Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. CK73706. D. Zeke Zeidler, Judge.
Lori Siegel under appointment by the Court of Appeal for Defendant and Appellant.
James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Tracey F. Dodds, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services.
ZELON, J.
J. H. (“Father”), the father of minors Sabrina H. and J.H. III, appeals from the juvenile court’s orders made pursuant to a petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 342, declaring Sabrina H. a dependent child of the court under section 300, subdivision (d), denying Father’s continued family reunification services, and ordering that Father not have any visitation with Sabrina H. Father contends that the juvenile court’s finding that Sabrina H. was sexually abused by Father was not supported by substantial evidence, and that its orders denying Father continued reunification services and visitation with Sabrina H. were an abuse of discretion. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Father and Gina G. (“Mother”) are the parents of Sabrina H., a girl born in June 2001, and J.H. III (“J.H.”), a boy born in June 2005. Mother also has two other children from a prior relationship – Selena S, a girl born in February 1994, and Albert S., a boy born in June 1997. This matter came to the attention of the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”) on July 8, 2008, when the DCFS received a referral alleging sexual abuse of Sabrina H. and Selena S. by Father, and general neglect of all four minors by Mother.
I. The Prior Dependency Proceedings
Prior to 2008, the DCFS had investigated an allegation that Father had sexually abused his stepdaughter, Selena S., when she was 11 years old. According to a police report, in December 2005, Selena S. disclosed to Mother that Father sexually molested her within the past month by fondling her vaginal area with his hand. Mother immediately reported the molestation to the police and obtained a restraining order against Father. Following an investigation, the DCFS concluded that the sexual abuse allegations against Father were substantiated, but decided to close its case because Mother had acted appropriately by obtaining a restraining order against Father and seeking medical treatment for Selena S. However, shortly after the DCFS closed its case, Mother requested that the court terminate the restraining order so that Father could have contact with his biological children, Sabrina H. and J.H. The court terminated the restraining order against Father on February 21, 2006.
The police department continued to pursue a criminal investigation. According to an arrest report, Father agreed to submit to a polygraph examination on January 25, 2007. Upon being informed that he had failed the polygraph, Father admitted to the police he touched Selena S.’s vaginal area with his fingers on one occasion. Father was arrested and charged with committing a lewd act upon a child in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a). However, the district attorney’s office decided not to prosecute the case on the basis that Selena S. was unavailable to testify.
II. Initiation of the Current Dependency Proceedings
Upon receiving the July 8, 2008 referral alleging abuse and neglect, the DCFS conducted interviews with Mother and Father. As of July 2008, the four children were residing solely with Mother, and Father was staying at a separate residence. According to Mother, Father had not had any contact with his stepdaughter, Selena S., since he sexually molested her in 2005. Mother stated that she allowed Father to visit his children, Sabrina H. and J.H., but denied that they ever spent the night at Father’s home. Mother indicated that the paternal grandparents also resided in Father’s home and that they would not permit any inappropriate conduct to occur. Although Mother initially denied any drug use, she tested positive for PCP in an on-demand drug test. After being informed of the test results, Mother admitted that she had a history of PCP use and that she had recently used PCP while the children were in her care. At first, Mother also denied that Father had a history of drug abuse, but later informed the DCFS that Father currently was using marijuana and cocaine. In his interview, Father denied that he ever sexually molested Selena S., and explained that the criminal case against him had been dismissed. Father acknowledged that he had been having unmonitored weekend visits with Sabrina H. and J.H. since the termination of the restraining order in early 2006. Father also confirmed that he never attended any sexual abuse counseling.
On July 10, 2008, the DCFS interviewed the three older children about the allegations of abuse and neglect. Selena S. stated that she had not seen Father since the sexual molestation in 2005. She was not aware of any of her siblings being victims of sexual abuse. Alfred S. indicated that he did not have any contact with Father, but that his half-siblings, Sabrina H. and J.H., spent weekends at Father’s home. In her interview, Sabrina H. described Father as “sometimes nice,” but noted that he hit her with a shoe when he was upset. Sabrina H. also confirmed that she and J.H. spent the weekends at Father’s home. Sabrina H. denied, however, that Father ever sexually abused her. On July 16, 2008, the DCFS decided to detain all four children and placed them together in foster care.
On July 21, 2008, the DCFS filed a section 300 petition on behalf of the children pursuant to subdivisions (a), (b), (d), and (j) of the statute. The petition alleged that Father physically abused Sabrina H. by striking her with a shoe. It also alleged that both Mother and Father had a history of substance abuse; that Mother was a current user of PCP; and that Father was a current user of cocaine and marijuana. The petition further alleged that Father sexually abused Selena S. in the past and that Mother allowed Father to have unlimited access to Sabrina H. and J.H., which placed the children at substantial risk of harm. At the July 21, 2008 detention hearing, the juvenile court ordered that all four children be detained and that family reunification services be provided to the parents. Both Mother and Father were granted monitored visitation with their biological children, but Father was ordered not to have any contact with his stepchildren, Selena S. and Alfred S. The court set the matter for a jurisdiction and disposition hearing.
