Opinion
September 13, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action involves petitions to terminate the parental rights to the child, Rickaria B. (D.O.B. 7/18/03). On 7/28/03, the Department of Children and Families (DCF or department) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Paula H. (respondent mother). On 2/17/04, the department filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Richard B. (respondent father). The department alleged the following ground for termination of the parental rights of the mother: failure to rehabilitate by the mother after her parental rights to another child were terminated. C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(E). As to the father, DCF alleged the following grounds: abandonment, failure to rehabilitate, and no ongoing parent-child relationship. C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(A) (Bi) (D).
The department's motion to review the permanency plan (termination and adoption) and the respondent mother's objection was consolidated with the termination action.
On 7/29/03, the mother was served by abode service with the termination petition. The father was served by in-hand service with the petition on 3/18/04 They were appointed counsel. The case was tried to the court on 7/20/04. The respondents contested the petitions. All counsel participated in the examination of witnesses. The petitioner called as a witness Yolanda Bonnick-McGhee (DCF). The mother and father did not testify or call any witnesses. All counsel made closing argument. Numerous exhibits were admitted into evidence. The department requested that the court take judicial notice of the trial court's 1/12/04 finding that continued efforts to reunify the respondent mother with the child were no longer appropriate by clear and convincing evidence. The court granted the department's request. The court took judicial notice of other facts contained in the court file.
"Exhibits are admissible in their entirety unless exclusion or excision of irrelevant or prejudicial portions is stated in the offer or requested by the objector. Montinieri v. Southern New England Telephone Co., 175 Conn. 337, 348-49, 398 A.2d 1180 (1978); See also State v. Albin, 178 Conn. 549, 553, 424 A.2d 259 (1979); State v. Mortoro, 160 Conn. 378, 390, 279 A.2d 546 (1971)." Tait's Handbook of Connecticut Evidence § 1.29.3 3rd ed 2001; "An exhibit offered and admitted as a full exhibit is in the case for all purposes. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner Smith, Inc. v. Cole, 189 Conn. 518, 525, 457 A.2d 656, 660 (1983). Full exhibits, then, are evidence . . ." Faulkner Graves, Connecticut Trial Evidence Notebook § E-21, 2nd ed. 2000-03.
In re Jeisean M., 270 Conn. 382, 402-03, (2004): "A party requesting the court to take judicial notice of a fact shall give timely notice of the request to all other parties. Before the court determines whether to take the requested judicial notice, any party shall have an opportunity to be heard." Conn. Code Evid. § 2-2. "So long as the parties are offered an opportunity to be heard the court may notice any fact concerning the parties and events of the case that is appropriate for judicial notice." State v. Zayas, 195 Conn. 611, 615, 490 A.2d 68 (1985). Trial courts may take judicial notice of facts contained in the court file; Brocket v. Jensen, 154 Conn. 328, 336, 225 A.2d 190 (1966); and may take notice of court files in other actions between the same parties. Carpenter v. Planning Zoning Commission, 176 Conn. 581, 591, 409 A.2d 1029 (1979).";
"The effect of judicial notice is that a proposition is accepted as true without a corresponding offer of proof by the party who ordinarily would have proved it. State v. Zayas, 195 Conn. 611, 614, 490 A.26 68, 70-71 (1985); State v. Tomanelli, 153 Conn. 365, 369, 216 A.2d 625, 628 (1966). However, judicial notice is not conclusive, and an opposing party is not precluded from disputing the matter to be judicially noticed through an offer of evidence to the contrary. Tommanelli, supra. 153 Conn. 368-69 216 A.2d 628-29: State v. Marshall, 11 Conn.App. 632, 635, 528 A.2d 1163, 1164-65 (1987)." Faulkner Graves, Connecticut Trial Evidence Notebook § J-7, 2nd ed. 2000-3.
ISSUES
The issue in this case is whether the petitioner has proved by clear and convincing evidence that the parental rights of the parents should be terminated. "In order to terminate a parent's parental rights under § 17a-112, the petitioner is required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify the family; General Statutes § 17-a-112(j)(1); (2) termination is in the best interest of the child; General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(2); and (3) there exists any one of the seven grounds for termination delineated in § 17a-112(j)(3)." In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 628, 847 A.2d 883 (2004). "Except in the case where termination is based on consent, in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and shall make written findings regarding" the seven statutorily-enumerated criteria. C.G.S. § 17a-112(k).
In re Sheena, I., 63 Conn.App. 713, 720-21, 778 A.2d 997 (2001) (citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted): "A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition . . . In the adjudicatory phase, the trial court determines whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights . . . exists by clear and convincing evidence. If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase. In the dispositional phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interests of the child . . . In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the parents' parental rights is not in the best interests of the child. In arriving at that decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in General Statutes . . . § 17a-112(e) . . ."
In determining whether the petitioner establishes the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence, the court's function as the finder of fact "is to draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical." (Internal citation omitted.) In re Christine F., 6 Conn.App. 360, 366, 505 A.2d 734 (1986). "The burden of persuasion, therefore, in those cases requiring a showing of clear and convincing proof is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist." Dacey v. Connecticut Bar Assn., 170 Conn. 520, 537, 368 A.2d 125 (1976). "The same evidence certainly can establish more than one ground for termination." (Internal citation omitted.) In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 16, 632 A.2d 1122 (1993). The court may consider both direct and circumstantial evidence, In re Juvenile Appeal (85-2), 3 Conn.App. 184, 193, 485 A.2d 1362 (1985); In re Cheyenne XXX, 59 Conn.App. 151, 158-59, 756 A.2d 303 (2000). "It is well established that in cases tried before courts, trial judges are the sole arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is they who determine the weight to be given specific testimony." In re Antonio M., 56 Conn.App. 534, 540, 744 A.2d 915 (2000). "It is the quintessential function of the fact finder to reject or accept certain evidence, and to believe or disbelieve any expert testimony." (Internal citation omitted.) In re Carissa K., 55 Conn.App. 768, 782, 740 A.2d 896 (1999). "Although expert testimony may be accorded great weight when it is offered, there is no requirement for expert testimony in termination of parental rights cases." (Internal citation omitted.) In re Jeisean M., 270 Conn. 382, 400 (2004).
