Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County Super.Ct.No. RIJ112505. Robyn Rogers, Temporary Judge. Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.
Jackie Menaster, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Jr., Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Marvin E. Mizell and Stephanie H. Chow, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RICHLI, Acting P.J.
On July 11, 2006, the Riverside County District Attorney filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition, charging minor with unlawful possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359).
On October 4, 2006, after a contested hearing, the juvenile court found the allegation true. The court also found minor’s legal residence to be in Los Angeles County and transferred the matter to Los Angeles County Superior Court for disposition. The court then placed minor in the custody of his father pending the transfer.
Minor filed a timely notice of appeal. Minor contends that the juvenile court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence.
I
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On June 5, 2006, about 5:20 p.m., Officer Jesse Marquez was dispatched to a possible vandalism in progress at a private park located in an apartment complex in Corona. The dispatch reported that about 10 juvenile males were burning a bench at the park and gave a clothing description. When the officer arrived at the park, he saw three juveniles crossing the street, coming from the park. The officer told the juveniles that he was investigating a possible crime at the park and asked them to “have a seat for me.” The juveniles complied.
At that time, Officer Timothy Slane arrived at the scene. Officer Marquez asked Officer Slane to go to the park to check for any burn marks or residue on the park bench. Officer Slane reported that there was significant vandalism, including burn marks, on the park bench. Officer Marquez then went to look at the damage while the other officer waited with the three juveniles. “Every inch” of the park bench was tagged with graffiti, burned, or damaged; Officer Marquez could not determine if the burn marks were fresh. When he returned, he and Officer Slane searched the juveniles with their consent.
Officer Slane patted minor down. In minor’s right pocket, the officer found a large baggie and five small, individually wrapped baggies; the baggies contained a green leafy substance. The officer also found approximately $80 in cash, in $20 denominations, in minor’s other pocket. Officer Marquez placed minor under arrest for possession of marijuana for sale.
The parties stipulated that the substance found on minor tested positive for marijuana and weighed 27.16 grams. Detective Tony Meyer opined that minor possessed the marijuana for sale based on the way the marijuana was packaged, the amount of cash minor was carrying, the lack of paraphernalia, and minor’s location in the park.
II
ANALYSIS
Minor contends that there was no reasonable suspicion to justify his initial detention, and even if the detention were justified, the detention became illegally prolonged. Minor also contends that any consent obtained after the illegal detention was invalid.
A. Standard of Review
“Our standard of review on appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial court’s factual findings where supported by substantial evidence, but we must exercise our independent judgment to determine whether, on the facts found, the search and seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness. [Citation.]” (People v. Avila (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1073-1074; accord People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 846; People v. Loewen (1983) 35 Cal.3d 117, 123.) The standard of review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is equally applicable to juvenile court proceedings. (In re Lennies H. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1236.)
B. The Detention Was Proper
“The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that ‘The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .’ The protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment have been held to be applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [Citation.] In deciding the reasonableness of the search and seizure at issue here, we are bound by the lower court’s findings of fact so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] We determine independently, however, the legal issue of whether, on the facts found, the search was reasonable within the meaning of the Constitution. [Citation.]” (People v. Gorrostieta (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 71, 80; see also Ornelas v. U.S. (1996) 517 U.S. 690 [ 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911].)
In order to justify the officers’ actions, we must first determine whether they had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in criminal activity, sufficient to support the detention. (See People v. Harris (1975) 15 Cal.3d 384; People v. Gatch (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 505, 508-509.) A reasonable suspicion of involvement in criminal activity will justify a temporary stop and detention even though the circumstances are also consistent with lawful activity. Typically, the purpose of the detention is to resolve the ambiguity. (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 233; In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893-894; U.S. v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 274-276 [ 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 74]; U.S. v. Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 7-8 [ 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 ].) Even if individual factors are susceptible to innocent explanation, and some factors are more probative than others, taken together they may suffice to form a particularized and objective basis for an investigatory stop. (Souza, at p. 233; Arvizu, at p. 277.)
“It is settled that circumstances short of probable cause to make an arrest may justify a police officer stopping and briefly detaining a person for questioning or other limited investigation.” (In re Tony C., supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 892, citing Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 22 [88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889].) However, the police are not free to detain citizens at will. “ . . . ‘[I] n order to justify an investigative stop or detention the circumstances known or apparent to the officer must include specific and articulable facts causing him to suspect that (1) some activity relating to crime has taken place or is occurring or about to occur, and (2) the person he intends to stop or detain is involved in that activity. Not only must he subjectively entertain such a suspicion, but it must be objectively reasonable for him to do so: the facts must be such as would cause any reasonable police officer in a like position, drawing when appropriate on his training and experience [citation], to suspect the same criminal activity, and the same involvement by the person in question. The corollary to this rule, of course, is that any investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith. [Citation.]’” (In re James D. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 903, 914, quoting In re Tony C., at p. 893; see also People v. Renteria (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 440, 443; People v. Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 231 [“[a] detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity”].)
In this case, the officers’ actions were reasonable, and the totality of the circumstances warranted the officers’ detention of minor. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Marquez testified that he received a dispatch reporting that approximately 10 juvenile males were burning a bench in a park. When Officer Marquez arrived at the park 15 to 20 minutes later, he saw three juveniles crossing the street, “coming from the park.” There was no one else at the park. Officer Marquez testified that the juveniles matched the description given for the male suspects, although at the hearing the officer could not remember the exact clothing description given.
Officer Marquez stopped the juveniles to determine whether they were involved in the reported vandalism at the park. The officer testified that the juveniles were not free to leave. While Officer Slane investigated the park, Officer Marquez asked the juveniles what they were doing at the park. They stated that they were visiting a friend living in the complex where the private park was located, but they would not reveal the name of their friend or inform the officer where their friend lived.
Upon confirming the vandalism in the park, Officer Marquez asked the three juveniles if they possessed anything illegal; they replied no. Officer Slane asked minor if he would consent to a search; minor gave consent. Officer Slane then patted minor down and found the contraband and money in his pockets.
In sum, minor’s age, gender, clothing, conduct, location and presence in a group were consistent with his possible participation in the criminal activity -- vandalism in a private park -- that the police were investigating. Under the case law cited above, the facts in this case support the trial court’s finding “that sufficient facts were presented to support the actions of the officers in this encounter with the minor; that they had a reasonable suspicion [to detain minor] . . . .” Therefore, we hold that the officers had reasonable cause to detain minor.
C. The Detention Was Not Unduly Prolonged
Minor argues that, even if the initial detention were proper, minor’s detention “became an illegally prolonged detention.” The People argue that this issue was forfeited because minor failed to argue this contention below. We need not address the waiver argument because minor’s claim fails on the merits.
“[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” (Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 500 [103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229].) There is no fixed time limit or rigid formula for determining the constitutionality of an investigatory detention. (People v. Gomez (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 531, 537.) A detention is deemed unconstitutional when it extends beyond what is reasonably necessary under the circumstances that made its initiation permissible. (Ibid.) The issue is whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation reasonably designed to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly. (Id. at p. 538.) In determining this issue, courts may consider that information may come to light during a detention that provides a reasonable basis for extending the detention. (People v. Russell (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 96, 102.)
In this case, the officers had an interest in preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence was found; they did not detain the juveniles for longer than was necessary to complete their investigation of the vandalism. When Officer Marquez asked the three juveniles what they were doing near the park, the juveniles gave evasive answers. This conduct provided a reasonable basis to extend the detention during the investigation of the park. The juveniles were detained only for the time it took the officers to investigate the damage to the park bench. After both officers inspected the park bench and could not determine whether any of the vandalism was “fresh,” the officers had a reasonable basis to search the juveniles to determine whether they had any items that may have been used in the vandalism in order to either confirm or dispel the officers’ suspicions that the juveniles committed the vandalism. Therefore, we find that minor’s detention was not unduly prolonged.
We need not address minor’s contention that his consent to the search was invalid, because the officers had a reasonable suspicion to detain the juveniles, and the detention was not illegally prolonged.
Based on the above, we find that the juvenile court properly denied minor’s motion to suppress evidence.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: GAUT J., KING J.