The petition included a separate allegation that the father of Selena S. and Alfred S. had an unresolved history of substance abuse and was a current user of PCP. The father of Selena S. and Alfred S. is not a party to this appeal.
III. The Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing
On July 29, 2008, the DCFS re-interviewed the three older children for its Jurisdiction/Disposition Report. In their interviews, Selena S. and Alfred S. denied any knowledge of Father physically abusing Sabrina H. Although Sabrina H. previously had reported that Father struck her with a shoe when he was upset, she stated in her subsequent interview that she could not remember how Father disciplined her. The children also denied observing either Mother or Father engage in any drug use. With respect to the allegation that Father sexually abused Selena S. in the past, Selena S. confirmed that Father had fondled her vagina once in 2005. Selena S. indicated that, during that incident, Father closed the door of her bedroom and lay down beside her on the bed. He then placed his hand under her clothing and rubbed her vaginal area with his hand. After Selena S. pushed Father’s hand away, Mother walked in and questioned Father about why he was in Selena S.’s bedroom with the door shut. Father denied any inappropriate conduct and claimed that he was simply talking to Selena S. Later, Selena S. disclosed to Mother that Father had molested her and Mother immediately called the police. Selena S. noted that she was concerned about Sabrina H.’s visits to Father’s home and that she had asked Sabrina H. if Father ever touched her, but Sabrina H. denied that he had. Selena S. stated that she believed Sabrina H. would tell her or Mother about any sexual abuse.
On July 31, 2008, the DCFS re-interviewed Mother and Father about the allegations of abuse and neglect. In her interview, Mother admitted that she had a history of PCP use and that she continued to use the drug on occasion, but denied doing so when the children were in her care. Mother also confirmed that Father had a history of cocaine use and that he currently used marijuana on a daily basis. Mother acknowledged that Father had sexually molested Selena S., but maintained that Father was not allowed in her home following that incident. Mother reasoned that she decided to allow Sabrina H. and J.H. to visit Father because she believed he would not harm his biological children, particularly when the paternal grandparents were also residing in Father’s home. In his interview, Father admitted that he struck Sabrina H. with a sandal once as a form of discipline, but noted that he now placed Sabrina H. in a corner when she misbehaved. Father also acknowledged that he had a history of cocaine and marijuana use, but stated that he stopped using cocaine as a teenager and marijuana within the past six months. Father again denied that he had ever sexually abused Selena S.
On September 17, 2008, the parties stipulated to a mediation agreement. In accordance with that agreement, the juvenile court sustained the section 300 petition as amended and declared the four minors to be dependent children of the court pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and (d). In sustaining the petition, the court found that Mother had an unresolved history of substance abuse and was a current user of PCP, which periodically limited her ability to provide regular care for the children. The court further found that Father sexually touched Selena S. on one occasion in 2005, and that Mother recently had allowed Father to have unlimited access to Sabrina H. The court concluded that Father’s prior sexual touching of Selena S. placed both Selena S. and Sabrina H. at risk of harm.
Proceeding to disposition, the juvenile court ordered that the four children be removed from parental custody and placed in the care of the DCFS for suitable placement with their maternal great aunt. The court also ordered the DCFS to provide the parents with family reunification services. Mother was ordered to participate in a drug rehabilitation program with weekly random testing, parenting education, and individual counseling to address case issues. Father was ordered to submit to eight consecutive weekly random drug tests, and to participate in parenting education and individual counseling to address appropriate sexual boundaries with children. The court granted Mother monitored visitation with all four children and Father monitored visitation with Sabrina H. and J.H. A six-month review hearing was set for March 2009.
In its December 17, 2008 status review report, the DCFS provided an update on the parents’ compliance with the case plan. According to the report, Mother had maintained consistent contact with the case social worker. She was participating in a parenting class, substance abuse program, and individual counseling, and had tested negative for drugs in all of her random drug tests. Mother also was attending weekly monitored visits with the children. Although Father had not maintained contact with the DCFS, he was regularly participating in a parenting program and in individual weekly therapy. The coordinator of the parenting program described Father was showing “great interest in learning new skills to be a better parent.” Father’s therapist reported that Father was working in therapy on his “relationships and future career and educational goals.” Father also had enrolled in a drug treatment program and had tested negative for drugs on four occasions, but failed to appear for three mandatory tests. On December 17, 2008, the juvenile court granted Mother unmonitored visitation with the children contingent upon her continued compliance with the case plan.
IV. The Section 342 Petition
On December 26, 2008, the DCFS filed a section 342 petition on behalf of Sabrina H. The petition alleged Father had sexually abused Sabrina H. when the child was six years old and that Mother knew or reasonably should have known of the sexual abuse but failed to take action to protect Sabrina H. The DCFS had received a referral alleging the sexual abuse of Sabrina H. from the maternal aunt, Ramona O. On November 4, 2008, Ramona O. reported that she was helping Sabrina H. shower when they began talking about Father. Ramona O. asked Sabrina H. if Father “does things to [her].” In response, Sabrina H. indicated that Father touched her “privates” three or four times in the past.
According to the DCFS, it originally attempted to file a section 388 petition to modify Father’s visitation with Sabrina H. based on the new allegation of sexual abuse, but that petition was never officially filed with the clerk’s office. At the December 17, 2008 progress hearing, the juvenile court advised the DCFS that it did not need to file a section 388 petition if it properly filed and served a section 342 petition because Father’s visitation with Sabrina H. could be modified on an emergency basis based on a detention under section 342. The DCFS thereafter filed the section 342 petition. The DCFS later agreed to amend the petition by striking all references to Mother.
On November 5, 2008, the case social worker interviewed Sabrina H. about the recent allegation of sexual abuse. Sabrina H. stated that she did not feel safe with Father, but described her monitored visits with him as “good.” When asked if anyone had ever touched her in a way that made her feel uncomfortable, Sabrina H. responded that Father rubbed her over her clothing with his fingers when she used to spend weekends with him. Sabrina H. denied that Father touched any other part of her body, but disclosed that Father made her touch his “middle part” and place her mouth on his penis. Sabrina H. indicated that she was six years old when the sexual abuse occurred. She also stated that she no longer wanted to visit Father because she was afraid of him. Sabrina H.’s maternal aunt and uncle had been monitoring her visits with Father since the children were placed in their home in September 2008. Neither had observed any behavioral changes in Sabrina H., although the maternal uncle noted that at times Sabrina H. felt insecure.
On November 6, 2008, the case social worker met with Father and the paternal grandmother about Sabrina H.’s allegations. Father denied that he ever sexually abused Sabrina H., and expressed that the allegations against him were “pure lies.” According to Father, when Sabrina H. and J.H. used to stay overnight in his one-bedroom home, they each had their own bed. Father also reported that his recent visitation with the children had been positive and took place in a public setting with the paternal grandparents also present. The paternal grandmother denied observing any sexual abuse by Father and insisted that she would not allow any abuse to occur. She noted that Sabrina H. and J.H. “fight for Father’s affection,” but she never saw Father touch them in an inappropriate manner. Both Father and the paternal grandmother posited that the maternal aunt was “putting things in [Sabrina H.’s] head.”
The case social worker re-interviewed Sabrina H.’s half-siblings, Selena S. and Alfred S., about the alleged sexual abuse of Sabrina H. On November 12, 2008, Selena S. informed the case social worker that Sabrina H. had disclosed to her a week before that Father sexually touched Sabrina H. on one occasion. According to Selena S., Sabrina H. said that she and J.H. had been sitting with Father when he touched her. Selena S. asked Sabrina H. if Father touched her at any other time, but Sabrina H. denied that he did. Selena S. also noted she had observed Sabrina H. often sitting alone in her room and that she suspected Sabrina H. may have been abused. In his interview, Alfred S. stated that Sabrina H. had not disclosed any sexual abuse to him. According to Alfred S., Sabrina H. usually spoke to him when she was sad, but she had not shared any concerns about her visits with Father.
The DCFS arranged for a forensic interview and sexual abuse examination of Sabrina H. Dr. Ticson performed the examination on November 7, 2008. Dr. Ticson indicated that Sabrina H. had a fused labia which could be consistent with chronic irritation or sexual abuse, but was not specific for sexual abuse. According to the medical report, Sabrina H. disclosed to Dr. Ticson before the examination that Father touched her under her clothes. At some point, however, Sabrina H. told Dr. Ticson in the maternal aunt’s presence that Father touched her over her clothes. In response, the maternal aunt asserted “that’s not what she told us” and that Father “penetrated her.” Sabrina H. disagreed and reiterated that the touching was over her clothes. However, after the examination, Sabrina H. also disclosed to Dr. Ticson that Father put “his mouth on her front part” and put “his penis in her butt, but not all the way in.” In her medical findings, Dr. Ticson noted that Sabrina H. had an abnormal anal-genital exam based on the labial fusion and that such findings were consistent with the child’s history.
Based on its investigation, the DCFS concluded that Sabrina H.’s allegations of sexual abuse by Father were substantiated. The DCFS recommended that all four children remain under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and that Father not have any further visitation with Sabrina H. On January 8, 2009, the juvenile court set the matter for an adjudication hearing on the section 342 petition. The court also ruled that its prior order for monitored visitation for Father should remain in effect pending further hearing.
