To establish the existence of a contract implied-in-fact in the District of Columbia, a party must initially demonstrate, (1) that valuable services were rendered, (2) to the person from whom recovery is sought, (3) which services were accepted by that person, and (4) under such circumstances as reasonably notified the person that the plaintiff expected to be paid by that person. Vereen, 623 A.2d 1190 (citing In re Rich, 337 A.2d 764, 766 (D.C. 1975). The first three elements are quickly resolved.
(1) valuable services must be rendered [by the plaintiff]; (2) for the person sought to be charged; (3) which services were accepted by the person sought to be charged, and enjoyed by him or her; and (4) under such circumstances as reasonably notified the person sought to be charged that the plaintiff, in performing such services, expected to be paid.In re Rich, 337 A.2d 764, 766 (D.C. 1975). TVL argues first that quantum meruit recovery is not appropriate in this case because it did not benefit from A M's services.
(4) under such circumstances as reasonably notified the person sought to be charged that the plaintiff, in performing such services, expected to be paid by him or her.In re Rich, 337 A.2d 764, 766 (D.C.1975). Direct Supply has alleged facts sufficient to state a quantum-meruit claim against NFP.
Am. Compl. p 45. To prevail on such a claim, a party "must show that the services [it performed] were beneficial to the recipient." Fred Ezra Co. v. Pedas, 682 A.2d 173, 176 (D.C. 1996); In re Rich, 337 A.2d 764, 766 (D.C. 1975) ("The essential elements for recovery . . . [include] valuable services being rendered . . . for the person sought to be charged."). Novecon alleges that "[t]he benefit[s] derived by BAEF" were Novecon's "(1) meeting with the landowners to try to negotiate a different percentage of the deal and (2) meeting with Bulgarian officials to obtain zoning for the project."
(1) valuable services must be rendered by the plaintiff; (2) for the person sought to be charged; (3) which services were accepted by the person sought to be charged and enjoyed by him or her; and (4) under such circumstances as reasonably notified the person sought to be charged that the plaintiff, in performing such services, expected to be paid.TVL Assoc. v. A M Constr. Corp., 474 A.2d 156, 159 (D.C. 1984) (citing In re Rich, 337 A.2d 764, 766 (D.C. 1975)). As the D.C. Court of Appeals has explained, a promise to pay will be implied in law when one party renders valuable services that the other party knowingly and voluntarily accepts.
(1) valuable services must be rendered by the plaintiff; (2) for the person sought to be charged; (3) which services were accepted by the person sought to be charged and enjoyed by him or her; and (4) under such circumstances as reasonably notified the person sought to be charged that the plaintiff, in performing such services, expected to be paid.TVL Assoc. v. A M Constr. Corp., 474 A.2d 156, 159 (D.C. 1984) (citing In re Rich, 337 A.2d 764, 766 (D.C. 1975)). As the D.C. Court of Appeals has explained, a promise to pay will be implied in law when one party renders valuable services that the other party knowingly and voluntarily accepts.
Next, with regard to the claim for quantum meruit, Novecon cannot show that it rendered any "valuable services" to BAEF. See In re Rich, 337 A.2d 764, 766 (D.C. 1975) ("The essential elements for recovery [include] valuable services rendered . . . for the person sought to be charged. . . . ."). Although Novecon contends that it performed certain, unspecified "work" for BAEF, presumably referring to its preliminary negotiations with the Batsov family, it is clear from the record that such work — although causing a detriment to Novecon — resulted in nothing of value to BAEF. "[A] party's expenditures in preparation for performance that do not confer a benefit on the other party do not give rise to a restitution interest."
"Quantum meruit is available where the parties understand and intend that compensation is to be paid, but that is not the case here." Cherokee Oil Co., Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 706 F. Supp. 826, 830 (M.D. Fla. 1989) aff'd sub nom. Cherokee Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co., 901 F.2d 1114 (11th Cir. 1990); see also In re Rich, 337 A.2d 764, 766 (D.C. 1975) ("It is clear that if the services are rendered freely with no expectation of payment, or rendered officiously, quantum meruit is to be denied."). IV
The obvious error in the debtor's argument concerning his interpretation of the Rules is that under Rule 305(c), the trustee is required to get prior approval of all expenditures from the estate — meaning withdrawals of money — except those provided by statute. See In re Conservatorship for Rich, 337 A.2d 764, 766 (D.C. 1975); Rosendorf v. Toomey, 349 A.2d 694, 702 (D.C. 1975). Because compensation under Rule 308(e) can be reduced below the usual percentages, see n. 6 (language in emphasis), it follows that the debtor could not even argue that the compensation he is entitled to as the officer making the sale of the property is provided by statute, even assuming Rule 308(e) were a "statute" within the meaning of that term as used in Rule 305(c).
Mr. Snead represents that the court approved compensation of an attorney for the ward at the rate of $250 per hour. (Appellant's Br. 12). We remand for the trial court to determine: (1) whether Mr. Snead performed services for Mr. Watkins and, if so, which services were legal and non-legal, respectively; (2) whether Mr. Snead is entitled to reasonable compensation for legal services and for non-legal fiduciary services, respectively; (3) if so, what factors the court relies upon for determination of reasonable hourly rates for fees awardable to Mr. Snead for legal and non-legal fees, respectively; and (4) the hourly rates and resulting amounts of fees awardable to Mr. Snead, respectively, for legal and non-legal services for Mr. Watkins. Ginberg, supra, 678 A.2d at 552; In re Rich, 337 A.2d 764, 767 (D.C. 1975). So ordered.