Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. JV125665
NICHOLSON, J.
The minor, Raymond S., was adjudicated a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) after vandalizing Rafael Garcia’s SUV and causing damage of at least $400. (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(1).) On appeal, the minor contends the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to provide an interpreter for Garcia and that there was insufficient evidence showing the amount of damage to Garcia’s was at least $400. We affirm.
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
One evening in October 2007, Janeen Kemp heard what sounded like glass breaking coming from the vicinity of the parking lot of her apartment complex. She looked out a window and saw the minor, one of her neighbors, swinging an object and breaking the taillights and driver’s side mirror of an SUV. The minor ran off after Kemp opened the window and asked what he was doing.
Rafael Garcia, also a tenant of the apartment complex, owned the damaged SUV. When he inspected it, he saw the brake lights, headlights, both side mirrors and windshield were broken. Garcia repaired everything himself, except for the windshield. He bought used parts to make the repairs, in the amount of approximately $400.
Deputy Kevin Darling also viewed the damage to Garcia’s SUV. He saw a cracked windshield, two broken taillights, two broken side mirrors and one broken headlight. He noted there were three to four crack lines on the windshield from four to 12 inches long.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 5, 2007, a petition was filed alleging the minor was a person described under section 602 as a result of having violated Penal Code section 594, subdivision (b)(1), vandalizing Garcia’s vehicle and causing $400 or more of damage. Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the court sustained the petition and declared the minor a ward of the court. He was committed to juvenile hall for 10 days. Various fines and fees were imposed, including $400 in victim restitution.
A second charge was also alleged in the petition, but was later dismissed for insufficient evidence. Because it is not relevant to any issues on appeal, we shall not discuss it.
DISCUSSION
I
The minor contends the trial court erred in failing to provide an interpreter for the victim and witness, Rafael Garcia. He argues this failure violated his rights under the California Constitution, as “[a]n interpreter is required to fulfill not only the defendant’s state constitutional rights, but also his federal constitutional rights to due process and confrontation.” Under a separate heading, the minor also contends the trial court’s failure to provide an interpreter violated his “statutory and state and federal constitutional rights to confrontation and due process.” Although headed separately, these arguments go to the same point, that the minor’s confrontation and due process rights were violated by the failure to appoint an interpreter for the complaining witness. Accordingly, we will analyze them together.
The complaining witness, Garcia acknowledged he did not speak English very well. After a brief examination, the court took a 15-minute recess to attempt to locate an interpreter. Apparently, there were none in the courthouse. The parties proceeded with further direct examination and cross-examination. At no time did defendant object to proceeding without an interpreter for Garcia.
The record reveals what may have been a strategic purpose for this failure to object. Immediately following the close of the prosecution’s case, the minor moved to dismiss the charge based on insufficient evidence of the amount of damage. This may well have been the strategy behind not objecting to the lack of an interpreter, the hopes that the testimony would be insufficient to support the charge.
To preserve an issue for review on appeal, a defendant must interpose a specific and timely objection in the trial court on the same ground that he asserts on appeal. (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 434.) This “requirement is necessary in criminal cases because a ‘contrary rule would deprive the People of the opportunity to cure the defect at trial and would “permit the defendant to gamble on an acquittal at his trial secure in the knowledge that a conviction would be reversed on appeal.”’” (Ibid., quoting People v. Rogers (1978) 21 Cal.3d 542, 548.) This rationale is equally applicable to juvenile proceedings.
The minor contends the issue is, nonetheless, cognizable on appeal, as “an affirmative showing that [the minor] was apprised of his right and intelligently and voluntarily waived that right was required for the hearing to proceed in a constitutionally valid fashion.” He relies on People v. Aguilar (1984) 35 Cal.3d 785 (Aguilar) in support of this claim.
Aguilar does not aid the minor’s claim. Article I, section 14 of the California Constitution states that “[a] person unable to understand English who is charged with a crime has a right to an interpreter throughout the proceedings.” In Aguilar, the California Supreme Court stressed the importance this right, which enables the defendant to understand and fully participate throughout the criminal proceedings. (Id. at pp. 790-791.) Because of the crucial nature of the right to an interpreter, defense counsel may not waive it; to be effective, a waiver must be personally made by the defendant. (Id. at pp. 794-795.) However, “[u]nlike Aguilar, this case does not involve the state constitutional right of a non-English-speaking criminal defendant to be provided with a ‘proceedings interpreter;’ rather, it concerns alleged error involving ‘witness interpreters.’” (People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 411.)