The court finds that it has proper jurisdiction of the matter, notice of the proceeding has been provided, and no action is pending in any other court affecting the custody of the child. The court has carefully considered the petitions and all of the testimony and evidence presented. On the basis of evidence presented, and for the reasons stated below, the court finds in favor of the petitioner and hereby terminates the parental rights of the respondents.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this decision. The facts were proved by clear and convincing evidence at trial. The child, Rickaria B., was born on 7/18/03. The department, on 7/24/03, invoked a ninety-six hour hold. On 7/28/03, the court granted an order of temporary custody (OTC). The OTC was sustained on 8/1/03, and specific steps were ordered. The mother was ordered to keep all appointments set by or with DCF, keep whereabouts known to DCF, participate in parenting and individual counseling and make progress toward the identified treatment goals, submit to substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations regarding treatment, submit to random drug testing, comply with recommended service providers including ADRC, secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income, no substance abuse, no involvement/further involvement with the criminal justice system, and visit the child as often as DCF permits. On 1/12/04, the child was adjudicated neglected (conditions injurious) and committed to the care and custody of DCF. On that day, the father was ordered to comply with specific steps including keep all appointments set by or with DCF, participate in parenting and individual counseling and make progress toward the identified treatment goals, submit to substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations regarding treatment, submit to random drug testing, comply with recommended service providers, secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income, no substance abuse, no involvement/further involvement with the criminal justice system, and visit the child as often as DCF permits. On 6/3/04, the court maintained the child's commitment.
Family History Respondent Mother
Paula H. was born on 4/26/70, in Hartford, Connecticut. She is 34 years old. She is the youngest of four children born to Betty H. and Paul F. She has two brothers and one sister. She grew up in Hartford and attended Hartford public schools. She dropped out of Weaver High School after completing the eleventh grade. She did not pursue any further education. She never married. She has five children by four different fathers.
She has a brief employment history with a temporary agency from 1998 to 2000. Otherwise, her primary source of legal income has been through state assistance.
The mother has a criminal history for drug offenses. See State's Exhibit H. On 4/25/91, she was convicted of possession of narcotics and sentenced to three years imprisonment, execution suspended after one year to serve, three years probation. Id. On 6/27/97, she was convicted of possession of narcotics and fined $1,000.00. Id.
She has a long history of substance abuse beginning when she was 17 years old. At that age, she began drinking alcohol. At 18 years old, she began smoking crack. She has participated in several drug programs although she has never seriously committed to maintaining her sobriety. She received substance abuse treatment at a number of programs including the John Dempsey Hospital-Reid House in Avon, Community Health Services, Hogar Crea. ADRC, Wheeler Clinic Lifeline Program in New Britain, and the Stonington Institute in Groton. At the time of trial, she was not in treatment.
The mother's struggle with substance addiction has been a major cause for the removal of her four other children from her care. Her mother has guardianship of three of the children Pauline B., Martinese B. and St. Ives G. Her parental rights to her fourth child, Anthony W., were terminated on 6/26/03. She consented to the termination based on failure to rehabilitate. Anthony W. is placed in a DCF licensed pre-adoptive home pending adoption.
She delivered her fifth child, Rickaria B., at Hartford Hospital on 7/18/03. On 7/20/03, she discussed her situation with the on-call social worker at Hartford Hospital. See State Exhibit A, p. 3. She admitted to irregular prenatal care and substance abuse. Id. She reported that cocaine and heroin were drugs that she used regularly. Id. At the time, she was not involved in treatment. Id. Before being admitted into the hospital, she was living in Norwich, Ct. Id. She was unemployed and was unsure where she would live upon her release. Id. She did not have the supplies necessary to care for the child.
On 8/12/03, the mother was admitted to Stonington Institute. See State's Exhibit C, p. 1. At the time of her admission, she reported having other inpatient treatment at ADRC in 2003 that she failed to complete. Id. She reported attending CHS in Hartford for outpatient treatment in 1993, but she left due to a relapse. Id. She had not been involved in AA/NA. Her admitting/discharge diagnosis was alcohol and cocaine dependency, opiod abuse and bipolar disorder. Id. The Stonington Institute report includes the following information regarding her substance abuse history:
"She states that she began using alcohol at age 17, and that it became a problem for her at age 25. She stated that she was consuming a 12 pack of beer on a daily basis, and had been consuming said amount for the past month. She stated that she has cut down within the last year, where she was consuming a 12 pack as well as a pint of gin. She stated that she began smoking crack at age 18, and that it because a problem for her at age 21. She stated that she was smoking 1-3 grams on a daily basis, and had been consuming said amount for the past month and year. She stated that she first tried heroin at age 33, and she does not consider it to be a problem. She stated that she was snorting 6-7 bags on a daily basis, which has progressed from 1-2 bags within the last month." Id.
On 9/4/03, she left the Stonington Institute to attend a court hearing and never returned to treatment. Id., p. 2. The discharge summary indicates that she made minimal progress while in the program, and her prognosis was poor at the time of discharge based on her level of denial and her unplanned discharge. Id.
Respondent Father
Richard B. was born on 11/18/66, in Hartford, Connecticut. He is 37 years old. He is the third of four children born to Betty B. and Raymond B. He has two sisters and one brother. He grew up in Hartford and attended Hartford public schools. He dropped out of Weaver High School in the tenth grade, but he later earned his GED in prison. He never married and Rickaria B. is his only child. He has a broad employment history from 1985 through 2000. He worked as a construction worker, a stockperson at Toys R Us, and a prep worker at local restaurants. He was also employed in the kitchen at Cigna Insurance Company and in a factory that specialized in making airplane parts. He has not been employed since 2000.
He has an extensive criminal history dating back to 1984. See State's Exhibit I. He has a number of convictions for drug offenses and violations of probation. Id. On 4/5/95, he was convicted of sale of hlcgn./narc. and sentenced to 3 years jail, execution suspended after 2 years jail, 3 years probation. Id. On 7/11/97, he was again convicted of sale of hlcgn./narc. and sentenced to 54 months in jail. Id. On 6/29/04, he was convicted of possession of narcotics and sentenced to 5 years in jail, execution suspended, 5 years probation. Id.
He has struggled with drug addiction for most of his life. He attempted drug rehabilitation a number of times without success. On 7/18/03, he was admitted to the Southeastern Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence, Inc. program (SCADD) in Lebanon, Connecticut. See State's Exhibit D. On 7/25/03, he received a pass from the program to visit with Rickaria B. in the hospital. Id. On his return to SCADD, he tested positive for cocaine. Id. As a result, he was discharged from the program for relapsing while in treatment. Id. The discharge summary indicates that he had made no progress in treatment, and he was unmotivated to maintain abstinence. Id.
On 8/11/03, he admitted himself to the Stonington Institute. State's Exhibit E. His admitting/discharge diagnosis was cocaine and heroin dependency. Id. Upon his admission, he reported that he was inpatient at Blue Hills about two weeks ago, but he left AMA. Id. He also reported being in ADRC about 3 weeks ago. Id. The report states the following information regarding his substance abuse history:
"The patient's history of chemical dependence includes crack cocaine, and heroin. He started smoking at age 18 and he reports that it was a problem at age 23. He smoked 1/2 ounce daily 28/28 days and 200/365. He snorted about 7-8 bags of heroin for 28/28 days and 300/365." Id.
On 9/4/03, he left the Stonington Institute and did not return. Id. His discharge summary reflects that he made some progress. Id.