On February 10, 2009, the juvenile court held a pretrial resolution conference on the section 342 petition. Counsel for Sabrina H. stated that Sabrina H. had indicated to him that she was afraid of Father and did not want to have any contact with him. Sabrina H.’s counsel asked the court to order no visitation between Father and Sabrina H. After hearing the argument of counsel, the court found that visitation with Father would be detrimental to Sabrina H., and ordered that there be no contact. The court continued the matter for a contested hearing on the section 342 petition, which later was set for the same date as the six-month review hearing under section 366.21, subdivision (e).
V. The Section 342 Adjudication Hearing & the Six-Month Review Hearing
In its March 16, 2009 status review report, the DCFS informed the court that Mother and the children had enrolled in sexual abuse counseling. The children had attended counseling for two weeks, and Sabrina H. had not yet disclosed any incidents of sexual abuse. The therapist advised the case social worker that it could take some time for Sabrina H. to discuss the abuse as children have to feel safe to disclose such information. The DCFS also reported that Mother had been fully compliant with her case plan and was maintaining consistent unmonitored visitation with the children. Mother had successfully completed a six-month drug treatment program in January 2009, and had tested negative for drugs in all of her random tests. She continued to participate in voluntary drug counseling and sexual abuse counseling. The DCFS reported that Father had failed to maintain regular contact with the case social worker. Father had eight negative drug tests between August 2008 and February 2009, but had not fully complied with the case plan because he failed to appear for three scheduled tests. Father also had not provided the DCFS with any further information regarding his participation in parenting education or individual therapy to address appropriate sexual boundaries with children. On March 24, 2009, Father’s counsel informed the juvenile court that Father had been incarcerated since February 26, 2009.
On April 16, 2009, the juvenile court held both an adjudication hearing on the section 342 petition and a six-month review hearing under section 366.21, subdivision (e). After hearing the argument of counsel, the court sustained the section 342 petition as amended and declared Sabrina H. a dependent child of the court pursuant to section 300, subdivision (d). The sustained petition provided that Father had sexually abused Sabrina H. when she was approximately six years old and that such sexual abuse by Father included touching Sabrina H.’s vaginal area and penetrating her with his penis. The petition further stated that Father’s sexual abuse endangered Sabrina H.’s physical and emotional health and safety and placed Sabrina H. and her siblings at risk of harm.
Proceeding to disposition of the section 342 petition and the status review under section 366.21, subdivision (e), the juvenile court found by a preponderance of the evidence that continued jurisdiction of the children was necessary and that the return of the children to the physical custody of their respective fathers would create a substantial risk of detriment. The court found that Mother was compliant with the case plan and that Father was compliant to the extent he could be at his place of incarceration. The court terminated the suitable placement order and ordered that the children be placed in the home of Mother under the supervision of the DCFS. Noting that it previously had found that any contact between Sabrina H. and Father was detrimental to the child, the court ruled that its prior order prohibiting visitation between Father and Sabrina H. was to remain in full force and effect.
With respect to reunification services, the juvenile court stated that “once children go [to the] home of [a] parent, the other parent is no longer in reunification mode.” The court noted that it was not terminating Father’s reunification services because such a ruling could impact Father in the future under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10). Instead, the court ruled that it was not ordering any further reunification services for Father. The court ordered that family maintenance services be provided to Mother and the children, and set the matter for a review hearing under section 364.
Under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), reunification services need not be provided to a parent where the court previously terminated reunification services for a dependent child’s sibling because the parent failed to reunify with the sibling after removal and where the parent has not made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to the prior removal. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10).)
On April 20, 2009, Father filed a timely notice of appeal. In his appeal, Father seeks to challenge the juvenile court’s orders sustaining the section 342 petition, denying Father continued reunification services, and ordering that Father not have any visitation with Sabrina H.
DISCUSSION
I. The Order Sustaining the Section 342 Petition
Father first contends that the juvenile court erred in sustaining the section 342 petition because there was no substantial evidence to support a finding that Father sexually abused Sabrina H. Section 342 provides, in pertinent part, that “[i]n any case in which a minor has been found to be a person described by Section 300 and the petitioner alleges new facts or circumstances, other than those under which the original petition was sustained, sufficient to state that the minor is a person described in Section 300, the petitioner shall file a subsequent petition.” (§ 342.) Accordingly, a subsequent petition may be filed under section 342 when dependency jurisdiction has been established and the DCFS alleges new facts or circumstances, other than those sustained in the original petition, that warrant the continuation of jurisdiction. (In re Victoria C. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 536, 542; In re Barbara P. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 926, 933.) Under section 300, subdivision (d), a child may be subject to the dependency jurisdiction of the juvenile court if the “child has been sexually abused, or there is a substantial risk that the child will be sexually abused, as defined in Section 11165.1 of the Penal Code, by his or her parent....” (§ 300, subd. (d).)
