Opinion
05-21-00342-CV
03-29-2022
IN RE BRYAN MARK RIGG, Relator
Original Proceeding from the 301st Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DF-15-11173
Before Justices Myers, Partida-Kipness, and Carlyle
MEMORANDUM OPINION
ROBBIE PARTIDA-KIPNESS JUSTICE
In this original proceeding, relator Bryan Mark Rigg (Father) seeks mandamus relief from an order finding him in contempt for violating a 2017 order modifying the parent-child relationship, issuing a related injunction, and awarding attorney's fees to real party in interest Stephanie Dawn Rigg (Mother). We conclude the trial court abused its discretion, and Father does not have an adequate remedy by appeal. Thus, we conditionally grant the writ of mandamus. 1
BACKGROUND
A. Underlying Proceeding
Father and Mother divorced in 2016. At the time of the underlying proceedings in early 2021, Father and Mother's three children were 20, 17, and 13 years old. This original proceeding arises from the trial court's March 31, 2021 Order of Enforcement by Contempt (1) finding Father violated the underlying 2017 Agreed Order Modifying the Parent-Child Relationship, (2) entering a mutual injunction against both Mother and Father, and (3) awarding Mother $15,000 in attorney's fees.
According to Mother's testimony, the Middle Child turned 18 in February 2021.
1. The underlying 2017 Agreed Order Modifying the Parent-Child Relationship
Following Mother and Father's divorce in 2016, the trial court signed an Agreed Order Modifying the Parent-Child Relationship on May 17, 2017 (2017 Order). Among other things, the 2017 Order provided: (1) each parent had "the right to receive information from any other conservator of the children concerning the health, education, and welfare of the children"; (2) Father had "the right, subject to the agreement of the other parent conservator, to make decisions concerning the children's education"; and (3) each parent had "the duty to inform the other conservator of the children in a timely manner of significant information concerning the health, education, and welfare of the children." 2
The 2017 Order further required a parent intending to have a child travel outside the United States to provide written notice to the other parent at least twenty-one days before departure of the child's date, time, and location of departure; a reasonable description of means of transportation and each destination of intended travel; the child's scheduled arrival and departure dates; the date, time, and location of the child's return to the United States; a complete statement of each portion of the intended travel during which the child would be unaccompanied by the parent; and the name, mailing address, and phone number of each non-parent accompanying the child.
2. Mother's suit for contempt
On July 24, 2019, Mother filed a Motion for Enforcement by Contempt asking Respondent to hold Father in contempt for failing to obtain Mother's agreement before making educational decisions for the Middle Child, failing to inform her of educational decisions regarding the Middle Child, failing to provide her with information before traveling internationally with the Middle Child, and generally interfering with her conservatorship rights.
On September 25, 2020, Mother amended her motion; all references are to the amended motion.
3. Testimony at the hearing on January 5, 2021
Mother testified at the hearing on her motion that Middle Child attended boarding school at Exeter Academy in New Hampshire the previous year. During the summer of 2020, Exeter communicated a plan for online learning and a staged 3 return to campus. On August 19, 2020, Mother received an e-mail from Father saying he had found a school in Iceland for Middle Child, and Father and Middle Child would be leaving "in a couple of days." Mother testified that, under the 2017 Order, both she and Father had the right to receive information about where the children were attending school, but she was not included in the decision-making process of finding a school for Middle Child in Iceland. Mother testified she requested information about the school in Iceland on several occasions but did not receive any details. Middle Child told Mother he might be going to Iceland or Germany, but Mother testified she did not have "any input at all" in the decision to send Middle Child to Iceland or Germany.
Mother testified she received an "email about Iceland" from Father on August 19, 2020, stating that classes started August 30th. She claimed this was "the one piece of information [she] had regarding the start date of classes." On August 22, 2020, Mother received a message from Middle Child saying he was in Boston on an intermediate stop on the way to Iceland. Mother asked Middle Child about the "status with Exeter" and how long he was staying in Iceland. Middle Child responded that Exeter was going to approve his leave of absence, and Iceland was "in flux."