In late February 2004, he was incarcerated at Corrigan Correctional Institution. During his incarceration, he completed the Tier 1 requirements of 7.5 hours of substance abuse programming. See State's Exhibit G.
On 6/30/04, as a condition of his probation, he was admitted to the Connecticut Renaissance Program. State's Exhibit F. At the time of his admission, he reported that he began using crack and heroin when he was around 18 and has been using them since. Id. He stated that he had previously started treatment in one program, but he had never successfully completed a treatment program. Id.
Child
Rickaria B. was born on 7/18/03, in Hartford, Connecticut. She was born at 34 weeks gestation. She weighed 6 pounds, 7 ounces and measured 19.5 inches tall. At birth, she tested positive for cocaine and heroin. As a result, she was diagnosed with Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome (NAS). Having this diagnosis, puts her at risk for a myriad of symptoms and health concerns. To date, she has not exhibited the symptoms associated with her diagnosis.
After the OTC was sustained, she was placed in foster care. She has lived in the same foster home since 11/14/03. She is reported to be doing well and is bonded with her foster parents. The foster parents have expressed a desire to adopt her if she is freed for adoption.
Witnesses Yolanda Bonnick-McGhee
DCF social worker Yolanda Bonnick-McGee testified regarding her involvement in the case. She was first assigned to the mother's case in December 2003. At that time, the department had a pending case involving Anthony W., the mother's fourth child. Previously, the court transferred guardianship of the mother's three other children to the maternal grandmother. On 6/26/03, the mother consented to the termination of her parental rights to Anthony W., based on failure to rehabilitate.
Since the worker was first assigned to the case, the mother's whereabouts have been mostly unknown. The mother provided the maternal grandmother's address as a mailing address. But the mother lived a transient lifestyle, staying on and off with the maternal grandmother. She had no permanent address. The worker testified that she left numerous messages for the mother with the maternal grandmother regarding visitation and services. The mother would not return the worker's calls. The mother also missed office appointments to sign releases.
Rickaria B. was born on 7/18/03: The worker testified that Rickaria B. was born positive for cocaine and heroin, and the child was diagnosed with Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome. In fact, all of the mother's children were born positive for cocaine and/or heroin. As a result, a referral was made to DCF and a ninety-six hour hold was invoked on 7/24/03.
From 7/18/03 to 7/20/04, the mother was involved in a number of programs to address her substance abuse issues. The mother has an extensive substance abuse history involving cocaine, heroin and alcohol. The mother enrolled herself in substance abuse programs. The department made one refusal for substance abuse treatment to the Advanced Behavioral Health program (ABH). The worker testified that during this time she didn't make any other referrals because she didn't know the mother's whereabouts. On numerous occasions, the worker would attempt to contact the mother through the maternal grandmother without success. The mother failed to successfully complete any of the programs she enrolled herself in or was referred to by the department.
Between late July 2003 and early August 2003, the mother enrolled herself in the ProKids program. The program wanted the department to allow the child to live with the mother at Coventry House, but the department refused. The worker did not offer an explanation for the department's refusal. During the same period, she was also involved with the ADRC program. However, she was discharged from the program. In mid-August 2003, she enrolled herself in a program at the Stonington Institute. She left the program in early September 2003, and she did not return. As a result, she was discharged from the Stonington Institute. The mother was not involved in any substance abuse programs from early September 2003 to March 2004. In March 2004, the mother contacted the worker regarding treatment. The worker referred her to ABH The program included substance abuse treatment, and individual/family counseling. The worker told the mother that she had to come to the office to sign a release, but the mother never did so. The worker was not able to reach the mother because the mother's whereabouts were unknown. In April 2004, the department discussed with her the Project Safe program. The mother failed to participate in the program. In April 2004, the mother called regarding a possible treatment program in Avon, CT. The worker told the mother that she had to provide more specifics and come to the office to sign releases. The mother failed to do so. During the past year, the mother failed to successfully complete any substance abuse treatment or parenting program. She did not follow through with the referral to ABH. She did not keep her whereabouts known to the department. She missed several office appointments to sign releases.
The worker testified that the mother's housing situation remained the same during this period. She never secured and maintained adequate housing. The mother continued to live a transient lifestyle with no permanent address. She used the maternal grandmother's address as her mailing address. The worker was unable to verify where the mother actually lived. Most of the time the mother's whereabouts were unknown. The worker would attempt to contact the mother without success. In total, the mother contacted the worker only four to five times. The mother knew she was responsible for keeping the worker informed of the mother's whereabouts and making herself available for referrals. The mother failed to comply with her responsibilities.
The worker testified that the mother had minimal visitation with the child. The worker testified that the mother was informed that she could have weekly visitation with the child. The mother was responsible for calling the worker to schedule the visitation. The department was responsible for making arrangements with the foster parents and for providing transportation. The mother did not take advantage of the weekly visitation. On 8/29/03, the mother visited with the child at the Stonington Institute. The mother did not call to request another visitation until December 2003. A visit was initially scheduled with the mother for 12/23/03. But the foster parents asked that the visit take place on 12/22/03, because they were going away for the holidays. The visitation did not occur because the department was unable to provide transportation. The mother never called to reschedule the December visitation as requested. In February 2004, the mother again called the worker to schedule a visitation with both parents. Their visit was scheduled for 2/10/04, however, the visitation did not occur because the parents never called to confirm and failed to appear. The worker called the respondents' mothers to locate the parents without success. In April 2004, the mother called to schedule a visitation. A visit was scheduled, but it had to be cancelled because the child was suffering from an ear infection. The mother was told to call back to reschedule the visitation, but she didn't follow through. In May 2004, a visit was scheduled with the mother after the administrative case review. The mother attended the review, but she left immediately after without visiting with the child. Between the time the ninety-six hour hold was revoked on 7/24/03, and the May 2004 administrative case review, the mother saw the child once.
The mother was not employed during this period. She failed to maintain a stable income. After Rickaria B. was born, the mother never obtained the supplies necessary to care for the child.
The worker testified that the father also has an extensive substance abuse history involving cocaine and heroin. He was involved in several substance abuse programs that he failed to successfully complete. The father was informed that the department would provide substance abuse treatment services; however, he indicated that he did not need DCF and would find his own treatment.
When Rickaria B. was born, the father was in the SCADD program. He received a pass from the program to visit the child. When he returned to the program on 7/25/03, he tested positive for cocaine and was discharged from the program. In August 2003, he enrolled himself in a forty-five day treatment program at the Stonington Institute. The father left the program after approximately thirty days and was discharged. On 1/13/04, the day after the child was adjudicated neglected the worker made a referral to ABH. The father refused to follow through with the referral to ABH. He indicated that he was instead going to participate in the Salvation Army substance abuse program. The father was told that he had to come to the office to sign a release. The father never came to the office to sign releases. In late February 2004, the father was incarcerated on drug and probation related charges. While incarcerated, he completed a Tier 1 treatment program at Corrigan C.I. On 6/30/04, as a condition part of his sentence, he was admitted into the Connecticut Renaissance Program, which is a six to nine month substance abuse program. Before being incarcerated, the father was referred to the Village for Children and Families for parenting and individual counseling. He failed to follow through with the referral. During this period, he failed to successfully complete any substance abuse program, and he did not follow through with any referrals made by the department.
