Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. JV32171
Duffy, J.
Rico T., a minor, appeals an order of the juvenile court requiring him to pay restitution to the victim of his admitted crimes, felony assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1), and misdemeanor petty theft in violation of Penal Code section 484/488. He challenges the award to the extent it directed restitution in the amount of $2,520 for the victim’s lost income. This amount related to two weeks of missed work some five months after the assault but the victim claimed this loss to be on account of injuries flowing from it. The minor contends that this aspect of the restitution award is unjustified as speculative and unrelated to the victim’s losses incurred as a direct result of the crimes. We reject these claims and affirm the order.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Facts of the Crimes
On the evening of January 20, 2008, Yellow Taxi Cab driver Osman Egal received a call from an unidentified male, later identified as Rico T., who requested that Egal pick up a young woman at a specific location in San Jose and drop her off in East San Jose. Egal picked up the woman but she did not know the specific address of her destination so as he approached East San Jose, Egal called the phone number of the male who had ordered the taxi to get the address.
Before a name change, Egal was formerly known as Abdinasir Adam and some portions of the record reflect this name. We will refer to him as by Osman Egal.
At the designated address, the woman got out of the car without giving Egal any money for the fare, which totaled $34. As the woman exited the taxi, Rico T. and another young male, Sollah G., approached the driver side door and opened it. They demanded Egal’s wallet. As he attempted to get it, they began hitting him, repeatedly, in the face, head, and upper body. Egal lost consciousness. Because of that, his cab rolled a bit, hitting a low fence bordering a nearby property. After about 40 minutes, Egal came to, only to realize that he was missing $50. Egal called the police but because of delay in response, he drove his taxi to Valley Medical Center to obtain treatment for his injuries. He remained at the hospital until the next morning. Doctors performed various tests to ascertain the extent of his injuries and confirmed that he had a broken nose. He also suffered scratches, bumps, and bruises around his head and face. He was prescribed pain medication. Egal, who leased his cab on a weekly basis, left the cab at the hospital and took a cab home.
II. Rico T.’s Arrest
By July 2008, six months after the incident, police had identified Rico T. as a suspect because the phone number from which he had ordered the taxi was connected to his address. He was taken into custody and Egal identified him from a line-up. After being read his Miranda rights, Rico T. admitted having called the taxi without any money to pay the fare. He blamed his friend for hitting Egal and for stealing his money, which he admitted he and his friend had ultimately split.
III. Procedural Background
At the time of his arrest for the crimes, Rico T. was on juvenile probation with a warrant out for his arrest for violating probation. He had previously been declared a ward of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 in December 2006 after admitting charges of petty theft in violation of Penal Code sections 484/488 and battery in violation of Penal Code sections 242/243, subdivision (a). His wardship was extended in December 2007 after he admitted having violated probation (failed drug tests) and he admitted having committed two misdemeanor offenses in Merced County—vehicle theft in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) and receipt of stolen property in violation of Penal Code section 496, subdivision (a).
In July 2008, Rico T. was charged by petition in the instant case with second degree robbery in violation of Penal Code sections 211/212.5, subdivision (c) (count 1). The petition was later amended to add one count of assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1) (count 2) and one count of petty theft in violation of Penal Code sections 484/488, a misdemeanor (count 3). On July 28, 2008, Rico T. admitted counts 2 and 3 and count 1 was dismissed under a negotiated disposition. The court extended the wardship and placed him in juvenile hall for 120 days. The court also ordered Rico T. and his mother to pay victim restitution in an amount to be determined.
IV. Specific Facts Concerning Restitution
Probation reported in July 2008 that Egal, the victim, had not submitted the “victim packet that was sent to him” in November 2007. He had initially reported to probation that he had had to seek medical attention at a hospital and that his medical bills totaled between $8,000 and $9,000, but that he had no insurance so the “State paid” the bills. He had also claimed that he had missed two weeks of work immediately after the incident. After that, he still suffered from “severe headaches from time to time and ha[d] to work shorter shifts.” Egal did not know what amount of restitution he would be claiming but he informed probation that he would later provide a specific amount. In November 2008, Egal claimed by letter that his unspecified losses for medical expenses and lost income were “at least fifty thousand dollars.”