On August 31, 2020, Father e-mailed Mother and told her it was taking much longer to get Middle Child situated than he thought. Mother asked Father if he was going to be in Dallas for his scheduled time with Youngest Child beginning on 4 September 3, 2020, because she had no information about when Father would return. On September 3, 2020, Father e-mailed Mother seeking a copy of Middle Child's birth certificate. Mother responded that she did not have "information regarding this program" and had not received international travel details as specified in the 2017 Order. Father said he had given everything to his lawyers, who had shared it with Mother's lawyers, and he did not have to give Mother anything else. At that time, however, Mother did not have Middle Child's international travel details or "information regarding the program" from any source.
On September 8, 2020, Father informed Mother in an e-mail that Middle Child was enrolled in school in Germany. Mother testified that, before receiving this email, she was not aware that Germany was an option, she did not agree to Middle Child being enrolled at school in Germany, and Father did not inform her or ask for her agreement when he applied to the school in Germany. Nevertheless, Mother testified, she did not demand that Middle Child come home immediately because he "sounded positive," and she thought that attending school in Germany might be "the best thing for him." Because it was September, she felt that Middle Child "needed to get started with school somewhere."
Mother testified there were other times that Father failed to inform her of "significant information about [her] kids." She cited one example in which Middle Child dislocated his shoulder in a football game at Exeter. She alleged the school did not tell her what happened, and she "was informed after the fact." She also 5 alleged that Middle Child spent "four or five weeks" in Germany the previous summer, but she had no contact information and was not informed about flight arrangements, travel plans, or Middle Child's residence.
On cross-examination, Mother testified that Middle Child stayed with Father almost exclusively after returning from Exeter at spring break for remote learning, and Middle Child stayed with Mother only one night. The 2017 Order required Mother to pay half of Middle Child's tuition if she agreed to Middle Child's attendance at a private school. Mother paid approximately $15,000 a year towards tuition at Middle Child's prior private school. Since Middle Child moved to Exeter, however, Mother paid no tuition. Mother did not object in writing to Middle Child attending Exeter or being educated in Iceland or Germany. Mother also conceded it was "possible that [she] could think that school in Germany is a good idea" but, "because of the terms of [her] decree," she could not agree to it because she could not afford to pay for it. She specifically testified, "[I]f I agree to attendance at a private school, I would pay 50 percent of that school tuition." Thus, she "never agreed in writing" to the decision to send Middle Child to Exeter but acquiesced to the decision because "[i]f Exeter were possible, it would only be possible if [Father] paid for it." She also testified that she had not visited Exeter. Although Mother knew in early September 2020 that Middle Child was going to school in Germany, she had not spoken with anybody from the school at the time of her testimony in January 2021. 6
Father, on the other hand, testified that, after the 2017 Order, he researched schools for Middle Child including "St. Paul, . . . Deerfield, . . . Phillips Exeter Academy, . . . Phillips Andover Academy, . . . [and] Kent School." Mother knew Father was looking at several options, and when Exeter was chosen, she did not lodge any objection to that decision. And, since Middle Child has been attending Exeter, Mother has never objected to that decision. Father also testified that Mother "hasn't even contacted Exeter and the teachers and the administration."
During the summer of 2020, Father learned that because of COVID concerns, Exeter might not return to in-person learning in the fall. Father became concerned that Middle Child might need to change schools because Exeter's teaching model relied heavily on in-person instruction. After some discussions with individuals at or involved with Exeter, Father told Mother in mid-July that he was going to investigate some programs in Europe. Mother did not object to overseas options. In August, things began to move very quickly, and Father received special permission to be a guest lecturer in Germany and Iceland, and he worked to get Middle Child admitted into programs so that they could obtain permission to travel to both Iceland and Germany to further investigate the programs.
Father explained that, once he was permitted to enter Iceland, he obtained standby tickets within forty-eight hours. According to Father, he could not obtain flight information because he and Middle Child were flying standby. Once they were in Iceland, "experience[d]" the schools, and determined acceptance requirements, 7 they compared the Icelandic program with a program at a "very elite, wonderful prep school in Germany" and decided the German school would provide a better opportunity for Middle Child. Because they had already quarantined and qualified to travel into Europe, they flew into Copenhagen and on to Germany to investigate the German school: LouisenLund Stiftung. As soon as Father had a "concrete program in place," he e-mailed Mother. Mother did not object and, because Mother is "not shy about voicing something when she's dissatisfied," he took her silence to be agreement. Father felt that, based on his experience with Mother regarding educational decisions, he was providing information in a timely and reasonable manner because the decision was "evolving real time."