The father had minimal contact with the child during the past year. He was informed that he could have weekly visits with the child. The father was responsible for contacting the department to schedule visitation. The department was responsible for making arrangements with the foster parents and providing transportation. The father had a visit with the child on 7/25/03, after which he was discharged from the SCADD program for testing positive for cocaine. The father had another visit with the child while at the Stonington Institute on 9/4/03. In February 2004, the mother contacted the worker to schedule a visit with the respondents. A visit was scheduled for 2/10/04, but the visit was cancelled after the respondents did not call to confirm and failed to appear. The worker tried to contact the respondents through the grandparents without success. The father did not request visitation again until 3/18/04, when he was incarcerated. The worker, however, did not make arrangements for visitation until July 2004. The department did not offer a satisfactory explanation for the delay. Between the day the ninety-six hour hold was invoked on 7/24/03, and when his TPR petition was filed on 2/17/04, the father saw the child only twice.
Throughout the pendency of this case, the father has not kept the department fully informed of his whereabouts. The department was not able to verify where he lived when he was not inpatient or incarcerated. He lived a transient lifestyle with no permanent address. The worker would attempt to contact him through the paternal grandmother without success. He failed to maintain adequate income or suitable housing. He did not have any demonstrable means of support. He did not keep his appointments with DCF. He refused to sign releases. He failed to financially support the child. He did not make inquiries as to the child. He contacted the department only three times regarding the child.
The worker testified that Rickaria B. has been in the current foster care placement since 11/14/03. This is the child's second foster care placement since 7/03. The current placement is a legal risk home. The foster parents are willing to adopt the child if she is freed for adoption.
The court will provide additional facts as needed that are found by clear and convincing evidence.
ADJUDICATION Reunification
The first issue the court must address is whether DCF met its burden concerning reunification efforts. The court must determine if "the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts provided such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to subsection (b) of section 17a-110 or section 17a-111b that such efforts are not appropriate." C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(1). In accordance with § 17a-112(j)(1), as amended, "the department may meet its burden concerning reunification in one of three ways: (1) by showing that it made such efforts, (2) by showing that the parent was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts or (3) by a previous judicial determination that such efforts were not appropriate." (Citation omitted; Emphasis added.) In re Ebony H., 68 Conn.App. 342, 348, 789 A.2d 1158 (2002).
Respondent Mother
The court must determine whether the department met its reunification burden as to the mother. On 1/12/04, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that further efforts toward reunifying the children with the mother were not appropriate. "Because this finding was made, the petitioner was not required to continue reunification efforts." In re Terrance C., 58 Conn.App. 389, 396, 755 A.2d 232 (2000). Therefore, this court is not required to make a further reunification finding as to the mother in the termination proceeding. In re Gary B., 66 Conn.App. 286, 290-91, 784 A.2d 412 (2001).
"Notwithstanding the finding that further reunification efforts were no longer appropriate or required . . . the petitioner had made efforts to unify the respondent with his child." In re Terrance C., supra, 58 Conn.App. 396-97 (department continued to contact the father regarding services, but the father failed to pursue the services; "[c]onsidering the lack of interest expressed by the respondent, the department made reasonable reunification efforts").
In this case, after the court found that reunification efforts were no longer appropriate, the department continued to offer services to the respondent mother. In March 2004, the mother contacted the worker regarding treatment. The worker referred her to the Advanced Behavioral Health program (ABH). The ABH program included substance abuse, and individual/family counseling. The worker told the mother that she had to come to the office to sign a release. The mother failed to come to the office to sign a release. The worker was unable to reach the mother because the mother's whereabouts were unknown. In April 2004, the department recommended that she enroll in the Project Safe program. The mother failed to follow through with the recommendation. In April 2004, the mother called regarding a possible treatment program in Avon, CT. The worker told the mother that she had to provide more specifics and come to the office to sign a release. The mother failed to provide more specifics, and she did not come to the office to sign a release. Because the mother failed to keep the department fully apprised of her whereabouts, she was not readily available for referrals.
The mother was also offered visitation services after 1/12/04. In February 2004, the mother called the worker to schedule a visitation with the respondents. The visit was scheduled for 2/10/04; however, the respondents did not call to confirm and failed to appear. The worker tried to contact the respondents through the grandparents without success. In April 2004, the mother called to schedule a visitation. A visit was scheduled, but it had to be cancelled because the child was suffering from an ear infection. The mother was told to call back to reschedule the visitation, but she didn't follow through. In May 2004, a visit was scheduled with the mother after the administrative case review; however, the mother left immediately after the review and did not visit with the child.
Even after the finding that reunification efforts were no longer appropriate, the mother was offered reunification services, but she failed to comply. The court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the department made reasonable reunification efforts, and the mother was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.
Respondent Father
The court must also determine if the department has met its reunification burden as to the father. The department alleges that reasonable efforts were made to reunify the father with the child. "The term reasonable efforts was recently addressed by this court: Turning to the statutory scheme encompassing the termination of the parental rights of a child committed to the department, the statute imposes on the department the duty, inter alia, to make reasonable efforts to reunite the child or children with the parents. The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof. Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn . . . [R]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible. [R]easonableness is an objective standard . . . and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ebony H., supra, 68 Conn.App. 349. The department has "a continuing duty to make reasonable efforts." In re Vincent B., 73 Conn.App. 637, 644, 809 A.2d 1119 (2002). But "[t]he department is required only to make `reasonable efforts' . . . [I]t is axiomatic that the law does not require a useless and futile act." (Citation omitted.) In re Antony B., 54 Conn.App. 463, 476, 735 A.2d 893 (1999). In addition, "making no efforts to reunify a parent and his or her child may be reasonable in certain circumstances . . ." In re Vincent B., supra, 73 Conn.App. 645.
In evaluating the department's reunification efforts as to the respondent father, the court may consider whether the department engaged the father, apprised him of what steps he had to take to achieve rehabilitation, and gave him feedback on his progress in reaching that goal. In re Vincent B., supra, 73 Conn.App. 645. The department may take into consideration whether the department met "its burden of making reasonable efforts to achieve reunification by engaging the respondent and making available services aimed at instilling in him [or her] healthy parental skills." In re Vincent B., supra, 73 Conn.App. 647. The court may also assess whether "steps taken by the respondent presented the department with a window of opportunity during which reasonable efforts at reunification should have been made." Id., 644. The court may find that the efforts were reasonable even though the department made mistakes. In re A., 55 Conn.App 293, 297-98, 738 A.2d 222 (1999) ("The court is aware that [the department] has made mistakes in this case in failing to treat [the respondent] as a victim of domestic violence . . . These mistakes, however, do not defeat the proposition that reasonable efforts at reunification were made. In the first instance, counseling services were provided . . . Other, in home services were offered, but refuse.").
