Opinion
357487
01-06-2022
In re RRKC, Minor.
UNPUBLISHED
Saginaw Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 21-008362-AM.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Shapiro and Ronayne Krause, JJ.
Per Curiam.
Petitioner appeals by right the trial court's order holding that the MCI superintendent's decision to withhold consent for petitioner to adopt the minor child, RRKC, was not arbitrary and capricious. Because the trial court's decision was not clearly erroneous, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
RRKC was hospitalized in June 2019 when she was 2½ months old for severe injuries from physical abuse. RRKC was removed from her parents' care and was placed in nonrelative foster care in July 2019 when she was 3½ months old. Petitioner, RRKC's maternal grandmother, testified that she visited RRKC frequently before she was hospitalized and stayed with her in the hospital until the circuit court prohibited visitation from family members. Petitioner testified that she worked for months contacting Child Protective Services (CPS) and RRKC's foster-care worker to have RRKC placed in her care, but was repeatedly ignored. Eventually, petitioner learned that she was registered as the perpetrator in a CPS complaint that was still on the Central Registry. Petitioner testified that she did not know about the complaint and that she had the record expunged in December 2019. The circuit court terminated the parental rights of both RRKC's parents in February 2020, and RRKC was committed to the Michigan Children's Institute (MCI).
Both petitioner and the foster parents requested to be considered for adoption of RRKC, and on January 1, 2021, the MCI superintendent issued a decision denying petitioner's request to adopt RRKC. In reaching her decision, the superintendent considered three factors: the length of time that RRKC had lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity; the willingness and ability of a relative to ensure the physical and emotional well-being of RRKC on a permanent basis; and the psychological relationship that existed between RRKC and the prospective adoptive parent. Regarding the first factor, the superintendent noted that RRKC had been with her foster parents for more than 17 months and had developed a secure attachment to them, identified them as her parents, and looked to them for comfort, guidance, and reassurance. The superintendent also stated that RRKC's foster parents met her needs and concluded that it would not be in RRKC's best interests to be removed from this stable and satisfactory environment. Regarding the second factor, the superintendent noted that because of RRKC's physical abuse, she needed specialized therapy services and parents who would advocate for her needs and work with her in the home. Although she noted that petitioner and her long-term partner were employed and had raised children together, the superintendent focused on several CPS complaints involving petitioner from 1997 through 2015. Several of the complaints involved issues with petitioner's daughter, RRKC's mother, who experienced mental health issues as a child. Only one complaint, which involved alleged medical neglect of petitioner's son in 1998, was substantiated, although petitioner testified that the complaint was unfounded, that CPS never informed her about the complaint, and that it was never investigated. The superintendent concluded that the reports raised concerns about petitioner's ability to provide for RRKC's well-being. Regarding the third factor, the superintendent acknowledged that petitioner had a past relationship with RRKC, but stated that because petitioner had not had contact with the child since 2019, RRKC, given her young age, could not be expected to remember petitioner.
Petitioner filed a motion in the trial court pursuant to MCL 710.45 requesting that the court hold that the MCI's decision was arbitrary and capricious. The trial court held a hearing regarding petitioner's motion, and both petitioner and her long-term-partner testified about petitioner's ability to parent RRKC. Petitioner did not call the MCI superintendent to testify. The trial court reviewed the superintendent's decision on the record and declined to give the CPS reports much weight. The court concluded, however, that petitioner had not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the superintendent's decision was arbitrary and capricious and denied petitioner's motion.
II. ANALYSIS
Petitioner argues that the superintendent's decision was without factual support, that the trial court conducted an improper analysis in affirming the superintendent decision, and that the trial court did not protect her constitutional rights or rights under the Adoption Code. We disagree on all counts.
"[A] family court's review of the superintendent's decision to withhold consent to adopt a state ward is limited to determining whether the adoption petitioner has established clear and convincing evidence that the MCI superintendent's withholding of consent was arbitrary and capricious." In re Keast, 278 Mich.App. 415, 423; 750 N.W.2d 643 (2008). We review for clear legal error whether the trial court properly applied this standard. Id. A trial court commits clear legal error when it "incorrectly chooses, interprets, or applies the law . . . ." Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich. 871, 881; 526 N.W.2d 889 (1994). We review de novo constitutional issues. Dorman v Clinton Twp, 269 Mich.App. 638, 644; 714 N.W.2d 350 (2006).
The MCI superintendent "represents the state of Michigan as guardian of all children committed to the state by a family court after termination of parental rights." In re Keast, 278 Mich.App. 415, 423; 750 N.W.2d 643 (2008). The superintendent "has the power to make decisions on behalf of a child committed to the institute," MCL 400.203(2), including the authority to consent to adoption, MCL 400.209(1). If the superintendent denies a petitioner's request for consent to adopt, the petitioner may file a motion with the court alleging that the superintendent's decision was arbitrary and capricious. MCL 710.45(2). A trial court will reverse the superintendent's decision only if the petitioner establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decision was arbitrary and capricious. MCL 710.45(7). When reviewing the superintendent's decision, "the focus is not whether the representative made the 'correct' decision or whether the [court] would have decided the issue differently than the representative, but whether the representative acted arbitrarily and capriciously in making the decision." In re Cotton, 208 Mich.App. 180, 184; 526 N.W.2d 601 (1994). The court must focus on the "reasons given by the representative for withholding the consent to the adoption," and "it is the absence of any good reason to withhold consent, not the presence of good reasons to grant it, that indicates that the representative was acting in an arbitrary and capricious manner." Id. at 185. But a reviewing court must also consider whether the decision of the superintendent was "fanciful or without factual support." Id. at 186.
