id. at 1113, n.28 (emphasis in original). The specific evidence at issue in K.T. related to the child's need for permanency and the length of time she had spent in foster care; the pre-adoptive nature of her foster home and the child's bond with foster parents; and whether the foster home met the child's developmental, physical, and emotional needs. Id. at 1112. The Court emphasized, however, that these foregoing factors were not an exhaustive list for consideration under all Section 2511(b) analyses. Id. at 1113, n.28. Rather, the K.T. Court found, as noted above, that the particular facts of each case determine the factors to be considered.
The Court recognized that "case law indicates that bond, plus permanency, stability and all 'intangible' factors may contribute equally to the determination of a child's specific developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare, and thus are all of 'primary' importance in the Section 2511(b) analysis." K.T., 296 A.3d at 1109. For instance, if relevant in a case, the orphans' court "can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child" in its analysis under Section 2511(b). See In re M.M., 106 A.3d 114, 118 (Pa.Super. 2014).
In the case sub judice, we initially observe that Mother failed to assert an error regarding Section 2511(b) in her concise statements of errors complained of on appeal and statements of questions involved in her brief. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii), 2116(a). Therefore, Mother has waived any claim concerning it. It follows that we do not review the order with respect to Section 2511(b). See In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation omitted) (finding that because the appellant-mother "failed to include a challenge to Section 2511(b) in her statement of questions involved and concise statements that issue is also waived")
Before turning to Mother's issue with respect to Section 2511(a)(8), we review whether she complied with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, which govern the content of briefs.
The Rules provide that the statement of the case must be
A closely condensed chronological statement, in narrative form, of all the facts which are necessary to be known in order to
determine the points in controversy, with an appropriate reference in each instance to the place in the record where the evidence substantiating the fact relied on may be found. See Rule 2132 (references in briefs to the record).Pa.R.A.P. 2117(a)(4). Because the statement of the case in Mother's brief spans 43 pages, it is not in compliance with this Rule.
With respect to the argument section of briefs, the Rules provide:
The argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part -- in distinctive type or in type of distinctively displayed -- the particular point treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation of the parties as are deemed pertinent.Pa.R.A.P. 2119. Mother's argument consists of approximately twenty-five pages and is not divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued. Rather, the argument is divided into one part with eight subheadings.
Rule 2101 underscores the seriousness with which this Court takes deviations from the procedural rules, as it permits us to quash or dismiss an appeal for appellate briefs that are substantially defective. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101; Commonwealth v. Briggs, 608 Pa. 430, 12 A.3d 291, 343 (2011) ("The briefing requirements scrupulously delineated in our appellate rules are not mere trifling matters of stylistic preference; rather, they represent a studied determination by our [Supreme] Court and its rules committee of the most efficacious manner by which appellate review may be conducted…."). Therefore, we strenuously caution Mother's counsel to comply with the Rules governing appellate briefs.
Instantly, we consider Mother's argument with respect to Section 2511(a)(8) insofar as we are able to discern it. Initially, we note that there is no dispute that Child has been removed from Mother's care for the requisite twelve-month period. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8). Rather, Mother contends the condition that led to Child's placement was her unresolved mental health problems. See Mother's Brief at 55. Specifically, Mother baldly asserts that she has resolved her mental health diagnoses, and, alternatively argues that she "made substantial progress towards alleviating it." Id. at 60. While Mother acknowledges that she has stopped taking medication and is not engaging in any mental health treatment, she asserts that she did not "present with psychotic symptoms and therefore she should not be forced to take antipsychotic medication." Id. at 67. In contradictory fashion, however, Mother also claims that she did not "categorically refuse to engage in mental health treatment[;] rather, she simply wanted a break from coerced, forced treatment. She wanted to manage her life and stressors on her own." Id. at 68. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Mother's arguments are without merit.
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the orphans' court found as follows concerning the second element of Section 2511(a)(8).