In finding that the department made reasonable efforts, the courts have given careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case. In re Sheila J., 62 Conn.App. 470, 479, 771 A.2d 244 (2001) (department offered respondent services over several years, but she failed to avail herself of or participate meaningfully in those services including failing to attend many visits, and denying the fact that she needed to participate in counseling); In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 362-63, 776 A.2d 487 (2001) (respondents participated in services but continually relapsed and resumed abusing substances and alcohol, so the department declined to pursue reunification as a goal after the children were removed; "dissolution of this family resulted from the respondents' cycle of alcohol and substance abuse and not from the failure of the department to provide services and assistance"); In re Ebony H., supra, 68 Conn.App. 350 (respondent's inability to overcome her drug addiction and failure to comply with services "thwarted the department's efforts to reunify her and the child"); In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. 377, 387, 784 A.2d 457 (2001) (department's "efforts were hampered by the respondent's passivity, her cognitive limitations and the extended period of time that had elapsed from the time of the child's placement until the respondent's decision to begin work toward rehabilitation"): In re Dorrell R., 64 Conn.App. 455, 466, 780 A.2d 944 (2001) ("respondent requested a referral for drug treatment from the department, which the department provided. "She once again failed to follow through."); In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 260 763 A.2d 71 (2000) ("department cannot be blamed for the fact that the respondent became a `stranger' to her child, . . . because of her own unwillingness to take advantage of the many opportunities that the department provided to help her develop parenting skills and to bond with her child"); In re Amanda A., 58 Conn.App. 451, 457, 755 A.2d 243 (2000) ("department did all it reasonably could do to reunify the respondent with her children and that it was the conduct of the respondent that led to the failure of those efforts"); In re Amber B., 56 Conn.App. 776, 783, 746 A.2d 222 (2000) ("appropriate and timely services were provided, including psychological counseling, transportation assistance, parenting and substance abuse counseling, and visitation coordination," but respondent failed to comply with services; "respondent was not the primary parent and he had no intention, nor the ability, to be a full-time caretaker for the child"); In re Antonio M., supra, 56 Conn.App. 547 (department offered services to respondent, many of which she rejected; "Without participation [by the respondent] in the services offered . . . without her acceptance of responsibility for the abuse which took place in the home and her acknowledgment of her own need to improve as a parent, further services would have been of no benefit toward any reunification"); In re Natalia G., 54 Conn.App. 800, 803, 737 A.2d 506 (1999) ("department was not aware of the respondent's whereabouts despite the fact that the trial court had ordered the respondent to keep the department apprised of his address;" respondent tested positive for cocaine and heroin and refused to comply with substance abuse treatment recommended and did not inquire about or visit his daughter); In re Antony B., supra, 54 Conn.App. 475 ("respondent has been unable to maintain housing and has been intermittently homeless, living in shelters").
In the alternative, the court may also determine that the respondent was either unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts. The court may find by clear and convincing evidence that "the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with the children. [T]he respondent's subsequent failure to take advantage of those efforts establish her inability or unwillingness to benefit from those reasonable efforts." In re Alexander T., 81 Conn.App. 668, 676, 841 A.2d 274 (2004). In making this determination, the court should consider whether "the respondent's positive step in participating in a treatment program demonstrated a degree of rehabilitation in itself." In re Vincent B., supra, 73 Conn.App. 645 (trial court reversed because reasonable efforts were not made when the department decided not to engage in further efforts based on its prior experiences with the respondent, despite the respondent taking steps and being in a position to benefit from services; respondent had successfully completed long-term inpatient substance abuse treatment and counseling for anger management and depression, and had attended regularly scheduled supervised visitation; there was no evidence of relapse in those areas). Id., 645. In addition, the court may consider whether the respondent "was unwilling or unable to formulate an appropriate plan for [child] . . ." Id., 647. "Expert testimony is not required to examine the respondent's history with the department and the trouble she has experienced in achieving rehabilitation to determine that the respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit from the efforts of the department." In re Alexander T., supra, 81 Conn.App. 676.
On 1/12/04, the father was ordered to comply with specific steps including participate in parenting and individual counseling and make progress toward the identified treatment goals, submit to substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations regarding treatment, submit to random drug testing, comply with recommended service providers, secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income, no substance abuse, no involvement/further involvement with the criminal justice system, and visit the child as often as DCF permits.
The father failed to fully comply with the specific steps. He did not keep the department informed of his whereabouts. The department was not able to verify where he lived when he was not inpatient or incarcerated. He lived a transient lifestyle with no permanent address. The worker would attempt to contact him through the paternal grandmother without success. Because the father failed to keep the department fully apprised of his whereabouts, he was not readily available for referrals. He failed to obtain employment and to maintain adequate income or suitable housing. He did not have any demonstrable means of support. He did not keep all his appointments with DCF. He refused to sign releases. He failed to financially support the child. He did not make inquiries as to the child. He contacted the department a total of three times regarding the child.
Since July 2003, he was involved in several substance abuse programs that he failed to successfully complete. In late July 2003, he was discharged from the SCADD program for testing positive for cocaine. In September 2003, he left the Stonington Institute program early and was discharged. The department offered him substance abuse services; however, he refused the referrals and indicated that he did not need DCF and would find his own treatment. On 1/13/04, the day after the child was adjudicated neglected, the worker made a referral to ABH which the father refused. Before being incarcerated, he was also referred to the Village for Children and Families for parenting and individual counseling. He failed to take advantage of these services. The father has had some success in treatment since being incarcerated. He was incarcerated in late February 2004 on drug and probation related charges. While incarcerated, he completed a Tier 1 treatment program at Corrigan C.I. On 6/30/04, as a condition of his sentence, he entered the Connecticut Renaissance treatment program.
The worker testified that the father had minimal contact with the child. The worker informed the father that he could have weekly visits with the child. The father was responsible for contacting the department to schedule visitation. The department was responsible for making arrangements with the foster parents and providing transportation. The father had a visit with the child on 7/25/03; after which he was discharged from the SCADD program for testing positive for cocaine. The father had a visit with the child while at the Stonington Institute on 9/4/03. In February 2004, the mother contacted the worker to request a visit with the respondents. A visit was scheduled for 2/10/04; however, the respondents failed to call to confirm or appear. The worker was unable to locate the respondents through the grandparents. The father did not contact the worker to request visitation until 3/18/04, after he was incarcerated. The department did not provide visitation with the father until July 2004.
