Opinion
F078732
11-17-2020
In re ERNESTO THOMAS RODRIGUEZ On Habeas Corpus.
Lisa A. Smittcamp, District Attorney, Traci Fritzler, Douglas A. Treisman, and Kelsey Peterson, Deputy District Attorneys, for Appellant. Eric Weaver, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Fresno Super. Ct. No. 18CRWR684439)
OPINION
APPEAL from an order granting petition for writ of habeas corpus. Arlan L. Harrell, Judge. Lisa A. Smittcamp, District Attorney, Traci Fritzler, Douglas A. Treisman, and Kelsey Peterson, Deputy District Attorneys, for Appellant. Eric Weaver, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Respondent.
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The People appeal the superior court's grant of Ernesto Thomas Rodriguez's petition for habeas corpus. The issue on appeal was resolved by our Supreme Court's decision in In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439 (Cook). We reverse the trial court's order granting Rodriguez's petition for habeas corpus and remand for further proceedings under Cook.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Rodriguez is a state prison inmate. In 2002, he was sentenced to 40 years to life in prison for second degree murder (15 years to life), with a vicarious firearm enhancement because he was a principal in a gang offense in which a firearm was used (25 years to life, consecutive). (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 12022.53, subd. (e).) The underlying offense was committed on May 31, 2001, when Rodriguez was 21 years old; he has been incarcerated ever since.
Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. --------
On August 24, 2018, Rodriguez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the superior court. He argued he was entitled to a hearing in the superior court pursuant to the California Supreme Court's opinion in People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin), for the purpose of making a record of relevant mitigating evidence related to his youth at the time he committed his crime, for consideration at a forthcoming youth offender parole hearing under section 3051.
Upon completion of relevant briefing, the superior court granted the petition and ordered that a Franklin hearing be held. The superior court's order was filed on January 4, 2019. The People subsequently filed this appeal.
DISCUSSION
The People expressly clarify that they "[do] not dispute" that Rodriguez qualifies for a youth offender parole hearing in the future, specifically in his 25th year of incarceration, pursuant to section 3051, subdivision (b)(3). Initially, the People took the position that the superior court incorrectly granted Rodriguez's petition because neither Franklin, nor section 3051, authorized any procedure for "an adult offender" to obtain a hearing in the superior court, for purposes of making a record regarding youth-related factors related to commission of the crime(s) at issue.
However, while this appeal was pending, our Supreme Court addressed the issue on appeal in Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th 439. Thereafter, the People filed a supplemental brief in which they candidly acknowledged that "the Cook decision is dispositive of all aspects of the present appeal." The People noted that Cook clarified that an offender eligible for a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051 "'may seek the remedy of a Franklin proceeding even though the offender's sentence is otherwise final.'" (Cook, supra, at p. 451.)
Rodriguez, in a supplemental brief filed in response to the People's supplemental brief, similarly acknowledged that "In re Cook controls the outcome of the appeal" and requested us to "accept [The People's] concession."
The parties are correct. Cook observed that, for youthful offenders, "the possibility that relevant evidence will be lost may increase as years go by," and further explained that "[t]his reality is no less true for offenders whose convictions are final on direct appeal." (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 450.) Cook therefore concluded that "an evidence preservation process should apply to all youthful offenders now eligible for [a youth offender] parole hearing," and clarified that "[i]n cases with final judgments, section 1203.01 gives the trial court authority to conduct an evidence preservation proceeding as envisioned in Franklin." (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 450, 452.)
Accordingly, under Cook and section 1203.01, Rodriguez is entitled to an opportunity to have an evidence preservation proceeding as envisioned in Franklin. (See Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 458-459, quoting Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284 ["consistent with Franklin and the court's inherent authority, the offender shall have the opportunity to 'place on the record any documents, evaluations, or testimony (subject to cross-examination) that may be relevant at his eventual youth offender parole hearing, and the prosecution likewise may put on the record any evidence that demonstrates the ... offender's culpability or cognitive maturity, or otherwise bears on the influence of youth-related factors'"].)
Cook describes the procedure by which a youthful offender seeking to preserve evidence following a final judgment would normally proceed: "[T]he proper avenue is to file a motion in superior court under the original caption and case number, citing the authority of section 1203.1 and today's decision. The motion should establish the inmate's entitlement to a youth offender parole hearing and indicate when such hearing is anticipated to take place, or if one or more hearings have already occurred." (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 458.) Cook noted that, in light of the availability of a "plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law" under section 1203.01, "resort to habeas corpus" for the purpose of obtaining an evidence preservation hearing was "unnecessary, at least in the first instance." (Cook, supra, at p. 452.)
While the parties both agree that Cook controls the substantive issue on appeal, they disagree as to the most prudent and efficient remedy given the procedural posture of this case, where the underlying habeas petition was filed in the superior court and various proceedings have already occurred in that court in this matter. The People urge that, in applying Cook, we should reverse the superior court's order granting Rodriguez's petition for habeas corpus, without prejudice to Rodriguez's ability to file a subsequent motion pursuant to Cook and section 1203.01. Rodriguez, on the other hand, suggests that the superior court's order was entirely consistent with Cook, whereby we should construe it "as one granting ordinary relief on a motion at law." Rodriguez states: "The order under review here thus may be equated with a grant of the motion to initiate the process pursuant to section 1203.01. It does not determine the ultimate content of the packet that Mr. Rodriguez will be authorized to submit to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation."
We recognize the posture of this case is unusual since the superior court has already ordered an evidence preservation hearing consistent with Cook, albeit on a petition for habeas corpus. We will reverse the superior court's order granting Rodriguez's petition for habeas corpus, without prejudice to Rodriguez's ability to obtain the same relief under section 1203.01 and Cook. The matter is remanded for the superior court to consider whether to construe Rodriguez's underlying petition for habeas corpus and related briefing as a motion pursuant to section 1203.01 and Cook or whether Rodriguez must file a new motion to obtain relief under these authorities.
DISPOSITION
The superior court's order granting Rodriguez's petition for habeas corpus is reversed. The matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SMITH, J. WE CONCUR: HILL, P.J. POOCHIGIAN, J.