Opinion
2000-08936
Argued November 5, 2001
December 3, 2001.
In a proceeding pursuant to RPTL article 7 to review a real property tax assessment for the tax year 1998-1999, Reckson Operating Partnership, L.P., appeals from an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Nicolai, J.), entered August 24, 2000, which granted the motion of the Assessor(s) of the Town of Greenburgh and the Town of Greenburgh for summary judgment, denied the petition, and dismissed the proceeding.
Podell, Schwartz, Schechter Banfield, LLP, New York, N Y (William E. Banfield and Gary Schuller of counsel), for appellant.
Susan A. Mancuso, Town Attorney, Elmsford, N.Y. (F. Peter O'Hara of counsel), for respondents.
Before: FRED T. SANTUCCI, J.P., GLORIA GOLDSTEIN, ANITA R. FLORIO, LEO F. McGINITY, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order and judgment is affirmed, with costs.
The property valuation by a tax assessor is presumptively valid, and in challenging the assessment, a petitioner must come forward with substantial evidence to the contrary (see, Matter of FMC Corp. v. Unmack, 92 N.Y.2d 179, 187). In a tax assessment case, the substantial evidence standard requires "that petitioner demonstrate the existence of a valid and credible dispute regarding valuation" (Matter of FMC Corp. v. Unmack, supra, at 188). It is well settled that "the purchase price set in the course of an arm's length transaction of recent vintage, if not explained away as abnormal in any fashion, is evidence of the `highest rank' to determine the true value of the property at that time" (Plaza Hotel Assoc. v. Wellington Assoc., 37 N.Y.2d 273, 277, quoting Matter of Woolworth Co. v. Tax Comm. of City of N.Y., 20 N.Y.2d 561, 565). The Supreme Court properly granted the respondents' motion for summary judgment, since they established that the recent sale price of the property was the best evidence of value of the property in question (see, Matter of FMC Corp. v. Unmack, supra, at 189). In opposition, the appellant failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
The appellant's remaining contention is without merit.
SANTUCCI, J.P., GOLDSTEIN, FLORIO and McGINITY, JJ., concur.