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the department made reasonable efforts to locate the father and to reunify him with the child. The department offered substance abuse treatment, counseling and visitation services. Although the department erred in not providing the father with visitation after his 3/18/04 request, the department's mistake does not defeat the proposition that reasonable efforts were made by the department. The department offered the father visitation services after the OTC was sustained, but the father only visited with the child twice. The court also finds by clear and convincing evidence that the father was unable or unwilling to benefit from the reunification efforts. His failure to take advantage of those efforts establishes his unwillingness or inability to benefit from those efforts. His longstanding substance abuse problem and transient lifestyle contributed significantly to his failure.
Statutory Ground for Termination
Each statutory basis set out in C.G.S. § 17a-112(j) is an independent ground for termination. In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 293, 618 A.2d 1 (1992). The petitioner is required "to prove by clear and convincing evidence, that one of the specific statutory bases for termination has been established." In re Baby Girl B., supra, 224 Conn. 293. "In the adjudicatory phase, the judicial authority is limited to evidence of events preceding the filing of the petition or the latest amendment, except where the judicial authority must consider subsequent events as part of its determination as to the existence of a ground for termination of parental rights." Practice Book § 35a-7. However, "[p]ost-adjudicatory date evidence may be considered in the adjudicatory phase in a termination of parental rights case alleging grounds of no ongoing parent-child relationship or failure to rehabilitate." P.B. § 35a-7, commentary; In re Amber B., supra, 56 Conn.App. 785 ("It is axiomatic that the court can rely on factors occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering if additional time would promote rehabilitation"); In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230, 763 A.2d 83 (2000) ("In the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time").
Mother — Parental failure to rehabilitate after prior termination of parental rights
The department has alleged failure to rehabilitate by the mother after her parental rights to another child were terminated. The petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that: the parent (1) of a child under the age of seven years who is neglected or uncared for; (2) has failed, is unable or is unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child; and (3) such parent's parental rights of another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the Commissioner of Children and Families. C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(E). The petitioner has proved by clear and convincing evidence that the child is under the age of seven years, she is 13 months old, and the child was adjudicated neglected and committed to DCF on 1/12/04. The department has also proved by clear and convincing evidence that the mother's parental rights to another child, Anthony W., were previously terminated on 6/26/03.
The personal rehabilitation element of the statute must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(E). Personal rehabilitation, as used in the statute, refers to the restoration of a respondent to a constructive and useful role as a parent. In re Migdalia M., 6 Conn.App. 194, 203, 504 A.2d 533 (1986). The parent's compliance with the court-ordered expectations entered at the time of the neglect adjudication is relevant but not dispositive to the rehabilitation finding. In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 168-69, 554 A.2d 722 (1989). "The court, in proceedings to terminate parental rights . . . considers the specific steps issued in the order as a measure of the degree of `personal rehabilitation' . . . The specific steps are also considered `fair warning' of the potential termination of parental rights in subsequent proceedings pursuant to § 17a-112." In re Jeffrey C., 64 Conn.App. 55, 61-62, 779 A.2d 765 (2001), rev'd on other grounds, 261 Conn. 189, 802 A.2d 772 (2002). "Indeed, the failure to comply with specific steps ordered by the court typically weighs heavily in a termination proceeding." In re Devon B., 264 Conn. 572, 584, 825 A.2d 127 (2003). "The failure to articulate expectations or to convey them to the respondent, however, does not in and of itself preclude a finding of failure to rehabilitate . . . [the statute] does not provide that in order to achieve personal rehabilitation a parent must meet the expectations of a court as ordered pursuant to a commitment hearing . . . [N]or have our courts required an articulation of expectations or strict compliance thereto as a condition precedent to a finding of failure to rehabilitate." (Citations omitted.) In re Michael M., 29 Conn.App. 112, 125, 614 A.2d 832 (1992).
"[T]he statute requires the trial court to analyze the respondent's rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child; and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable `within a reasonable time.' There may be instances in which the evidence does not establish that parental rights should be terminated under this section, despite the fact that continuing support programs for the parent may be suitable or even necessary." In re Luis C., supra, 210 Conn. 167. The statute "requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation she has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date she can assume a responsible position in her child's life." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 873 (1999). "Although the standard is not full rehabilitation, the parent must show more than `any' rehabilitation . . . Successful completion of the petitioner's expressly articulated expectations is not sufficient to defeat the petitioner's claim that the parent has not achieved sufficient rehabilitation . . . [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [her] ability to manage [her] own life, but rather whether [she] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue . . . Thus, even if a parent has made successful strides in her ability to manage her life and may have achieved a level of stability within her limitations, such improvements, although commendable, are not dispositive on the issue of whether, within a reasonable period of time, she could assume a responsible position in the life of her child." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). In re Victoria B., 79 Conn.App. 245, 254-55, 829 A.2d 855 (2003). "Thus, the trial court's inquiry requires the determination of both the present and past status of the child and obtaining a historical perspective of the respondent's child caring and parenting." (Citations omitted: internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Galen F., 54 Conn.App. 590, 594, 737 A.2d 499 (1999).
In obtaining a historical perspective of the mother's child caring and parenting abilities, the court finds that she has a long history of substance abuse, neglect of her children, and failure to rehabilitate. Her history of substance abuse began when she was 17 years old. Over the last seventeen years, she has abused cocaine, heroin and alcohol in varying degrees. She has been diagnosed with alcohol dependency, cocaine dependency, and opiod abuse. Although she has participated in substance abuse programs, she has failed to maintain sobriety. She has a history with the department going back to 1988, based on issues of neglect and abuse with her other children. In the early 1990s, the guardianship of three of her other children were transferred to the maternal grandmother. On 6/26/03, just weeks before Rickaria B. was born, her parental rights to Anthony W. were terminated based on her failure to rehabilitate. All of her children were born positive for cocaine and/or heroin. Rickaria B. was born positive for both heroin and cocaine.
On 7/18/03, when the child was born, the mother was struggling with her drug and alcohol addiction, and she was unable to meet the child's needs. As a result, on 7/24/03, a ninety-six hour hold was invoked. On 8/1/03, the court ordered specific steps to facilitate the mother's reunification with Rickaria B. including keep all appointments set by or with DCF, keep her whereabouts known to DCF, participate in parenting and individual counseling and make progress toward the identified treatment goals (substance abuse and physical abuse), submit to substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations regarding treatment, submit to random drug testing, comply with recommended service providers including ADRC, secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income, no substance abuse, visit the child as often as DCF permits.
