Opinion
No. 05-17-00742-CV
07-05-2017
IN RE GRACIELA QUIROZ, ET AL, Relators
Original Proceeding from the 298th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 15-02671
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Francis, Brown, and Whitehill
Opinion by Justice Francis
Before the Court is relators' June 28, 2017 petition for writ of mandamus in which they complain that the trial court has failed to rule on the parties' motions for summary judgment. The underlying proceeding involves a premises liability action in which the parties agreed to litigate the legal issues of release and waiver before engaging in merits discovery. In accordance with that agreement, the trial court signed an order on November 5, 2015 continuing the initial trial setting, abating general discovery, limiting discovery to issues of release and waiver, and ordering the parties to file dispositive motions regarding release and waiver within ninety days of the order. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the trial court heard those motions on July 1, 2016. The parties filed supplemental letter briefs following the hearing and, in late August 2016, filed proposed orders. On April 10, 2017, relators filed a letter in the trial court asking if the court required additional briefing or a status conference to assist the court in ruling on the motions. On May 11, 2017, relators filed a motion for rulings on the motions. This original proceeding followed.
Availability of Mandamus Relief
When a motion is properly filed and pending before a trial court, the act of giving consideration to and ruling upon that motion is a ministerial act, and mandamus may issue to compel the trial judge to act. Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Garcia, 945 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, orig. proceeding). To obtain mandamus relief for the trial court's refusal to rule on a motion, a relator must establish: (1) the motion was properly filed and has been pending for a reasonable time, (2) the relator requested a ruling on the motion, and (3) the trial court refused to rule. Stoner v. Massey, 586 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. 1979); In re Buholtz, No. 05-16-01312-CV, 2017 WL 462361, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 31, 2017, orig. proceeding); Crouch v. Shields, 385 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Applicable Law
A trial court is required to consider and rule upon a motion within a reasonable time. Safety-Kleen Corp., 945 S.W.2d at 269. No litigant is entitled to a hearing at whatever time he may choose, however. In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d 225, 229 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding). A trial court has a reasonable time within which to consider a motion and to rule. In re Craig, 426 S.W.3d 106, 107 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, orig. proceeding); In re Sarkissian, 243 S.W.3d 860, 861 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, orig. proceeding). Whether a reasonable time for the trial court to act has lapsed is dependent upon the circumstances of each case and no bright line separates a reasonable time period from an unreasonable one. In re Shapira, No. 05-16-00184-CV, 2016 WL 1756754, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 29, 2016, orig. proceeding). Among the criteria included are the trial court's actual knowledge of the motion, its overt refusal to act, the state of the court's docket, and the existence of other judicial and administrative matters which must be addressed first. Id.; In re First Mercury Ins. Co., 13-13-00469-CV, 2013 WL 6056665, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Nov. 13, 2013, orig. proceeding).
Discussion
Here, relators have shown that the trial court is aware of the motions; the trial court held a hearing on the motions, received proposed orders from the parties and, more recently, received relators' formal request for ruling. Relators have not shown, however, that the trial court has refused to rule or that the trial court has abused its discretion by not ruling in the seven weeks since relators formally requested a ruling. Because the trial court's power to control its own docket is discretionary, a reviewing appellate court may not arbitrarily interfere with it. Although we recognize that the motions were heard a year ago and address preliminary legal issues that the parties want resolved before litigating the merits, relators did not formally request a ruling from the trial court until May 11, 2017, and the trial court is entitled to a reasonable time in which to rule following that request.
The Court's opinion in Swarovski is distinguishable from this case because the trial court in Swarovski had unnecessarily delayed the resolution of the case on prior occasions, failed to rule after telling relator the court intended to rule after reviewing certain records, and nearly four months had passed between the date relator requested entry of final judgment and the date relator sought a writ of mandamus. In re Swarovski, 05-17-00192-CV, 2017 WL 1075642, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 22, 2017, no pet.). Here, in contrast, less than two months have passed since relators filed their formal request for a ruling. Under this record, relators have not established that they are entitled to mandamus relief at this time.
Accordingly, we deny relators' petition for writ of mandamus.
/Molly Francis/
MOLLY FRANCIS
JUSTICE 170742F.P05