Opinion
10-22-00353-CV
04-19-2023
IN THE INTEREST OF R.W.S., J.R.S., AND M.S., CHILDREN
From the 13th District Court Navarro County, Texas Trial Court No. D21-29633-CV
Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Johnson, and Justice Smith
MEMORANDUM OPINION
TOM GRAY Chief Justice
The mother and father of R.W.S., J.R.S., and M.S. appeal from a judgment that terminated their parental rights to their children after a jury trial. See TEX. FAM. CODE §161.001. The mother and father complain that the definition of "endanger" in the jury charge was erroneous, although they each acknowledge that there was no objection to the instruction given made to the trial court. Because we find that this complaint was not properly preserved, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The mother and father filed separate briefs in this proceeding but raised the same issue and arguments.
Preservation of Jury Charge Error
The mother and father each complain that the definition of "endanger" submitted to the jury in the jury charge constituted an improper comment on the weight of the evidence. Both the mother and father acknowledge that no objection was ever made to the trial court to any part of the jury charge.
The mother and father both argue that, in termination of parental rights proceedings, the current rules for preservation of jury charge error pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure should be set aside and the criminal standard set forth in Almanza v. State should be adopted. See Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). If the Almanza standard was adopted, jury charge error would not have to be preserved in the trial court in order to complain on appeal; rather, unobjected-to error would be reviewed for egregious harm as in criminal appeals. See Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We decline the parents' invitation to alter preservation rules in termination of parental rights proceedings.
In civil proceedings, Rule 272 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states in part that "[a]ll objections [to the jury charge] not so presented [in writing or dictated into the record] shall be considered as waived." TEX. R. CIV. P. 272. The Texas Supreme Court has long held that a complaint about the jury charge is waived unless the trial court is made aware of the complaint through a timely objection and a ruling is obtained, even in termination proceedings. See In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 349 (Tex. 2003); In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 363 (Tex. 2003). Because neither the mother nor the father objected to the jury charge on this basis, this complaint was waived. See also TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). We overrule the mother and father's sole issues.
Conclusion
Having found no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.