The mother failed to fully comply with the specific steps. First, she failed to keep all her appointments set by or with DCF including not coming to the office to sign releases. She also failed to appear at several court hearings. Second, she did not keep her whereabouts known to DCF. She lived a transient lifestyle and kept her whereabouts unknown for long periods of time. On numerous occasions, the worker attempted to contact her without success. The mother knew she was responsible for keeping her whereabouts known. Third, she did not participate in parenting and individual counseling and make progress toward the identified treatment goals relating to substance abuse and physical abuse. She failed to complete substance abuse programs at ADRC and the Stonington Institute. Fourth, she failed to comply with recommended service providers. Because she failed to keep the worker informed of her whereabouts, the mother was not readily available for referrals. She failed to comply with a referral to ABH. Fifth, she has failed to secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income. She never obtained the necessary supplies for the child, e.g., crib or bassinette, clothing, food. Sixth, she has not provided proof of no substance abuse. She reported abusing alcohol, cocaine and heroin after the child was born. She did not successfully complete a substance abuse program. Although she was permitted to visit the child weekly, she has only requested visitation a few times. She did not see the child on a regular basis.
The level of rehabilitation the mother has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would encourage a belief that within a reasonable time she could assume a responsible position in the child's life. The child is 13 months old and has special needs. The mother has failed, is unable or is unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, she could assume a responsible position in the life of the child. Even if it could be argued that she "demonstrated some efforts and had taken some steps toward rehabilitation, those efforts were too little and too late." In re Sheila J., supra, 62 Conn.App. 481.
Based on the evidence presented, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the mother has failed to achieve the necessary degree of personal rehabilitation. Therefore, the court finds that the petitioner has proved all the elements required for termination of the mother's parental rights under C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(E).
Father — Abandonment
The department has alleged that the child has been abandoned by the father. The petitioner must prove that the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child. 17a-112(j)(3)(A). "[A]bandonment focuses on the parent's conduct . . . A lack of interest in the child is not the sole criterion in determining abandonment . . . General Statutes 17a-112(b)(1) defines abandonment as the "fail[ure] to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child . . .' . . . Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support are indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child . . . Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kezia M., supra, 33 Conn.App. 17-18. The court identified the minimal parental obligations for determination of whether abandonment has occurred. "The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes: (1) express love and affection for the child; (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child; (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing, and medical care; (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile; and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 18. In re Angellica W., 49 Conn.App. 541, 551, 714 A.2d 1265 (1998).
The respondent father has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child. He saw the child twice from 7/18/03 to 2/17/04. He did not contact the department on a regular basis to find out how Rickaria B. was doing or to ask how to contact the child. He failed to support the child, physically, emotionally or financially. He did not contribute to the child's maintenance.
Based on the evidence presented, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the child has been abandoned by the father. Therefore, the court finds that the petitioner has proved this statutory ground for termination of the father's parental rights under C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(A).
Father — Parental failure to rehabilitate
DCF has alleged that the father has failed to rehabilitate himself after the child was adjudicated as neglected/uncared for in a prior proceeding. The petitioner must prove that the "child has been found by the Superior Court . . . to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding . . . and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child." C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i). The petitioner has proved by clear and convincing evidence that on 1/12/04, Rickaria B. was adjudicated neglected and was committed to DCF.
As previously stated, personal rehabilitation, as used in the statute, refers to the restoration of a respondent to a constructive and useful role as a parent. In re Migdalia M., supra, 6 Conn.App. 203. "In the adjudicatory phase, the judicial authority is limited to evidence of events preceding the filing of the petition or the latest amendment, except where the judicial authority must consider subsequent events as part of its determination as to the existence of a ground for termination of parental rights." Practice Book § 35a-7. However, "[p]ost-adjudicatoty date evidence may be considered in the adjudicatory phase in a termination of parental rights case alleging the grounds of no ongoing parent-child relationship or failure to rehabilitate." P.B. § 35a-7, commentary.
On 1/12/04, specific steps were set out for him to facilitate his reunification with the child including keep all appointments set by or with DCF, keep your whereabouts known to DCF, participate in parenting and individual counseling and make progress toward the identified treatment goals, submit to substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations regarding treatment, secure and maintain adequate housing and income, no substance abuse, no involvement/further involvement with the criminal justice system, and visit with child as often as DCF permits. He was unable or unwilling to fully comply with those expectations.
The father failed to fully comply with the specific steps ordered on 1/12/04. He also failed to achieve the necessary degree of personal rehabilitation prior to the steps being ordered. First, he has failed to keep all appointments set by or with DCF. For example, on 2/4/04, he failed to attend an appointment made by DCF at the Alcohol and Drug Rehabilitation Center (ADRC). He also failed to come to the office to sign releases as requested. Second, he did not fully comply with his substance abuse treatment. He failed to complete the programs at SCADD, the Stonington Institute and ABH. Third, he did not kept his whereabouts known to DCF for extended periods of time. On numerous occasions, the worker tried to contact him without success. He failed to maintain a permanent address. He did not secure and maintain adequate housing. Fourth, he failed to participate in the recommended parenting classes at the Village for Families and Children. Fifth, he did not secure and maintain legal income. Sixth, he failed to provide proof of no substance abuse. On at least one occasion after the child was born, he tested positive for cocaine. He also admitted to continued use of cocaine and heroin. Seventh, he continued to have involvement with the criminal justice system. He was incarcerated between late February 2004 and June 2004. Finally, he failed to visit the child on a regular basis. He only saw the child twice between 7/18/03 and 2/17/04.
Considering the age and needs of the child, the father made little progress toward rehabilitation. He failed to fully comply with the specific steps. He has only recently made some progress toward addressing his substance abuse issues. He has not maintained adequate housing and income. His relationship with the child can be fairly characterized as nonexistent. The child was born on 7/18/03, and has special needs. Under the best case scenario, he will need to remain in treatment for several more months, maintain a significant period of verifiable sobriety, and participate in parenting and individual counseling, before he could assume a responsible position in the life of the child. Although he had "demonstrated some efforts and had taken some steps toward rehabilitation, those efforts were too little and too late." In re Sheila J., supra, 62 Conn.App. 481.
Based on the evidence presented, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the father has failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation necessary to provide a safe and stable home for the child within a foreseeable period of time. Therefore, the court finds that the petitioner has proved this statutory ground for termination of the father's parental rights under C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i).
Father — No-ongoing parent-child relationship
In addition, the department has alleged the additional ground of no ongoing parent-child relationship. The petitioner must prove that "there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child." C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(D)
In the adjudicatory phase, the petitioner must establish (1) that no ongoing parent-child relationship exists; and (2) the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop. In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 525, 777 A.2d 695 (2001). No ongoing parent-child relationship "contemplate[s] a situation in which, regardless of fault, a child either has never known his or her parents, so that no relationship has ever developed between them or has definitively lost that relationship, so that despite its former existence it has now been completely displaced." In re Juvenile Appeal, (Anonymous), 177 Conn. 648, 670, 420 A.2d 875 (1979). "In either case, the ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent." In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), supra, 177 Conn. 670. "[T]he phrase `feelings for the natural parent' refers to feelings of a positive nature." In re Juvenile Appeal (84-6), 2 Conn.App. 705, 709, 483 A.2d 1101 (1984), cert. denied, 195 Conn. 801 (1985). "The feelings of the child are most important in determining whether a parent-child relationship exists." In re Jonathon G., supra, 63 Conn.App. 526.