The behavior that [Mother] exhibited during visitation or in meetings with caseworkers makes it clear that her mental health needs were not being met. The fact that there was significant improvement in her behavior when she was consistent with therapy and medication is important to note here. Since Mother has stopped taking her medication and is not currently in
treatment, this court is inclined to believe that this condition has not been remedied and continues to exist.O.C.O. at 19. The record amply supports the court's findings.
Ms. Kohnfelder testified that her job as a TRAC caseworker is to ensure children's safety in foster homes and to supervise visitation between children and their natural parents. See N.T., 3/17/23, at 162-63. She has been involved with Mother since the placement of her biological son in 2018, with whom Child resides in the same foster home. Id. at 162, 167. At the time of Child's birth, Mother's supervised visitation with her son was suspended by court order "due to her unstability [sic] and aggressive nature in the visitations…." Id. at 170. The court ordered Mother's visitations to resume with her son when Child was approximately five months old. Id. As such, Mother's supervised visits with Child commenced in June of 2020, once per week virtually and not in-person because of the COVID-19 pandemic, and they occurred simultaneously with Child's brother. Id. at 170, 172.
Ms. Kohnfelder testified Child and her brother "have a very special relationship. The two of them get along very well…." N.T., 3/17/23, at 167.
Ms. Kohnfelder testified: "During the virtual visits Mother was pretty confrontational. She did not take redirection well. I had to remind her that if she could not maintain contact with just the children and have an appropriate visitation with the children that I would have to end the virtual visit." Id. at 172. For example, she explained that Mother would make accusations in front of the children about them not being well taken care of in foster care. Id. at 172-73. In addition, Ms. Kohnfelder confirmed that Mother would become aggravated and yelled at caseworkers during these supervised visits. Id. at 173-74, 206.
In fact, Ms. Kohnfelder testified that Mother is simply not able to be redirected during supervised visits. Id. at 193. She explained that, during in-person supervised visits:
[T]here have been multiple, multiple incidents where…I would have to redirect [Mother] which would result in escalation and [Mother] accusing myself of putting my hands on her child when I had not touched her children. I was simply trying to redirect them because she was not redirecting them.Id. at 195. Ms. Kohnfelder testified, "[W]e are required to have supervisors in the office during the visitations in case [Mother] was to escalate because we are not a secure office and we do not have security on site." Id. at 174. Ms. Kohnfelder described a supervised visit in May of 2022, when Child was brought to the visit by a male TRAC caseworker and Mother
was very upset due to a male being around her child. She became very escalated. She started cursing in the lobby where it escalated to the point where the TRAC CEO had to intervene. She tried to talk to Mother. At this point, she encouraged Mother to keep calm around Child and have appropriate behavior around Child.Id. at 175-76 (cleaned up). Ms. Kohnfelder testified with respect to Child's behavior after this incident as follows:
And then during visitation on this day [Child] was very quiet. Mother asked what was wrong with her, if someone had hit her or have been mean to her. This caused [Child] to have a meltdown.
She cried increasingly louder stating that she wanted her mommy and that she wanted her brother.Id. at 176. Ms. Kohnfelder clarified that when Child wanted "her mommy," she meant her foster mother. Id.
It is important to note that Ms. Kohnfelder testified she noticed a difference in Mother's behavior when she was receiving mental health treatment and when she was not. Id. Specifically, she testified that "[t]here was a period of time in 2021 where visitation was going well while Mother was in treatment. And Mother was not as confrontational." Id. at 176-77. Ms. Kohnfelder testified that Mother's confrontational behavior started increasing in the beginning of 2022. Id. at 177. For instance, she testified that Mother "multiple times" in front of Child made allegations of her abuse in the foster home. Id. She explained that Mother "is concerned about [Child] having dry skin, about age-appropriate scratches, you know, skinned knees, stuff like that. And most recently on November 15, [2022,] Mother stated that [Child]'s vagina was red. And the supervising caseworker notes that there was no sign of redness…." Id. at 177-78. Ms. Kohnfelder confirmed she has no concern about the care that Child receives in the foster home. Id. at 181. Moreover, she testified that when Mother makes such allegations in front of Child, Child "begins to have a very flat affect. She does not respond well especially when Mother becomes agitated during visitations. She shuts down…." Id. at 179.