Romero made clear that the general rule that a failure to object to errors committed at trial forfeits the issue on appeal applies to situations in which the claim of error relates to interpreters for witnesses. “‘“[A]s a general rule, ‘the failure to object to errors committed at trial relieves the reviewing court of the obligation to consider those errors on appeal.’ [Citations.] This applies to claims based on statutory violations, as well as claims based on violations of fundamental constitutional rights. [Citations.]”’ [Citation.] The reason for this rule is to allow errors to be corrected by the trial court and to prevent gamesmanship by the defense. [Citations.] We see no reason why the general rule of forfeiture should not be applied to violations of rules of court or to claims of error relating to interpreters for the witnesses. Here, each of the claimed violations of [the minor’s] rights could easily have been addressed and corrected in the trial court had defendant objected. His failure to do so precludes him from now asserting errors relating to the witness interpreters. [Citation.]” (People v. Romero, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 411.) The minor’s efforts to distinguish this case from Romero are unavailing. Accordingly, the issue is forfeited.
II
Penal Code section 594 defines felony vandalism as requiring the damage be in the amount of $400 or more. The minor contends the trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss the petition, as there was insufficient evidence to show the amount of damage was $400 or more.
The only evidence presented on the amount of damage done to Garcia’s vehicle was Garcia’s testimony. Garcia described the damage done to the car and explained he was able to get most of the parts to repair the car from the wrecking yard, which was less expensive than the store. He believed he spent $400 for the parts to fix the truck, although he did not have the receipts with him in court. He later testified it could have been $400.12, or more than $400. Still later, he indicated the amount could have been $399. Garcia testified a dealer wanted $1,000 for parts only to fix the car and the parts were $800 at the parts store. Garcia fixed everything himself, except the windshield. The windshield had a number of cracks in it.
After the close of the prosecution’s case, the minor moved under section 701.1 to dismiss the charge. He argued that there was insufficient evidence that the damages to the car were $400 or more. The court denied the motion, finding that the lowest amount testified to by Garcia was $399 and there remained the damage to the windshield which was “worth more than a dollar.” Accordingly, the court denied the motion.
The minor now contends the trial court “substituted for the actual evidence presented its own speculative estimate regarding the cost of the damaged windshield, to reach an unspecified total that was comfortably over the $400 required....”
“[T]he standard for review of the juvenile court's denial of a motion to dismiss is whether there is substantial evidence to support the offense charged in the petition. [Citation.] In applying the substantial evidence rule, we must ‘assume in favor of [the court's] order the existence of every fact from which the [court] could have reasonably deduced from the evidence whether the offense charged was committed and if it was perpetrated by the person or persons accused of the offense. [Citations.] Accordingly, we may not set aside the trial court's denial of the motion on the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence unless it clearly appears that upon no hypothesis whatsoever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the conclusion reached by the court below.’ [Citations.]” (In re Man J. (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 475, 482.)
Here, the evidence was that Garcia paid at least $399 on parts to repair his car, excluding the windshield. The dealer had quoted Garcia $1,000 for parts to repair his car and the parts store quote a cost of $800 for parts. Nothing in Penal Code section 594 requires direct evidence from the owner of the vandalized property to meet the $400 threshold. The high cost of body repair work is within the common knowledge of nearly every car owner. Certainly, it was not unreasonable or speculative for the court to conclude repairing the windshield would cost more than $1.00. This is particularly so, given the estimates from the dealer and the parts store, in addition to the amounts already paid for parts to repair the damage.
There was substantial evidence to support the finding that the minor caused $400 or more of damage to Garcia’s vehicle. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss was properly denied.
III
The minor next contends the cumulative impact of the errors warrants reversal. The premise behind the cumulative error doctrine is that while a number of errors may be harmless taken individually, their cumulative effect requires reversal. (People v. Bunyard (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1236.) However, in this case, we have found no errors. Accordingly, we also reject the claim of cumulative error. (People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 531.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: BLEASE, Acting P. J., CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.