Richard B. has failed to meet on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child. He only saw the child twice between 7/18/03 and 2/17/04. There is no evidence that the child has any connection or bond with the father. The child would not recognize the father as her parent or seek comfort from him or go to him to have her needs met. Under the circumstances, the father is unable to develop a positive relationship with the child in the foreseeable future. It would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop.
Based on the evidence presented, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that no ongoing parent-child relationship exists, and the allowance of further time for the establishment of such a relationship would harm the interests of the child. Therefore, the court finds that the petitioner has proved this ground for termination under C.G.S. § 17a-1129(j)(3)(D).
DISPOSITION
"In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the respondent's parental rights is not in the best interest of the child. In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in [§ 17a-112(k)]." In re Vanna A., 83 Conn.App. 17, 26, 847 A.2d 1073 (2004). "The factors, however, serve simply as guidelines to assist the court in its determination of the child's best interest, and each factor need not be proven by clear and convincing evidence." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Victoria B., supra, 79 Conn.App. 258-59. In the dispositional phase, the court may consider events occurring through the close of the dispositional hearing. Practice Book § 35a-9. These criteria and this court's findings are as follows:
(1) "The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent."
DCF offered appropriate and timely services to facilitate the return of the child to the respondent mother. The mother failed to take advantage of the services the department had to offer. She did not keep her whereabouts known to the department for extended periods of time. She did not make herself readily available for referrals. Due to her inability and unwillingness to successfully address her substance abuse and transient lifestyle, she failed to make any demonstrable progress in improving her child-caring and parenting abilities. The Department did everything it reasonably could to reunify the mother with the child, and it was the mother's conduct that led to the failure of those efforts.
DCF offered appropriate and timely services to facilitate the return of the child to the father. The father failed to take advantage of services the department had to offer. He did not keep his whereabouts known to the department for extended periods of time. He did not make himself readily available for referrals. Due to his inability and unwillingness to address his substance abuse and transient lifestyle, he failed to make any demonstrable progress in improving his child-caring and parenting abilities. The department did everything it reasonably could to reunify the father with the child, and it was the father's conduct that led to the failure of those efforts.
(2) "Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended."
DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify the mother with the child. Her failure to be reunified with the child is a result of her failure to address her substance abuse and housing issues.
DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify the father with the child. His failure to be reunified with the child is a result of his failure to address his substance abuse and housing issues.
(3) "The terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent and the extent to which the parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order."
On 8/1/03, the court issued specific steps to the respondent mother. She failed to comply with the specific steps including keep whereabouts known to DCF, participate in parenting and individual counseling and make progress toward identified treatment goals, comply with recommended service providers, secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income, no substance abuse, and visit with the child as often as DCF permits. She had minimal contact with the child. The mother displayed little dedication to meeting her child-caring and parenting obligations.
On 1/12/04, the court issued specific steps to the respondent father. He failed to successfully comply with specific steps including participate in parenting education, cooperate with substance abuse treatment services, and visit with the child as often as DCF permits. He had minimal contact with the child. The father displayed little dedication to meeting his child-caring and parenting obligations.
(4) "The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional CT Page 13891 ties."
The child has little, if any, positive feelings toward her parents, but she appears bonded with and has significant ties with her current foster parent. She has been in the same foster care placement since 11/14/03.
(5) "The age of the child"
Rickaria B. is 13 months old.
(6) "The efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child."
The respondent mother made little effort to adjust her circumstances or conduct to allow reunification with the child, so the child's return to her would be in the child's best interest. She failed to address her substance abuse issues. She failed to keep her whereabouts known to the department. She failed to fully comply with the recommended services. She failed to maintain suitable and adequate housing and income. She failed to maintain regular contact with the child.
The respondent father made little effort to adjust his circumstances or conduct to allow reunification with the child, so the child's return to him would be in the child's best interest. He failed to address his substance abuse issues. He failed to keep his whereabouts known to the department. He failed to fully comply with the recommended services. He failed to maintain suitable and adequate housing and income. He failed to maintain regular contact with the child.
(7) "The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other parent or by the economic circumstances of the parent."
The mother did not face any unreasonable interference from any person or economic circumstances preventing her from establishing or maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child. The mother was provided the assistance of counsel at state expense. She was offered services, but she failed to fully comply.
The father did not face any unreasonable interference from any person or economic circumstances preventing him from establishing or maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child. He was also provided with the assistance of counsel at state expense. He was offered services, but he failed to fully comply.
BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
The court must now address the issue of whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child. This is part of the dispositional phase of a termination proceeding. In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 511, 613 A.2d 748 (1992) ("the determination of the child's best interests comes into play only after statutory grounds for termination of parental rights have been established by clear and convincing evidence"). The court can consider all events occurring through the close of the dispositional hearing. Practice Book § 35a-9.
The Appellate Court has "consistently held that to allow a child to languish in foster care is not in the child's best interest" In re Drew R., 47 Conn.App. 124, 131, 702 A.2d 647 (1997). The child has been in foster care since late 7/03. Given her age and her specialized needs, the child requires a caretaker that will be consistently available to meet her emotional and physical needs. The foster parents are stable and permanency is paramount to the child's development. The child is doing well and has bonded with the foster parents. The foster parents have expressed a willingness to adopt. Removal from the foster home would cause harm to the child's well-being.
The respondent parents have significant issues that impact on their ability to be good parents. They have failed to fully address their substance abuse issues and the impact these addictions have on their child. Since the child was removed, the department has provided services to the parents. The parents were unable or unwilling to benefit from these services. Both parents failed to fully comply with the specific steps. They have avoided their responsibilities by keeping their whereabouts unknown for extended periods of time. Both parents failed to make themselves readily available for services. They have had minimal contact with the child. They are not in a position to meet the needs of the child in the foreseeable future. To delay or disrupt a permanent placement while the parents continue to work on their issues, with no clear end in sight, is not in the best interest of the child.
Based upon the foregoing findings, and having considered all the evidence and statutory considerations, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the child's best interest to terminate the parental rights of Paula H. and Richard B.
JUDGMENT
The petition is granted and judgment may enter terminating the parental rights of Paula H. and Richard B.
For the reasons set forth above, the petitioner's motion to review the permanency plan is granted and the respondent mother's objection is denied.
The Commissioner for Children and Families is appointed statutory parent for Rickaria B. The Commissioner is to file with the court no later than thirty days following the date of judgment, a written report toward a permanent plan for the child.
The court further finds that the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to effectuate the permanency plan.
BY THE COURT:
Bentivegna, J.