Opinion
No. 336634
07-18-2017
In re I. A. ROBINSON, Minor.
UNPUBLISHED Kalamazoo Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 2015-000255-NA Before: SAWYER, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and BECKERING, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent mother appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating her parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions of adjudication continue to exist), (g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), and (j) (child will be harmed if returned to parent). We affirm.
The trial court assumed jurisdiction over the minor child in June 2015 after respondent made a series of Facebook posts indicating that she intended to kill herself by drinking bleach. The petition alleged that respondent had a history of unresolved mental issues, including a diagnosis of schizophrenia, and did not appear to be taking her mental health medication. This history of mental issues included a six-year hospitalization following respondent's murder of her then-boyfriend in 2006.
From June 2015 to September 2015, respondent exercised supervised parenting time. Respondent's parenting time was changed to unsupervised parenting time in September 2015 due to respondent's continued compliance with the case service plan. Respondent appeared to be taking her medication regularly and participated actively in Community Mental Health services. Shortly after the change to unsupervised parenting time, the minor child's behaviors increased, including tantrums and sexualized conduct. In December 2015, the minor child returned from an unsupervised parenting time with bruises on her cheeks and a Children's Protective Services (CPS) investigation occurred. A doctor ultimately found the bruises to be consistent with respondent placing the minor child's head between her legs while combing her hair and not consistent with physical abuse. Around the same time, respondent's psychiatrist reported that respondent was aggressive and paranoid during their sessions and believed many persons were trying to frame her, were stalking her, and were raping her. Respondent's psychiatrist doubted if respondent was taking her mental health medication as prescribed. Because of the increase in the minor child's behavior, the CPS investigation, and the psychiatrist's findings, respondent's parenting time was changed to supervised parenting time.
In February 2016, during a supervised parenting time, respondent locked the caseworkers out of her residence and refused to allow them to collect the minor child. After seven hours and police intervention, the minor child was finally returned. After arriving at her foster-care home, the minor child disclosed that respondent had touched her "pee pee." The trial court suspended respondent's parenting time, and her parenting time remained suspended through the termination hearings. Ultimately, respondent's parental rights were terminated in December 2016.
Respondent argues that the trial court violated her due process rights by failing to inquire into her competency. We disagree.
A respondent's claim that her constitutional rights to substantive or procedural due process were violated is typically reviewed de novo. In re TK, 306 Mich App 698, 703; 859 NW2d 208 (2014). Whether a bona fide doubt exists as to a defendant's competence is typically reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Harris, 185 Mich App 100, 102; 460 NW2d 239 (1990). However, because this issue was unpreserved, this Court reviews for plain error. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Defendant may obtain relief only if "(1) error . . . occurred, (2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, (3) and the plain error affected substantial rights." Id. Reversal based on plain error is only warranted where "the plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when an error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings independent of the defendant's innocence." Id. at 763-764 (quotation marks and citation removed).
Under both the Michigan Constitution and the United States Constitution, the government cannot deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 17. In accordance with this due-process right, a criminal defendant "may not be tried unless he is competent." Godinez v Moran, 509 US 389, 396; 113 S Ct 2680; 125 L Ed 2d 321 (1993); MCL 330.2022(1). Defendants are presumed to be competent. People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 284; 662 NW2d 836 (2003); MCL 330.2020(1). MCL 300.2020(1) defines competency as follows:
[A defendant] shall be determined incompetent to stand trial only if he is incapable because of his mental condition of understanding the nature and object of the proceedings against him or of assisting in his defense in a rational manner. The court shall determine the capacity of a defendant to assist in his defense by his ability to perform the tasks reasonably necessary for him to perform in the preparation of his defense and during his trial.The issue of competence may be raised by the trial court, defendant or defense counsel, or the prosecutor. MCL 330.2024. However, the trial court only has the duty of raising the issue of competence sua sponte where facts are brought to its attention that raise a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's competence. Harris, 185 Mich App at 102. In termination proceedings, this Court adopts the standards used to evaluate competency in criminal proceedings.
In the present case, respondent was diagnosed with schizophrenia, post-traumatic stress disorder, and borderline personality disorder. However, there is no indication in the record that these illnesses rendered respondent unable to understand the nature of the proceedings or unable to assist in her defense. See MCL 300.2020(1). At multiple times during the proceedings, respondent affirmatively indicated that she understood her rights and the procedures. Specifically, respondent indicated that she understood her rights at the preliminary hearing and that she understood her rights and the consequences of admitting to the petition's allegations at the pretrial hearing. On several occasions, respondent demonstrated an ability to navigate the sometimes complex bureaucracy of daycare registration, her educational institution's financial aid, preschool registration, and welfare benefits. Respondent also demonstrated an awareness of her various services and their content. On one occasion, respondent specifically interjected at the hearing to clarify the difference between her YWCA classes and parenting classes.
Respondent was also able to assist her defense. See MCL 300.2020(1). On multiple occasions, respondent requested an adjournment of the proceedings. Respondent's counsel indicated that respondent desired an adjournment at the initial preliminary hearing so that she could be physically present at the hearing. Respondent personally requested an adjournment of the termination hearing because she wanted to proceed with counsel that had represented her throughout the proceedings rather than substitute counsel. Further, the record shows that respondent wrote counsel notes—or, at times, simply interrupted questioning or testimony—to inform counsel what questions she would like to be asked during the hearings. At a motion to suspend parenting time, respondent even objected to testimony as hearsay.
At the pretrial hearing, respondent also demonstrated an understanding that her threatening behavior toward her caseworkers was inhibiting the progress of her case and her ability to exercise parenting time with the minor child. Respondent attempted to solve this issue at the pretrial hearing by directly speaking to the caseworkers at the hearing. Respondent also ensured that she would be able to continue to comply with the case service plan at the pretrial hearing by asking follow-up questions concerning the transfer of her case from Bethany Christian Services to the DHHS.
Undoubtedly, the record also reflects respondent's severe mental health issues. After being charged with first-degree murder in 2006, respondent was found guilty but mentally ill. During the termination proceedings, respondent had occasional outbursts. Respondent testified in a rambling fashion and, at times, fixated on her paranoia regarding continuing sexual assault. However, the termination proceedings occurred nine years after respondent was found guilty but mentally ill and three years after her hospitalization ended. And although respondent's testimony at the proceedings demonstrated respondent's continuing paranoia, there is no evidence suggesting that her delusions affected her ability to understand the proceedings or to assist in her defense. Accordingly, because the trial court was not presented with facts that raised a bona fide doubt as to respondent's competency, we find no error in the trial court's failure to inquire as to respondent's competency.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Jane M. Beckering