Opinion
No. 11-93-12310 MS.
March 19, 2009
ORDER DENYING DEBORAH ROBINSON'S REQUEST TO REOPEN CASE
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the request of Deborah Robinson to reopen Evaline Robinson's bankruptcy case for the purpose of instituting additional proceedings. Deborah Robinson sent to the Court by certified mail a Letter to the Honorable Mark B. McFeeley and a document captioned Pursuant to Rule 9011-2 with Permission of the Court Motion to Open Bankruptcy Case No. 93-12-310 Pro Se Pursuant to Rule 9011-2 to be Heard Ex Parte for Garnishee and Corporation Registered Agent, Victim, Deborah Robinson, a non-party and Restraining Order on Debtor Evaline S. Robinson, Debtor, et al Pursuant to Causes of Action and Motion to Enforce May 24, 1996 SSA Decision and Motion to Enforce DOJ 504 and 504 Title II Access to Court and Motion to Enforce Article II, Sec. 11 and 1, Including the Bab's Bayan, or Hague Rome Statue [sic.] 15 so Protect Victim Deborah Robinson to Grant Relief to Garnishee Under Incorporated County of Los Alamos Magistrate Municipal Action 31-7-1; Accruing Assett [sic.] Loss and Damage of Registered Agent's Assetts [sic.] Adjudicated in this Court in 1993 and in NM State Court in 1993 vs. Assetts [sic.] Listed for Debtor Evaline S. Robinson with No Access to First Judicial District Court for Deborah Robinson to Receive Relief from this Court and Evidentiary Hearing to Set Aside Judgments and Orders and Request for a Judgment from Court. ( See Docket No. 21 and Docket No. 22). The Court will consider both documents together as a motion to reopen Evaline Robinson's bankruptcy case. Upon careful review of the documents submitted by Deborah Robinson, the Court finds that there is no relief that can be granted to Deborah Robinson by reopening this bankruptcy case. The Court will, therefore, deny Deborah Robinson's request to reopen the case.
DISCUSSION
Reopening is governed by 11 U.S.C. § 350(b), which provides:
A case may be reopened in the court in which such case was closed to administer assets, to accord relief to the debtor, or for other cause.
11 U.S.C. § 350(b).
Whether to reopen a closed bankruptcy case falls within the Court's discretion. See In re Petroleum Production Management, Inc., 282 B.R. 9, 13 (10th Cir. BAP 2002) ("Generally, a bankruptcy court's decision on a motion to reopen a closed case under 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) is reviewed for abuse of discretion.") (citations omitted); Batstone v. Emmerling (In re Emmerling), 223 B.R. 860, 864 (2nd Cir. BAP 1997) ("`the decision to reopen or not is discretionary with the court . . .'") (quoting Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 350.03[5] (1996)). The ability to request that a case be reopened is "implicitly confined to debtors, creditors, or trustees, each with a particular and direct stake in reopening cognizable under the Bankruptcy Code." Nintendo Company, Ltd. v. Patten (In re Alpex Computer Corp.), 71 F.3d 353, 356 (10th Cir. 1995).
Deborah Robinson is not the debtor. She is, rather, the Debtor Evaline Robinson's daughter. Nor is she listed as a creditor in Evaline Robinson's voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy case filed July 26, 1993. Despite her familial relationship to the Debtor, it appears to the Court that Deborah Robinson lacks standing to request that Evaline Robinson's bankruptcy case be reopened. Lack of standing is sufficient grounds to deny the motion. See Alpex, 71 F.3d at 356 (noting that "standing is a `prudential requirement.'") (quoting Travelers Ins. Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 45 F.3d 737, 741 (3rd Cir. 1995) (citation omitted)). Even if the Court were to assume that Deborah Robinson had standing to file a motion to reopen under 11 U.S.C. § 350(b), the Court finds that the request to reopen must be denied.
Evaline Robinson's bankruptcy case was dismissed on June 13, 1994. Under the majority view, a dismissed case cannot be reopened under 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) because it was not closed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 350(a) following the administration of the estate. See Armel Laminates, Inc. v. Lomas Nettleton Co. (In re Income Property Builders, Inc.), 699 F.2d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (stating that "[t]he word `reopened' used in Section 350(b) obviously relates to the word `closed' used in the same section. In our opinion a case cannot be reopened unless it has been closed. An order dismissing a bankruptcy case accomplishes a completely different result than an order closing it would and is not an order closing."). Because Evaline Robinson's case was dismissed, the case cannot be reopened under 11 U.S.C. § 350(b).
Finally, even if the Court were to take the minority approach, Deborah Robinson's request to reopen the Debtor's bankruptcy case must be denied. The documents submitted by Deborah Robinson are largely unintelligible, but appear, in part, to complain that the Debtor and Los Alamos County have taken certain actions against Deborah Robinson in 1993, 1996 and 2003, and that Evaline Robinson's bankruptcy case should be reopened so that restraining orders can be placed against those parties. It is not clear that this Court would have subject matter jurisdiction over these claims or any of the other claims asserted by Deborah Robinson in her motion. Even if subject matter jurisdiction existed, the Court is not required to reopen the case. Under these circumstances, where the underlying bankruptcy case was dismissed more than fourteen years ago, and where the relief Ms. Robinson seeks to obtain by reopening the bankruptcy case does not relate directly to a right provided under the Bankruptcy Code, it is well within the Court's discretion to deny the request to reopen.
See, e.g., In re Ross, 278 B.R. 268, 273 (Bankr.M.D.Ga. 2001) (disagreeing with Income Property Builders, and finding that because the court could reopen the case without any effect on the dismissal order, a case that is dismissed and subsequently closed may nevertheless be reopened in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 350(b)).
See, In re Janssen, 396 B.R. 624, 635 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 2008) (suggesting that "it is helpful to conceptualize a bankruptcy court's decision whether to reopen a closed bankruptcy case as the exercise of the court's more fundamental power to "permissively abstain.'").
Id. at 634-635 (stating, that "it generally is appropriate for a bankruptcy court to exercise its discretion and reopen a case to consider affording relief to a debtor who asserts a right provided under title 11 or in a prior order of the bankruptcy court []" and that among the factors that guide the exercise of the court's discretion is "the length of time that the case was closed.") (citations omitted). See also, In re Riazuddin, 363 B.R. 177, 184 (10th Cir. BAP 2007) (stating generally that "there is no abuse of discretion in the bankruptcy court's decision not to reopen a case if reopening would not afford the moving party any relief.") (citation omitted).
WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Deborah Robinson's request to reopen this bankruptcy case is DENIED.