4. Trial Court's Order of Contempt
On March 31, 2021, the trial court signed an order of enforcement by contempt. The order found that Father was guilty of six separate violations of the 2017 Order:
(1) failing to obtain Mother's agreement before making decisions concerning Middle Child's education in Iceland;
(2) failing to obtain Mother's agreement before making decisions concerning Middle Child's education in Germany;
(3) failing to inform Mother in a timely manner of significant information concerning Middle Child's education and welfare in Iceland;
(4) failing to inform Mother in a timely manner of significant information concerning Middle Child's education and welfare in Germany;
(5) failing to provide Mother information concerning Middle Child's travel outside the United States; and
(6) interfering with Mother's rights of conservatorship generally.8
The trial court found Father in contempt for each of these violations and awarded Mother $15,000 in attorney's fees. The trial court also concluded that a permanent injunction was "appropriate relief" because of the "conduct of the parties." Thus, the trial court permanently enjoined both Mother and Father from (1) making disparaging remarks regarding the other parent to the children or within their hearing and (2) discussing this litigation or the facts surrounding the breakup of the marriage with the children or in their presence or within their hearing. This original proceeding followed.
B. Mandamus Proceeding
Father complains in his mandamus petition that the trial court abused its discretion in finding him in contempt because the provisions in the 2017 Order forming the basis of four of the violations were not specific enough to support a finding of contempt; it was impossible to comply with the provisions regarding notice of travel plans that form the basis of the fifth violation; and the sixth violation was no more than a generalized statement of the first four violations. Father also contends the injunction infringes on his freedom of speech without any evidence that such an injunction was requested or necessary. Finally, Father argues that the award of attorney's fees to Mother was unwarranted because he should not have been found in contempt, and the evidence was insufficient to support the amount awarded. Father asks us to grant mandamus relief and order the trial court to vacate the March 31, 2021 order of enforcement by contempt in its entirety. 9
ANALYSIS
Contempt orders are not appealable and are reviewable only by a petition for writ of mandamus or habeas corpus. In re Janson, 614 S.W.3d 724, 727 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding). If, as here, the contemnor is not jailed, the proper vehicle to challenge the contempt order is a petition for writ of mandamus. Id. To obtain mandamus relief, the contemnor must show the trial court abused its discretion. Id.
To be enforceable by contempt, a judgment must set out the terms for compliance in clear and unambiguous terms. Ex parte Brister, 801 S.W.2d 833, 834 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding); In re Martin, 523 S.W.3d 165, 169-70 (Tex. App.- Dallas 2017, orig. proceeding). The order must unequivocally command the duty or obligation that the person charged with contempt is accused of violating. Ex parte Padron, 565 S.W.2d 921, 921 (Tex. 1978) (orig. proceeding). The order must be sufficiently specific so that the person charged with obeying the order will readily know exactly what duties and obligations the order imposes. Ex parte Chambers, 898 S.W.2d 257, 259-60 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding). If the court's order requires inferences or conclusions about whether particular conduct is encompassed by the order and concerning which reasonable persons might differ, the order is insufficient to support a judgment of contempt. Id. at 260; see also Roosth v. Roosth, 889 S.W.2d 445, 452 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (father's visitation subject to agreement of mother not enforceable by contempt). A contempt order 10 must also be set aside if the underlying judgment enforces the instructions of a party, rather than the court's specific requirements. Ex parte Brister, 801 S.W.2d at 834- 35 (holding any contempt order rendered by a court must enforce the specific requirements of the court not the "cryptic instructions of a party given with the court's permission but without the certainty of detailed provisions of a decree").
A. Purported Violations
Here, the 2017 Order provided that (1) each parent had "the right to receive information from any other conservator of the children concerning the health, education, and welfare of the children"; (2) each parent had "the duty to inform the other conservator of the children in a timely manner of significant information concerning the health, education, and welfare of the children"; and (3) Father had "the right, subject to the agreement of the other parent conservator, to make decisions concerning the children's education." The order also required each parent to provide certain information to the other parent before traveling internationally with a child and set forth each parent's right of conservatorship. These provisions underpin the trial court's finding of contempt.