A. FACTUAL SUPPORT
Petitioner first argues that the superintendent's decision to withhold consent for adoption was without factual support. Petitioner primarily contends that the superintendent's decision was largely based on unsubstantiated or outdated CPS reports that the trial court concluded were not credible. Although the trial court declined to give much weight to the CPS reports, that was not the only basis for the superintendent's decision. The superintendent noted that RRKC had been with her foster parents since she was 3½ months old, identified her foster parents as her parents, and had developed a secure attachment to them. Petitioner has offered no evidence that RRKC's foster home was inadequate. Although the superintendent largely relied on CPS reports to conclude that petitioner would not be able to provide for the child's well-being, the superintendent also determined that the foster parents had demonstrated that they would provide for RRKC extensive therapies and would advocate for her future needs as the foster parents had already taken the child to multiple follow-up appointments, therapies, and Early On services. This reasoning was sound and was not arbitrary and capricious.
Petitioner also contends that the superintendent did not place sufficient weight on her relationship with RRKC or her history of successfully raising other children. The superintendent acknowledged both of those factors, but concluded that petitioner's relationship with RRKC had deteriorated given RRKC's young age and because petitioner had not had contact with her since 2019. We acknowledge that petitioner was precluded by court order from visiting the child, but regardless of the reason for the lack of contact, the prolonged period of petitioner's absence from the young child's life supported the finding that there was a deteriorated bond, especially compared with the child's bond to the foster parents.
Petitioner next argues that the superintendent's decision was based on a predetermined intent to separate RRKC from her biological family, rather than reasoned and principled decision-making. The record does not support this contention. The superintendent's decision that it would not be in RRKC's best interests to remove her from the only family that she has known for most of her life was reasonable and principled. Petitioner only presented evidence that she would have been a good caregiver, which does not show that the superintendent's denial was arbitrary and capricious. As noted, "it is the absence of any good reason to withhold consent, not the presence of good reasons to grant it, that indicates that the representative was acting in an arbitrary and capricious manner." In re Cotton, 208 Mich.App. at 185. Therefore, the trial court did not err by finding that petitioner had not shown that the MCI superintendent's decision was arbitrary and capricious.
B. IMPROPER ANALYSIS
Petitioner next argues that the trial court conducted an improper analysis by solely focusing on the Adoption Code's best-interest factors instead of first analyzing whether the superintendent's decision was arbitrary and capricious. However, the trial court clearly outlined the correct standard of review at the beginning of its analysis:
The petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence that the MCI superintendent's decision to withhold consent was arbitrary and capricious. That's what the court must look at. The court focuses on whether or not the superintendent acted arbitrarily and capriciously.
Then, after discussing the MCI superintendent's decision point by point, the trial court concluded its analysis by again citing the proper standard of review:
Again, the court is required to look to see whether or not the petitioner has shown by clear and convincing evidence based on that decision by the MCI superintendent that I've just gone over, that consent has been arbitrarily and capriciously withheld. The court does not find this to be true based on the information that the court is allowed to review. Therefore, I deny the motion that the decision to withhold consent was arbitrary and capricious and I dismiss the petition to adopt filed by [petitioner].
Although the trial court did discuss the Adoption Code's best-interest factors, MCL 710.22(g), this was necessary to review the superintendent's decision because that decision was based on three of the best-interest factors. Therefore, the trial court's analysis was proper.
C. PETITIONER'S RIGHTS
Lastly, petitioner argues that the trial court failed to protect her rights under the Michigan Constitution and the Adoption Code, MCL 710.21 et seq. Petitioner relies on Article 1, § 17 of the Michigan Constitution, which states, in relevant part, "The right of all individuals, firms, corporations and voluntary associations to fair and just treatment in the course of legislative and executive investigations and hearings shall not be infringed." Const 1963, art 1, § 17. Petitioner has effectively abandoned this unpreserved argument by failing to elaborate on it. See Berger v Berger, 277 Mich.App. 700, 712; 746 N.W.2d 335 (2008). Further, while it is presumably petitioner's position that the superintendent's decision constituted an executive investigation, she fails to explain how she was deprived of fair and just treatment. She contends that the superintendent decided to separate RRKC from her and place the child with a foster-care family without a hearing. But it was the circuit court in the termination proceedings that decided to suspend petitioner's visitation with the child. Accordingly, this argument is without merit.
Petitioner also contends that the trial court failed to protect her rights under the Adoption Code. Petitioner cites MCL 710.21a, which provides that the general purposes of the Adoption Code are:
(a) To provide that each adoptee in this state who needs adoption services receives those services.
(b) To provide procedures and services that will safeguard and promote the best interests of each adoptee in need of adoption and that will protect the rights of all parties concerned. If conflicts arise between the rights of the adoptee and the rights of another, the rights of the adoptee shall be paramount.
(c) To provide prompt legal proceedings to assure that the adoptee is free for adoptive placement at the earliest possible time.
(d) To achieve permanency and stability for adoptees as quickly as possible.
(e) To support the permanency of a finalized adoption by allowing all interested parties to participate in proceedings regarding the adoptee.MCL 710.22(a) defines an "adoptee" as "the individual who is to be adopted, regardless of whether the individual is a child or an adult." Thus, the purposes of the Adoption Code are focused on the individual being adopted, not a potential adopter. Petitioner cites no statutory provision that guarantees her any rights as a party interested in adoption. Further, the superintendent complied with the goal listed under MCL 710.21a(e) "[t]o support the permanency of a finalized adoption by allowing all interested parties to participate in proceedings regarding the adoptee" by reviewing petitioner's request for adoption of RRKC and denying it in a written decision. For these reasons, petitioner has not shown that the trial court or the superintendent denied her any rights.
Affirmed.
Jane E. Markey, Douglas B. Shapiro, Amy Ronayne Krause, JJ.