Ms. Fuch testified that, since she became this family's CYF caseworker in June of 2022, Mother has not provided documentation demonstrating that she is in mental health treatment. See N.T., 4/14/23, at 56. Ms. Fuch testified she has discussed with Mother her need to be in treatment, and Mother
usually states to me that her - she's fine, she does not need medication, she does not need therapy. She had it for a while. And then - however, there is still a need, according to the last reports from the psychologist, and whenever I attempt to talk with her about it, she does not want to discuss it. She doesn't want to talk about her mental health anymore because she states that she's fine.Id. at 56-57. Nonetheless, Ms. Fuch described Mother as still having "delusions or unorganized thoughts." Id. at 58. For example, she called Mother in November of 2022, to discuss the recommendation that she continue to receive mental health treatment. Ms. Fuch explained:
And then, as I said, our conversation just went from one thing to another. And then she told me that she did not want to discuss it, that her mental health is fine….She didn't want to discuss outpatient or psychiatrist or support, and that was it.
[S]he just said: Well,…I passed the bar exam but didn't graduate from law school. I am going to medical school. I might go back to school if I could, you know? So it was just part of the conversation, but she just seemed to jump around a bit because she didn't want to talk about the mental health part.Id. at 60-61. Based on the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion by the orphans' court in concluding that Mother's mental health problem continued to exist at the time of the subject proceedings.
There is no evidence in the certified record that Mother went to law school, took any state bar exam, or was enrolled in medical school.
Although Mother does not directly argue this aspect of the orphans' court's finding, we will also consider Child's needs and welfare under Section 2511(a)(8). In September and October of 2022, Dr. Bernstein completed bonding assessments amongst Child, Mother, and her foster mother. See N.T., 3/17/23, at 36. Dr. Bernstein testified that, while Mother and Child had a positive interaction during their evaluation, he did not believe that Child's relationship with Mother was necessary or beneficial. Id. at 41-42, 62-63. Rather, he concluded that terminating Mother's parental rights would not be detrimental to Child. Id. at 100-01. In contrast, Dr. Bernstein concluded that Child has a "strong bond" with her foster mother "who has essentially fulfilled the role of her day-to-day caretaker since her entrance into this world." Id. at 41.
Accordingly, Dr. Bernstein supported the termination of Mother's parental rights for the following reasons:
[I]n this case [Mother] in totality has had a history over the years of significant challenges from - not just with the psychiatric hospitalizations and the diagnoses and treatment in which she has participated, but also - again, allegedly not at the time I saw her - of homelessness….[W]hat I'm looking at…is overall the stability of her life and what that life may be like prognostically speaking for the next few years during crucial periods of Child development and beyond.Id. at 92. Indeed, Dr. Bernstein also completed an individual assessment of Mother and noted her "disconnect." Specifically, he testified:
On the one hand, you have the pretty substantial record….Mother has struggled with mental health, received psychiatric hospitalizations, had issues…with housing. On the other hand,
[Mother] has all but essentially minimized those factors and to an extent skewed them as inaccurate….[I]t did give [me] concern about her mental health stability as I am aware that there are guidelines and criteria that must be met in order to receive psychiatric hospitalization[.]Id. at 57-58.
Upon further review, the totality of the testimonial evidence in this case supports the termination of Mother's parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8). Child had been removed from the care of Mother for her entire three years of life. Mother's long-standing mental health problems, which led to Child's removal from her care, continue to exist, and the termination of Mother's parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of Child by providing for her continued stability in the home of her foster mother. Accordingly, we affirm the order pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8) and (b).
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
[*] Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.