Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. YJ30803, Stephanie M. Davis, Judge.
Torres & Torres, Tonja R. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Susan D. Martynec and Robert M. Snider, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
KLEIN, P. J.
Defendant and Appellant, R.P., appeals an order continuing him a ward of the state under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, based on the finding he committed second degree robbery in violation of Penal Code section 211. R.P. contends the probation condition prohibiting him from possessing any “dangerous or deadly weapon” is unconstitutionally vague.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
We hold a probation condition prohibiting a minor from possessing any “dangerous or deadly weapon” is a valid exercise of a juvenile court’s discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s order.
BACKGROUND
A petition filed in August of 2007 alleged R.P. struck a store employee with a wooden stick when the employee tried to prevent R.P. from escaping with stolen goods. R.P. admitted to assault with a deadly weapon in violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1). The juvenile court sustained the petition, declared R.P. a ward of the state, and ordered him placed home-on-probation.
These facts are gathered from the probation officer’s report.
A second petition alleged R.P. committed second degree robbery in violation of section 211 when he and another minor forcibly removed a chain from the victim’s neck on March 1, 2008. The juvenile court sustained the second petition, terminated its previous home-on-probation order, and placed R.P. in a short-term camp community program. The juvenile court continued probation with several new terms restricting R.P.’s contact with the victim and gang members. The probation condition at issue prohibits R.P. from possessing any “dangerous or deadly weapon.”
DISCUSSION
1. General principles.
The Legislature gives the juvenile court broad discretion to impose probation conditions. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730, subd. (b) [“The court may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.”]; see also § 1203.1, subd. (j).)
However, a juvenile court’s discretion to impose conditions of probation is not boundless, and a probation condition must not violate a probationer’s inalienable rights. Thus, when a facial challenge is made to the constitutionality of a probation condition, there is no need to preserve the claim by an objection in the juvenile court. (See In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889 [vagueness challenge to probation condition preserved on appeal despite probationer’s failure to object in trial court].) Under such circumstances, fairness and efficiency considerations weigh in favor of an appellate court’s de novo review of a facial constitutional challenge. (See id. at pp. 885-888.)
At the same time, Sheena K. has suggested a somewhat relaxed standard for evaluating the constitutionality of juvenile probation conditions. “[A] condition of probation that would be unconstitutional or otherwise improper for an adult probationer may be permissible for a minor under the supervision of the juvenile court.” (In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 889.)
We now turn to the merits of R.P.’s claim.
2. No merit to R.P.’s contention the probation condition is void for vagueness.
R.P. contends the probation condition is unconstitutionally vague because “any object can be used as a deadly weapon” and thus the condition gives “no fair warning as to what might result in a violation.” We first discuss the void for vagueness doctrine and then apply it to the case at hand.
a. The void for vagueness doctrine as applied to a challenge to a probation condition.
The concern underlying the void for vagueness doctrine is the due process requirement of adequate notice. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art I, § 7.) A probation condition is unconstitutional when its terms are so vague people of “common intelligence” must guess at its meaning. (In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.) To survive a challenge on the ground of vagueness, a probation condition “must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated” (Ibid., quoting People v. Reinertson (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 320, 324-325.) A condition is sufficiently precise if its terms have a “plain commonsense meaning, which is well settled....” (People v. Rodriquez (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 389, 398 (hereafter Rodriquez); see also People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593, 605 [“any reasonable and practical construction” of the statutory language at issue defeats a vagueness challenge].)
b. Definition of “dangerous or deadly weapon” includes the user’s criminal intent.
The meaning of “dangerous or deadly weapon” has been the subject of much litigation. However, arguments asserting the phrase is vague have been uniformly rejected. Such arguments generally arise in the context of cases involving charges of assault with a deadly weapon. (§ 245, subd. (a)(1).) This case presents the issue in the context of a condition of juvenile probation, prior to any allegation the probationer has violated the condition. Despite the different context, no different result obtains.
We note at the outset that, absent a peculiar statutory definition, “deadly weapon” is given the same uniform meaning across statutes, and “[c]ases discussing the definition of a deadly weapon routinely rely on other cases dealing with different statutes.” (People v. Page (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1472.)
Definitions of “deadly or dangerous weapon” consistently include the harmful capability of the item and the intent of its user to inflict or threaten to inflict great bodily injury. Section 245, subdivision (a)(1) defines “deadly weapon” as an object or instrument used in a way “likely to produce great bodily injury.” Similarly, the CALCRIM instructions define a “deadly weapon” as “any object, instrument, or weapon that is inherently deadly or dangerous or one that is used in such a way that it is capable of causing and likely to cause death or great bodily injury.” (CALCRIM Nos. 875, 2503, 3130.) Furthermore, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “dangerous weapon” as “[a]n object or device that, because of the way it is used, is capable of causing serious bodily injury.” (Black’s Law Dict. (8th ed. 2004).) Black’s Law Dictionary defines “deadly weapon” as “[a]ny firearm or other device, instrument, material, or substance that, from the manner in which it is used or is intended to be used, is calculated or likely to produce death.” (Ibid.)
