This Court has recently noted that "lead[ing] a good life free of criminal conduct and ethical misdeeds is not proof of . . . current professional competence." In re Reed, Del.Supr., 584 A.2d 1207, 1209 (1990). The Court recognizes that it is difficult to establish fitness and competence to practice law for an attorney who has been prohibited from demonstrating that fitness and competence for some 23 years.

Cases involving reinstatement proceedings cited by ODC in its brief involved petitions for reinstatement from disbarment, where the underlying misconduct was serious misconduct such as theft from clients. See, In re Reed, 584 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1990)(disbarred after conviction for theft following a series of other disciplinary actions), In re Bennethum, 278 A.2d 831 (Del. 1971) (disbarred as a result of being convicted of giving false testimony and fabricating evidence in his criminal trial for willful failure to file tax returns) and In re Hawkins, 87 A. 243 (Del. 1913)(disbarred after being convicted of embezzlement from a client) and cases on reinstatement like In re Clark, 406 A.2d 28 (Del. 1979) (cited in Reed) (disbarred after diverting approximately $100,000 from his clients). The Panel finds In re Pankowski, Del.Supr., No. 503, 2013, Jacobs J. (October 13, 2014) more helpful in that it specifically addressed a similar situations to that leading to Petitioner's suspension, where the attorney had an alcohol addiction that contributed to the behavior leading to his suspension.

Bd.Prof.Resp.R. 23(d). Under either scenario, reinstatement will be allowed only upon a "produc[tion of] clear and convincing evidence of professional rehabilitation, fitness to practice, and competence," In re Reed, Del.Supr., 584 A.2d 1207, 1209 (1990) (interpreting Rule 23 of the Rules of the Board on Professional Responsibility) (emphasis omitted), and "that the resumption of the practice of law within Delaware will not be detrimental to the administration of justice[,]" Bd. Prof.Resp.R. 23(f). Lawyers, not originally successful, may reapply for reinstatement.

Given McCann's past sanctions, and the gravity of the violations here, compared with sanctions imposed on other lawyers, the sanction here should be a suspension of not less than one year, beginning January 1, 1996. The one-year suspension is subject to reinstatement after "produc[tion] of clear and convincing evidence of professional rehabilitation, fitness to practice law, and competence," In re Reed, Del.Supr., 584 A.2d 1207, 1209 (1990) (interpreting Rule 23 of Rules of Board on Professional Responsibility) (emphasis omitted), as well as a showing "that the resumption of the practice of law within Delaware will not be detrimental to the administration of justice," Bd.Prof.Resp.R. 23(f). The conduct of the members of the Bar must meet reasonable professional standards so that the public is appropriately served by and protected from any member of the Bar of this Court who (like McCann in this case) lacks diligence in handling client matters, prepares and files false documents, and allows himself to act as a lawyer in preparing a will which benefits him. It is the exclusive responsibility of this Court to preserve the integrity of the Bar. Accordingly, THEJUDGMENT OF THIS COURT IS AS FOLLOWS:

This is necessary in view of the need to assure that Mekler will take further and effective measures, beyond those noted in the list of mitigating factors, to organize and supervise his office. Mekler will be eligible to apply for reinstatement after completion of the one-year suspension and after "produc[tion] [of] clear and convincing evidence of professional rehabilitation, fitness to practice, and competence," In re Reed, Del.Supr., 584 A.2d 1207, 1209 (1990) (interpreting Rule 23 of Rules of Board on Professional Responsibility) (emphasis omitted), as well as a showing "that the resumption of the practice of law within Delaware will not be detrimental to the administration of justice," Bd. Prof.Resp.R. 23(f). The conduct of the members of the Bar must meet reasonable professional standards so that the public is appropriately served by and protected from any member of the Bar of this Court who (like Mekler in this case) operates his or her practice in a sloppy, grossly negligent and disrespectful manner in disregard of minimal professional expectations. It is the exclusive responsibility of this Court to preserve the integrity of the Bar. Accordingly, THE JUDGMENT OF THIS COURT IS AS FOLLOWS:

Given the seriousness of Figliola's violations, we feel a showing of rehabilitation is necessary before Figliola can be reinstated to the Delaware Bar. Reinstatement after this period will be allowed only upon a "produc[tion] of clear and convincing evidence of professional rehabilitation, fitness to practice law, and competence," In re Reed, Del.Supr., 584 A.2d 1207, 1209 (1990) (interpreting Rule 23 of Rules of Board on Professional Responsibility) (emphasis omitted), as well as a showing "that the resumption of the practice of law within Delaware will not be detrimental to the administration of justice[,]" Bd.Prof.Resp.R. 23(f). The Court adopts the conditions for reinstatement imposed by the Board and additional conditions calculated to show a sensitivity to client and Firm responsibilities and the handling of financial affairs.