A contested restitution hearing took place on July 17, 2009. Two months before that, Egal provided probation with a letter and a spread sheet he had prepared concerning his lost income and medical expenses. At that time, Egal reported that the injuries he suffered as a result of the attack “left him with daily discomfort in his nasal passages, including constant sneezing and blockage.” He was still planning to consult a surgeon for his nasal injuries as he believed his broken nose had not healed correctly. Egal said that as a result of the assault, he continued to experience dizziness while driving and he was fearful of certain situations and locations such that he would refuse fares, lessening his income. As relayed by probation, Egal then requested restitution for his income losses and expenses in the total amount of $39,179.
Egal testified about his losses at the July 2009 restitution hearing. He explained that for about a week after the attack, he could not work at all due to his injuries—swollen eyes, headache, and neck pain—affecting his ability to drive. And he worked only part time in the next few weeks, resuming his full time cab driving only after about a month. But he still suffered from headaches, dizziness, and allergy type symptoms that he had not experienced before the assault and he sought medical attention twice from January 28, 2008 until June 1, 2008. These symptoms continued, making it difficult for Egal to drive his cab for the 10-12 hours a day he was used to doing seven days per week.
In June 2008, some five months after the assault, Egal did not work for two weeks as he did not feel well from the persistent headaches, dizziness, nose bleeds, and allergy-like symptoms for which he had seen a doctor but was taking only over-the-counter medication. After that two-week period, he again drove his cab full time, 10-12 hours per day, through mid-November, when, still feeling unwell and overworked, he went to see his family and rest in Somalia, returning in April 2009. He saw a doctor twice while in Somalia and took painkillers for lingering back pain that he attributed to the assault. After his return to the United States, he started working again in May 2009 but did not go full time until that June.
At the hearing, Egal appeared to claim $4,485.50 in medical expenses (which were not contested); $1,440 for lost income in the week after the attack; $900 additional reduced income for two weeks in February 2008 when was only able to work part-time; $2,520 in lost income for the two weeks in June 2008 when he did not work; $29,880 in lost income for six months beginning mid-November 2008; and $110 for transportation costs.
All lost income was net, after deductions for gas and leasing the cab.
V. The Court’s Order
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ordered victim restitution in the amount of $9,425.50. This was composed of $4,485.50 in medical expenses; $1,440 for lost wages in the first week after the attack; $900 in reduced income in the two weeks after that; $2,520 for lost income for two weeks in June 2008; and $80 in transportation costs. With regard to the $2,520 for the two-week period in June 2008, the court said, “[a]lthough it’s getting close to the edge of comfortable for me[,] there is evidence that [Egal] had a broken nose as a result of this incident. And there was a problem with his nose and because of the time period[,] I think it’s... within the... reasonable period of time from the assault to... find a nexus.” The court rejected Egal’s lost income claim for the six-month period starting in mid-November 2008 when he went to Somalia, finding that this was “just too attenuated.” The court pointed to the lack of medical information connected to the assault for that period of time and observed that Egal himself had said that he needed to take time off then as a result of being overworked.
Rico T. timely appealed, challenging only the $2,520 in lost income for the two-week period Egal did not work in June 2008 some five months after the crime.
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 governs restitution in cases in which a minor is adjudicated a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. It is parallel to Penal Code section 1202.4 governing restitution generally. (In re Brittany L. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1386-1387 (Brittany L.); In re Anthony M. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1016 (Anthony M.).) Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6, subdivision (a)(1) provides that it “is the intent of the Legislature that a victim... who incurs any economic loss as a result of the minor’s conduct shall receive restitution directly from that minor.” Subdivision (h) provides in relevant part that “[r]estitution... shall be imposed in the amount of the losses, as determined.... The court shall order full restitution.... A restitution order... shall identify... the amount of each victim’s loss to which it pertains, and shall be of a dollar amount sufficient to fully reimburse the victim... for all determined economic losses incurred as the result of the minor’s conduct... including.... [¶] (2) Medical expenses. [¶] (3) Wages or profits lost due to injury incurred by the victim,...”
“Generally, an order of restitution will not be overturned in the absence of an abuse of discretion. [Citation.] The court abuses its discretion when it acts contrary to law [citation] or fails to ‘use a rational method that could reasonably be said to make the victim whole, and [it] may not make an order which is arbitrary or capricious’ [Citation].” (Anthony M, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1016.) Any rational method may be used, “provided it is reasonably calculated to make the victim whole, and provided it is consistent with the purpose of rehabilitation.” (Brittany L., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1391-1392, fn. omitted.) These purposes are “three-fold, to rehabilitate the defendant, deter future delinquent behavior, and make the victim whole by compensating him [or her] for his [or her] economic losses.” (Anthony M., supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1017.) And “ ‘[w]hile the amount of restitution cannot be arbitrary or capricious, “there is no requirement the restitution order be limited to the exact amount of the loss in which the [minor] is actually found culpable, nor is there any requirement the order reflect the amount of damages that may be recoverable in a civil action....” ’ ” (Brittany L., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1391, fn. omitted.) Moreover, a victim’s right to restitution is to be “ ‘broadly and liberally construed.’ ” (In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1132 (Johnny M.).) But a restitution order is not intended to provide a victim with a windfall and it must be limited to economic losses. (Anthony M., supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1017.)