Case law confirms the plain meaning definition of “deadly weapon” as “ ‘any object, instrument, or weapon which is used in such a manner as to be capable of producing, and likely to produce, death or great bodily injury.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Aguilar (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1037.) This definition encompasses inherently deadly items such as dirks and blackjacks which are specifically designed as weapons and are thus “deadly weapons” as a matter of law, as well as other items that are not deadly per se but may be used in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily injury. (Id. at p. 1029.) “In determining whether an object not inherently deadly or dangerous is used as such, the trier of fact may consider the nature of the object, the manner in which it is used, and all other facts relevant to the issue. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) An object is used in a “dangerous or deadly” manner when it is capable of inflicting “great bodily injury or death,” and the offender “intended [at that moment] to use it as a weapon should the circumstances require....” (People v. Page, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 1471 [pencil was used as a deadly weapon where defendant’s accomplice threatened to stab the victim’s neck with it]; see also People v. Golde (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 101, 116-117 [motor vehicle was used as a deadly weapon where defendant drove it toward the victim and repositioned it in the victim’s direction when she tried to move out of its way].)
c. No merit to R.P.’s argument reasonable people do not know the meaning of “dangerous or deadly weapon.”
R.P. argues “the fact that legal research is even necessary” shows the condition at issue is unclear to a person of common intelligence and it is therefore unconstitutionally vague. We disagree. Legal research is not required to discern the meaning of “deadly or dangerous weapon.”
As early as 1975, the Court of Appeal reached the issue of whether the phrase “deadly weapon” has a commonsense meaning. The court concluded “If the terms ‘deadly’ and ‘weapon’ are examined in various dictionaries, a plain, commonsense definition of ‘deadly weapon’ appears: an instrument capable of being used offensively or defensively and likely to cause death or destruction.” (People v. Rodriquez, supra, 50 Cal.App.3d at p. 398.)
An examination of dictionary definitions of the terms “deadly,” “dangerous,” and “weapon” reveals a definition of “deadly or dangerous weapon” consistent with the definition in Rodriquez. By combining the definitions of these root words, we arrive at a definition of “deadly or dangerous weapon” as any instrument designed or used for inflicting bodily harm, fatal injury, or serious damage. (DK Oxford Illustrated American Dict. (2003) p. 212; American Heritage College Dict. (4th ed. 2002) p. 359; Random House Webster’s College Dict. (2d ed. 2001) p. 1384; New Oxford American Dict. (2001) pp. 431, 1910.) The close parallel between the Rodriquez definition and the contemporary definition indicates the meaning of “dangerous or deadly weapon” is well established and therefore sufficiently clear to reasonable people.
“Dangerous” is defined as “able or likely to cause harm or injury” (New Oxford American Dictionary (2001) p. 431).
Thus, we reject R.P.’s assertion the terms are vague.
d. No merit to R.P.’s argument the probation condition at issue cannot stand because peace officers may enforce the condition as a strict liability offense.
R.P. contends the probation condition creates “an inherent danger that law enforcement officers may construe the term instead as a strict liability prohibition” and punish “completely innocent” conduct.
A similar argument was raised in People v. Rubalcava (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322 (Rubalcava), in which the appellant contended section 12020 was unconstitutional because it did not explicitly make defendant’s intended use of the object an element of the crime. (Rubalcava, supra, at p. 331.) Rubalcava acknowledged, “As written, section 12020... may criminalize seemingly innocent conduct. Consequently, the statute may invite arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement not due to any vagueness in the statutory language but due to the wide range of otherwise innocent conduct it proscribes.” (Id. at p. 333.) Nonetheless, the court rejected the appellant’s constitutional challenge. (Id. at pp.333-334.)
Like the statute in Rubalcava, the probation condition at issue raises the concern it may capture some innocent conduct in the future. However, such a concern does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. (See Rubalcava, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 331 [although section 12020’s potentially broad reach may extend to “innocent” users, e.g., “ ‘[t]he tailor who places a pair of scissors in his jacket’ ” or “ ‘the carpenter who puts an awl in his pocket,’ ” “these concerns do not render the statute unconstitutional.”].) Like any other probationer, if R.P. is later charged with violating the “no-dangerous-or-deadly-weapon” probation condition, he is free to contend the item is not a deadly or dangerous weapon under the specific circumstances of the alleged violation.
Moreover, even if we accepted the argument the probation condition may be unconstitutional as applied to a different probationer, we cannot say it is unconstitutional as applied to R.P. R.P. admitted to assault with a deadly weapon (a wooden stick). The admission casts doubt on his assertion he “could be violating the probation condition unknowingly every day.” As the People correctly point out, “the term ‘dangerous or deadly weapon’ is a matter of common knowledge and everyday experience – particularly to a juvenile who was already found to have possessed one.”
In sum, the mere possibility peace officers may enforce the probation condition as a strict liability offense does not render the condition unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, we conclude “dangerous or deadly weapon” has a plain commonsense meaning sufficient to put R.P. on notice of the conduct the probation condition at issue prohibits. The only reasonable reading of the condition is that R.P. must not possess any item specifically designed as a weapon or any item not so specifically designed under circumstances reasonably reflecting his criminal intent.
Given the meaning of “dangerous or deadly weapon” is not vague, we hold a condition of juvenile probation prohibiting possession of any “dangerous or deadly weapon” passes constitutional muster. We therefore reject R.P.’s void for vagueness challenge.
DISPOSITION
The order continuing R.P. a ward of the state is affirmed.
We concur: CROSKEY, J. ALDRICH, J.
“Deadly” is defined as “causing or able to cause fatal injury or serious damage” (DK Oxford Illustrated American Dict. (2003) p. 212).
“Weapon” is defined as: “anything used against an opponent, adversary, or victim” (Random House Webster’s College Dict. (2d ed. 2001) p. 1384); “a thing designed or used for inflicting bodily harm or physical damage” (New Oxford American Dictionary (2001) p. 1910).