Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4526-12T4
03-17-2014
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL OF APPLICATION FOR FIREARMS PURCHASER ID CARD AND/OR HANDGUN PURCHASE PERMIT OF: PAUL ROBINSON.
Law Offices of Richard W. Hogan, attorneys for appellant (Gregory K. Byrd, on the brief). Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Acting Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Nicole D. Wallace, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, on the statement in lieu of brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Fasciale and Haas.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. 2012-052.
Law Offices of Richard W. Hogan, attorneys for appellant (Gregory K. Byrd, on the brief).
Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Acting Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Nicole D. Wallace, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, on the statement in lieu of brief). PER CURIAM
Paul Robinson appeals from a May 2, 2013 order denying his application for a Firearms Purchaser Identification Card (FPIC). The State agrees that there is insufficient evidence in the record on which to affirm the order. We remand, however, because the judge did not resolve the State's contention that Robinson deliberately filed misleading applications with the local police department to conceal his alleged mental health problems.
In 2011, Robinson applied for a FPIC with a local police department. Detective Michael Dugan reviewed the application, determined the application was incomplete, and requested that Robinson submit a second application. Robinson submitted the second application, but he left blank information regarding his prior addresses. The detective denied the application because Robinson submitted incomplete FPIC applications and had been involved in a prior domestic violence incident. Robinson appealed to the Law Division.
The judge conducted a hearing, at which Detective Dugan testified that Robinson appeared to be hiding information about where he had lived. He indicated that Robinson refused to provide more information about his prior residences once the detective requested that Robinson submit a second application. The detective suspected that Robinson had resided in a half-way home or home for people with mental health issues. The detective also testified that in September 2011, the police seized Robinson's guns as a result of a domestic violence incident in which Robinson's wife alleged that he harassed her after drinking alcohol excessively. According to records from the Township of Neptune, after the incident, Robinson was charged with obstruction of justice and resisting arrest and pled guilty to violating a non-criminal municipal ordinance.
The record is unclear whether the wife filed for and obtained a restraining order against Robinson.
The judge denied Robinson's application, relying on N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3c(5), which states that a FPIC should be denied "[t]o any person where the issuance would not be in the interest of the public health, safety or welfare." The judge stated that "the interaction with the police that we discussed here today happened only on September 29, 2011, I find that particularly relevant."
On appeal, Robinson argues that a violation of a non-criminal municipal ordinance is insufficient to deny his application. It is uncontested that the judge did not adequately explain his basis for denying the application under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3c(5). We do not reverse outright, however, because we are concerned with the remaining unresolved allegations regarding Robinson's incomplete applications and suspected mental health issues. The judge made no findings about these contentions. As a result, we are unable to determine whether the judge erred by relying on N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3c(5) to deny Robinson's FPIC application.
The standards for reviewing an application for a FPIC are well-settled. A municipal police chief has the discretion, "subject to standards which have been adjudged constitutionally adequate," to grant or deny an individual's application for a handgun permit or identification card. Weston v. State, 60 N.J. 36, 43 (1972); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3d. "'The function of the Police Chief as the local administrative official charged with responsibility for the original decision to grant or withhold . . . involves largely the exercise of an informal discretion,' based upon the information disclosed by a 'good faith investigation.'" In re Application of Boyadjian, 362 N.J. Super. 463, 475 (App. Div.) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 250 (2003).
When reviewing an application, a police chief must consider the interests of the community and must not make a decision that is "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable." Boyadjian, supra, 362 N.J. Super. at 478. After completing the investigation, if the police chief decides to deny the application, there is "no obligation to hold a trial-type hearing before doing so." Weston, supra, 60 N.J. at 43. If the chief decides, however, to deny the application, the applicant should be given "an opportunity . . . to discuss the matter . . . to be informed of the reasons for the denial and to offer any pertinent explanation or information for the purpose of meeting the objections being raised." Id. at 43-44.
The chief's decision to deny an application is subject to de novo review by the Law Division, which "in this context contemplates introduction of relevant and material testimony and the application of an independent judgment to the testimony by the reviewing court." Id. at 45. The police chief bears the burden of establishing the existence of good cause for the denial by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 46. In evaluating the facts and the reasons given for rejection, "the court should give appropriate consideration to the Chief's investigative experience and to any expertise he appears to have developed in administering the statute." Ibid.
Upon review of the Law Division's decision, "[a]n appellate court should accept a trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial credible evidence." In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 116-17 (1997). Where the evidence is mostly testimonial and involves questions of credibility, deference to a trial court's findings of fact is particularly appropriate. Id. at 117. We will not, therefore, disturb a trial court's findings of fact unless those findings would result in an injustice. Ibid. (citing Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974)).
It is also well-settled that a trial judge "shall, by an opinion or memorandum decision, either written or oral, find the facts and state [his or her] conclusions of law thereon in all actions tried without a jury . . . ." R. 1:7-4(a). "The rule requires specific findings of fact and conclusions of law . . . ." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 1 on R. 1:7-4 (2014). The Supreme Court has expounded on this essential obligation:
Failure to perform that duty constitutes a disservice to the litigants, the attorneys and the appellate court. Naked conclusions do not satisfy the purpose of [Rule] 1:7-4. Rather, the trial court must state clearly its factual findings and correlate them with the relevant legal conclusions.
[Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 569-70 (1980) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).]
Here, the judge's finding regarding "the interaction with the police that we discussed here today" was inadequate. The detective testified about several interactions with the police and we are unable to discern on this record what the judge meant by "discussed here today." Moreover, the judge made no findings regarding the State's allegations that Robinson (1) deliberately misled the detective by filling out incomplete applications, and (2) may have had a history of mental illness. We therefore remand, direct the judge to make the requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law, and adjudicate the merits of Robinson's appeal. We do not retain jurisdiction.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION