Opinion
No. 336906
09-14-2017
In re REAVES, Minors.
UNPUBLISHED Washtenaw Circuit Court Family Division
LC Nos. 15-000011-NA; 15-000012-NA; 15-000013-NA; 15-000014-NA; 15-000015-NA; 15-000016-NA; 15-000017-NA Before: HOEKSTRA, P.J., and METER and K. F. KELLY, JJ. PER CURIAM.
In this child protection case, respondent appeals as of right the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to seven children: NHR, AMR, MDR, IMR, JER, and twins, BFR and MCR. Respondent had two older children, AS and NS, from a previous relationship, who were not in her care during the events at issue. The trial court found that petitioner, Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), established by clear and convincing evidence grounds to terminate respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). It also found that termination was in the children's best interests. Because the trial court did not clearly err by terminating respondent's parental rights, we affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The evidence showed that respondent has a long and significant history of abuse. As a teenager, respondent had been removed from her mother's care as a result of abuse and placed with relatives, where she suffered further abuse. Respondent became involved with the father of her two oldest children while still a teenager. He physically abused her for a period of years, resulting in frequent police contact for domestic violence calls. One officer in particular recalled that the father of respondent's two oldest children used to beat respondent—and it was "not just the typical shove," "she used to get beat up pretty bad." Ultimately, respondent's oldest daughter, AS, became a ward of the court and NS went to live in a relative's care.
Later, respondent began a relationship with the father of the seven children at issue here. This man also beat respondent, and police officers frequently had contact with her about his abuse. Respondent obtained a personal protection order (PPO) against him and he spent time in jail for battering respondent, but she continued to see him. It was undisputed that the children witnessed the violence against respondent. There was even evidence that the children tried to intervene to protect respondent. Notably, despite this violent abuse, respondent still chose to place the children in his care while she worked long hours.
The DHHS removed the children in February 2015, after a hospital staff member reported that BFR, who was then about three months old, had been admitted to the hospital with a skull fracture and subdural hematoma. In addition, MCR had a leg fracture that was indicative of abuse. BFR was later diagnosed with cerebral palsy arising from the injuries that she sustained. Father admitted that he caused the physical injuries to BFR and MCR, and his parental rights were terminated. Respondent also pleaded to allegations establishing jurisdiction; she agreed that she left her seven children in father's care while she was working long hours even though she knew from personal experience that he was violent. After providing services aimed at reunification, the DHHS eventually petitioned to terminate respondent's parental rights. In January 2017, after a termination hearing, the trial court terminated respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). Respondent now appeals as of right to this Court.
On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding statutory grounds for termination and by concluding that termination was in the children's best interests. According to respondent, she has suitable income and housing, she is no longer involved with dangerous domestic partners, she has participated in services, and expert testimony from Dr. Robert Ortega established that at some point she might be able to at least parent NHR and AMR. In these circumstances, respondent contends that the trial court clearly erred by terminating her parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). Respondent maintains that these same facts also demonstrate that termination was not in the children's best interests. With regard to the children's best interests, respondent also contends that the trial court failed to consider the children, specifically NHR and AMR, individually.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review for clear error both a trial court's finding that a statutory ground has been proved by clear and convincing evidence and that termination is in the children's best interests. In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). A trial court's finding is clearly erroneous when, after reviewing the entire evidence, this Court is left with the definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake. In re Gonzales/Martinez Minors, 310 Mich App 426, 430-431; 871 NW2d 868 (2015). "When reviewing the trial court's findings of fact, this Court accords deference to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 541; 702 NW2d 192 (2005).
III. STATUTORY GROUNDS
A trial court may terminate a parent's parental rights if it finds that the petitioner has established at least one of the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. MCL 712A.19b(3); In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App at 431. In this case, the trial court found statutory grounds for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j), which state:
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds [that]:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
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(g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
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(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child's parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent. [MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j).]
With regard to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), the trial court took jurisdiction over the minor children after respondent left them in their father's care and he inflicted a severe head injury on BFR and fractured MCR's lower leg. At the adjudication, respondent admitted that she knew from personal experience that the children's father had a propensity for violence and that she nevertheless repeatedly left the children in his care for long periods of time. In other words, she failed to keep her children safe from an abusive adult. See In re Dearmon, 303 Mich App 684, 700; 847 NW2d 514 (2014). The DHHS thereafter offered her services for more than 182 days to help her better understand her role as the children's caregiver and to appreciate how she contributed to the harms inflicted on the children. In particular, DHHS provided her with psychological evaluations to identify her underlying mental health needs and then provided her with therapy to help her end the cycle of violence that had pervaded her life. Despite these services and opportunities, at the time of the termination hearing, respondent still lacked the judgment necessary to protect her children from violence.
More specifically, the clinical psychologist who evaluated respondent in May 2015, Joshua Ehrlich, opined that respondent was unable to provide a safe home for her children because she was "unable to protect her children adequately from harm" and she was not "prepared to make the sort of substantive changes that would be necessary to ameliorate those conditions." He came to these conclusions because, as a result of childhood trauma, respondent "defensively dissociates" and denies reality in a way that led her to deny the danger posed by the violent men with whom she associated. While it could be possible to overcome the effects of childhood trauma, Ehrlich believed that respondent's impairment reflected a "level of trauma that interferes with judgment" to such a degree that "it is not easily remediated." He opined that she would need "intensive treatment over many years."
Following Ehrlich's evaluation, despite his somewhat dim view of respondent's prognosis, the DHHS provided respondent with mental health services in the hope that she would be able to parent her children within a reasonable time. Unfortunately, there was substantial evidence that respondent did not benefit from the services. For instance, despite services, respondent continued to exercise poor judgment in her choice of romantic partners. Evidence showed that, during the pendency of this case, respondent became involved with a convicted sex offender (whose offense involved a child), and she brought him around her children. Respondent allowed this man to live with her, and she did not disclose this relationship to her therapists. Like past boyfriends, this man physically assaulted respondent. Indeed, he imprisoned and tortured respondent, and went to prison. In short, once again, respondent followed a pattern of involving herself with a dangerous man who posed a risk to her and her children.
Moreover, as her relationship with this abusive man demonstrates, despite opportunities for therapy and other services, respondent simply still did not understand that she should avoid dangerous men for her own well-being and for the safety of her children. At the termination hearing, respondent essentially testified that it was not her fault that she became involved with another violent man. She claimed that she was not receiving the support that she needed from DHHS. Respondent similarly testified that she had to allow the children's father to watch the children because DHHS had not provided her with support at that time. When asked whether she had made any mistakes as a parent, respondent again blamed DHHS; she stated that whatever defects she had were its responsibility because she was once a ward of the state. When pressed on this issue, respondent could not identify any of her own parenting shortcomings. She simply refused to see that her poor relationship choices not only enabled the physical violence that she suffered, but also harmed her children. See, e.g., In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App at 432. While we do not discount the significant trauma and abuse that respondent has suffered in her lifetime, her lack of insight into the role she played in exposing the children to danger and in continuing this cycle of violence is indicative of the fact that she remains unable to protect her children. Cf. In re Dearmon, 303 Mich App at 700.
Nevertheless, respondent contends that she should be given additional time to participate in services in light of the testimony offered by Dr. Ortega, who opined that, with further counseling and treatment for a minimum of six months, respondent might be able to reach a point where she could parent NHR and AMR. We are not persuaded by respondent's contention that Dr. Ortega's testimony renders the trial court's decision clearly erroneous. First, the credibility of Dr. Ortega's testimony was for the trial court. In re Fried, 266 Mich App at 541. Second, Dr. Ortega did not suggest that the condition leading to adjudication had been rectified or that respondent was ready to parent her children. At most, he said she might be able to parent two of her children after more treatment. At the time of termination, the children had been out of respondent's care for almost two years, and the trial court did not clearly err by concluding that she could not rectify the conditions leading to the adjudication within a reasonable time. Indeed, the facts show that respondent has already had a lengthy opportunity to participate in services, but, as discussed, she did not benefit from those services.
Insofar as respondent notes that she did participate in services, the fact of mere participation does not render the trial court's decision clearly erroneous. As this Court has stated, "it is not enough" for a parent to merely participate in services; "a parent must benefit from the services offered so that he or she can improve parenting skills to the point where the children would no longer be at risk in the parent's custody." In re Gazella, 264 Mich App 668, 676; 692 NW2d 708 (2005), superseded by statute in part on other grounds by MCL 712A.19b(5). While this case was pending, respondent completed parenting classes, participated in the mental health assessments, and attended therapy. Yet, as discussed, she did not benefit from services and she remained unable to provide proper care for her children. Indeed, rather than focusing her energies on benefiting from services, it appears that, at every opportunity, she lashed out at and undermined the professionals and caregivers who were trying to help her and her children. There was evidence that she stalked a foster parent, repeatedly made unsubstantiated claims against the foster parents to CPS, and threatened or interfered with the professionals who were addressing her needs and the needs of her children. Such conduct does not demonstrate that respondent benefited from the services offered.