We review the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition findings for substantial evidence. (In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, 828; In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1654.) Substantial evidence is “evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value.” (In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1401.) Under this standard of review, we examine the whole record in a light most favorable to the findings and conclusions of the juvenile court and defer to the lower court on issues of credibility of the evidence and witnesses. (In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1393; In re Tania S. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 728, 733.) We determine only whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, that supports the juvenile court’s order, resolving all conflicts in support of the determination and indulging all legitimate inferences to uphold the lower court’s order. (In re John V. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1212; In re Katrina C. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 540, 547.)
Father argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he sexually abused Sabrina H. because Sabrina H.’s various statements about the abuse were vastly inconsistent. Father notes that when the DCFS initially interviewed the children in July 2008, which was after the molestation of Sabrina H. allegedly occurred, Sabrina H. denied that Father ever touched her in an inappropriate manner and Sabrina H.’s half-siblings confirmed that Sabrina H. had not disclosed any sexual abuse to them. Father reasons that it was not until November 2008 that Sabrina H. first raised allegations of sexual abuse, and at that time, Sabrina H. related conflicting accounts about the nature and frequency of the abuse. Father also points out that, while the abuse allegedly occurred during Sabrina H.’s visits with Father in the one-bedroom home he shared with the paternal grandparents, the paternal grandmother denied witnessing any inappropriate touching by Father or any behavioral changes in Sabrina H.
In essence, Father’s argument is that Sabrina H. was not a credible witness because her accounts of the sexual abuse were inconsistent and conflicted with the statements of Father who denied that he inappropriately touched Sabrina H. and other witnesses who denied observing any signs of sexual abuse in the child. However, in the context of dependency proceedings, issues of fact and credibility are the sole province of the trier of fact. (In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193.) It is the trier of fact that “determines the credibility of witnesses, weighs the evidence, and resolves factual conflicts. We cannot reject the testimony of a witness that the trier of fact chooses to believe unless the testimony is physically impossible or its falsity is apparent without resorting to inferences or deductions. As part of its task, the trier of fact may believe and accept as true only part of a witness’s testimony and disregard the rest. On appeal, we must accept that part of the testimony which supports the judgment. [Citation.]” (In re Daniel G. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 824, 830.) The testimony of a single witness can be sufficient to uphold a judgment on appeal. (In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 200.)
Father correctly notes that Sabrina H.’s various retellings of the sexual abuse were inconsistent in certain respects. Sabrina H. initially denied that Father ever inappropriately touched her. When Sabrina H. first disclosed the sexual abuse to her half-sister, Selena S., in or about November 2008, she told Selena S. that Father “touched” her on one occasion. Approximately one week later, Sabrina H. related to her maternal aunt and the case social worker that Father touched her inappropriately three or four times in the past. In her interview with the social worker, Sabrina H. was asked more specific questions about the exact nature and extent of the touching. Sabrina H. disclosed that Father touched her vaginal area over her clothing with his hand, made her touch his penis over his clothing, and made her put her mouth on his penis. She denied any vaginal or anal penetration at that time. In her medical examination, Sabrina H. initially expressed to Dr. Ticson that Father touched her under her clothing, but later stated in the maternal aunt’s presence that the touching was over her clothing. After the exam, Sabrina H. made an additional disclosure to Dr. Ticson that Father penetrated her anal opening with his penis.
While Sabrina H.’s accounts of the details and types of sexual abuse she endured were not entirely consistent, she clearly communicated in each of her four disclosures that Father had sexually molested her. As the DCFS notes, Sabrina H.’s first two disclosures were to family members whereas her subsequent disclosures were to the case social worker and the examining physician, each of whom questioned Sabrina H. more extensively about the nature and extent of the sexual contact. It is not surprising that Sabrina H.’s description of the abuse increased in detail as she was interviewed by persons with more professional experience in dealing with sexual abuse allegations. Moreover, while it is true that Sabrina H.’s adult relatives had not observed any behavioral changes in the child, Sabrina H.’s half-sister, who also had been molested by Father, noticed that Sabrina H. was spending more time alone in her room and suspected sexual abuse. Sabrina H. herself conveyed to the case social worker in November 2008 that she was afraid of Father and no longer wanted to have contact with him. Ultimately, the inconsistencies in Sabrina H.’s retellings went to the weight of the evidence, but did not render Sabrina H.’s account that Father sexually abused her inherently improbable or unreliable. (See In re P.A. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1344 [substantial evidence supported sexual abuse finding even though the child’s account of the abuse “varied in the details”]; In re Rubisela E. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 177, 195 [substantial evidence supported sexual abuse finding because “although the exact circumstances surrounding the event may have differed in the retelling, the essence of the offense... did not change”].) After considering all of the evidence, the juvenile court found Sabrina H. to be credible and that determination is entitled to deference by this Court.
Father also asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he inappropriately touched Sabrina H. for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification within the meaning of Penal Code section 11165.1. Penal Code section 11165.1 defines sexual abuse as either “sexual assault or sexual exploitation.” (Pen. Code, § 11165.1.) The term “sexual assault” is defined by reference to several criminal sex acts and other sexual conduct, including “[t]he intentional touching of the genitals or intimate parts... or the clothing covering them, of a child,... for purposes of sexual arousal or gratification....” (Pen. Code, § 11165.1, subd. (b)(4).) Such touching does not, however, include “acts which may reasonably be construed to be normal caretaker responsibilities; interactions with, or demonstrations of affection for, the child; or acts performed for a valid medical purpose.” (Pen. Code, § 11165.1, subd. (b)(4).)
Because sexual intent can seldom be proven by direct evidence, it may be inferred from the circumstances. (In re Mariah T. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 428, 440.) “[T]he trier of fact looks to all the circumstances, including the charged act, to determine whether it was performed with the required specific intent. [Citation.]” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 344, fn. 7.) “[T]he ‘circumstances’ which bear on the ‘sexual’ nature of the encounter are those facts which indicate that the actor touched the child in order to obtain sexual gratification. For this reason, the trier of fact has always been free to consider the relationship of the parties, the nature of the touching, and the presence or absence of any nonsexual purpose....” (People v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 450, fn. 16.)
Father claims that the circumstances surrounding the alleged touching of Sabrina H. are devoid of any evidence of a sexual intent. However, contrary to Father’s characterization of the sexual abuse, Sabrina H. did not solely disclose that Father touched her genital area with his hand, which depending on the circumstances, could fall within the range of normal caretaking responsibilities. Sabrina H. also described other acts done by Father, including an incident where Father inserted his penis into her. Given the nature of the conduct disclosed by Sabrina H. and the lack of any legitimate reason for such conduct toward a child, the juvenile court reasonably could infer from the circumstances that Father acted with the requisite sexual intent. We conclude that substantial evidence supported the jurisdictional finding that Father sexually abused Sabrina H. The juvenile court therefore did not err in sustaining the section 342 petition.
II. The Order Denying Father Family Reunification Services
Father also challenges the juvenile court’s order denying him continued family reunification services. “The juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child’s interests and to fashion a dispositional order accordingly.” (In re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 474.). On appeal, a reviewing court will not reverse the juvenile court’s determination regarding the provision of reunification services absent an abuse of discretion. (In re Nada R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1179; In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006.) “‘The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.’ [Citations.]” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
Under section 361.5, “[w]henever a minor is removed from parental custody, the juvenile court must, in the absence of certain specified exceptions, order the social worker to provide services to the parent for the purpose of facilitating reunification of the family. [Citations.]” (In re Jesse W. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 49, 59, fn. omitted; see § 361.5, subd. (a) [“whenever a child is removed from a parent’s... custody, the juvenile court shall order the social worker to provide child welfare services to the child and the child’s mother and statutorily presumed father”].) Subdivision (a) of the statute reflects the different treatment afforded to parents depending upon the age of the child at the time of removal from parental custody. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1).) For a child three years of age or older, family reunification services “shall be provided beginning with the dispositional hearing and ending 12 months after the date the child entered foster care....” (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).) For a child under the age of three, such services “shall be provided for a period of six months from the dispositional hearing... but no longer than 12 months from the date the child entered foster care....” (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B).)
“Family reunification services play a ‘crucial role’ in dependency proceedings. [Citations.]” (In re Alanna A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 555, 563.) The law thus favors family reunification wherever possible. (In re Jesse W., supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 59.) At the same time, however, the statutes governing reunifications services must be considered in light of the juvenile dependency system as a whole. “The objective of the dependency scheme is to protect abused or neglected children and those at substantial risk thereof and to provide permanent, stable homes if those children cannot be returned home within a prescribed period of time. [Citations.]” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 307.) Because reunification services are a benefit, not a constitutional entitlement, the juvenile court has the discretion to terminate such services at any time, depending upon the circumstances of the case. (In re Aryanna C. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1242; In re Derrick S. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 436, 448.)
Relying on Aryanna C. and Derrick S., Father argues that he generally was entitled to 12 months of family reunification services under section 361.5 and that the juvenile court could only terminate his services earlier in rare circumstances that did not exist here. In Aryanna C., the appellate court held that a juvenile court has discretion to terminate reunifications services for a parent of a dependent child under the age of three prior to the six-month reunification period provided in section 361.5. (In re Aryanna C., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1242-1243.) Drawing on the language of former section 361.5, subdivision (a)(2) that services “may not exceed” six months for a child under the age of three, the court concluded that “a parent is not entitled to a prescribed minimum period of services,” and that it “remains within the discretion of the juvenile court to determine whether continued services are in the [child’s] best interests.” (Aryanna C., supra, at p. 1243.) The court reasoned that “[w]here... the likelihood of reunification is extremely low [citation], a continuation of the reunification period would waste scarce resources and delay permanency for dependent minors.” (Id. at p. 1242.)
In Derrick S., the appellate court extended the reasoning of Aryanna C. to dependent children age three or older, and held that “a juvenile court conducting a dependency for a child above the age of three retains the discretion to terminate the provision of reunification services before expiration of the 12-month period” set forth in section 361.5. (In re Derrick S., supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 449.) Like Aryanna C., the court in Derrick S. construed section 361.5’s provision for reunification services as setting an “outside limit” rather than a minimum guarantee. (Id. at p. 448.) The court also relied on the language of section 366.21, subdivision (e), which states that if a child is not returned to parental custody at the six-month review hearing, the juvenile court “shall determine whether reasonable services... have been provided,” and “shall order that those services be initiated, continued, or terminated.” (§ 366.21, subd. (e) [italics added].) The court concluded that while “12 months of services will ordinarily be provided for a parent of a dependent child over the age of three, [the] services may be discontinued in the rare case when ‘the likelihood of reunification is,’ for whatever reason, ‘extremely low.’ [Citation.]” (In re Derrick S., supra, at p. 448.)
Father contends that, unlike Derrick S. and Aryanna C., this was not a case where the likelihood of reunification was extremely low, particularly in light of the juvenile court’s finding that Father had complied with his case plan to the extent he could given his incarceration. Notably, however, neither Derrick S. nor Aryanna C. concerned the termination of reunification services for a parent when the child has been returned to the custody of the other parent, as was the case here. At the six-month review hearing, the juvenile court ordered that Sabrina H. and J.H., along with their half-siblings, be placed in the home of Mother under the supervision of the DCFS. It was only after the juvenile court ordered that the children be returned to Mother’s custody that it issued its order denying Father continued reunification services.
This case is therefore closer to In re Gabriel L. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 644, which considered the scope of a juvenile court’s discretion to deny or continue reunification services where, after a period during which both parents were provided with services, the child was placed with only one parent. While acknowledging that no statute specifically addressed such a factual scenario, the appellate court in Gabriel L. reasoned that a juvenile court’s “discretion to provide services for parents when a child has been placed with one parent after a period of reunification services is similar to the situation when the child is removed from the custodial parent and placed with the noncustodial parent under section 361.2 because in both cases the child is in parental custody, not in foster care.” (Id. at p. 651.) The court noted that “[w]hen a child is in foster care, unless the case falls within a specified statutory exception, it is assumed that reunification services will be ordered. Under section 361.2, by contrast, that presumption is not present because the child is not in out-of-home placement, but with a parent.” (Ibid.)
As the court in Gabriel L. further recognized, section 361.2 invests the juvenile court with broad discretion as to the provision of reunification services to the parents. (In re Gabriel L., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 651.) Specifically, when a child is placed in the custody of one parent subject to continued court supervision, the juvenile court “may order that reunification services be provided to the parent or guardian from whom the child is being removed,... that services be provided solely to the parent who is assuming physical custody..., or that services be provided to both parents....” (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(3).) “The decision whether to provide services and to which parent is discretionary to the court because the child is not out of the home, but in placement with a parent. [Citation.]” (In re Gabriel L., supra, at p. 651.) Gabriel L. thus held that, upon placing a dependent child in the home of one parent after a period of reunification services for both parents, the juvenile court “has discretion to find that the ordering of such services to the nonreunifying parent is not in the child’s interest and to not order services for that parent. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 652.)
We agree with the DCFS that the reasoning of Gabriel L. applies here. When the juvenile court removes a child from parental custody, “the focus of the proceedings is to reunify the child with a parent, when safe to do so for the child. [Citation.]” (In re Adrianna P. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 44, 59.) Once the child is returned to the custody of a parent after a period of reunification services, that objective has been met. In such a case, the juvenile court has the discretion to order that the non-custodial parent not be provided with further reunification services if the court determines that the discontinuation of services is in the child’s best interest. (§ 361.2(b)(3); In re Gabriel L., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at pp. 651-652; see also In re Erika W. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 470, 476-477 [under section 361.2, the juvenile court had the discretion not to order reunification services for a previously custodial parent when the child was placed with a previously noncustodial parent].) In this case, the juvenile court properly exercised its discretion in declining to continue family reunification services for Father.
The juvenile court’s finding at the section 342 hearing that Father sexually abused Sabrina H. was the second sexual abuse allegation that had been sustained against Father within a year. Whereas Father’s prior sexual abuse of a child consisted of his fondling his stepdaughter, Selena S., on one occasion, his abuse of Sabrina H. included touching her vaginal area and penetrating her. Additionally, while it is true that Father was partially compliant with his case plan as of the section 342 hearing, there was no showing in the record that Father was addressing issues of appropriate sexual boundaries with children in his individual counseling, as previously ordered by the court. Furthermore, at the time of the juvenile court’s order denying Father further family reunification services, Father was incarcerated and Sabrina H. was adamant that she did want any contact with him. Under these circumstances, the likelihood of Father reunifying with his children was extremely low. The juvenile court accordingly did not abuse its discretion in denying Father continued reunification services once the children were returned to the home of Mother.
I. The Order Denying Father Visitation with Sabrina H.
Father argues that the juvenile court also abused its discretion in denying him visitation with Sabrina H. because there was no substantial evidence to support a finding that visitation with Father was detrimental to the child. “[T]he power to decide whether any visitation occurs belongs to the court alone. [Citation.]” (In re S.H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310, 317; see also In re Christopher H., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1008-1009 [“The juvenile court has the sole power to determine whether visitation will occur.”].) “A juvenile court’s determination as to whether parental visits are in the best interests of a dependent child may be reversed only upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion. [Citations.]” (In re Emmanuel R. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 452, 465.) The abuse of discretion standard warrants a high degree of deference to the decision of the juvenile court. (In re J.N. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 450, 459.)
Under section 362.1, whenever a child is placed in foster care and reunification services are provided to the parent, the juvenile court shall order visitation between the parent and the child, subject to the exception that “[n]o visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child.” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(B).) Therefore, as this Court recently recognized, “when reunification services have been ordered and are still being provided,... some visitation is mandatory unless the court specifically finds any visitation with the parent would pose a threat to the child’s safety.” (In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1491, fn. omitted.) Even after the end of the reunification period, it ordinarily is improper to suspend visits between a parent and child “[a]bsent a showing of detriment caused by visitation.” (In re Luke L. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 670, 679; see also § 366.21, subd. (h) [once reunification services are terminated and a permanent plan hearing is set, the “court shall continue to permit the parent... to visit the child pending the hearing unless it finds that visitation would be detrimental to the child”].) “Visitation may be seen as an element critical to promotion of the parents’ interest in the care and management of their children, even if actual physical custody is not the outcome. [Citation.]” (In re Luke L., supra, at p. 679.)
Notwithstanding the legislative preference for visitation, “the parents’ interest in the care, custody and companionship of their children is not to be maintained at the child’s expense; the child’s input and refusal and the possible adverse consequences if a visit is forced against the child’s will are factors to be considered in administering visitation. [Citation.]” (In re S.H., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 317; see also In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 50-51 [child’s aversion to visiting an abusive parent is a proper factor for consideration in administering visitation as long as it is not the “the sole factor”].) Moreover, “[w]hile visitation is a key element of reunification, the court must focus on the best interests of the children ‘and on the elimination of conditions which led to the juvenile court’s finding that the child has suffered, or is at risk of suffering, harm specified in section 300.’ [Citation.]” (In re Julie M., supra, at p. 50.) “It is the juvenile court’s responsibility to ensure regular parent-child visitation occurs while at the same time providing for flexibility in response to the changing needs of the child and to dynamic family circumstances. [Citations.]” (In re S.H., supra, at p. 317.)
In this case, the juvenile court did not err in ordering that there be no visitation between Father and Sabrina H. The sustained allegations against Father were serious in nature. After sexually molesting his 11-year-old stepdaughter, Selena S., on one occasion, Father proceeded to sexually abuse his then six-year-old daughter, Sabrina H., several times. On appeal, Father asserts that there was no evidence that he acted inappropriately during his monitored visitation with Sabrina H. and notes that the maternal aunt and uncle who monitored the visits had not observed any behavioral changes in the child. However, it appears from the record that the maternal aunt and uncle did not always stay to supervise Father’s visits with Sabrina H. as they were required to do, and at times left Sabrina H. and J.H. alone with Father at McDonalds. It also appears that the mere presence of other adults had not protected Sabrina H. from being sexually abused by Father in the past. The sexual abuse of Sabrina H. occurred during her visits to Father’s one-bedroom home where, according to Father and Mother, the paternal grandparents were always present.
In the DCFS’s service log, the case social worker indicated that Selena S. and J.H. (as opposed to Sabrina H. and J.H.) were having unmonitored visits with their biological father at McDonalds. However, elsewhere in the service log, the social worker explained that the father of Selena S. and Alfred S. was not visiting his children at all, and that the father of Sabrina H. and J.H. was visiting his children twice a week at McDonalds. It thus appears that the reference to the unmonitored visits at McDonalds was to Father’s visits with Sabrina H. and J.H.
Father also reasons that, as of the hearing on the section 342 petition, Sabrina H.’s therapist had not indicated that Sabrina H. was suffering any emotional or physical harm as a result of the prior sexual abuse or her visitation with Father. However, Sabrina H. only recently had begun sexual abuse counseling, and according to her therapist, it was not uncommon for a child to need some time in therapy before discussing the abuse. In any event, Sabrina H. had clearly expressed to both the case social worker and her counsel that she was afraid of Father and did not want to visit him. Considering all of these facts, there was substantial evidence to support a finding that visitation between Father and Sabrina H. was not only detrimental to Sabrina H.’s well-being, but also posed a risk to the child’s safety. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father visitation with Sabrina H.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
We concur: WOODS, Acting P. J., JACKSON, J.