1. Timeliness
The first two provisions are concomitant and impose a duty on the parties to "timely" provide certain information. A similar duty was at issue in Ex parte Carpenter, 566 S.W.2d 123, 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, orig. proceeding). There, the order required relator to "timely pay" for medical charges 11 that exceeded the child's insurance coverage. Id. When relator failed to pay, the child's mother filed a motion to enforce by contempt. Id. The trial court found relator in contempt. Id. The court of appeals, however, determined that "[t]he word 'timely' is imprecise and subjective; it does not readily inform the person of the duty imposed upon him." Id. Thus, the court concluded the order was unenforceable and could not support a contempt judgment. Id. (citing Ex parte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1967)); see also Hollingsworth v. Hollingsworth, 274 S.W.3d 811, 818 (Tex. App.- Dallas 2008, no pet.) (citing Carpenter in affirming trial court's clarification decree addressing ambiguity created by use of "timely" in the original decree).
The court in In re Campbell also determined that "timely" was too ambiguous to support enforcement by contempt. In re Campbell, No. 01-17-00251-CV, 2017 WL 3598251, at *5 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 22, 2017, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). There, the decree provision required relator to "assist and encourage the children in returning the [nonpossessory parent's missed] call in a timely manner." Id. On appeal from the trial court's contempt order, the court of appeals concluded "'[t]imely' is an inherently ambiguous term when it is unqualified." Id. at *6. Accordingly, the "timeliness requirement" was too ambiguous to support enforcement by contempt. Id.
Finally, the court in In re Honermann-Garinger found a contempt order unenforceable on a provision identical to the one at issue here. In re Honermann-Garinger, No. 02-10-00361-CV, 2010 WL 4644464, at *3 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 12 Nov. 17, 2010, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). The provision imposed on the parents "the duty to inform the other parent in a timely manner of significant information concerning the health, education, and welfare of the child." Id. On appeal from the trial court's contempt order arising from relator's failure to notify the other parent that she had been taking the child to therapy, the court of appeals concluded that "timely" is too ambiguous to support a contempt order. Id. The court further concluded that the provision did not require either parent "to notify the other of a doctor's appointment" or "impose any time parameter" for providing information. Id. Furthermore, the provision "does not set forth what information is to be provided[-]only 'significant information.'" Id.
The "timeliness" provision at issue here employs the same use of the word "timely" as was found too ambiguous to support a contempt finding in Carpenter, Campbell, and Honermann-Garinger. Additionally, as pointed out in Honermann-Garinger, the provision does not specify what information is required. Accordingly, it cannot support a contempt finding that Father failed to provide information concerning Middle Child's education to Mother.
2. Agreement
The third provision states that Father's right to make educational decisions was "subject to the agreement of the other parent conservator." A similar provision was at issue in In re Martin, 523 S.W.3d at 168-70. The provision at issue in Martin granted grandparents "no less than 35 hours of unsupervised visitation per month 13 with the children to be scheduled subject to the discretion and agreement of all parties." Id. at 168. We found that the provision did not "set out when such visitation must occur" but merely "allows for visitation only upon agreement of the parties." Id. at 170. Consequently, we concluded the provision was not enforceable by contempt. Id.; see also Roosth, 889 S.W.2d at 452 (father's visitation subject to agreement of mother not enforceable by contempt).
Like the vague provision in Martin, the provision here does not specify how the agreement was to be given. See In re Martin, 523 S.W.3d at 170; see also Ex parte Rosser, 899 S.W.2d 382, 387 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, orig. proceeding) (visitation order requiring relator to "assure" that certain counseling sessions were attended was unenforceable by contempt because it did not specify how assurance was to be given). Because the provision here is dependent on the parties' agreement and fails to specify how any such agreement is to be given, it is unenforceable by contempt.
3. International Travel
The trial court also found Father in contempt for failing to provide information required under the 2017 Order for international travel with a child. The 2017 Order required such information to be provided to the other parent at least twenty-one days before travel. Father contends that the rapidly evolving situation regarding Middle Child's schooling and COVID restrictions meant that the travel decisions in question 14 were being made within hours of the scheduled departure to Iceland. Thus, he was unable to strictly comply with the 2017 Order.
A criminal contempt conviction for disobedience of a court order requires "proof beyond a reasonable doubt of: (1) a reasonably specific order; (2) a violation of the order; and (3) the willful intent to violate the order." In re Luther, 620 S.W.3d 715, 721 (Tex. 2021) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Ex parte Chambers, 898 S.W.2d at 259). We may infer the contemnor's noncompliance is willful if he or she fails to comply with an unambiguous order of which he or she has notice. In re Washington, No 05-19-00778-CV, 2019 WL 4784762, at *2 (Tex. App.-Dallas Oct. 1, 2019, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (citing Ex parte Chambers, 898 S.W.2d at 261). The contemnor may raise a defense that noncompliance was involuntary. Id. The contemnor has the burden to show his or her inability to comply. Id.
The record reflects that a need, or compelling desire, to find a new school for Middle Child arose over the summer of 2020 when Exeter announced it would be conducting distance learning in the upcoming year. Father testified that Middle Child had struggled with distance learning when Exeter sent the children home after spring break in 2020. There was also evidence that the parties had discussed the need to find a school in which Middle Child could receive in-person instruction. Father testified to the various actions he and Middle Child took to find candidate schools abroad and secure travel arrangements. Mother did not object to this evidence but only testified that she did not receive the information required by the 2017 Order. 15 Based on the evidence presented, however, it is apparent that strict compliance with the 2017 Order's international travel provision was impossible due to the rapidly changing travel requirements and the need to locate acceptable candidate schools. There is no evidence that Father willfully failed to comply with the 2017 Order. See In re Luther, 620 S.W.3d at 721. And the trial court's order contains no indication that the trial court found Father had willfully disregarded the 2017 Order. Rather, it appears from the contempt order's language that the trial court incorrectly imposed a strict liability standard to Father's failure to comply with the international travel provision. See Ex parte Chambers, 898 S.W.2d at 261 ("[O]ne's noncompliance cannot have been willful if the failure to comply was involuntary."). Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in finding Father in contempt for willfully violating the international travel provision.
4. Interference With Rights of Conservatorship
The trial court also found Father in contempt for generally interfering with Mother's conservatorship rights. Specifically, the contempt order indicates that Father interfered with Mother's:
. "right to receive information . . . concerning [Middle Child's] education" and "right to confer with [Father] before making a decision concerning the education and welfare of [Middle Child] by failing to respond to reasonable requests for information concerning the Iceland and Germany programs";
. "right of access to [Middle Child's] educational records" and "right to consult with school officials . . . by refusing to provide name and contact information for the Iceland program" and "failing to confirm [Mother] . . . is listed as [Middle Child's] parent and emergency contact16
entitled to receive all information and communications about [Middle Child] from the Germany program";
. "right to attend [Middle Child's] school activities by failing to inform [Mother] of the Iceland program more than 4 days in advance of [Middle Child's] departure, by failing to inform her of the Germany program before [Middle Child's] arrival in Germany, by failing to inform her of any information sessions or orientations for either program, and failing to provide the name and address for the program in Iceland"; and
. "right to be designated on [Middle Child's] records as a person to be notified in case of an emergency, by failing to provide proof, upon request, that she has been so designated . . ., and by failing to provide [Mother] the name and contact information for the Iceland program"
Father contends these findings are duplicative of the trial court's prior findings. With respect to the right to confer, to receive education information, and to attend school activities, Father is correct. The remaining findings concern other conservatorship rights. All of the listed violations, however, arise from Father's purported failure to "timely" provide "significant information concerning [Middle Child's] . . . education." As previously discussed, this provision is not enforceable by contempt. See Ex parte Chambers, 898 S.W.2d at 259 (order must be sufficiently specific to be enforceable by contempt). Accordingly, these additional violations cannot support a contempt order.
B. Injunction
Father contends the trial court abused its discretion in issuing an injunction because there was no evidence to support the injunction. "Gag orders in civil judicial proceedings are valid only when an imminent and irreparable harm to the judicial 17 process will deprive litigants of a just resolution of their dispute, and the judicial action represents the least restrictive means to prevent that harm." Grigsby v. Coker, 904 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding) (citing Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding)). "Such order must be supported by evidence and specific findings." Id.
The trial court's enforcement order here enjoined the parties from "[m]aking disparaging remarks regarding the other parent to the children or within their hearing" and "[d]iscussing this litigation or the facts surrounding the breakup of the marriage with the children or in their presence or within their hearing." According to the order, the trial court issued its injunction "because of the conduct of the parties." Mother contends the injunction was proper, summarily asserting that "[a]mple evidence" supports the injunction and that Father's petition here further "demonstrates exactly why the trial court's injunction was necessary and justified." Both parties cite Grigsby to support their respective arguments.
Grigsby involved a child custody modification proceeding in which the trial court enjoined the father and mother from
communicating with any person about the other party in a derogatory manner either in person or by and through their attorneys using such terms as pedophile or other derogatory or defamatory words except when discussing the case with the counsellors or experts.Grigsby, 904 S.W.2d at 620. The mother in Grigsby sought mandamus to vacate the order, asserting that it violated state and federal free speech rights. Id. The supreme court noted testimony in which father alleged that mother and her counsel had 18 referred to father as a pedophile and requested a mutual injunction. Id. In finding the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the injunction, the supreme court noted:
The faults in this gag order are likely a function of the procedure, or lack of procedure, used in adopting it: no formal motion, no prior notice, and no formal hearing or evidence. There is no indication that exigent circumstances warranted an abbreviation in procedures authorized . . . .Id. at 621.
The circumstances here mirror those deemed insufficient in Grigsby. Neither party moved for an injunction. Although the record reflects text messages exchanged between the parties containing disparaging remarks, and both parties testified regarding these messages, there is no evidence that the parties committed the acts the trial court enjoined (namely, making any prohibited remarks in the presence of the children or within their hearing). There is also no evidence of any exigent circumstances to warrant the trial court's abbreviated procedure in issuing its injunction. See id. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the mutual injunction.
C. Attorney's Fees
In addition to finding Father in contempt, the trial court ordered him to pay Mother's attorney's fees and costs, totaling $15,000. Father contends the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees because the award was not permitted by any statute. The trial court's enforcement order does not cite any authority for its fee award. 19
Father notes that section 157.167 of the family code requires a fee award in an action to enforce an order for child support or possession or access. Tex. Fam. Code § 157.167(a), (b). This provision does not apply, however, to Mother's motion to enforce rights and duties of conservatorship. Mother acknowledges as much in her response to Father's petition, noting that section 157.167 fees are "not mandatory in this case," but contending that she "was entitled to recover her attorney's fees and costs at the discretion of the trial court under Tex. Fam. Code § 106.002." Section 106.002 permits a court to "render judgment for reasonable attorney's fees and expenses" in suits under title 5 of the family code. Id. § 106.002(a). Mother's enforcement action qualifies as a "suit" under title 5. See id. § 101.031 (defining a "suit" as "a legal action under this title"); id. § 157.001-.009 (providing a mechanism for enforcing temporary or final orders). However, section 106.002 does not permit fees before a judgment. Id. § 106.002(a) (a "court may render judgment for reasonable attorney's fees and expenses"); see also In re T.M.F., No. 09-10-00019-CV, 2010 WL 974577, at *3 (Tex. App.-Beaumont Mar. 18, 2010, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (granting mandamus relief from interim fee award). No judgment has been issued here.
The only other statute that would permit interim fees in this situation is section 105.001, which permits a fee award "for the safety and welfare of the child." Tex. Fam. Code § 105.001(a)(5). The record does not reflect that Mother sought fees under this provision or offered evidence to support such an award. Accordingly, 20 because there is no statutory basis for the trial court's fee award, the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to Mother.
CONCLUSION
The provisions of the 2017 Order on which the trial court's contempt order relies are too ambiguous to support enforcement by contempt. Additionally, there is no evidence to support the trial court's injunction and there is no statutory basis for the trial court's fee award. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by finding Father in contempt, issuing the injunction, and awarding attorney's fees to Mother. We conditionally grant a writ of mandamus and order the trial court to immediately set aside its March 31, 2021 Order of Enforcement by Contempt. The writ will issue only if the trial court fails to comply. 21