An appellate court reviews the court’s findings imposing direct victim restitution for abuse of discretion. (People v. Mearns (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 493, 498.) “ ‘ “When there is a factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court, no abuse of discretion will be found.” ’ ” (Johnny M., supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 1132; accord, People v. Maheshwari (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1409 [reviewing court “will not disturb the trial court’s determination [of restitution] unless it is arbitrary, capricious and exceeds the bounds of reason”].) “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence [supporting a restitution award], the ‘ “power of the appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,” to support the trial court’s findings.’ [Citations.] Further, the standard of proof at a restitution hearing is by a preponderance of the evidence, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] ‘If the circumstances reasonably justify the [trial court’s] findings,’ the judgment may not be overturned when the circumstances might also reasonably support a contrary finding. [Citation.] We do not reweigh or reinterpret the evidence; rather, we determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the inference drawn by the trier of fact.” (People v. Baker (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 463, 468-469.)
II. The Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion
In what is in essence a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting restitution in the amount of $2,520 for Egal’s claim of two weeks of missed work in June 2008, Rico T. contends that this amount was “speculative,” not directly attributable to the crime, and “opportunistic.” Given the deferential standard of review, and the evidentiary support in the record for this amount, he is wrong on all counts.
Egal testified that there were lingering impacts of his injuries, specifically his broken nose. Whereas he had no such problems before the assault, he continued to experience headaches (particularly when driving, which was his work), dizziness, bloody noses, nasal blockages, and new allergy-like symptoms even months after. To deal with these problems, he stopped working for two weeks in June 2008, during which he took over-the-counter medication and felt better, resuming full time work for several months after that. Egal attributed his lingering symptoms and consequential need to take time off to injuries suffered in the assault, even though he normally worked while sick. Contrary to Rico T.’s claim on appeal, there is thus evidence in the record to support that this loss was a result of the crime. The court specifically found that because of Egal’s broken nose and lingering problems related to that, there was a “nexus” or causal relationship between the assault and the two-week break from work in June 2008 nearly five months later. And this finding is supported by substantial evidence.
Egal normally worked seven days per week, 10-12 hours per day. One day’s net income was $180. Thus, two weeks’ worth of work for Egal meant a loss of income of $2,524, which the trial court rounded down to $2,520. Thus, the method used to compute lost income for this period was rational and based on undisputed evidence, not speculation. The amount of restitution ordered for the two-week period corresponded with, and directly mitigated for, net loss of income, as supported by Egal’s undisputed testimony and the spread-sheet he had prepared. It is of no moment that no doctor ordered or recommended the time off, that Egal did not see a doctor during this period, or that the period began on a Saturday and ended on a Sunday, as if that coincidence suggests a leisure vacation rather than a break to recuperate from lingering injuries, particularly for someone who works seven days per week. It is likewise irrelevant that the court, though accepting Egal’s testimony on this point, declined to order additional amounts of restitution for the six-month period from November 2008 to May 2009, finding that “too attenuated,” particularly as Egal himself had testified that he had needed that break due to being overworked.
Rico T. further implies that Egal’s evolving restitution claim “taints [his] credibility,” as if our role were to second guess the trial court’s factual findings. But this is not our function as we do not reweigh or reinterpret evidence so long as there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings. And, in any event, it is not surprising or unusual that lingering injuries like those sustained by Egal here would inhibit a victim’s ability to consistently and specifically quantify losses in the immediate wake of such an assault.
In short, the trial court properly applied Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 to award direct victim restitution to Egal for substantiated economic losses suffered as a result of Rico T.’s crime. The losses were rationally and factually based, and were fully supported by substantial evidence in order to make the victim whole. The court thus did not abuse its discretion to the extent it ordered restitution in the amount of $2,520 for two weeks of lost income in June 2008.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Rushing, P.J. Elia, J.