Overall, the evidence demonstrates that respondent had time to make changes and the opportunity to take advantage of a variety of services; and, yet, despite these opportunities she lacked insight into her role in the harms suffered by her children, making it very likely that she would again endanger the children if they were returned to her care. In these circumstances, we are not left with the definite and firm conviction that the trial court clearly erred when it found that DHHS had proved by clear and convincing evidence that the condition that led to the adjudication—respondent's inability to exclude violent men from her children's lives—continued to exist and that there was no reasonable likelihood that she could rectify the condition within a reasonable time considering the children's ages. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i); In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 710; 846 NW2d 61 (2014).
"Only one statutory ground need be established by clear and convincing evidence to terminate a respondent's parental rights." In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 (2011). However, we note that the same evidence supporting termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) also supported the trial court's findings that respondent, "without regard to intent," failed to provide her children with proper care or custody and that there was "no reasonable expectation" that she would "be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time" considering the children's ages. MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). The evidence that respondent's children had already suffered mental, emotional, and physical harms as a result of their exposure to respondent's violent intimate partners and that respondent would likely continue to choose to be with such men, also supported a finding that there was "a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity" of respondent, that the children would "be harmed if . . . returned to the home of the parent." MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). The evidence showed that respondent would again involve herself with a man who would abuse her and, as a result, her children would either be exposed to a violent home environment or would be directly harmed at the hands of an abuser. Cf. In re Dearmon, 303 Mich App at 700; In re Plump, 294 Mich App 270, 273; 817 NW2d 119 (2011). Thus, the trial court did not clearly err when it found that DHHS had proved these additional grounds by clear and convincing evidence.
IV. BEST INTERESTS
"If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests, the court shall order termination of parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be made." MCL 712A.19b(5). "[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence." In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). The trial court may consider a variety of factors, including the "child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home." In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App at 434 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Trial courts have a duty to decide the best interests of children individually. Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 42. However, the trial court is only required to address differences in the best interests between children when the best interests significantly differ; the court does not have to make redundant factual findings. In re White, 303 Mich App at 715-716.
In this case, discussing the children's respective bonds with respondent, the court found that the two oldest girls appeared to be bonded to respondent, but it expressed "serious doubts as to how healthy it [was]." The three boys had varying degrees of a bond with her, the court stated, but not as strong as that of the two older girls. It found that the twins had no bond with her at all. Thus, respondent's bond with the children did not militate against termination.
Turning to respondent's parenting ability, the trial court noted that, even after receiving services, respondent lacked insight into how to "safely parent these children." The trial court also reasoned that all of the children needed permanency, stability, and finality in a safe environment if they were to have any chance of overcoming the trauma that they already suffered under respondent's care. The court did not fault respondent for the violence that she had suffered throughout her life, but it noted that the violence was "deep" and "pervasive." The court emphasized that respondent had been given an opportunity for services and, despite some participation, she did not demonstrate any real benefit and instead remained unable to meet her children's needs and to protect them from harm.
The court also found that the children had each shown improvement outside of respondent's care. The trial court's findings in this regard were supported by testimony and evidence that all the children had problems when first removed from respondent's care. The twins had both been physically injured, and BFR suffered severe neurological deficits. The three boys each had developmental delays, and there was evidence that they were aggressive and difficult to control. Finally, an agency worker testified that the two older girls had become mature beyond their years, because—at eight and nine years of age—they had to take on a maternal role. While in foster care, each child had made gains. BFR had shown improvements in her function and MCR was meeting her milestones. The boys too were showing signs of being better able to handle their emotions and aggression. The two older girls had also developed lighter attitudes and were able to act their ages more often. Given the gains in foster care and respondent's inability to provide a safe home, the court found that termination was in the children's best interests; it was "confident that they [would] get the best chance" if they were not returned to respondent's care. On the facts of this case, it cannot be said that the trial court clearly erred when it found that termination was in the children's best interests.
On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court erred by failing to separately consider the best interests of the two older girls. However, the record clearly shows that the trial court properly considered the best interests of the two older girls separately to the extent their interests differed from the younger children. In re White, 303 Mich App at 715-716. For instance, the court acknowledged that they appeared to be more bonded with respondent, but it also expressed doubt that the bond was healthy, which was supported by evidence that the girls had been forced into a more maternal role in the family. The court also recognized that Dr. Ortega had opined that respondent might be able to parent the older girls at some point, but the court reasonably determined that this did not weigh against termination because Dr. Ortega's conclusion was based on the fact that the girls would put fewer demands on respondent, not because respondent had improved her parenting skills. The court considered these differences and it found that termination was in the best interests of the older girls, notwithstanding the evidence that they had a bond with respondent and that respondent might be able to care for them at some unknown point in the future. In short, the trial court's factual findings properly addressed the best interests of the older girls individually to the extent their circumstances differed from those of their younger siblings. Id. Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err when it found that DHHS had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the best interests of the two older girls. In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 90.
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly